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ABSTRACT 	  
 
In this thesis I investigate the mechanisms and processes underlying figurative 
language comprehension. I attempt to determine whether there might be something 
unique about metaphor due to the interpretation processes involved, or whether 
metaphoric interpretations are in fact processed in the same way as other non-literal 
uses of language, such as hyperbole. Various theoretical accounts of figurative 
language interpretation from different pragmatic and psychological processing models 
are examined from an empirical perspective as a way of exploring the cognitive basis 
of their claims. Previous empirical research investigating metaphor comprehension is 
critically discussed not just from a psychological perspective, but also in relation to 
pragmatic accounts of figurative language.  
There is a plethora of past and current theoretical literature on metaphor, which over 
the last few decades has been discussed in relation to psycholinguistic research 
investigating metaphor processing. In contrast, despite recent unified pragmatic 
accounts of figurative language, which posit a unified account of metaphor, 
hyperbole, and other loose uses, there has been little, if any empirical research 
looking at hyperbole or other tropes. This leaves us with an important question; can 
what we know about the processing of metaphor be generalised to other tropes such 
as hyperbole? With this question in mind, I will present a series of on-line and 
developmental experiments, aimed at further exploring the processes and mechanisms 
underlying metaphor comprehension, and directly contrasting the processing of 
metaphor and hyperbole. 
The results of these experiments have implications both for psycholinguistic research 
on non-literal language processing, and for lexical pragmatic accounts of figurative 
language comprehension, but also for developmental research investigating children’s 
pragmatic capacities. As well as shedding light on the cognitive processes involved in 
constructing metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations, the findings of this thesis give 
us some indication of the cognitive mechanisms that need to have developed in order 
to arrive at a non-literal interpretation of an utterance. 
Words: Experimental pragmatics, language processing, figurative language, metaphor, 
hyperbole, psycholinguistics, pragmatics, language acquisition, inferential processes. 
	   6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 	  
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 5	  
Table of contents .......................................................................................................... 6	  
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 10	  
1 Theoretical accounts of figurative language ......................................................... 17	  
1.1  What is figurative language and why is it interesting? ......................................... 17	  
1.2	  	  A brief history of the study of metaphor ............................................................... 18	  
1.3	  	  Gricean pragmatics and the maxim of truthfulness ............................................... 23	  
1.4	  	  Neo-Gricean ‘literal first’ accounts ....................................................................... 29	  
1.4.1	   Metaphors as implicit similes .................................................................. 30	  
1.4.2	   Salience imbalance account ..................................................................... 31	  
1.5	   Problems with the three-stage processing model ................................... 33	  
1.6	  	  Beyond literalness ................................................................................................. 34	  
1.6.1	   Relevance Theory and figurative language ............................................. 35	  
1.6.2	   Class-inclusion account of metaphor ....................................................... 59	  
1.6.3	   Graded salience hypothesis and metaphor ............................................... 65	  
1.6.4	   Structure mapping account of metaphor .................................................. 70	  
1.6.5	   Direct access view ................................................................................... 75	  
1.6.6            Summary of current accounts of metaphor .............................................. 80	  
1.7  Adult processing predictions of the above accounts ............................................. 85	  
1.7.1	   Metaphor .................................................................................................. 85	  
1.7.2	   Hyperbole ................................................................................................ 98	  
1.8  Summary ............................................................................................................. 100	  
2	  Adult Empirical research investigating figurative language processing ......... 102	  
2.1	  	  Adult Metaphor findings ..................................................................................... 106	  
	   7 
2.1.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Findings for and against a non-sequential account of Metaphor 
processing……. ......................................................................................................... 106	  
2.1.2	   Findings indicating effects of familiarity .............................................. 114	  
2.1.3	   	  	  Findings relating to contemporary theoretical accounts ......................... 117	  
2.1.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Potential Evidence of suppression during metaphor comprehension ..... 133	  
2.2	  	  Adult Hyperbole findings .................................................................................... 145	  
2.3	  	  Summary and discussion of empirical evidence ................................................. 148	  
2.4	  	  Some remaining research questions .................................................................... 152	  
3	  	  Report of our adult studies investigating metaphor and hyperbole 
processing… .............................................................................................................. 155	  
3.1	  	  Introduction ......................................................................................................... 155	  
3.1.1             Previous findings and some remaining questions ................................. 156	  
3.2	  	  Experiment 1: Reading-time experiment contrasting metaphor and hyperbole .. 160	  
3.2.1	   Introduction ............................................................................................ 160	  
3.2.2	   Preliminary off-line research in preperation for experiment 1 .............. 161	  
3.2.3	   Method ................................................................................................... 166	  
3.2.4	   Results .................................................................................................... 169	  
3.2.5	   Discussion .............................................................................................. 171	  
3.3  Experiment 2: Follow-up word naming experiment, ruling out potential priming 
effects……….. ........................................................................................................... 176	  
3.3.1	   Introduction ............................................................................................ 176	  
3.3.2	   Method ................................................................................................... 177	  
3.3.3	   Results .................................................................................................... 181	  
3.3.4	   Discussion .............................................................................................. 182	  
3.4	  	  Experiment 3: Word naming experiment investigating supression during 
metaphor and hyperbole comprehension ................................................................... 184	  
3.4.1	   Introduction ............................................................................................ 184	  
	   8 
3.4.2	   Method ................................................................................................... 185	  
3.4.3	   Results .................................................................................................... 188	  
3.4.4	   Discussion .............................................................................................. 190	  
3.5	  	  Experiment 4: eye-tracking experiment contrasting metaphor and hyperbole ... 193	  
3.5.1	   Introduction ............................................................................................ 193	  
3.5.2	   Method ................................................................................................... 196	  
3.5.3	   Results .................................................................................................... 198	  
3.5.4	   Discussion .............................................................................................. 200	  
3.6	  	  Summary of findings ........................................................................................... 202	  
3.7 Arriving at metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations – differences in processing 
effort ........................................................................................................................... 205	  
3.7.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The relationship between the topic and the vehicle concepts ................ 206	  
3.7.2	   The richness/complexity of metaphoric and hyperbolic 
interpretations….. ...................................................................................................... 212	  
3.7.3             Summary ............................................................................................... 214	  
3.8	  Summary of adult findings in relation to current pragmatic and psychological 
accounts……. ............................................................................................................. 214	  
4 Children’s understanding of figurative language .............................................. 217	  
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 217	  
4.2 Metaphor comprehension in children .................................................................. 222	  
4.2.1            Factors affecting comprehension ........................................................... 225	  
4.2.2           Very early metaphor comprehension ...................................................... 217	  
4.2.3           Contrasting with other tropes .................................................................. 245	  
4.2.4           Inhibition control and figurative language .............................................. 248	  
4.3 Developmental study contrasting young children’s comprehension of metaphor 
and hyperbole ............................................................................................................. 252	  
4.3.1 Experiment 1 ..................................................................................................... 255	  
	   9 
Method ....................................................................................................................... 256	  
Results ........................................................................................................................ 265	  
Discussion .................................................................................................................. 268	  
Summary of findings from experiment 1 ................................................................... 270	  
4.3.2 Experiment 2 ..................................................................................................... 267	  
Method ....................................................................................................................... 272	  
Results ........................................................................................................................ 279	  
Discussion .................................................................................................................. 282	  
Summary of findings from experiment 2 ................................................................... 285	  
4.4 conclusions ........................................................................................................... 286 
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….289 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 294	  















	   10 
INTRODUCTION 	  
 
This thesis is an experimental investigation into the processes and mechanisms 
involved in arriving at metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations. I present findings 
from a series of on-line and developmental experiments aimed at shedding light on 
which of several pragmatic and psychological accounts best capture the cognitive 
processes underlying the interpretation of metaphor and hyperbole, and determining 
whether there might be something unique about metaphor due to the interpretation 
processes involved, or whether metaphoric interpretations are in fact processed in the 
same way as other non-literal uses of language, such as hyperbole.  
Metaphor (e.g. the politician’s speech was noxious) and hyperbole (e.g. The earl grey 
tea was noxious) are two common types of figurative language. Both are seen as types 
of non-literal language, in which the meaning the speaker intends to communicate is 
not that which is lexically encoded. There is a plethora of past and current theoretical 
literature on metaphor, which over the last few decades has either been backed up, or 
drawn into question by an ever-increasing amount of psycholinguistic research 
investigating metaphor processing. In contrast, despite recent unified pragmatic 
accounts of figurative language interpretation in which the difference between 
metaphor and hyperbole is seen to be a quantitative one, with metaphor being a 
further broadening of the encoded content than hyperbole, there has been little, if any 
empirical research looking at hyperbole or other tropes. This leaves us with an 
important question; can what we know about the processing of metaphor be 
generalised to other tropes such as hyperbole? With this question in mind, I will 
discuss findings from four on-line experiments, and two developmental experiments 
in which we directly contrast metaphor and hyperbole processing. As well as 
shedding light on whether unified accounts accurately capture the cognitive processes 
underlying both metaphor and hyperbole comprehension, the on-line experimental 
findings I discuss also address some remaining questions pertaining to how exactly 
metaphor is processed by adult comprehenders. In addition, the developmental 
findings I discuss provide insights with respect to young children’s capacity to 
interpret both metaphor and hyperbole. 
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Metaphor and Hyperbole 
Metaphoric and hyperbolic statements can appear in pretty much any context in which 
language is used; everyday communication, poetry, literature, news reports etc.  
Metaphor     Hyperbole 
a) The fridge was a monster        d) The earl grey tea was noxious  
b) The university was a forest        e) The nursery school is a festival 
c) My tooth brush is a sports car        f) My little road has become a motorway 
Throughout this thesis I will refer to metaphor and hyperbole as separate tropes, 
however there is no agreed upon, strict definition for either category. In fact, as I will 
discuss (see section 1.6.1), some theorists (Wilson and Carston 2007) argue that 
hyperbole is simply less of a ‘broadening’ of the literal meaning than metaphor, but 
that they are essentially the same phenomenon, requiring the same explanation. It is 
this claim that motivates this thesis, which among other things, aims to clarify the 
degree of similarity between the two tropes and their comprehension procedures. 
Therefore, to define metaphor and hyperbole at this stage is essentially to beg the 
question that I aim to address in this thesis. Below, however, are the Collins English 
dictionary entries for the two terms, which provide an indication of how the terms are 
generally used: 
Hyperbole: ‘A deliberate exaggeration used for effect’. 
Metaphor: ‘A figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or 
action that it does not literally denote in order to imply a resemblance’ 
The above definitions coincide with an observation that can be used to distinguish the 
two tropes. Metaphors contain category violations, where hyperboles do not. For 
example, in the metaphor in (a), there is no context in which a fridge can be literally 
described as a monster. It is a category violation to include a fridge in the category of 
monsters because fridges fall outside of the denotation of the term ‘monster’. 
Monsters are animate, where fridges are not. However, with respect to the hyperbole 
in (d), in certain contexts it is possible for earl grey tea to be noxious (e.g. if it had 
been spiked, or if it is passed its sell-by date), whereas, in a hyperbolic context (e.g. if 
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the drinker found it not to their taste), it is an exaggeration to describe the tea as 
noxious. 
Metaphors and hyperboles vary in familiarity from the highly conventionalized to the 
completely novel. Those listed in (a-f) are all novel, however those listed below in (g) 
and (i) are fairly familiar, and those in (h) and (j) are highly conventionalized.  
Metaphor    Hyperbole    
g) My day has been a car crash i) This house is a palace 
h) My daughter is an angel  j) This bath is boiling 
As will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter, where a metaphor falls on the 
familiarity continuum is thought to affect how that metaphor is processed (i.e. via 
disambiguation or on-line meaning construction). In order to ensure that we are 
investigating the cognitive processes underlying the construction of a novel, occasion 
specific non-literal interpretation, rather than the selection of a contextually 
appropriate meaning from a series of already available meanings, completely novel 
metaphors and hyperboles (such as those in a-f) were used in all of the experiments 
discussed in this thesis. 
The familiar metaphors and hyperboles listed above, though highly familiar, they are 
still thought to be distinct (with respect to processing) from idiomatic expressions 
such as those in (k-m) (Glucksberg 2001:68).  
k) You are pulling my leg 
l) He kicked the bucket 
m) She let the cat out of the bag 
In (a-j), there is a clear relationship between the linguistically encoded meanings and 
the figurative meanings. However, what is characteristic of idiomatic expressions, 
such as those in (k-m), is that there appears to be no obvious relationship between the 
linguistic content and the non-literal meaning. Though familiar metaphors and 
hyperboles such as those in g-j will not be used in the experiments presented in this 
thesis, they will be discussed in the beginning chapters in order to contrast them with 
completely novel metaphors in processing terms. However, although idiomatic 
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expressions deserve attention in their own right, but they will not be discussed in any 
detail in this thesis. 
Theoretical background 
There is no theoretical consensus on how figurative language interpretation should be 
accounted for. Figurative language has wide reaching implications across a range of 
disciplines: Poetics, Literature, Epistemology, Semantic theory, Pragmatic theory, and 
Psycholinguistics. Such linguistic phenomena raise a multitude of interesting 
questions, the answers to which are of great importance to the aforementioned areas 
of study, which means that a number of different theories have been put forward from 
various different perspective. 
On the basis of empirical evidence, most current accounts reject a sequential 
processing model in which a default literal interpretation must be arrived at and 
rejected as contextually inappropriate before an alternative, more appropriate meaning 
can be derived, and opt for some sort of parallel processing model. However, whether 
figurative utterances of the form X is Y (The fridge was a monster) are processed as 
categorization statements (Carston 2002; Wilson and Carston 2007; Glucksberg 2001) 
as their syntactic structure suggests, or whether they are processed as implicit 
comparison statements, and processed as such is a matter for debate (Clement & 
Gentner, 1991, Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1994; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993, 
Wolff and Gentner 2011). In the early chapters of this thesis, I will discuss how 
various current accounts of figurative language (predominantly metaphor) measure up 
to existing empirical evidence relating to metaphor processing. 
Despite their disagreements over the exact processes that take place during metaphor 
comprehension, most current accounts share the assumption, which is supported by 
empirical evidence, that while processing novel nominal metaphors (e.g. The fridge 
was a monster), features associated with the literal meaning of the metaphor vehicle 
lose activation, though few claims are made with respect to whether this deactivation 
would result from active suppression, or passive decay (due to lack of attention). 
Many authors of empirical research investigating activation levels of metaphor 
irrelevant information associated with the lexically encoded content of the utterance 
argue that their findings are suggestive of active suppression taking place during the 
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processing of novel metaphors. However, as I will discuss in some detail, many of 
these findings are somewhat inconclusive. 
Can what we know about the processing of metaphor be generalised to 
hyperbole? 
I will argue that all of the current psychological and pragmatic accounts discussed in 
this thesis implicitly suggest that all non-literal utterances of the form X is Y are 
processed in the same way, regardless of whether we might categorise that utterance 
as a metaphor (e.g. the politician’s speech was noxious) or as a hyperbole (e.g. the 
earl grey tea was noxious). Indeed, Relevance theoretic lexical pragmatists (Wilson 
and Carston 2007; Carston 2002) explicitly posit a unified concept construction 
account of figurative language in which they claim that all utterances in which a 
vehicle term (e.g. ‘shark’ in ‘that defence lawyer is a shark’) is used to convey a 
broader sense than that which encoded (e.g. metaphor, hyperbole, approximation), are 
processed in the same way.  
As already mentioned, there is little, if any, research comparing metaphor and 
hyperbole. Recent on-line empirical research has focused almost exclusively on 
metaphor despite the current, unified accounts discussed above. This means that, as 
yet, we are unable to determine whether unified accounts of figurative language 
adequately capture the processes involved in both metaphor and hyperbole 
comprehension, or whether earlier philosophical accounts (Black 1962, 1979; 
Davidson 1978) were correct to treat metaphor as a unique phenomenon, worthy of its 
own account. 
The data reported in this thesis will allow us to directly contrast the processing of 
metaphors and hyperboles, with the aim of shedding light on any processing 
similarities and differences between the two tropes. The findings discussed also 
contribute to the existing adult and developmental data on metaphor processing. 
Outline of the thesis 
The theoretical discussion and experimental work presented in this thesis constitutes 
an investigation into what would be an adequate processing model of figurative 
language, as well as which cognitive mechanisms might underlie non-literal language 
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interpretation. Furthermore, a detailed discussion is provided of how adult and 
developmental experimental findings bear on the on-going theoretical debates.  
In Chapter 1 I will give an overview of various theoretical accounts of metaphor, 
before discussing in more detail several current psychological and pragmatic accounts 
that make processing predictions, which can be empirically tested. Not all of these 
testable predictions are made directly by the authors of the accounts discussed, but, as 
I discuss in some detail, are deducible from the workings of the accounts posited.  As 
already mentioned, although there is a lack of consensus with respect to the exact 
comprehension processes posited, all of these accounts either explicitly propose, or 
implicitly suggest that metaphor and hyperbole are processed in the same way. 
In Chapter 2, I will review empirical research investigating the processing of 
figurative language. This literature tends to focus on metaphor given the 
disproportionate amount of attention given to metaphor in the theoretical literature. I 
will however, discuss a small amount of off-line research investigating hyperbole. 
The five experiments presented in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis were designed, for 
the most part, to address the following specific questions which emerge from my 
review of the theoretical and empirical literature: 
1. Are there processing differences between metaphors and hyperboles? 
2. Does arriving at a metaphoric or hyperbolic interpretation of an utterance 
reduce the activation level of the lexically encoded content enough to dampen 
priming as has been found with respect to metaphor?  
3. If there are any processing differences between the two tropes, do these 
differences lie in the way in which the lexically encoded content is accessed 
and dealt with, or do any such differences occur further down the line when 
deriving inferences. 
Where chapter 3 is dedicated to the presentation of a series of on-line (reading-time, 
word-naming and eye-tracking) experiments in which the processing of metaphors 
and hyperboles was directly investigated, chapter 4 is dedicated to the presentation of 
developmental findings, which as well as providing important insights into young 
children’s capacities with respect to non-literal language interpretation, can tell us a 
lot about the processes and mechanisms required during the interpretation of these 
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tropes. With the predictions of current theoretical accounts, together with the 
questions in 1-3 held in mind, the developmental experiments reported in chapter 4 
were designed to address the following specific questions. 
4. Do we see any difference in the age at which children acquire the ability to 
comprehend hyperbole and metaphor? 
5. Is there a correlation between the development of figurative language 
comprehension capacities and the development of inhibition control 
capacities? 
6. Do we see a difference in how contingent the different tropes are on the 
development of Inhibition Control? 
The findings reported in chapters 3 and 4 are important as they contribute to our 
understanding of a) how figurative language processing differs from the processing of 
literal language, if it differs at all, b) how figurative language interpretation affects 
lexical processing, c) whether the processes and mechanisms underlying metaphor 
and hyperbole comprehension differ, d) When children develop the ability to 
accurately interpret metaphoric and hyperbolic language, and e) Whether that ability 
is contingent on the development of inhibitory control capacities. Moreover, in 
shedding light on these issues, our findings will serve to verify some of the claims 
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1 THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 	  
1.1 WHAT IS FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE AND WHY IS IT INTERESTING? 
Metaphors and hyperboles such as those in a-f are two common types of figurative 
language that can appear in pretty much any context in which language is used; 
everyday communication, poetry, literature, news reports etc. and have been studied 
for centuries, from various different perspectives. Both are understood as instances in 
which the intended meaning is not that which is lexically encoded. Hyperboles are 
considered to be deliberate exaggerations, used for effect, whereas metaphors are 
considered to be instances in which a word is used to refer to an object, which would 
not ‘literally’ be included in its denotation ‘in order to imply a resemblance’ between 
the two objects.  
Metaphor     Hyperbole	  
a) The fridge was a monster        d) The earl grey tea was noxious  
b) The university was a forest        e) The nursery school is a festival	  
c) My tooth brush is a sports car        f) My little road has become a motorway	  
Many interesting theories and insights relating to the use and understanding of 
metaphor and figurative language have emerged in the work of thinkers and 
researchers from a multitude of different disciplines and schools of thought. 
Figurative language has wide reaching implications across a range of disciplines: 
Poetics, Literature, Epistemology, Semantic theory, Pragmatic theory, and 
Psycholinguistics. Such linguistic phenomena raise a multitude of interesting 
questions, the answers to which would be of great importance to the aforementioned 
areas of study. Why do we use metaphor? What is its function? What is 
communicated by a metaphor? How do we comprehend metaphors? Are metaphoric 
statements false? If so, why utter a false statement? Is metaphor a deviant form of 
language? Do we mean something beyond what is ‘actually said’ when we utter a 
metaphor?  
The data reported in this thesis (see chapters 3 and 4) will hopefully shed light on at 
least some of these questions.
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1.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STUDY OF METAPHOR 	  
Aristotle	  
Perhaps the earliest thorough description and analysis of figurative language comes 
from Aristotle, who wrote:	  
 “Metaphor is the application of a word belonging to something else either from 
genus [genos] to species [eidos], or from the species to the genus, or from the species 
to a species, or according to analogy.” (poet.21 1457b7-9). 	  
Aristotle proposed three types of metaphors in which he claimed that one term is 
substituted by another: genus (category or family) for species (sub category of a 
genus) (e.g. “Here stands my ship” – riding at anchor is a species of standing), and 
species for genus (e.g. “Indeed ten thousand noble things Odysseus did” – the 
‘species’ of many ‘ten thousand’ is used instead of the word ‘many’), or species for 
species (e.g. “drawing off his life with the bronze”- drawing off is used for severing, 
and severing for drawing off). 
In most current accounts, metaphors in this format are usually referred to as ‘nominal’ 
metaphors or ‘predicative’ metaphors, and they have received the most attention in 
contemporary investigations of metaphor. The ‘metaphors’ Aristotle refers to as 
‘species for genus’ are those that are now generally considered to be nominal 
hyperboles, rather than metaphors. 
More recently, metaphor has been treated as a ‘special’ figure of speech, and has 
received almost all of the theoretical attention given to non-literal language. However, 
Aristotle saw hyperbole as one of three sub-types of metaphor, which could all be 
explained by his substitution theory. This unified approach to non-literal language is 
echoed in the current Lexical Pragmatic accounts of figurative language, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter (see section 1.6.1) (Wilson 2003; Sperber and 
Wilson 2006; Wilson and Carston 2007; Recanati 2001, 2004). 
Aristotle made several observations relating to the function of metaphor and its 
effects. These observations reemerge in nearly all subsequent discussions of 
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metaphor, and are still relevant to current research investigating the processing of 
figurative language1.	  
1. Aristotle thought metaphor to be a special form of language, and that such ‘miss-
applications’ of terms allow us to perceive likenesses in a way which would not be 
possible otherwise:	  
 “To use each of the things mentioned appropriately is a great thing, as well 
as using double and foreign words, but much the greatest is the metaphorical. 
For, just as it alone is not to be taken from another, so it is a sign of a good 
nature; for to make metaphors well is to contemplate what is like.” (poet. 22, 
1459a4-9).	  
2. He believed metaphor to be informative and enlightening, and to play an important 
clarifying role during discourse:	  
“ A word in its prevailing and native meaning and metaphor are alone useful in the 
lexis of prose. A sign of this is that these are the only kinds of words everybody uses; 
for all people carry on their conversations with metaphor and words in their native 
and prevailing meanings. Thus, it is clear that if one composes well there will be 
unfamiliar quality and it escapes notice and will be clear. This we said, was the virtue 
of rhetorical language.” (rhet. 3.2.6, 1404b32-38)	  
“Metaphor especially has clarity and sweetness and strangeness, and its use cannot 
be learned from someone else. (rhet. 3.2.8, 1405a6-10)	  
3. He observed that metaphors have the property of “bringing-before-the-eyes”; 
prompting audiences to visualize imagery.	  
“I call those things “before-the-eyes” that signify things engaged in activity. For 
example, to say that a good man is “foursquare” is a metaphor, for both are 
“complete”; but it does not signify activity [energeia]. On the other hand, the phrase 
“having his prime of life in full bloom” is energeia, as is “you, like a free-ranging 
animal” and “now then the Greeks darting forward on their feet.” Darting is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1Thanks to Diana Mazzarella (Presented 2012; UCL) for these interpretations of Aristotle. 	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actualization and metaphor; for he means “quickly.” And [energeia], as Homer often 
uses it, is making the lifeless living through the metaphor. (Rhet. 3.11.2, 1411b26-32) 
Aristotle associates “before-the-eyes” with “energeia” [activity]. He believes that 
metaphors have the quality of making things become real and active; unperceivable 
things become actual and perceivable.	  
To my knowledge, all subsequent accounts of metaphor, including contemporary 
pragmatic and psychological theories discussed in detail later in this chapter, 
incorporate some or all of the above observations (1-3).	  
Max Black and Donald Davidson	  
More recent philosophical analyses of metaphor put forward by Max Black (1962; 
1979) and Donald Davidson (1978) attempt to define its place in, or relation to, a 
theory of semantics2.   
Black (1962; 1979), like Aristotle and many others before him, considered a metaphor 
to have, alongside its literal meaning, an alternative ‘metaphorical’ sense or meaning. 
Black’s ‘Interaction theory’ of metaphor posits that a metaphorically intended 
statement encourages us to apply ‘a system of commonplaces’ associated with the 
metaphorical word, to the subject of the metaphor (i.e. in “man is a wolf” the hearer 
applies stereotypical attributes of a wolf to man). This is not dissimilar to Aristotle’s 
observation (a) that metaphors allow us to perceive likenesses.	  
Like Aristotle’s observation b), that a metaphor has an extra level of informativeness, 
or a certain enlightening property about it, Black also claims that metaphors have 
additional informative power. He argues that a literal paraphrase of a metaphor lacks 
“the same power to inform and enlighten as the original……One of the points I most 
wish to stress is that the loss in such cases is a loss of cognitive content; the relevant 
weakness of the literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or boringly 
explicit; it fails to be a translation because it fails to give the insight that the 
metaphor did.” (Black 1962:46) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  I am passing over medieval theories of metaphor (often inspired by Aristotle) and early modern theories, to get 
to theories closer to us and to our contemporary views on the topic (see Curtius 1965 for full review). 	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The challenge for Black was to devise a way in which the inferential process he posits 
could be accounted for within a theory of semantics. If a metaphoric statement has 
two meanings, how are these two meanings communicated via a single sentence?  
Davidson (1978) argues that the assumption at the heart of most accounts of 
metaphor, that metaphoric statements are ambiguous, is mistaken. He believes that 
Black and others confuse “the effects metaphors have on us” with encoded content.	  
“The common error is to fasten on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes 
and to read these contents into the metaphor itself” (Davidson 1978, in 1984:261)	  
“When we try to say what a metaphor means, we realize there is no end to what we 
want to mention.” (Davidson 1978, in 1984:263)	  
Davidson claims that metaphors have just one meaning; their encoded ‘literal’ 
meaning. He argues that anything beyond this, which is evoked by the metaphor in a 
given context (i.e. thoughts, imagery etc.), is not part of the semantic content of the 
statement. He doesn’t disagree with Black and Aristotle with respect to the effects and 
properties they attribute to metaphor.	  
“No doubt metaphors often make us notice aspects of things we did not notice before; 
no doubt they bring surprising analogies and similarities to our attention; they do 
provide a kind of lens or lattice, as Black says, through which we view the relevant 
phenomena”. (Davidson 1978, in 1984: 261)	  
 His disagreement is with Black’s view of how metaphors produce these effects.	  
“A metaphor does its work through other intermediaries – to suppose it can be 
effective only by conveying a coded message is like thinking a joke or a dream makes 
some statement which a clever interpreter can restate in plain prose. Joke or dream 
or metaphor can, like a picture or a bump on the head, make us appreciate some fact 
– but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact.” (Davidson 1978, in 1984: 262)	  
In short, Davidson argues that metaphorical effects lie outside of a theory of 
semantics; the project of defining how such effects might be part of the content of a 
metaphoric statement is a misguided one. If metaphorical effects are not part of the 
encoded content of a metaphorical utterance, how might such intended effects be 
conveyed? How might a hearer infer such effects on the basis of the encoded content? 
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These questions pertain to the domain of Pragmatics. If Davidson is correct, then we 
must turn to a Pragmatic theory for an account of metaphor interpretation. However 
Davidson, like Chomsky (1992a), believes that a coherent pragmatic theory is not 
possible because communication and interpretation are not topics that can be reasoned 
about using scientific methods (See Carston 2002:1).	  
“The interpreter, presented with an utterance and a situation, assigns some 
interpretation to what is being said by a person in this situation.” But this, the topic 
of successful communication, “is far too complex and obscure to merit attention in 
empirical enquiry.” (Chomsky 1992a:120)	  
The project of constructing a pragmatic theory has not been considered fruitless by 
everyone, though. Paul Grice (1957; 1967; 1975) developed an entire theory of 
meaning and communication, in which he set out to explain how hearers bridge the 
gap between sentence meaning and the speaker’s intended meaning. Figurative 
utterances are particularly evident cases in which ‘what is said’ vastly 
underdetermines speaker meaning, and as such they are one of the phenomena which 
Grice attempts to explain with his ‘inferential model of communication’. The next 
section will be dedicated to a detailed discussion of Grice’s account. 	  
This thesis investigates figurative language comprehension as a cognitive process, and 
examines how various theoretical accounts of figurative language measure up to 
empirical data. Therefore, I will focus on pragmatic accounts, stemming from Grice’s 
account, which place pragmatics within the context of cognitive science, so that their 
theories can be evaluated experimentally, and psychological accounts which posit 
specific processing models that empirical facts can shed light on. These accounts and 
their empirical predictions will be discussed in detail in the next section3. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3According to Linguist George Lakoff (1980; 1987; 1990; 1993), contrary to the accounts discussed here, 
metaphor transcends its linguistic manifestations, and reflects the metaphorical structure of our minds. 
Philosophical and pragmatic accounts of figurative language assume it to be a linguistic phenomenon which aids 
or enriches communication. Lakoff on the other hand, asserts that metaphoric expressions are indicative of the 
metaphorical makeup of our conceptual representations (i.e. mappings between conceptual domains). I will not 
directly address Lakoff’s account in this thesis, although I will discuss Raymond Gibbs’ psychological account, 
which is based on a similar premise.	  	  
	   23 
1.3 GRICEAN PRAGMATICS AND THE MAXIM OF TRUTHFULNESS 	  	  
This thesis will not focus very much on what our empirical findings can tell us about 
Grice because he offers a general model of communication (which aims to account for 
figurative language) rather than a specific processing model of figurative language, 
which means that the empirical claims which can be extracted from his writings are 
limited. Having said that, Grice’s account forms the basis of most current pragmatic 
theories, including Relevance Theory (RT) (1986; 1995) which will be a main focus 
of this thesis. Grice’s theory also inspired more or less distantly several of the 
psychological accounts of metaphor understanding. This being the case, this section is 
dedicated to introducing Gricean pragmatics, and its assumptions and predictions.	  
Recognition of speaker’s intentions	  
Before Grice, accounts of communication were based on a code model which posits 
that an individual with a message to convey, produces the associated signal (an 
utterance), which is received and decoded by another individual who has at their 
disposal, an identical copy of the code. Grice, on the other hand, claimed that for 
successful communication to take place, as well as the ability to decode the explicit 
content of an utterance the hearer needs to be able to recognize the intentions of the 
speaker.	  
“One of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, 
indeed rational, behavior” (Grice 1989:28/Grice 1975:47)	  
The co-operative principle and conversational maxims	  
Grice claims that hearers expect speakers to obey a ‘Co-operative principle’ (CP) and 
a set of ‘maxims of communication’. It is this expectation, together with the speaker’s 
recognition of the hearer’s expectation, which Grice argues, allows for successful 
communication. According to Grice, the best hypothesis a hearer can make about a 
speaker’s intended meaning is the one that satisfies those Co-operative principle and 
maxims. The CP and maxims are detailed below. 
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Grice’s Co-operative principle:	  
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. (Grice 1989:26)	  
Grice’s conversational maxims:	  
Quantity (informativeness):	  
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange).	  
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.	  	  
Quality (truthfulness):	  
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true.	  
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. (‘maxim of truthfulness’)	  
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.	  
Relation (relevance):	  
1. Be relevant.	  
Manner (clarity):	  
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.	  
2. Avoid ambiguity.	  
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).	  
4. Be orderly.	  
Grice claims that during a communicative exchange, a hearer assumes the speaker is 
obeying the CP and maxims in saying ‘what is said’, and that it is this assumption 
together with the recognition of the speaker’s intentions, that allows the hearer to 
infer the full signification of the utterance.	  
Conversational implicatures	  
Critical to Grice’s account is his notion of a ‘conversational implicature’, which is a 
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set of propositions that can be attributed to the speaker during a communicative 
exchange. A conversational implicature can be inferred either in response to an 
apparent flouting of one or more of the maxims in order to preserve the assumption 
that the speaker was obeying the CP and the maxims (or at least the CP) in saying 
what was said, or as a result of the speaker having explicitly obeyed the CP and 
maxims. 	  
Grice describes three types of conversational implicature:	  
Resulting from obeying the CP and maxims	  
On the basis of a speaker having apparently obeyed all of the maxims in saying what 
is said, a hearer may draw inferences that are not part of what is said. So long as the 
speaker does not indicate in any way that the hearer is not justified in drawing such 
inferences, then Grice argues that those inferences count as conversational 
implicatures. An example of this kind of implicature is g).	  
g) A: I am hungry	  
 B: There is a shop next door	  
B would not be obeying the maxim of relevance if he knew that the shop next door 
was actually closed for renovation, or that it in fact sold paint-brushes, not food. 
Therefore, B’s utterance can be taken to conversationally implicate that the shop will 
be open and it will sell something to eat (see Grice 1975/1989:32).	  
Resulting from a conflict between maxims	  
It is possible that in certain circumstances a speaker may need to flout one maxim in 
order to obey another more important one. Such a case is illustrated in (h)	  
h) A: What is the name of the lead actress in the film we watched last night?	  
 B: It begins with a ‘t’	  
B’s utterance is clearly under-informative, and thus flouts the maxim of quantity. 
However, A will probably infer that B did not want to say something for which she 
lacked adequate evidence, and so flouted the maxim of quantity in order to not flout 
the maxim of quality, which is arguably more important. On this basis A would take 
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B’s utterance to implicate that B isn’t sure of the name of the actress in the said film.	  
Resulting from a flouting of a maxim	  
In some instances a speaker will intentionally flout a maxim in order to convey a 
conversational implicature. See the example in i) below.	  
i) A: Have you seen the price of petrol these days?	  
 B: I don’t have a car	  
B explicitly communicated that B doesn’t have a car. However, based on B’s apparent 
flouting of the maxim of relevance, A would take B’s utterance to conversationally 
implicate that B hasn’t seen the price of petrol recently because she has not got a car. 
It is this implicature that fleshes out A's utterance in order for A to preserve the 
assumption that B is obeying the maxim of relevance. 	  
Grice argued that an apparent violation of a maxim can disappear when an implicature 
is arrived at, but in some instances the apparent violation of a maxim is overt and 
blatant, and remains even when an implicature is supplied. It is among these kinds of 
utterances that Grice places metaphor.	  
Non-literal language	  
Grice proposed that non-literal language production involves the flouting of the 
conversational maxim of truthfulness, which is the first maxim of quality.  He argued 
that if someone utters the metaphor in j), they are blatantly flouting the maxim of 
truthfulness by uttering a false statement: no human can be cream in coffee. 	  
j) You are the cream in my coffee	  
However, that ‘you are not the cream in my coffee’, is such a trivial fact that it cannot 
be this that the speaker is trying to communicate. Instead, Grice claims that in using 
this utterance, the speaker is attributing to the hearer a feature of ‘cream’, in this 
instance it would be a feature such as ‘delightful’. Grice claims that having 
recognized the intended meaning of the speaker (in this case, the intention to attribute 
a feature such as ‘delightful’ to the hearer), the hearer would infer that intended 
meaning to be an implicature of the speaker’s utterance.	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According to Grice’s argument, a metaphor (or any non-literal statement, e.g. 
hyperboles) can be recognized whenever an utterance is considered to be false 
according to how things are in the world.  The hearer arrives at the literal meaning of 
an utterance, and only then, if it is considered to flout the maxim of truthfulness, will 
the hearer assume that the speaker is flouting this maxim in order to communicate a 
non-encoded implied meaning, and thus derive the implicature. 	  
Grice considered implicatures to be outside of the semantic content of an utterance; an 
implicature does not contribute to the ‘proposition expressed’, to what is said, by the 
utterance. The explicit content of the utterance is already ‘literally false’ according to 
the truth conditions, so the metaphorical interpretation is part of the implicit content 
of the utterance. 
Summary of Grice’s account 
Grice (1967) sketched a theory of utterance interpretation based on a Co-operative 
Principle and maxims of truthfulness, informativeness, relevance and clarity (Quality, 
Quantity, Relation and Manner). Grice claimed that hearers expect speakers to obey a 
‘Co-operative principle’ (CP) and a set of ‘maxims of communication’. It is this 
expectation, together with the speaker’s recognition of the hearer’s expectation, which 
Grice argues, allows for successful communication.   
It is the maxim of truthfulness that Grice argues we are intentionally flouting for 
effect when we produce a non-literal utterance. According to Grice, a metaphor (or 
any other non-literal statement) can be recognized whenever an utterance is 
considered to be false.  The hearer arrives at the literal meaning of an utterance, and 
only then, if it is considered to flout the maxim of truthfulness, will the hearer assume 
that the speaker is flouting this maxim in order to communicate a non-encoded 
implied meaning, and thus derive the implicature.  
Potential problems with the Gricean account 
A potential limitation of a Gricean approach is its inability to account for instances of 
loose use which, intuitively, appear related to metaphor. As discussed, Grice argues 
that lies, jokes, metaphors, hyperboles and ironies are all cases in which his maxims 
are purposely violated. Wilson and Sperber (2002) argue that although this is a 
reasonable way to account for these phenomena, approximations (e.g. ‘The lawn is 
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flat’ or ‘The water is boiling’) and other loose uses (e.g. ‘the glass’ when referring to 
a plastic picnic cup), which they argue are closely related to metaphor, are not so 
easily accounted for by Grice’s maxims. It does not seem accurate to claim that in 
uttering (k), the speaker is intentionally flouting the maxim of truthfulness.	  
k) Let’s sit here for the picnic, it is flat (referring to a patch of grass in a field which is 
unlikely to be absolutely flat). 
The utterance in k) is approximately true, and for the purposes of the communicative 
exchange it is true enough. However, when is an utterance true enough? If the maxim 
of truthfulness is adjusted to account of approximations and loose uses such as those 
in k), then we would be left with a very vague notion of truthfulness which would not 
be robust enough to explain how a hearer is able to arrive at a speaker’s intended 
meaning. 
The degree to which approximations and loose uses diverge from the strict literal 
sense varies from occasion to occasion, and their acceptability varies with content and 
context. The same statement can be an acceptable approximation in one situation and 
not in another. The utterance in l) would be an acceptable response to the question 
‘what time does the party start?’, when the speaker of l) thinks that people will be 
generally arriving for the party between 7.30 and 8pm, but not to the question ‘what 
time does the train leave?’, when the speaker believes that the train will be leaving at 
7.57pm.  
l) At 8pm 
m) I had to run to the shops  
n) I don’t suppose you have got a hoover I can borrow 
Indeed, Lewis (1979) put forward an account of such instances, in which he posited 
that there are “contextually-determined standards of precision” which guide us when 
interpreting such utterances. However, m) and n) illustrate that there are cases in 
which ‘degrees of approximation’ or ‘standards of precision’ do not seem appropriate. 
As Wilson and Sperber (2002) argue, although walking and running generally differ 
in speed, the two actions are not at either end of a gradient. There is a sharp cut-off 
point between walking and running; it is not just a matter of speed. Walking at 8km 
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an hour is not the same as running 8km an hour, the two actions are qualitatively 
different. Therefore, it is hard to claim that the speaker of m) ‘approximately’ ran to 
the shops, when they had just walked there fast due to being in a rush. Moreover, a 
speaker of n) most likely requires a vacuum cleaner in order to clean up some mess, 
and they are unlikely to have a preference for the specific brand (Hoover). They are 
using the term ‘hoover’ loosely to refer to all vacuum cleaners, but it does not seem 
appropriate to say that the speaker is using the term approximately. The words 
‘hoover’ and ‘run’ have clear conceptual boundaries, which cannot be broadened to 
pick out instances that ‘approximately’ fall within their denotations. 
For Wilson and Sperber (2002) these data cast doubt over the existence of a maxim of 
truthfulness, and the assumption that there is a default ‘literal’ meaning. But also, 
over a vague notion of truthfulness, or pragmatic vagueness such as that put forward 
by Lewis (1979). 
Grice did not concern himself with a cognitive model of language processing, which 
means that his theoretical account of figurative language, as it stands, makes no 
psychological processing predictions. Consequently, Grice’s account cannot be 
empirically tested, and thus cannot be objected to on the basis of inconsistencies with 
empirical findings.	   However, as I will discuss below, subsequent neo-Gricean 
accounts have adapted Grice’s theory, such that they posit a stage-by-stage 
comprehension procedure, which does make processing predictions that can be 
empirically tested. See below for full discussion. 
	  
1.4 NEO-GRICEAN ‘LITERAL FIRST’ ACCOUNTS 	  	  
Until recently, like Grice’s account, most accounts of metaphor were based on the 
assumption that every metaphorically intended utterance has a default literal 
interpretation, and that the intended meanings of such utterances are generated by 
systematic departures from that literal meaning. The key difference between Grice’s 
account and neo-Gricean philosophical (Searle 1979), psychological (Clark and Lucy 
1965; Janus and Bever 1985) and linguistic (Lyons 1977) accounts of non-literal 
language comprehension is that the neo-Gricean accounts posit a stage-by-stage, 
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psychologically real comprehension procedure, which means that they can be 
measured up against empirical evidence from psycholinguistic experiments, which 
can tell us about how we process language. 
The assumption that there exists a default literal meaning leads to a ‘standard three-
stage model of non-literal language comprehension’. 
1. First derive the literal meaning of an utterance 
2.  Secondly, test the derived literal meaning against the context 
3. Finally, if the literal meaning makes sense in that context, then accept it as the 
intended meaning. If it doesn’t make sense in that context, search for an 
alternative, more contextually appropriate meaning. 
“Where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that 
differs from sentence meaning” (Searle 1979:114) 
Two applications of this standard three-stage model are discussed below (standard 
comparison accounts, and the salience imbalance account).  
	  
1.4.1 METAPHORS AS IMPLICIT SIMILES 	  	  
Proponents of ‘comparison accounts’ (Tversky 1977; Clark & Haviland 1977; Searle 
1979) claim that, based on the recognition that a metaphoric utterance is defective 
(false) if understood literally, hearers transform the false categorical statement into a 
true simile; realising that the statement cannot be intended literally, as a category 
assertion, the hearer interprets it as though it were a simile (i.e. My lawyer is like a 
shark). Not all, but a particular subset of features of the vehicle topic and vehicle 
concept are compared. So, when a speaker utters “Mary is an angel”, she is 
communicating that Mary is in some way(s) similar to an angel. The context would 
determine where those similarities lie. 
The advantage of a comparison (implicit simile) account is that it simplifies the 
problem of how we process metaphoric statements. If metaphors are recognized as 
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being implicit similes, then they can be processed just as literal comparisons are 
processed, and they pose no further problems of interpretation.	  
Potential problems with a comparison model	  
Any comparison theory of how we process metaphor, must account for how the 
particular subset of features for comparison are selected in a given context. 
Glucksberg (2001) argues that this process can be nothing other than the 
interpretation of the comparison assertion itself; to understand a comparison, is to 
identify the respects in which the two terms are alike, namely ‘the grounds for the 
comparison’. Therefore, Glucksberg (2001:chapter 1) argues, the comparison model 
cannot be a model of how metaphors are understood but instead it is a model of how 
people judge the degree to which two things are similar in certain contexts. Rather 
than providing a model of metaphor comprehension, comparison models can only 
provide a model of similarity. 	  
In addition, Glucksberg (2001:chapter 1) illustrates that the direction of the 
comparison between the topic and vehicle can yield different features to be compared. 
E.g. ‘Canada is like the US’ VS. ‘the US is like Canada’. The features of the US 
attributed to Canada in the 1st comparison may be completely different to those in the 
second. Metaphorical comparisons offer the most extreme cases of this asymmetry. 
They are not just asymmetrical as in the example above; they are completely 
irreversible (e.g. ‘the butcher is a surgeon’ has a completely different meaning to ‘the 
surgeon is a butcher’). On this basis, Glucksberg argues that the comparison model is 
not sufficient in explaining the comprehension processes underlying metaphor. 
Finally, empirical data cast doubt over any account that applies the three-stage 
processing model. These findings will be discussed in detail in section 2.1.2. 
	  
1.4.2 SALIENCE IMBALANCE ACCOUNT 	  
 
Ortony (1979) attempted to develop a comparison account that got around the 
criticisms mentioned above. In contrast with standard comparison accounts, he argued 
that metaphoric comparisons involve two objects (a topic and a vehicle) that do not 
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share any salient features or properties. Ortony claimed that the grounds for a 
metaphoric comparison are those features that are salient of the vehicle, but are not 
salient of the topic, rather than features that are salient of both the topic and vehicle 
concepts. So in “John is a shark”, John is being compared to the salient features of 
SHARK4 (e.g. TENACIOUS; PREDATORY; AGGRESSIVE). Ortony proposed that 
this salience imbalance in the comparison process is what makes a metaphor a 
metaphor “The essence of metaphoricity is salience imbalance” (Ortony 1979: 179) 
Potential problems with the salience imbalance model	  
Glucksberg (2001: chapter 1) argues that in order for a literal comparison to be 
informative, just like a metaphoric comparison, it must have a low/high salience 
imbalance. It cannot be a high/high balanced comparison because it would not be 
informative to the hearer to point out that two things have shared salient features 
because the hearer must already know the features of the topic and vehicle in order to 
access these features. Therefore, in order for a comparison to be informative, whether 
it is literal or metaphoric, there must be a salience imbalance. Therefore salience 
imbalance cannot account for distinguishing between literal and metaphoric 
utterances. 	  
In addition, Glucksberg illustrates that often the speaker’s intention when using a 
metaphor, is to introduce new properties or features to the hearer’s ‘topic’ concept. 
Glucksberg illustrates how such cases are a problem for the salience imbalance 
account. Consider the metaphor in o).	  
o) Jane is a monster	  
Before hearing the utterance in o), the hearer may not have already known that Jane 
had any of the qualities of a monster. In this case, features associated with the hearer’s 
concept MONSTER would not be associated with the hearer’s concept JANE at all. In 
such instances in which salient features associated with the vehicle concept (e.g. 
MONSTER) are not associated at all with the hearer’s topic concept (e.g. JANE) then 
the salience imbalance account cannot work. The feature mapping process cannot take 
place.	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Moreover, although Ortony attempted to provide an account which avoided 
Glucksberg’s general criticisms of a comparison account, as with the standard 
comparison account, Ortony’s account still comes up against empirical evidence 
suggesting that there is no default literal interpretation (X is like Y), which is an 
assumption of this account.  
Finally, like the standard comparison accounts, Ortony’s salience imbalance account 
applies the three-stage processing model of non-literal language, and thus falls foul of 
empirical data that suggests that such a model is wrong. 
 
1.5 PROBLEMS WITH THE THREE-STAGE PROCESSING MODEL 	  
The above ‘literal first’ accounts, although theoretically distinct from one another, 
share one key psychological prediction; metaphors are processed via a three-stage 
processing model: 
1. Derive the literal meaning of an utterance 
2.  Test the derived literal meaning against the context 
3. If the literal meaning makes sense in that context, then accept it as the 
intended meaning. If it doesn’t make sense in that context, search for an 
alternative, more contextually appropriate meaning. 
Glucksberg (2001) argues that this processing model makes four clear predictions. 
Firstly, literal interpretations are unproblematic and context independent. Secondly, 
literal meanings have unconditional priority over any alternative interpretation, and 
will thus be quicker to process. Thirdly, literal meanings are derived automatically, 
whereas metaphoric interpretations are optional. Finally, metaphors are processed as 
comparison statements rather than as category assertions, as their form would suggest. 
As we will see in Section 2.1.1, these predictions are not born out in the majority of 
the data investigating metaphor processing (e.g., Inhoff, Lima and Carroll 1984, 
Blasko and Connine 1993, Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos 1978, Blasko and 
Connine 1993, Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin 1982, McElree and Nordlie 1999). See 
section 2.1.1 for a full discussion.  
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On the basis of these empirical findings, many current accounts of non-literal 
language comprehension have rejected the three-stage processing model in favour of a 
parallel processing model in which there is not default interpretation. These accounts 
are discussed below. 
	  
1.6 BEYOND LITERALNESS 	  
Current theories of metaphor disagree about the exact comprehension procedures 
involved in interpreting a metaphoric utterance. For example, is it a case of matching 
properties between the topic and vehicle concepts? Or is it a case of attributing 
properties from the vehicle concept to the topic? However, one thing that current 
pragmatic and psychological accounts largely agree upon, based on the empirical 
findings mentioned above (see section 2.1.1 for full discussion), is that metaphor 
comprehension is not a three stage, sequential process. Most current, accounts now 
propose some sort of ‘parallel processing’ model in which the encoded and non-
encoded content are processed in parallel (See Carston 2002:326,358; Wilson and 
Carston 2007:28; Recanati 2004:54; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Gentner and Wolff 
2000; 2011; Giora 1999). 	  
Although most psychological accounts of non-literal language focus on metaphor, in 
response to observations of clear parallels between metaphor and other tropes 
(Sperber and Wilson 2006), recent pragmatic accounts, and, in particular relevance-
theorists, such as Sperber and Wilson (2006) and Wilson and Carston (2007), have 
explicitly posited ‘unified’ accounts of figurative language, which aim to account for 
all figurative uses including metaphor and hyperbole. Furthermore, alternative 
accounts, for instance Glucksberg and Keysar’s (1990) class-inclusion account, and 
Gentner and colleague’s (Clements and Gentner 1991; Wolff and Gentner 2011) 
Structure-Mapping account, in which tropes other than metaphor are not discussed, 
nonetheless clearly suggest that hyperbolic statements of the form X is Y, are 
processed in the same way as metaphoric statements of the same form. 	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The rest of this section is dedicated to a thorough discussion of current pragmatic and 
psychological accounts of figurative language that I will measure up against both 
existing empirical findings (chapter 2), and our new findings (chapter 3).	  
As one of the objectives of this thesis is to test whether the processes and mechanisms 
underlying the comprehension of metaphors and hyperboles are the same (as is 
proposed by current lexical pragmatic accounts (Wilson and Carston 2007; Recanati 
2001; 2004), I will discuss each theory, not just as an account of metaphor, but in 
relation to hyperbole as well. 
 
1.6.1 RELEVANCE THEORY AND FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 	  	  
Relevance Theory (RT), like most recent pragmatic theories, has inherited some 
fundamental principles from Gricean pragmatics (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/95), 
but they do reject other aspects of Grice’s theory, and in doing so, they construct an 
alternative framework which provides an account of human communication in a 
broader context of human cognition (See Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) and Wilson 
and Sperber (2012) for a full and detailed discussion of Relevance theory, and 
Carston (2002) for a thorough analysis of its implications). 
 
Like Grice, Relevance Theorists believe human communication to be inferential, and 
that successful communication requires expressing and recognizing intentions. 
Moreover, like Grice, they argue that every utterance carries with it, an expectation of 
relevance; hearers assume that a speaker’s utterance will be relevant enough to be 
worth their attention. However, unlike Grice, Relevance theorists argue that this 
presumption of relevance results from a general principle of human cognition, rather 
than a co-operative principle or a set of maxims. By placing their theory of 
communication in a broader context of human cognition, Relevance theorists allow 
themselves the opportunity to avoid positing rules or maxims.  
 
 “According to relevance theory, utterances raise expectations of relevance not 
because speakers are expected to obey a Co-operative Principle and maxims or some 
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other specifically communicative convention, but because the search for relevance is 
a basic feature of human cognition, which communicators may exploit.”	   (Wilson and 
Sperber 2004) 
 
Positing a cognitive leaning towards relevance allows Relevance theorists the 
opportunity to avoid the maxim of truthfulness, which they argue is problematic in 
light of the numerous different ways in which we use language loosely. 
 
A maxim of truthfulness has the effect of reducing the gap between sentence meaning 
and speaker’s explicit meaning to a minimum; speakers will always endeavor to make 
their utterances true. Grice argued that speaker meaning could be inferred simply by 
assigning reference to referring expressions, and deriving any communicated 
implicatures. One of the reasons, theorists have always wanted to keep the gap 
between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning as small as possible, is because 
they couldn’t conceive of inferential capacities which could be capable of inferring a 
speaker’s meaning that differs significantly from the meaning of the sentence she 
uttered. However, by proposing that human cognition is geared towards the search for 
relevance, Relevance theorists are able to posit inferential processes that are efficient 
enough to allow for a larger discrepancy between sentence meaning and speaker’s 
meaning. 
 
Without a maxim of truthfulness, you lose the notion that every utterance is true 
unless a speaker is being un-co-operative or flouting the maxim of truthfulness for 
effect (in the case of metaphors). Moreover, you lose the notion of a default literal 
interpretation. According to Relevance Theory, a hearer searches for the optimally 
relevant interpretation in the context, and considers possibilities in order of 
accessibility. There is no default literal meaning that is derived first and measured up 
against the context in order to see if it is appropriate.  
 
The greater gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, allowed by 
Relevance Theory, draws into question Grice’s notions ‘explicit’, ‘literal’ and ‘what is 
said’. For Grice, speaker’s meaning consists of ‘what is said’ (which Grice saw as the 
unproblematic, literal meaning of an utterance, which is decoded), and (optionally) 
‘what is implicated’ (any implicit content which is inferentially derived in the 
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context). Relevance Theorists argue that this two-way distinction is too simplistic, and 
reject the notions of ‘what is said’ (literal meaning). In its place, Sperber and Wilson 
(1986/95) introduce the term ‘explicature’ (see full discussion below) to refer to the 
explicit content of an utterance which is arrived at by a combination of decoding and 
inference. In addition, they adopt Grice’s notion of ‘implicature’ to refer to the 
intended, implicit content of an utterance, which is arrived at purely by inference. 
 
This flexing of the semantic/pragmatic boundary means that Relevance Theory claims 
that certain phenomena, though part of the explicit content of the utterance, are 
derived via pragmatic inference, where others argue that they can be straightforwardly 
dealt with by a semantic theory (see Carston 2002: chapter 2 for a full discussion). 
Indeed, a particularly interesting aspect of the current Relevance Theoretic lexical 
pragmatic account of figurative language (Wilson and Carston 2007; Carston 2002), 
which distinguishes it from a Gricean or neo-Gricean account, is that its authors argue 
that figurative interpretations, though inferentially derived, contribute to the explicit 
content of the utterance (i.e. the explicature). This is in contrast with their earlier 
standard Relevance Theoretic account, which like neo-Gricean accounts, claimed that 
figurative interpretations contributed only to the implicit content of the utterance.	  
In addition, rather than focusing exclusively on metaphor, Relevance Theorists claim 
that their lexical pragmatic approach can account for all instances in which a word is 
used to convey a meaning which is either broader or narrower than that which is 
encoded (i.e. metaphor; hyperbole; approximation; narrowing). Wilson and Carston 
(2007) argue that there is no clear cut off point between approximation, hyperbole and 
metaphor, which leaves little justification for treating them as distinct phenomena, 
requiring separate explanations. This, together with other “internal descriptive and 
theoretical reasons”5 (Wilson and Carston 2007:16) motivate their pursuit of a 
unified account.  This makes this account particularly important with respect to this 
thesis, as it posits the same fundamental processes and mechanisms for the 
comprehension of metaphors and hyperboles.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5See Carston 1997, 2002; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Wilson 2003 for full discussion of theoretical arguments	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By proposing a unified account of narrowing and broadening (i.e. narrowing; 
approximation; hyperbole; metaphor), Relevance Theorists distance themselves from 
the general consensus to posit different processes for the different phenomena. For 
example, Levinson (2000) and Bluntner (1998; 2004) see narrowing as a default 
inference to a stereotypical interpretation, Lewis (1979) and Lasersohn (1999) have 
argued that approximations are the result of variations in standards of precision 
appropriate for different discourses, and metaphor, which gets the most attention, is 
among other things, considered to be a blatant flouting of a maxim of truthfulness 
(Grice 1975), a domain-mapping operation (Gentner and Bowdle 2008; Wolff and 
Gentner 2011), underlying conceptual schemas (Lakoff 1993; Gibbs 1990) or the 
result of the dual referential nature of terms in metaphor vehicle position (Glucksberg 
and Keysar 1990). In contrast, Relevance theorists argue that the processes and 
mechanisms for understanding metaphorical uses are the same as those deployed for 
all other word uses. 
“They are relevance-seeking processes of forming and testing interpretive hypotheses 
in their order of accessibility, taking as premises the most highly activated items of 
encyclopaedic information, deriving implications from them, and stopping once 
expectations of relevance are satisfied.” (Carston and Wearing 2011:2) 
Below, I will summarize the basic principles and workings of Relevance Theory, 
before moving on to the aspects of the account that are relevant to our discussion of 
figurative language. 
Relevance 	  
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) define relevance as a property of inputs to cognitive 
processes (e.g. sights, sounds, utterances). They argue that human cognition is 
relevance-oriented; it tends to be geared towards the “maximization of relevance”. By 
this they mean that “cognitive resources tend to be allocated to the processing of the 
most relevant inputs available…”. (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 261) 	  
“We are not claiming that humans always succeed in maximizing relevance, but only 
that they have a sufficient tendency to do so to make their massive investment in 
cognition evolutionarily worth while.” (Sperber and Wilson 2006:178)	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Relevance Theorists claim that cognitive processing is a balancing act between 
‘cognitive effects’ and ‘processing effort’. An input that requires a lot of effort will be 
less relevant than one that does not, and the more ‘cognitive effects’ an input yields, 
the more relevant it will be. An ‘optimally relevant’ piece of information would be 
one which achieves this balance. Suppose you want to know whether to drive or walk 
to work, and so you ask your friend “ is it raining outside?”. Your friend could either 
answer “yes” or “no”, or they could pass you their telephone, on which the weather 
details for today and the rest of the week are displayed on the screen. Both responses 
would contain all the information required, but extracting this information from the 
telephone screen would require more processing effort than processing your friend’s 
utterance, which would make the second response (using the telephone) less relevant. 
Cognitive effects	  
According to Relevance Theory, a cognitive effect is something that either 
strengthens a previously held contextual assumption, or contradicts and eliminates 
a previously held contextual assumption. For our purposes the most important type of 
cognitive effect is a ‘contextual implication’: “An implication deducible from input 
and context together, but from neither input nor context alone.” (Wilson and Carston 
2007:24).  
A set of assumptions P contextually implies an assumption Q in the context C if and 
only if 
i) the union of P and C non-trivially implies Q 
ii) P does not trivially imply Q and 
iii) C does not trivially imply Q  (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95:109) 
A contextual implication can be intended (an implicature) or unintended. An example 
is below in (p). 
p) A: Have you seen that new French film? 
   B: I don’t like films with subtitles. 
The ‘proposition expressed’ (the explicature) by B’s utterance is that she doesn’t like 
films with subtitles. However, the implicature (intended contextual implication) 
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communicated by her utterance is that she has not seen the film that A is referring to. 
However, an unintended implication which A might derive from B’s utterance is that 
B is not very cultured, or open minded when it comes to her taste in films. 
Anything that inputs to a cognitive process can be relevant; sights, sounds, utterances, 
actions, thoughts, memories, conclusions of inferences etc. Something can be relevant 
in one context, but not in another. An input is relevant in a context when it interacts 
with that context to yield cognitive effects. New information is irrelevant in a context 
when it yields no cognitive effects. 
The principles of relevance	  
Relevance Theorists argue that hearers expect speakers to be optimally relevant, and it 
is the assumption that the speaker will attempt to fulfill this expectation, that allows 
hearers to infer the speaker’s intended meaning. So, in place of Grice’s maxims, 
Relevance Theorists place ‘The cognitive principle of relevance’: 
“Human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximization of relevance” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: §3.1- 2; Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 610)  
and ‘The communicative principle of relevance’:  
“Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995: §3.7; Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 612).	  
It follows from the communicative principle of relevance that a hearer is justified in 
expecting an utterance to be optimally relevant “that it is relevant enough to be worth 
her processing effort, but also that it is the most relevant one compatible with the 
speaker’s abilities and preferences” (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 266-278; Wilson 
and Sperber, 2004: 612). According to Relevance Theory, the act of ostensive 
communication alone automatically communicates this ‘presumption of optimal 
relevance’.	  
Relevance Theorists claim that the two principles of relevance result in the following 
Relevance- theoretic comprehension procedure:	  
a. Follow the path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative 
hypotheses (disambiguation, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
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accessibility.	  
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned). (Wilson and 
Sperber, 2004: 613)	  
“According to this heuristic, at each point in the on-line processing of an utterance, 
the addressee tentatively chooses the most accessible interpretation, and reconsiders 
this choice only if it seems unlikely (on the basis of the available evidence) to lead to 
an overall interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance. The same 
procedure applies to the full range of pragmatic tasks: assigning referents to 
referential expressions, disambiguating ambiguous words or structures, supplying 
contextual assumptions, deriving implications, etc. Thus, the fact that an 
interpretation is highly accessible gives it an initial degree of plausibility. A hearer 
using this heuristic will stop at the first overall interpretation that satisfies his 
expectation of relevance: this is his best hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning 
given the evidence available to him”. (Wilson and Carston 2007:25)	  
Explicit and implicit content	  
As mentioned in the introduction to this account, Relevance Theorists argue that the 
principles of relevance not only guide the inferential processes which allow us to 
derive contextual implications, but also play a central role in recovering the explicit 
content of an utterance – in Relevance Theoretic terms, the ‘explicature’ of the 
utterance. Unlike Grice, according to RTs, the explicit content of an utterance is not 
limited to that which is linguistically encoded. Relevance Theorists claim that 
grammatical and semantic systems are responsible for decoding a ‘logical form’, 
which is not fully propositional (Carston 2004a:633), and must be fleshed out via 
pragmatic inference in order to arrive at the proposition expressed. Based on the 
logical form and the context, the hearer is able to infer the speaker’s intended 
meaning. The speaker’s intended meaning consists of explicatures and implicatures. 
Explicatures represent that which is explicitly expressed by an utterance and are 
developments of the logical form (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95:182), whereas 
implicatures, which represent what is implicitly conveyed by an utterance, are purely 
pragmatic.	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Explicatures and implicatures are not the result of different pragmatic processes. Both 
are the result of the same inferential pragmatic process. The difference lies in the type 
of representation that the pragmatic processes operate on. Explicatures are based on, 
and therefore constrained by, the logical form of the utterance, where as implicatures 
are completely inferentially derived.	  
Relevance Theorists propose that explicatures and implicatures are ‘mutually 
adjusted’ in parallel. They are not derived sequentially, instead their on-line 
computation takes place in parallel through a ‘backwards and forwards processing’, 
meaning that during processing of an utterance, anticipatory expectations of 
implicatures could have an effect on the explicature derived, and vice versa.	  
“The process may involve several backwards and forwards adjustments of content 
before an equilibrium is achieved which meets the system’s current ‘expectations’ of 
relevance.” (Carston, 2002a: 143)	  
Relevance theoretic accounts of figurative language	  
The original account	  
Relevance Theorists believe that metaphors such as that in (q) are not implicit similes, 
as comparison account have suggested, they are processed as categorizations just as 
the syntax suggests – the function being to attribute properties of the metaphor vehicle 
to the topic. 
q) Alice is a monkey	  
The original Relevance Theoretic account proposed that a metaphoric interpretation is 
part of the implicit content of an utterance and therefore, not part of the proposition 
expressed. This can be illustrated with the example in q).	  
The proposition expressed by q) would be that Alice is a monkey but “the relevance 
[of x)] will be established by finding a range of contextual effects which can be 
retained as weak or strong implicatures.”6 (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95:236)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  According to Relevance Theory, implicatures may vary in their strength, depending on how mutually manifest 
the informative intention to make manifest the assumption being implied is (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/95:39 
for discussion of mutual manifestness).	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“ In some (perhaps many) instances, a speaker chooses to produce an utterance 
which is a less than literal (that is, loose) interpretation of the thought she intends to 
communicate. This will arise when she judges that the communication of her thought 
is facilitated by such a non-literal utterance, in that it makes the thought more 
accessible to the hearer than a literal one would, or when there isn’t a literal 
utterance available to provide a literal means of expression of the thought” Carston 
2002:331)	  
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) argue that metaphors give access to an encyclopaedic 
schema for ‘monkeys’ with one or more salient and highly accessible assumption(s). 
In the case of q), monkeys are stereotypically mischievous creatures, and therefore if 
(q) is processed in a stereotypical metaphor biasing context (e.g. in which the speaker 
is referring to her little girl, Alice), it would yield the implication that ‘Alice is 
mischievous’. According to the Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, this 
interpretation would be arrived at because it is the first accessible interpretation 
considered that satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance in the given context. 
In addition, Sperber and Wilson suggest that metaphors such as that in (q) enable 
speakers to convey images that depict something that a literal paraphrase could not (at 
least not without demanding much more processing effort). For example, (q) might 
convey an image of a particularly devious and cheeky monkey behaving more 
extremely than a typical naughty child. This observation can be traced back to 
Aristotle’s notion of “Bringing-before-the-eyes”. Aristotle proposed that metaphors 
have the quality of making things become real and active; unperceivable things 
become actual and perceivable (see section 1.2 for full discussion). 
However, Relevance theorists were dissatisfied with their account of metaphor (and 
other instances in which the speaker chooses to produce an utterance that is not 
intended literally, i.e. hyperbole, approximation etc.) with respect to their claims 
about the explicit and implicit content of a metaphoric utterance. There was a clear 
asymmetry between their account of ‘narrowing’, in which a general term (i.e. drink) 
is used to convey a more specific sense (i.e. drink alcohol), and ‘broadening’ (or 
loosening), in which a term (i.e. forest) is used to convey a broader meaning (i.e. any 
overgrown area) than that which is lexically encoded (i.e. dense area of trees). 
Concept narrowing had always been taken by Relevance Theorists to be one of those 
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pragmatic processes (such as reference assignment and disambiguation) that are 
involved in arriving at the explicit content of the utterance. On the other hand, 
concept broadening had always been seen as a process that contributed to the implicit 
content of the utterance. 
The question arose as to why this asymmetry should exist when in all other respects 
the two processes of lexical adjustment appear symmetrical.  
“The question of why there should be this asymmetry arises, since, on the face of it at 
least, these look like opposite and symmetrical processes of pragmatically 
constructing a new concept from an lexically encoded one: narrowing vs. 
broadening.” (Carston 2002:334) 
In fact, it is this observation that is developed into the current Relevance Theoretic 
account of figurative language, which provides a unified account of all instances of 
narrowing and broadening, in which one “there are two possible outcomes (a 
narrower concept or a broader concept) of what is essentially a single process: a 
process of picking and choosing from among the elements of logical and 
encyclopaedic information that are made available by the encoded concept.” (Carston 
2002:334). See section below for full discussion. 
Moreover, on close analysis there is strong evidence from embedding tests, which 
suggest lexical broadening contributes to the proposition expresses, and thus affects 
the truth conditional content of the utterance.  Consider the utterance in r). 
r) No teenager is a saint7	  
It is the proposition expressed that undergoes sentence operations such as negation. 
Thus if it is the encoded concept SAINT which falls within the scope of the negation, 
then r) would be interpreted as making the irrelevant and trivial claim that no teenager 
has been canonized. More likely, r) would be understood as conveying the more 
relevant claim that no teenager is a SAINT*8 (i.e. no teenager is a really kind, 
generous individual). In order to arrive at this interpretation, the adjusted concept 
SAINT* must fall within the scope of the negation, and must, therefore, contribute to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7Taken from Wilson and Carston (2007) 
8 I will use the convention of capital letters to represent an encoded concept and capital letters followed by a * to 
represent an occasion specific, adjusted concept (ad hoc concept). 
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the proposition expressed (truth conditional content).9 It is important to highlight, that 
although Relevance Theorists maintain that the lexical adjustment procedure 
contributes to the explicit content of the utterance, that is not to say that they do not 
think implicatures are also conveyed by a metaphoric utterance. On the contrary, 
according to this account, contextual implications, both intended (implicatures) and 
unintended, will most likely result from the lexical adjustment process.  
Consider the utterance in r) again; according to Relevance theorists, the propositional 
content of the utterance is ‘there are no teenagers that are SAINTS*, which means 
that the pragmatically adjusted concept is part of the proposition expressed, but there 
are likely to also be many implicatures also conveyed by this utterance, which make 
up the entire metaphoric intended meaning (i.e. that teenagers are frequently 
ungenerous and self-centered individuals). 
Below I will discuss the current Relevance Theoretic, unified ad hoc concept 
construction account, in which lexical broadening (i.e. metaphors and hyperboles) and 
narrowing are accounted for by one pragmatic process of lexical adjustment, which 
contributes to the propositional content of the utterance.	  
The unified concept construction account	  
Relevance Theorists are not alone in presenting a unified pragmatic approach to 
broadening and narrowing (Carston 2002; Wilson 2003; Wilson and Carston 2007; 
Sperber and Wilson 2006). Recanati has also put forward a well known lexical 
pragmatic account of non-literal language (Recanati 1995; 2001; 2004). The 
Relevance Theoretic account and Recanati’s account differ with respect to some 
important fine-grained theoretical assumptions (i.e. whether comprehension 
procedures are purely inferential, or a mixture of inferential and associative), and the 
comprehension procedures they posit. However, these theoretical differences are not 
readily empirically testable, and are therefore not directly relevant to this thesis. More 
importantly for our current purposes, Recanati’s and Relevance theorist’s accounts 
both claim that when processing an utterance in which a word has been used to 
convey either a broader or narrower sense than that which is encoded, an occasion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9See Wilson and Carston 2007 and Carston 2002 for more evidence and a thorough discussion. 	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specific concept is constructed on-line which denotes either a broader or narrower 
category than the lexically encoded concept. This claim is open to empirical 
investigation, and will, therefore, be one of the main foci of discussion throughout 
this thesis. From here onwards, I will only explicitly discuss the Relevance Theoretic 
account. However, any conclusions drawn will (unless otherwise specified) ipso facto 
apply to Recanati’s unified lexical pragmatic account (at least on this point) due to 
their shared empirically testable claim. See endnotei for a brief discussion of the 
specifics of Recanati’s account, and the similarities and differences between the 
Relevance theoretic and Recanati’s accounts.	  
The current Relevance Theoretic account of figurative language states that the 
pragmatic process involved in figurative language interpretation take place at the 
lexical level, rather than at the sentence level, and that that lexical pragmatic process 
contributes to the explicature of the utterance (Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber and 
Wilson 2006; Carston 2002). The same principles of relevance (as those detailed 
above) guide comprehension, and the same comprehension procedure is followed. 
However, rather than the metaphoric interpretation being part of the implicit content 
of the utterance, which is entirely inferentially derived (as was claimed in the original 
Relevance Theoretic account, and by Grice), the current lexical pragmatic account 
claims that the lexical adjustment procedure contributes to the explicit content of the 
utterance. The occasion specific interpretation of various pragmatic phenomena (e.g. 
narrowings, approximations, loose uses, metaphors, hyperboles etc.) involves the 
construction of an ‘ad hoc concept’ or ‘occasion-specific sense’ in place of the 
encoded vehicle concept, based on an interaction between the encoded topic and 
vehicle concepts, contextual information and expectations of relevance. 
This term originates in the work of Lawrence Barsalou (1987; 1992) in which he 
illustrated that in different contexts and for different purposes, people can incorporate 
different information from long-term memory (encyclopaedic entries) to form distinct 
concepts for a single category. For example, in one context, the category of cats is 
conceptualized as having the property ‘chase birds’, whereas in other contexts it isn’t. 
Moreover, for some purposes the property ‘winners and losers’ is taken to be central 
to the concept SPORTS, for other purposes the property is absent completely from 
this concept, or is demoted in importance. 
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Carston (2002) argues that from a Relevance theoretic point of view, it makes sense 
that such concept adjustment capacities are made use of during communication. 
“It is hardly surprising that this capacity is exercised in communication and 
interpretation, where it is given the extra impetus and direction of the presumption of 
relevance, so that any required construction of concepts is guaranteed to be relatively 
easy to achieve (low in processing cost) and to have a satisfactory array of cognitive 
effects.” (Carston 2002:322) 
Relevance Theorists claim that words are frequently used to convey either a broader 
or narrower sense than that which is encoded. They argue that a wide range of 
phenomena can be explained by appealing to this notion of lexical adjustment; 
narrowing or broadening of the encoded concept.  
Narrowing 
Lexical narrowing involves the use of a word to convey a more specific sense. Case 
of narrowing are in (s, t and u).	  
s) All young professionals run	  
t) I don’t have time	  
u) I really need to get a life	  
In different contexts, this utterance could be understood as conveying different senses. 
The speaker could intend to communicate that ‘all young professionals engage in the 
action of running at some point in their lives (e.g. to catch a ball, or to catch the bus). 
However, in most contexts this interpretation would not satisfy the hearer’s 
expectation of relevance, it is highly likely that most people already hold the 
assumption that most people (provided they are able bodied) engage in the act of 
running at some point in their lives. In most contexts, in (s) the lexical item ‘run’ 
which encodes a concept which denotes the action of running, is being used to convey 
a more specific sense; something along the lines of ‘engage in the vigorous activity of 
carrying out that action [of running] for a prolonged period on a regular basis for 
exercise’. This interpretation would most likely satisfy the hearer’s expectation of 
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relevance as it would provide a new piece of information, which would either 
strengthen an existing assumption, or generate a completely new assumption. 
Lexical narrowing comprehension procedure 
The lexical narrowing comprehension procedure would be as follows:	  
In this specific context, based on the presumption of relevance and informed by the 
logical form and relevant contextual information, the hearer constructs an ad hoc 
concept RUN* out of the encyclopaedic and logical information associated with the 
lexically encoded concept RUN, which has a narrower denotation than that of the 
encoded concept RUN (i.e. only denotes ‘engaging in the vigorous activity of 
carrying out that action [of running] for a prolonged period on a regular basis for 
exercise’). See the discussion of lexical broadening below, for a more thorough 
breakdown of the comprehension procedure followed during the lexical adjustment 
procedure.	  
The narrowing in (u) illustrates that narrowing can take place to lesser or greater 
degrees, and also in different directions. In different contexts the speaker might be 
understood differently. They might be conveying that they need to get an interesting 
or exciting life, or in another context their utterance might be understood as 
communicating that they need to engage with the practicalities of life; stop having so 
much fun, and settle down. 
Broadening	  
Lexical broadening involves the use of a word to convey a broader sense than that 
which is encoded. Phenomena that Relevance Theorists (Sperber and Wilson 2006; 
Wilson and Carston 2007) claim can be accounted for by lexical broadening include 
metaphor, hyperbole, approximation, and other loose uses10. They argue that these 
phenomena are distinguished only by the degree to which the encoded concept is 
broadened. Approximations, they argue, are instances in which a strict sense is 
“marginally extended to include a penumbra of items (what Lasersohn (1999) calls a 
pragmatic halo) that strictly speaking falls outside its linguistically specified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10Relevance Theorists also explain category extensions and neologisms using this lexical pragmatic account.	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denotation.” (Wilson and Carston 2007:8). Hyperboles involve a greater broadening 
of the encoded concept, which gives the impression of ‘exaggeration’, and metaphors 
involve the greatest broadening of all.  
“We suggested…that ‘approximation’, ‘hyperbole’, ‘metaphor’ are not distinct 
theoretical kinds, requiring different interpretive mechanisms, but merely occupy 
different points on a continuum of degrees of broadening” (Wilson and Carston 
2007:29). 
An example of each phenomenon is given in s-u below.	  
Approximation	  
v) The water is boiling	  
Hyperbole	  
w) This house is a palace	  
Metaphor	  
x) John is a clown	  
A speaker could utter (w) hyperbolically with the intention of conveying that they 
think said house is huge, and luxurious. In which case, the hearer would construct an 
ad hoc concept PALACE* which has a broader denotation than the encoded concept 
PALACE, such that it includes in its denotation large family homes, which are nicely 
decorated.	  
A speaker intending (x) metaphorically would be conveying that they think John is a 
foolish silly character (i.e. he exhibits features associated with clowns). In order to 
accurately interpret (x) metaphorically, the hearer must construct an ad hoc concept 
CLOWN* which denotes a broader category of things than the encoded concept 
CLOWN. Silly, foolish people would be in included in the denotation of the ad hoc 
concept, whereas they would have fallen outside of the denotation of the lexically 
encoded concept CLOWN.	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Examples (y) and (z) illustrate the encoded concept in the same utterance can be 
broadened to a lesser or greater degree in order to satisfy the hearers expectation of 
relevance in different contexts.	  
y) The film made me sick	  
z) That book puts me to sleep11	  
In (y), the speaker could be understood as communicating that she actually came 
close to vomiting during or after watching the film (i.e. the encoded concept is only 
marginally broadened), or she could be understood as conveying that it made her feel 
a little nauseous (i.e. the encoded concept is extended further), or she could be 
conveying that she was made to feel a little uncomfortable by the film (i.e. an even 
further broadening of the encoded concept). The intuition that an utterance is either an 
approximation, a hyperbole, or a metaphor results from the degree to which the 
encoded vehicle concept has been broadened (i.e. the particular sub set of 
encyclopaedic properties/features used to construct the ad hoc concept). The occasion 
specific concept constructed when interpreting an approximation will share a larger 
number of encyclopaedic properties/features with the encoded concept, than the ad 
hoc concept constructed when interpreting a hyperbole. The lexical adjustment will be 
even bigger in the case of metaphors.	  
In all instances of narrowing and broadening, the logical form together with the 
contextual information and the presumption of relevance inform the lexical 
adjustment process. 
Lexical broadening comprehension procedure	  
According to Wilson and Carston (2007:27), lexical broadenings (including 
metaphors and hyperboles) would be interpreted via the following comprehension 
procedure (illustrated using the metaphor in u):	  
The hearer decodes the sentence uttered, which encodes the concept CLOWN. This 
encoded concept activates a range of logical properties (e.g. a clown is a FOOLISH 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11Taken	  from	  Wilson	  and	  Carston	  (2007)	  	  
	   51 
AND AMUSING CHARACTER), which enable deductive inferences to be drawn. 
For example, from the proposition that John is a CLOWN, it is deducible that John is 
a foolish and amusing character. In addition, a variety of encyclopaedic properties 
associated with the concept CLOWN are activated (e.g. colourful, funny, clumsy, 
foolish). In a discourse context in which the hearer is expecting an answer about 
whether John is an appropriate person to pick for a position of responsibility, 
encyclopaedic properties to do with character and sensibility (e.g. foolish, funny, 
clumsy) are likely to receive additional activation, and would thus be the most 
accessible in the context. The surrounding linguistic content (i.e. the other words in 
the utterance) will also have an effect on activation levels of encyclopaedic properties 
associated with the encoded concept. For example, in the metaphor ‘The politician’s 
speech was noxious’, the ‘topic’ of the metaphor ‘The politician’s speech’ would 
prime particular encyclopaedic properties of the encoded concept NOXIOUS (e.g. 
unpalatable, distasteful, dangerous). Features associated with the concept NOXIOUS 
which could not be applied to ‘the politicians speech’ would not be highly activated.  
Based on the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, the hearer “tentatively 
assumes” that among the implicatures conveyed by the metaphoric utterance are the 
following:	  
1. John is a foolish and clumsy person	  
2. John is not always responsible and trustworthy	  
3. John would not be a good person to place in a position of responsibility.	  
In a context in which John is evidently not a real clown, the encoded concept 
CLOWN needs to be broadened in order for these implicatures to be justified. An ad 
hoc concept CLOWN* is constructed from the encyclopaedic properties associated 
with the encoded concept CLOWN. Some ‘content constitutive’ feature(s) (e.g. the 
feature ENTERTAINER) associated with the encoded concept will not be included in 
the ad hoc concept. The dropping of content constitutive features of the encoded 
concept results in the denotation of the ad hoc concept including foolish, funny and 
clumsy people (individuals who share some of the encyclopaedic properties 
associated with the encoded concept CLOWN), as well as actual clowns. Having 
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arrived at an interpretation that satisfies their expectation of relevance, the hearer 
would stop the search.	  
The comprehension procedure detailed above nicely illustrates Relevance Theorists 
notion of ‘mutual parallel adjustment’ discussed above. 	  
“…tentative hypotheses about contextual assumptions, explicatures and contextual 
implications are incrementally modified so as to yield an overall interpretation which 
satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance” (Wilson and Carston 2007: 28)	  
According to Wilson and Carston (2007), the hearer begins his or her search for an 
interpretation that will satisfy their expectations of relevance, in doing so they 
tentatively accept a set of implicatures, while looking for an interpretation of the 
metaphor vehicle, which will allow them to accurately infer those implicatures. 
Forward and backward inferences are required: The tentatively accepted implicatures 
are arrived at via forward inferencing from the premise that John is a CLOWN 
(combined with relevant contextual information), while backward inferencing, based 
on those implicatures, yields the adjusted proposition expressed John is a CLOWN*. 
Rejecting the notion of a default literal interpretation 
As this account proposes that the ad hoc adjusted concept contributes to the 
proposition expressed by the figurative utterance, a fully-fledged proposition 
containing the encoded concept (e.g. CLOWN) is never processed. The encoded 
concept is ‘accessed’ as part of the incomplete logical form which is decoded from 
the utterance, and the encyclopaedic properties/features associated with that concept 
are searched through in order to find those which are accessible and relevant enough 
to constitute the ad hoc, occasion specific concept under construction. Where Grice 
believed ‘literalness’ to have priority at the utterance level, Wilson and Carston 
(2007) argue that ‘literalness’ only has priority at the local level of words, not at the 
global level of the utterance.  
With respect to the Relevance Theoretic arguments for a truth-conditional lexical 
pragmatics, the Relevance Theoretic account not only diverges radically from other 
pragmatic accounts (which are based on the Gricean assumption that metaphoric 
interpretations are implicitly communicated), but also draws into question Davidson’s 
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(1978) philosophical arguments for metaphoric effects lying outside of the semantic 
content of an utterance. If one posits inferential capacities as efficient as those posited 
by Relevance Theorists, then as Relevance theorists have done, it is possible to argue 
that the output of inferential, pragmatic processes contribute to the truth-conditional 
content of an utterance (the semantic content). Their account in which the boundary 
between semantics and pragmatics has been shifted, entails the radical claim that the 
input to the inferential comprehension procedures that they posit, is a set of 
‘incomplete logical forms’, which are then fleshed out into fully propositional forms 
(the proposition expressed). 
“the input to the system for utterance comprehension is a set of logical forms (and a 
set of procedural constraints), which have been decoded by the language processing 
system. The logical forms are often highly schematic conceptual structures, 
functioning as mere templates for the construction of fully propositional forms. The 
output of the pragmatic comprehension system is a set of assumptions or 
propositional forms, explicatures, and implicatures, which constitute ‘what is 
communicated’ or speaker meaning.” (Carston 2002:64) 
The rejection of the notion of a default literal interpretation, and the positing of a 
parallel processing model means that the Relevance Theoretic account avoids falling 
foul of empirical evidence, which suggests that a) a literal interpretation of a 
figurative utterance does not need to be arrived at before an alternative non-literal 
interpretation can be inferred, and b) metaphoric interpretations are available right 
from the beginning of processing (Inhoff et al. 1984, Blasko and Connine 1993, 
Ortony et al. 1978, Blasko and Connine 1993, Glucksberg et al. 1982, McElree and 
Nordlie 1999). See section 2.1.1 for a full discussion of these findings. 
 
Dual-direction adjustment during metaphor interpretation	  
Wilson and Carston (2007; Carston 2002) claim that metaphors can encode a concept 
which must be narrowed as well as broadened in order to arrive at an interpretation 
which satisfies the hearer’s expectations of relevance. Take the example in (a2).	  
a2) The dog is a monster	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In a context in which the dog in question has just attacked a defenseless child, the 
concept MONSTER must be narrowed to denote only those monsters that are vicious 
and aggressive, excluding friendly monsters such as those featuring in the film 
‘Monsters inc.’, as well as broadened to include dogs which exhibit traits associated 
with MONSTERS. 
“In the discourse context [“will she look after the children if we get ill?” – “Sally is 
an Angel”], the most accessible adjustment of the encoded concept ANGEL……is the 
ad hoc concept ANGEL*, which is narrower than ANGEL in some respects, and 
broader in others…….Both narrowing and broadening emerge as by-products of the 
search for relevance, and the same encoded concept may be narrowed or broadened 
(or both) to different degrees and in different ways across different occasions of use” 
(Wilson and Carston 2007:29) 
Wilson and Carston (2007) do not, however, argue that such dual directional lexical 
adjustment is a defining feature of metaphor. Instead they simply observe that 
metaphors can require both narrowing and broadening of the encoded vehicle 
concept. In contrast, Carston and Wearing (2011) have put forward a discontinuity 
account of metaphor in which they propose that metaphor interpretation, like 
approximation, hyperbole and narrowing, does indeed involve the lexical pragmatic 
process of ad hoc concept construction, but that it is unique with respect to the fact 
that it by definition requires lexical adjustment in both directions: narrowing and 
broadening. Carston and Wearing (2011) argue that dual directional lexical 
adjustment is a defining feature of metaphor interpretation, which sets it apart from 
other tropes such as hyperbole and approximation. 
“….metaphorical use inevitably involves concept narrowing as well as broadening. 
So while the denotation of the ad hoc concept communicated by a hyperbolic use is 
simply more inclusive than that of the original lexical concept, the denotation of the 
ad hoc concept derived on a metaphorical use either merely overlaps with the 
denotation of the encoded concept or is entirely disjoint from it”. (Carston and 
Wearing 2011:11). 
Carston and Wearing (2011) illustrate their claim with the following diagram: 
L = linguistically encoded concept; C* = pragmatically-derived concept 
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(a)      (b)     (c)   
 
Hyperbolic loose use               Metaphoric use (broadening and narrowing) 
Carston and Wearing use hyperbolic similes to motivate their claim. The many 
examples in which metaphor and hyperbole co-occur (as in b2 and c2) are often used 
as support for the idea that the two tropes lie on a continuum. 
b2) You are a saint 
c2) You are a pig 
“A great many conversational metaphors seem to be simultaneously hyperbolic in this 
way, especially in their frequent use as devises for blaming/insulting or 
praising/complenting”. (Carston and Wearing 2011:10). 
However, Carston and Wearing point out that simile and hyperbole also frequently 
co-occur (i.e. the metaphors in r and s could easily be converted into the similes in d2 
and e2). Yet similes do not involve any lexical adjustment of the vehicle term 
(Instead, Carston and Wearing claim that it is a loosening of an encyclopaedic 
property of the literal encoded concept that produces the hyperbolic quality of the 
utterance). 
d2) You are like a saint 
e2) You are like a pig 
“Just as there are hyperbolic similes without there being any loose use continuum 
between hyperboles and similes, so, we suggest, there are hyperbolic metaphors 
without this indicating that there is a continuum between hyperboles and metaphors 
(the only difference between them being in the degree and/or direction of loosening). 
In short, the co-occurrence of these figures doesn’t weigh in favour of a hyperbole-
metaphor continuum.” (Carston and Wearing 2011:11) 
	   L	   C*	   L	   C*	   L	  C*	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Carston and Wearing’s discontinuity account does not refute the notion of a unified 
account of figurative language. According to their account, all figurative 
interpretations are still the result of the same lexical adjustment procedure, and both 
narrowing and broadening still contribute to the proposition expressed by an utterance 
(the truth-conditional content). In fact, Carston originally put forward this observation 
of bi-directional lexical adjustment in metaphors in her (2002) book, as an additional 
argument for a unified account of narrowing and broadening. She argued that if some 
interpretations result from a narrowing as well as a broadening of the lexically 
encoded concept then this is further motivation for a unified account with respect to 
the processes contributions to the proposition expressed. 
“The fact that both processes might be required in forming a communicated ad hoc 
concept makes it look all the more likely that they both contribute to the proposition 
expressed”.  (Carston 2002:344) 
From concept construction to disambiguation 
Wilson and Carston (2007) argue that some lexical adjustments can be one-off 
processes, never to be repeated again, meaning that the ad hoc concept constructed 
will be“ tied to [that] particular concept that may never occur again” (Wilson and 
Carston 2007:14). However, within groups and communities, some ad hoc 
constructed senses catch on and are frequently used. In such cases, the frequency of 
use can lead to a metaphor vehicle gaining additional sense12.	  
“In such cases, the pragmatic process of concept construction becomes progressively 
more routinized, and may ultimately spread through a speech community and 
stabilize as an extra lexical sense.” (Wilson and Carston 2007)	  
Once a metaphor vehicle has become polysemous in this way, it is likely be processed 
as an ambiguous word, thus requiring disambiguation (another pragmatic process that 
Relevance theorists consider to contribute to the truth conditional content of an 
utterance), rather than ad hoc concept construction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12Relevance Theorits argue that their lexical pragmatic account could provide insights into the processes 
underlying polysemy and language change (Wilson and Carston 2007:15)	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Summary of the Relevance theoretic account 
Human cognition is geared towards relevance 
Relevance Theory is an inferential model of communication in which successful 
communication requires expressing and recognizing intentions. Relevance theorists 
argue that human cognition is geared towards the search for relevance, and it is this 
that allows our inferential capacities to be efficient enough to derive speakers’ 
meanings without a set of maxims or a co-operative principle (such as those posited 
by Grice 1967). 
Figurative interpretations contribute to the proposition expressed 
They argue that utterance meaning is a combination of the explicit content of the 
utterance (the explicature) and any additional implicatures conveyed by the utterance 
in a given context. They argue that the explicit content of an utterance is arrived at by 
a combination of decoding and inference, whereas implicatures are arrived at purely 
by inference. Thus, the output of certain pragmatic processes (i.e. reference 
assignment and disambiguation) contribute to the proposition expressed. Importantly, 
for the purposes of this thesis, one of those pragmatic processes is lexical broadening, 
which is the process that allows us to interpret novel figurative utterances in which a 
word is used to convey a broader sense than that which is encoded (i.e. my lawyer is a 
shark). 
A unified concept construction account 
The current Relevance Theoretic, lexical pragmatic account of figurative language 
claims that metaphor is a type of ‘loose use of language’ comparable to various other 
phenomena usually discussed in other terms (e.g. approximations and hyperboles), 
and that all such instances in which a word is used to convey a broader sense than that 
which is encoded, as well as those cases in which a word is used to convey a narrower 
sense than that which is encoded, are processed in the same way. They argue that both 
narrowings and broadenings result from a general pragmatic process of ‘concept 
adjustment’ (Carston 2002; Wilson and Carston 2007), which contributes to the 
explicit content of the utterance. 
Though committed to the unification of all instances of narrowing and broadening 
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under one mechanism of concept adjustment, Relevance Theorists Carston and 
Wearing (2011) have put forward an account in which they separate out a distinct 
natural class of cases within the unified account. They argue that metaphor cannot be 
completely conflated with other tropes such as hyperbole, because metaphoric 
interpretations are distinct from hyperbolic or approximate interpretations due to the 
fact that the lexically encoded vehicle concept has been narrowed as well as 
broadened. 
Relevant and irrelevant information 
According to this account, in a metaphor-biasing context, the metaphor irrelevant 
features associated with the lexically encoded vehicle concept will not be considered 
during interpretation, and will therefore lose activation. 	  
 
There is no default literal interpretation 
As the Relevance Theoretic account proposes that the ad hoc adjusted concept 
contributes to the proposition expressed by the figurative utterance, a fully-fledged 
proposition containing the encoded concept (e.g. CLOWN) is never processed; there 
is no default literal interpretation of an utterance, which means that the current 
Relevance Theoretic account does not fall foul of empirical data that goes against the 
three-stage Neo-Gricean processing model (see 2.1.1 for full discussion of the 
relevant findings). 
Familiar vs. novel metaphors 
Wilson and Carston (2007) argue that within groups and communities, some ad hoc 
constructed senses catch on and are frequently used. In such cases, the frequency of 
use can lead to a metaphor vehicle gaining additional sense. Once a metaphor vehicle 
has become polysemous in this way, it is likely be processed as an ambiguous word, 
thus requiring disambiguation, rather than ad hoc concept construction. 
Below, I will discuss another account that is based on the assumption that metaphor 
comprehension involves the use of stable, lexically encoded concepts and the 
construction of ad hoc, occasion specific ones. 
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1.6.2 CLASS-INCLUSION ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR 	  	  
Like the Relevance Theoretic account, Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar’s (1990) 
Class- inclusion account of metaphor is a property attribution/categorization model, in 
which it is posited that an occasion specific concept is constructed on-line, during 
interpretation.  
f2) My lawyer is a shark13  
The class-inclusion account holds that when producing a metaphor such as that in 
(f2), a speaker intends to categorize an object or entity (the topic, e.g. ‘lawyer’), 
within an occasion specific category (e.g. VICIOUS AND TENACIOUS THINGS) in 
order to attribute the properties of that ad hoc category (e.g. ‘vicious’ and ‘tenacious’) 
to its new member – the topic. The metaphor vehicle (e.g. ‘shark’) is chosen by the 
speaker because it is a good exemplar (a prototypical member) of the ad hoc category 
in which they intend to categorize the topic. 	  
 
The concept construction process – differing contributions from the topic and 
vehicle	  
The theory proposes that in any given metaphoric context, vehicle terms have “dual 
reference”. By this, it is meant that metaphor vehicles denote two different categories; 
a superordinate category and a basic-level category. For example, in the case of (f2) 
the word ‘shark’ refers both to the basic-level category LARGE FISH (an object or 
entity), and to the superordinate category VICIOUS AND TENACIOUS THINGS (a 
type). 	  
During comprehension, the hearer must construct an appropriate ‘ad hoc’ 
superordinate category based on the ‘local context’. The topic and the vehicle are 
used to determine the superordinate category that the vehicle is referring to in that 
particular context. The vehicle provides ‘properties for attribution’ to the topic. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Taken from Glucksberg 2001 	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by virtue of manifesting these properties, that the vehicle is an exemplar of the 
superordinate category being constructed, which is why it is chosen as an appropriate 
metaphor vehicle by the speaker. The topic provides ‘dimensions of attribution: a set 
of dimensions along which it might be characterized which are relevant to the vehicle. 
Vehicles instantiate many properties, and topics can be characterized in many ways 
but only those properties of the vehicle that fit the dimensions of attribution of the 
topic, which in turn are relevant to the vehicle, are considered when constructing the 
ad hoc superordinate category. 	  
According to this account, when a term is being used as a metaphor vehicle, and is 
referring to the superordinate category, the metaphor irrelevant features associated 
with the basic-level category will not be considered during interpretation, and will 
therefore lose activation. 	  
Like relevance-theorists, Glucksberg and Keysar see metaphors as categorization 
statements, not as implicit similes in which the topic and the vehicle concepts are 
compared in the search for similarities. However, this is where the parallel with 
Relevance Theory stops. According to the class-inclusion account, rather than both 
inputting to a comparison process, metaphor ‘vehicles’ and ‘topics’ play different but 
interactive roles – A metaphor topic provides dimensions for attribution, while a 
metaphor vehicle provides properties to be attributed to the topic. Glucksberg is quick 
to point out, though, that this does not mean that the relationship between the topic 
and vehicle concept is not considered. 	  
“Note, this does not preclude a comparison process in which the metaphor vehicle is 
assessed vis-à-vis information available in the metaphor topic. The claim is that the 
properties per se of the topic and vehicle are not the appropriate inputs to the 
comparison process. Instead, vehicle properties on the one hand and topic dimensions 
on the other are the relevant inputs for comparison, analogous to the slots and fillers 
of head nouns and modifiers in conceptual combinations” (Glucksberg 2001 p. 53- 
54).	  
 “A first step is alignment of the vehicle and the topic concepts so that dimensions of 
attribution of the topic can be matched against candidate properties of the vehicle” 
(Glucksberg 2001.p. 54)	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 “The properties of a metaphor vehicle that are attributed to the topic are determined 
by two criteria: (a) the higher-order category (or categories that the vehicle may 
exemplify, and (b) whether the prototypical properties of that category characterize 
the topic in a meaningful way” (Glucksberg 2001. p.55).  
In short, Glucksberg also posits an early alignment procedure, but the topic and 
vehicle input different things to the alignment; the topic’s dimensions of attributions 
are aligned with properties of the vehicle.	  
The relationship between the topic and vehicle during figurative language 
comprehension	  
Glucksberg argues that although the semantic relationship between the vehicle and 
topic concepts is not considered (the concepts are not compared, and neither are 
features mapped from one to the other), topics do vary in terms of the level of 
constraint they place on interpretation due to how many relevant (to the vehicle) 
dimensions of attribution they provide. He proposes that topics are either high or low-
constraining. 	  
“High-constraining topics produce limited expectations about how they might be 
characterized, where as low-constraining topics produce relatively unlimited 
expectations about how they might be characterized” (Glucksberg 2001:54). 	  
For example ‘lawyer’ would be a high-constraining metaphor as there are relatively 
few dimensions on which lawyers can be characterized i.e. cost, reputation, 
temperament, ethos, skill, experience etc. It is unlikely that any lawyer would be 
characterized as a lawyer based on dimensions that are irrelevant to law, such as their 
health, their eye colour or their diet. ‘My friend’ on the other hand would be a low-
constraining topic as there are a multitude of dimensions on which I could 
characterize her. Glucksberg argues that it is how constraining the topic is, along with 
how good an exemplar the vehicle term is of the properties the speaker intends to 
attribute, which determines how apt a metaphor is. 	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Novel vs. Conventional metaphors	  
Glucksberg (2001) states that his account is of novel metaphor comprehension, but 
that the process is not all that different in the case of conventionalized metaphors. He 
argues that as a result of frequent use, metaphor vehicles move from being good 
exemplars of an ad hoc category, to become prototypical members of that category. In 
such instances, they may lexically encode the ‘ad hoc category’, meaning that 
processing will involve concept selection as opposed to the concept construction 
process posited for novel metaphor interpretation. However, Glucksberg (2001:99) 
argues that those vehicles would still be “….actively instantiated in different and 
sometimes novel ways for different topics. Thus, understanding my surgeon is a 
butcher entails a different construal of the category of incompetent, bungling people 
than does understanding my carpenter is a butcher.” 	  
Beyond default ‘literalness’	  
Like the Relevance Theoretic account, and in line with empirical evidence discussed 
in section 2.1.1, the class-inclusion account does not require metaphoric utterances to 
have a global literal interpretation that must be arrived at first. In fact, Glucksberg’s 
account does not draw upon a literal/non-literal distinction; the context dictates 
whether the vehicle term refers to the superordinate or basic-level category.	  
“…figurative language involves the same kinds of linguistic and pragmatic 
operations that are used in ordinary, literal language.” (Glucksberg (2001): preface)	  
Hyperbole	  
The class-inclusion account makes no claims about hyperbole. However, we can 
speculate that such an account would predict that hyperboles of the kind X is Y (e.g. 
earl grey tea is noxious) would trigger the same comprehension processes as either 
metaphors of the same form or literal class-inclusions. Both are instances in which the 
vehicle term is being used to refer to a superordinate category, rather than a basic 
level category.  
For example, the word ‘noxious’ can refer to the basic-level category HARMFUL, 
POISONOUS, AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, but it can also refer to a superordinate 
category; the exact nature of the superordinate category is determined by the 
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dimensions of attribution provided by the topic of the statement, and it is this 
relationship between the topic and vehicle which determines whether the statement is 
hyperbolic or metaphoric. In a metaphoric context as in (g2), the superordinate 
category referred to by ‘noxious’ would be something along the lines of 
DISTASTEFUL AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS THINGS, whereas in a 
hyperbolic context as in (h2), the superordinate category referred to by ‘noxious’ 
would be more like DISGUSTING, UNPALATABLE THINGS. 
g2) The politician’s speech was noxious 
h2) The earl grey tea was noxious 
In short, I am arguing that the class-inclusion account, though posited as an account 
of metaphor alone, is also equipped to account for hyperbolic statements. In fact, I 
would argue that the specifics of the account entail that hyperbolic statements must be 
accounted for by the same comprehension procedure.	  
Glucksberg argues that the ‘recognition of dual reference’ is a necessary signal of 
metaphoricity, but in light of the above claim that hyperboles must also be accounted 
for by the class-inclusion account, perhaps this should be re-phrased as ‘recognition 
of dual reference is a necessary signal of figurativeness’.  
Summary 
Dual reference 
Like the Relevance theoretic account, according to the class-inclusion model, 
metaphoric statements are true class-inclusion assertions. However, according to 
Glucksberg’s and colleagues account in it is the ‘dual reference’ of the metaphor 
vehicle that allows for interpretation. The metaphor vehicle not only has its usual 
denotation, but also refers to a broader ad hoc category. In a metaphoric context the 
metaphor vehicle gives name to a new category, which is constructed on-line, while 
its salient properties become prototypical of that category. Those prototypical 
properties are then attributed to the topic of the metaphor. 
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Relevant and irrelevant information 
According to this account, when a term is being used as a metaphor vehicle, and is 
referring to the superordinate category, the metaphor irrelevant features associated 
with the basic-level category will not be considered during interpretation, and will 
therefore lose activation. 	  
No default literal interpretation 
Like the Relevance Theoretic account, and in line with empirical evidence discussed 
in section 2.1.1, the class-inclusion account does not require metaphoric utterances to 
have a global literal interpretation that must be arrived at first; the context dictates 
whether the vehicle term refers to the superordinate or basic-level category. 
Familiar vs. novel metaphors 
Glucksberg (2001) states that his account is of novel metaphor comprehension, but he 
argues that as a result of frequent use, metaphor vehicles can transition from being 
good exemplars of an ad hoc category, to become prototypical members of that 
category. In such instances, they may lexically encode the ‘ad hoc category’ meaning 
that processing will involve concept selection as opposed to the concept construction 
process posited for novel metaphor interpretation.	  
Natural extension to include hyperbole 
The class-inclusion account, though posited as an account of metaphor alone, is also 
equipped to account for hyperbolic statements. In fact, I argue that the workings of 
the account entail that hyperbolic statements must be accounted for by the same 
comprehension procedure.	  
In the next section, I will discuss Rachel Giora’s pragmatic account, which like 
Relevance theory, claims that successful utterance interpretation results from a 
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1.6.3 GRADED SALIENCE HYPOTHESIS AND METAPHOR 	  	  
Rachel Giora (1997,1999,2002,2003) proposes an alternative pragmatic account to 
Grice and Relevance Theory. Like all pragmatic accounts it aims to explain how 
meanings are arrived at in context, given the fact that speaker meaning is vastly 
underdetermined by sentence meaning.  However, the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
(GSH) argues that it is salience rather than a cooperative principle and maxims, or a 
principle of relevance, which determines the initial processes involved in utterance 
comprehension. She argues that the most salient meaning is initially accessed, and 
only if it does not fit the context, does further processing take place. 	  
Salience	  
Giora argues that to be salient, meanings of words or utterances must be “stored or 
coded in the mental lexicon…..stored information is superior to un-stored information 
such as novel information or information inferable from context: while salient 
information is highly accessible, non-salient information requires strongly supportive 
contextual information to become as accessible as salient information” (Giora 
2003:15). The most salient information is that which is also prominent due to being 
conventional, familiar, and/or frequently used. Coded meanings that are less familiar 
or less frequent, are less salient, and meanings that are not encoded in the mental 
lexicon (meanings constructed on the fly) are non-salient.	  
Giora (2003) clarifies that salience is not a property that is held or not held, instead it 
is a gradient. The more familiar, conventional or stereotypical the information is, or 
the more frequently it is used, the more salient it will be.	  
Giora claims that in processing terms (at least), there is no such thing as a literal/non-
literal distinction. If two utterances, one generally considered to be ‘literal’, and the 
other ‘non-literal’, converge in degree of salience (i.e. ‘The lemon is yellow’ and 
‘You are an angel’), then they are initially processed in exactly the same way. 
However, if those two utterances diverge in degree of salience (i.e. ‘the lemon is 
yellow’ and ‘my husband is a curtain’), then they will be processed differently. In the 
case of both utterances, the most salient meaning(s) will be accessed first, but the 
unfamiliar utterance will require additional processing, due to the salient meaning 
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(that my husband is a cloth drape which hangs in front of the window) being 
contextually inappropriate. 	  
Metaphoric utterances 
Sequential or non-sequential processing 	  
According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, in the case of a familiar metaphor, both 
the ‘literal’ and the metaphoric meanings are equally salient, which means that both 
the ‘literal’ and the metaphoric meanings of such metaphors will be initially accessed 
in both metaphor and literal biasing contexts. Giora (1997; 1999) recognizes that 
context does play a role in the sense that salience can be affected by the preceding or 
surrounding context, but she believes that role to be limited, and that it is unable to 
trigger the suppression of other highly salient meanings which are not primed by the 
context.	  	  
In contrast with other accounts, such as Wilson and Carston (2007), Glucksberg and 
Keysar 1990) or Clement and Gentner (1991), and with her own account of familiar 
metaphors, Giora argues that less familiar metaphors do involve a sequential ‘literal 
first’ process, as novel metaphors have only one salient meaning – the literal one. In 
such instances, the literal meaning is evoked first and rejected on the basis of poor 
contextual fit before the less salient metaphoric meaning is activated.  
Therefore, with respect to familiar metaphors, the Graded Salience Hypothesis is in 
line with empirical evidence which does not support a ‘literal first’ account, as 
according to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, salient meanings are accessed first, and 
both ‘literal’ and ‘metaphoric’ meanings are equally salient (Inhoff et al. 1984, Blasko 
and Connine 1993, Ortony et al. 1978, Blasko and Connine 1993, Glucksberg et al. 
1982, McElree and Nordlie 1999). However, Giora still proposes a ‘literal first’ 
account for novel metaphors, which do not fit with these findings.  
The retention/suppression hypothesis	  
The Graded Salience Hypothesis states that in the case of conventional metaphors (in 
which both the ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’ meanings are initially activated), and in less 
familiar metaphors (in which the less salient metaphoric meaning is accessed after a 
delay in which the salient ‘literal’ meaning is accessed and rejected), the contextually 
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incompatible ‘literal’ meaning is not discarded in a metaphor biasing context, 
provided it plays a role in the construction of the compatible meaning, and that it does 
not ‘disrupt’ the derivation of the compatible, metaphoric interpretation. For example, 
the salient ‘literal’ meaning of ‘rubbish dump’ which denotes a public area in which 
people dispose of their waste, would be retained in a metaphoric context (e.g. my 
house is a rubbish dump), as it has played a role in the construction of, and does not 
conflict with the compatible, metaphoric meaning. 	  	  
In contrast, when processing a familiar metaphor in a literal biasing context, the 
incompatible, metaphoric meaning (which was initially accessed at the same time as 
the equally salient ‘literal’ meaning) would be suppressed14, as it interferes with 
arriving at the compatible ‘literal’ interpretation. 	  	  
According to Giora then, suppression does not necessarily take place during metaphor 
processing. However, when processing any literal utterance that also has a ‘non-
literal’ interpretation, it is usually necessary to suppress the metaphoric interpretation 
which is automatically activated at the same time as the appropriate literal meaning.  
 
i2) He was disarmed 	  
Giora argues that extremely apt metaphors such as that in (i2), are the exceptions to 
this rule, as the ‘literal’ (dispossess someone of their weapon) and ‘figurative’ 
(charming someone out of their animosity) meanings are so closely related, that the 
‘metaphoric’ meaning does not conflict with the ‘literal’ meaning, and thus, does not 
need to be suppressed. 
“Comprehension involves an initial phase in which contextually appropriate and 
salient meanings are activated- the latter automatically and independently of 
contextual information, the former as a result of a predictive context, and an 
immediate subsequent phase of integration in which the activated meanings are either 
retained for further processes or suppressed as contextually disruptive.” (Giora 
2003:38) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The activation level would be reduced (see section  or full discussion of the mechanism of suppression) 
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Aptness	  
The Graded Salience Hypothesis entails that figurative statements pertaining to highly 
salient features of a vehicle concept are easier to process than those pertaining to less 
salient features of the same vehicle concept. For example, the statement ‘It had been 
his duvet for years’ preceded by the context ‘Jimmy didn’t want to go to secondary 
school and leave his lovely comforting primary school behind’ would be easier to 
process than the same statement preceded by the context ‘Jimmy was sad when one of 
his oldest ducks on the farm died’, because although the metaphor relevant features in 
the second example ‘feathery’ and ‘old’ could indeed be associated features of the 
concept DUVET, they are perhaps not as salient as the features ‘comforting’ and 
‘protective’, which are the relevant features in the first example. Thus, the first 
metaphor would be more ‘apt’ (easy to process) than the second	  15.	  
Hyperbolic utterances	  
As with Glucksberg, Giora does not explicitly discuss hyperbole. However, it is 
reasonable to speculate that the Graded Salience Hypothesis would account for 
hyperboles of the type X is Y in the same way as it accounts for metaphors of the 
same type. Furthermore, the Graded Salience Hypothesis is a general account of 
language comprehension, not just of metaphor, hence, the premise that salience 
determines initial processing is applied to all types of utterances. Presumably, in the 
case of familiar hyperboles, both salient ‘literal’ and ‘hyperbolic’ interpretations are 
activated, with no subsequent suppression taking place. However, in the case of 
unfamiliar hyperboles, only one salient ‘literal’ meaning would be activated, 
necessitating further processing triggered by the rejection of this salient meaning 
based on lack of contextual fit. 
Summary 
Salient first 
The Graded Salience Hypothesis argues that it is salience rather than the flouting of 
maxims or a principle of relevance, which determines the initial processes involved in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15Thanks to Rachel Giora for helpful discussions on this topic.	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utterance comprehension. Giora argues that the most salient meaning is initially 
accessed, and only if it does not fit the context, does further processing take place. 
Is there a default literal interpretation- familiar vs. novel metaphors? 
According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, in the case of a familiar metaphor, both 
the ‘literal’ and the metaphoric meanings are equally salient, which means that both 
the ‘literal’ and the metaphoric meanings of such metaphors will be initially accessed 
in both metaphor and literal biasing contexts. However, Giora argues that less familiar 
metaphors do involve a sequential ‘literal first’ process, as novel metaphors have only 
one salient meaning – the literal one. In such instances, the literal meaning is evoked 
first and rejected on the basis of poor contextual fit before the less salient metaphoric 
meaning is activated. 
Relevant and irrelevant meanings 
The Graded Salience Hypothesis states that in the case of conventional metaphors (in 
which both the ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’ meanings are initially activated), and in less 
familiar metaphors (in which the less salient metaphoric meaning is accessed after a 
delay in which the salient ‘literal’ meaning is accessed and rejected), the contextually 
incompatible ‘literal’ meaning is not discarded in a metaphor biasing context, 
provided it plays a role in the construction of the compatible meaning, and that it does 
not ‘disrupt’ the derivation of the compatible, metaphoric interpretation. In contrast, 
when processing a familiar metaphor in a literal biasing context, the incompatible, 
metaphoric meaning (which was initially accessed at the same time as the equally 
salient ‘literal’ meaning) would be suppressed, as it interferes with arriving at the 
compatible ‘literal’ interpretation.  
 
Natural extension to include hyperbole	  
As with Glucksberg, Giora does not explicitly discuss hyperbole. However, it is 
reasonable to speculate that the Graded Salience Hypothesis would account for 
hyperboles of the type X is Y in the same way as it accounts for metaphors of the 
same type; not least because the Graded Salience Hypothesis is a general account of 
language comprehension, not just of metaphor, hence, the premise that salience 
determines initial processing is applied to all types of utterances. 
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In the next section, I will discuss a comparison account of metaphor that overcomes 
many of the limitations of standard comparison accounts (see section 1.4 for full 
discussion), while still claiming that metaphors are processed as implicit similes. 
 
1.6.4 STRUCTURE MAPPING ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR 	  	  
Psycholinguist Dedre Gentner and colleagues offer an alternative ‘Structure-
Mapping’ account of metaphor (Clement & Gentner 1991, Forbus, Gentner, & Law 
1994; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus 1993, Wolff and Gentner 2011). This thesis 
proposes that metaphor comprehension is a comparison process rather than a 
categorization process as suggested by concept construction accounts, such as 
Relevance Theory (Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2006) or the class-
inclusion account of metaphor (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990). However, the account 
is such that it doesn’t fall foul of the same criticisms leveled at standard comparison 
accounts (see section 1.4 for discussion). 	  
Gentner and colleagues argue that during comprehension, the hearer engages in a 
structural alignment process, which involves searching for common relational features 
(attributes and relations) between the topic and vehicle concepts, followed by an 
inference projection process in which predicates are mapped/projected from the base 
(vehicle) to the target (topic). Hearers must keep active relational correspondences 
between the vehicle and the topic and must not be distracted by surface differences. 
Structure alignment 
Gentner and colleagues argue that during all comparisons, firstly the two domains 
(topic and vehicle) are initially ‘aligned’16; at which stage directionality is not 
considered (i.e. the role each concept is playing (topic/vehicle) is not considered).  
The Structure-Mapping Engine (SME) (Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16‘First, the identical predicates in the target and base concepts are matched, and the arguments of these predicates 
are placed in correspondence by parallel connectivity : midwife - Socrates, mother - student and child - idea. Next, 
these local matches are coalesced into a global system of matches that is maximally consistent’ (Bowdle and 
Gentner 2005:11)	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Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995) utilizes “a three-stage local-to-global matching 
process” (Wolff and Gentner 2011:4) to find the “maximal structurally consistent 
alignment between two representations”.  
Stage 1:  
All pairs of identical predicates and their corresponding arguments are mapped. (e.g. 
for the metaphor ‘‘Suburbs are parasites,’’ if the topic and vehicle representations 
include something along the lines of ‘parasites get food from host’ and ‘suburbs get 
utilities from near by cities’, the two ‘get-from’ predicates would be matched, leading 
to the further correspondences suburb - parasite, host - city, and food - utilities. 
Gentner and Colleages argue that this initial ‘local matching’ stage results in a large 
number of potential correspondences.  
Stage 2:  
However, during a second phase, structural consistency is enforced; the local matches 
are coalesced into small, structurally consistent mapping clusters (called kernels).  
Stage 3: 
Kernels are merged into large global interpretations, using a merge algorithm (Forbus 
& Oblinger, 1990) that begins with the maximal kernel, adds the next-largest kernel 
that is structurally consistent with the first, and continues until no more kernels can be 
added without compromising structural consistency.  
The SME then produces a structural evaluation of the interpretation(s), using a 
cascade-like algorithm that favors deep interrelated systems over shallow systems, all 
else being equal. 
Predicate projection/mapping 
Later in processing, predicates are mapped/projected from base (vehicle) to target 
(topic). The distinction between metaphoric and literal comparisons lies in the types 
of predicates that are mapped. In both cases, many relation predicates are mapped 
from base to target, but in the case of literal comparisons, many more attribute 
predicates are mapped from base to target (literal comparisons can also generally be 
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reversed, unlike metaphoric comparisons), than in the case of metaphoric 
comparisons.	  
“ The hydrogen atom is like our solar system……‘The electron revolves around the 
nucleus, just as the planets revolve around the sun’ but not ‘the nucleus is yellow, 
massive etc. like the sun’” (Gentner 1983:3) 
No default literal interpretation 
The Structure Mapping Engine (SME) can derive two interpretations of a comparison 
(literal and a metaphorical) in parallel. Therefore, according to this account, 
metaphoric comparisons of the type ‘My lawyer is a shark’ are processed in the same 
way as a literal comparison, which means that there is no need to initiate a special 
metaphor interpretation process. This also means that as with the concept construction 
accounts discussed above, this account does not come up against the problem of there 
being a default ‘literal interpretation’ which must be arrived at first before being 
rejected in search of an alternative metaphoric interpretation. 	  
The career of metaphor	  
In addition to the main working of the account detailed above, Bowdle and Gentner 
(2005) build the ‘Career of metaphor’ theory based on the Structure Mapping account, 
which provides an account of how metaphoric mappings might come to stabilize (be 
stored in long term memory), and how conventionalized metaphors might be 
processed. Bowdle and Gentner argue that conventional figurative statements differ 
from novel ones in that they have ‘stored’ metaphorical representations, and that 
where novel metaphors are always processed as comparisons in the way described 
above, conventional metaphors can either be processed as implicit similes in that way, 
or they can be processed as categorizations just as literal categorizations (e.g. A 
lemon is a fruit) would be. As a result of this, they argue that conventionalized 
metaphors may be quicker to process than novel metaphors as processing is more 
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Hyperbole	  	  
Although not discussed by Gentner and colleagues, the Structure-Mapping account 
appears to entail that hyperbolic comparisons of the type ‘The earl grey tea was 
noxious’ or ‘His back yard was a forest’, would also be processed in the same way as 
metaphoric (‘The politician’s speech was noxious’ or ‘The university was a forest’) 
and literal comparisons (‘The varnish was noxious’ or ‘The national park was a 
forest’. Structure-mapping offers a way in which metaphorical and literal comparisons 
can be processed via a single mechanism “the processing mechanism is indifferent to 
this distinction” (Gentner and Wolff 1997:17); the only difference between the two 
types of comparisons being the type of predicates that are mapped. Therefore, 
presumably, hyperbole would lie somewhere along the continuum between literal 
comparisons and metaphors; with hyperbolic comparisons involving more mapping of 
object attributes than metaphoric comparisons, but less than literal comparisons. See 
the examples below: 
 
j2) The back yard is a forest (hyperbole)	  
k2) The university is a forest (metaphor)	  
 
It is clear to see that in the case of the metaphor in (k2), relation predicates are 
mapped, but attribute predicates are not. Universities are big, dense and confusing like 
a forest (a mapping of relation predicates), but they are not packed full of trees and 
undergrowth like forests (a mapping of attribute predicates). However, in the case of 
the hyperbole in (j2), as well as the mapping of relation predicates (e.g. difficult to 
access and walk through), many attribute predicates will also be mapped. An 
overgrown, ill-maintained back yard will share many attributes with a forest (e.g. 




Gentner and colleagues argue that during comprehension, the hearer engages in a 
structural alignment process, which involves searching for common relational features 
(attributes and relations) between the topic and vehicle concepts, followed by an 
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inference projection process in which predicates are mapped/projected from the base 
(vehicle) to the target (topic).  
Relevant and irrelevant information 
Hearers must keep active relational correspondences between the vehicle and the 
topic, and must not be distracted by surface differences. Thus, relevant relational 
correspondences will be activated, while irrelevant surface differences will lose 
activation. 
No default literal interpretation 
The Structure Mapping Engine (SME) can derive two interpretations of a comparison 
(literal and a metaphorical) in parallel. Therefore, according to this account, 
metaphoric comparisons of the type ‘My lawyer is a shark’ are processed in the same 
way as a literal comparison, which means that there is no need to initiate a special 
metaphor interpretation process. 
Familiar vs. novel metaphors 
Bowdle and Gentner argue that conventional figurative statements differ from novel 
ones in that they have ‘stored’ metaphorical representations, and that where novel 
metaphors are always processed as comparisons in the way described above, 
conventional metaphors can either be processed as implicit similes in that way, or 
they can be processed as categorizations just as literal categorizations. 
 
 
A natural extension to hyperbole 
 
The account posits that metaphorical and literal comparisons can be processed via a 
single mechanism; the only difference between the two types of comparisons being 
the type of predicates that are mapped (attribute vs. relation). Therefore, presumably, 
hyperbole would lie somewhere along the continuum between literal comparisons and 
metaphors, with hyperbolic comparisons involving more mapping of object attributes 
than metaphoric comparisons, but less than literal comparisons.  
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In the next section, I will discuss an account in which it is claimed that our conceptual 
system is metaphoric in its structure; there are permanent mappings between domains 
in long-term memory, which facilitate metaphor comprehension during 
communication. 
 
1.6.5 DIRECT ACCESS VIEW 	  	  
Raymond Gibbs’ Direct Access (DA) model of metaphor holds that it is possible for 
hearers to comprehend the intended meanings of non-literal utterances, directly, if 
they are supported by a ‘social context’ (Gibbs 1994). The hearer need not arrive at a 
‘literal’ interpretation of the entire utterance, before using pragmatic information to 
infer the intended meaning. As we have seen, this is not a novel claim. All four of the 
current accounts discussed above, also fall in line with the empirical evidence, by not 
positing a ‘literal-first’ processing model. Like lexical pragmatic accounts (Wilson 
and Carston 2007), the Direct Access account does claim that literalness may still take 
precedence at a lexical level, yet not at the utterance level. Gibbs (1994: 461) argues 
that hearers may still ‘analyze aspects of what words mean’ when comprehending 
figurative language’, so the uniqueness of the account does not lie here.	  
The Direct Access view stands apart from the other accounts discussed with respect to 
its claims about the nature of our conceptual representations, and the role they play in 
metaphor comprehension. Gibbs (1992), following the linguist, Lakoff (1980; 1987; 
1990; 1993), argues that metaphors are fundamental to the structure of our network of 
conceptual representations, rather than instances of ad hoc, occasion specific 
categorizations for communicative purposes. He argues that we make sense of the 
world by making metaphoric comparisons, and therefore these comparisons are an 
integral part of our mental representations, and that new metaphoric comparisons are 
nearly always built on existing metaphoric mappings between domains in long term 
memory.	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Metaphoric mind	  	  
Recall that the class-inclusion account posits that in producing a metaphor, we are 
constructing an ad hoc category (i.e. VICIOUS TENATIOUS THINGS) with which 
to categorize the topic (i.e. LAWYERS), and using a ‘prototypical’ member of that ad 
hoc category (i.e. SHARKS) to refer to it, as it doesn’t have its own associated single 
lexical item. This entails that every time a novel, yet related metaphor is constructed 
(e.g. Lawyers are tigers; lawyers are crocodiles etc.), this same process of ad hoc 
concept construction takes place. 	  	  
Gibbs (1992) argues that according to Glucksberg’s view, many related metaphors 
would result in many separate conceptual mappings (i.e. LAWYERS – SHARKS; 
LAWYERS – TIGERS; LAWYERS – CROCODILES), which is an aspect of the 
account which Gibbs takes issue with. As with the Relevance Theory concept 
construction account, the class-inclusion account does propose that stable concepts 
are accessed and used during the construction of ad hoc categories from which 
metaphors arise, but they do not acknowledge that our stable concepts themselves 
might be metaphorically structured, and that novel metaphors may be constructed on 
the basis of such existing, permanent metaphoric conceptual mappings. 	  	  
Gibbs (1992) follows Lakoff and others (Johnson 1987; Kovecses 1988; Lakoff 
1987,1990; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989) by claiming that there 
are permanent mappings between domains in long term memory, constituted by 
previous metaphoric comparisons, and that the vast majority of seemingly novel 
metaphors reflect stable metaphoric conceptual mappings (i.e. if an individual already 
has a mapping between LAWYERS and SHARKS, then that individual has an 
understanding of the relationship between lawyers and vicious, tenacious things, and 
could construct a novel, yet related metaphor ‘My lawyer is a tiger’, with ‘tiger’ being 
an alternative prototypical member of that ad hoc category VICIOUS TENACIOUS 
THINGS). On this basis, Gibbs (1992) argues that we understand the world, or at least 
structure our more abstract concepts, in terms of our other concepts (e.g. we 
understand love in terms of a journey), and that this influences the vast majority of 
metaphor comprehension.	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Gibbs does not posit a processing model of exactly what he believes to be “the 
conditions under which people ordinarily activate conceptual metaphors during 
metaphor comprehension” (Gibbs 1992:576). On the contrary, he argues that more 
fine-grained empirical studies would need to be carried out in order to make such 
predictions. He proposes two hypotheses:	  	  
“either….people comprehend metaphoric statements by instantiating conceptual 
metaphors from long-term memory at the same time that they engage in ad hoc 
categorization…..or perhaps people use pre-existing metaphorical mapping when 
they reflect on the meanings of verbal metaphors, but do not access this metaphorical 
knowledge in long-term memory during the immediate, on-line processing of 
linguistics metaphors.” (Gibbs 1992:576). 	  	  
Familiarity 	  	  
By definition, the Direct Access account is an account of both highly 
conventionalized metaphors (e.g. She is an angel or she is a pig) (conceptual 
mappings between domains (ANGEL – KIND; GREEDY – PIG), and novel 
metaphors (love is a mountain path) based on pre-existing conceptual mappings 
(LOVE – JOURNEY) in long term memory.  	  
Gibbs (1992) alludes to the fact that he would accept an ad hoc concept construction 
account of the few cases that he concedes may be truly novel metaphors, but that 
Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) are wrong not to acknowledge that most metaphors are 
based on pre-existing metaphoric conceptual mappings.  	  	  
Gibbs argues that this notion of metaphoric mappings in our conceptual system, 
explains why some, seemingly novel metaphors appear so easy to comprehend, where 
others do not. The former could be based on a pre-existing metaphoric mapping 
between domains in long-term memory, and the latter could not be. 	  	  
Hyperbole	  	  
Gibbs (1990; 1992; 2000; 2002; 2006) applies the Direct Access view to metaphor, 
idioms and irony. However, presumably the claim that hearers need not arrive at a 
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literal interpretation of an utterance before inferring a figurative interpretation would 
apply to all instances of ‘non-literal’ language which rely on mappings between 
domains i.e. hyperbolic statements pertain to mappings between domains just as 
metaphoric statements do. Thus, the interpretation of hyperbolic statements should be 
facilitated by the pre-existing mappings posited by Gibbs, just as he proposes 
metaphor interpretation to be, as if novel metaphoric comparisons are nearly always 
built on existing metaphoric mappings between domains in long-term memory, then, 
probably, so are novel hyperbolic comparisons. Consider the examples in (l2) and 
(m2),  
 
l2) The bath is boiling 
m2) The sea is boiling17 
 
The statement in (l2) would be categorized as a hyperbole (a broadening of the 
concept BOILING along the temperature scale to include very hot water as well as 
water at 100 degrees centigrade), and the statement in (m2) would be categorized as a 
metaphor (a broadening of the concept BOILING to include any rough and turbulent 
waters, including a stormy sea), but both pertain to distinct mappings between the 
topic and vehicle domains. Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that the existence 
of stable metaphoric mappings in long-term memory would facilitate hyperbole 




A metaphorical mind 
 
Gibbs (1992) argues that metaphors are fundamental to the structure of our network of 
conceptual representations, rather than instances of ad hoc, occasion specific 
categorizations for communicative purposes. He argues that we make sense of the 
world by making metaphoric comparisons, and therefore these comparisons are an 
integral part of our mental representations. Consequently, new metaphoric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Taken from Carston 2010	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comparisons are nearly always built on existing metaphoric mappings between 
domains in long-term memory. 
 
No default literal interpretation 
 
By definition, this account entails that metaphoric interpretations are accessed 
directly, and a hearer need not go via the literal interpretation of the utterance. 
 
Familiar vs. novel metaphors 
 
The Direct Access account is an account of both highly conventionalized metaphors 
(e.g. She is an angel or she is a pig) (conceptual mappings between domains (ANGEL 
– KIND; GREEDY – PIG), and novel metaphors (love is a mountain path) based on 
pre-existing conceptual mappings (LOVE – JOURNEY) in long-term memory. Gibbs 
does, however, concede that the only exception might be truly novel metaphors, 
which are not based at all on any pre-existing conceptual mapping. He argues that 
these may indeed be interpreted via something like the concept construction account 
posited by Glucksberg and colleagues.  	  
A natural extension to hyperbole 
 
Like metaphoric statements, hyperbolic statements pertain to mappings between 
domains. Thus, the existence of stable metaphoric mappings in long-term memory 
would facilitate comprehension of hyperboles just as Gibbs claims they facilitate the 
comprehension of metaphor, as if novel metaphoric comparisons are nearly always 
built on existing metaphoric mappings between domains in long-term memory, then 
surely so are novel hyperbolic comparisons. 
 
Before discussing the processing predictions made by the current theoretical accounts 
discussed in this chapter, I will summarize and contrast the theories according to the 
claims they make with respect to 5 key issues relating to figurative language 
comprehension, all of which will be relevant to the findings (both existing and new) 
and discussion presented in the rest of this thesis. 	  
	   80 
1.6.6 SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF METAPHOR 
 
What is the metaphor interpretation comprehension procedure? 
The concept construction accounts (Relevance Theory and the Class-inclusion 
account) propose that metaphors serve to categorize topics within an ad hoc, occasion 
specific category, which is derived from the vehicle term, thus allowing features of 
that ad hoc category to be projected from the vehicle to the topic. However, the two 
concept construction accounts discussed differ with respect to the claims they make 
about what drives interpretation. 
 
Relevance Theorists lay out a detailed comprehension procedure, which, is argued to 
guide the hearer in her selection of relevant features with which to construct our ‘ad 
hoc concept’. On the other hand, Glucksberg and colleagues claim that it is the topic’s 
dimensions of attribution, as well as the prototypical features of the metaphor vehicle, 
which guide our construction of the ad hoc category of which the metaphor vehicle is 
an exemplar. 	  	  
Likewise, where Relevance Theorists claim that expectations of relevance trigger the 
concept construction process, Glucksberg and colleagues propose that it is the 
recognition of the dual-reference of the vehicle, which signals metaphoricity, and thus 
triggers the hearer to construct the ad hoc concept of which they believe the vehicle to 
be an exemplar, which in turn determines the properties which are intended for 
attribution. 	  	  
In contrast with the two concept construction/categorization accounts, the structure 
mapping account states that novel metaphor comprehension involves the neutral 
structural alignment of the topic and vehicle concepts, and the subsequent projection 
of relevant predicates from the vehicle to the topic. 	  	  
Although she doesn’t place her stake in the categorization/comparison debate, Giora 
proposes that it is salience rather than literality/non-literality, or contextual relevance, 
that determines the initial processes involved in metaphor comprehension (or any 
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utterance comprehension). She argues that the most salient meaning is initially 
accessed, and only if it does not fit the context, does further processing take place.  	  	  
Finally, the Direct access account does not posit a processing model, but instead, 
makes the more general claim that metaphoricity is at the heart of our conceptual 
representations of the world, and thus such pre-existing conceptual mappings are 
utilized during the processing of seemingly novel metaphors.  	  
What is the fate of relevant and irrelevant information/meanings associated with 
encoded concepts during metaphor comprehension? 
According to both concept construction accounts (Relevance Theory and Class-
inclusion), in a metaphor biasing context, metaphor relevant features associated with 
the lexically encoded vehicle concept will be activated, while those features that are 
irrelevant will not be considered during interpretation, and will therefore lose 
activation.  
Likewise, according to the Structure-mapping model, hearers must keep active 
relational correspondences between the vehicle and the topic, and must not be 
distracted by surface differences. Thus, relevant relational correspondences will be 
activated, while irrelevant surface differences will lose activation. 
The Graded Salience Hypothesis, on the other hand, makes quite different claims with 
respect to the treatment of relevant and irrelevant meanings during processing. Giora 
claims that in the case of conventional metaphors and less familiar metaphors, the 
contextually incompatible ‘literal’ meaning is not discarded in a metaphor biasing 
context, provided it plays a role in the construction of the compatible meaning, and 
that it does not ‘disrupt’ the derivation of the compatible, metaphoric interpretation. 
In contrast, when processing a familiar metaphor in a literal biasing context, the 
incompatible, metaphoric meaning would be suppressed, as it interferes with arriving 
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Must a default literal interpretation arrived at before a more appropriate non-literal 
interpretation can be derived? 
 
All of the above accounts, with the exception of Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis 
account of novel metaphor comprehension, propose that we are not required to go via 
the literal interpretation of a figurative statement in order to arrive at an appropriate 
metaphoric interpretation as was suggested by neo-Gricean accounts (Clark and Lucy 
1965; Janus and Bever 1985; Lyons 1977). Giora, on the other hand claims that the 
only salient meaning available when processing a novel metaphor, will be the ‘literal’ 
meaning, and thus, any subsequent interpretation derived from the context would be 
arrived at after first processing the ‘literal’ meaning.	  
Are the processes and mechanisms posited different for familiar and novel 
metaphors? 
Wilson and Carston (2007) argue that frequent use of a metaphoric statement can lead 
to a metaphor vehicle gaining an additional lexically encoded meaning. They argue 
that once a metaphor vehicle has become polysemous in this way, it is likely to be 
processed as an ambiguous word, thus requiring disambiguation, rather than ad hoc 
concept construction.  
Likewise, Glucksberg (2001) states that his account is one of novel metaphor 
comprehension, but he argues that as a result of frequent use, metaphor vehicles can 
transition from being good exemplars of an ad hoc category, to become prototypical 
members of that category. In such instances, they may come to lexically encode the 
‘ad hoc category’, meaning that processing will involve concept selection as opposed 
to the concept construction process posited for novel metaphor interpretation. 
An account centered around salience would always have to posit quite different 
accounts of familiar and unfamiliar metaphor processing, as by definition an intended 
metaphoric interpretation of an unfamiliar metaphor would not be salient. Thus, the 
Graded Salience Hypothesis claims that in the case of a familiar metaphor both the 
‘literal’ and the metaphoric meanings will be initially accessed in both metaphor and 
literal biasing contexts, as both the ‘literal’ and the metaphoric meanings are equally 
salient.  However, in the case of less familiar metaphors, the literal meaning is evoked 
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first and rejected on the basis of poor contextual fit before the less salient metaphoric 
meaning is activated, as novel metaphors have only one salient meaning – the literal 
one. 	  
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) argue that conventional figurative statements differ from 
novel ones in that they have ‘stored’ metaphorical representations, and that where 
novel metaphors are always processed as comparisons in the way described above, 
conventional metaphors can either be processed as implicit similes in that way, or 
they can be processed as categorizations just as literal categorizations. 
 
Finally, the Direct Access account does not distinguish between highly 
conventionalized metaphors and novel metaphors (love is a mountain path) based on 
pre-existing conceptual mappings (LOVE – JOURNEY) in long term memory. Gibbs 
does, however, concede that truly novel metaphors, which are not based at all on any 
pre-existing conceptual mapping might be processed via occasion specific concept 
construction.  
 
Can the theories discussed also account for how hyperbolic statements are 
processed? 
 
The relevance theoretic lexical pragmatic account claims that approximations, 
hyperboles and metaphors are all instances in which an accurate interpretation is 
arrived at by constructing an occasion specific concept that has a broader denotation 
than that of the lexically encoded vehicle concept, and that all such instances of 
lexical broadening can be accounted for by their on-line concept construction account. 
This raises the question, why do many theories claim only to account for metaphor? 
Are they right to apply their accounts to metaphor alone, or could any of the current 
accounts discussed be extended to account for hyperbole; the other trope which is the 
focus of this thesis? 
The class-inclusion account, though posited as an account of metaphor alone, is also 
equipped to account for hyperbolic statements. In fact, I propose that the workings of 
the account entail that hyperbolic statements must be accounted for by the same 
comprehension procedure, as there is nothing in the detail of the processing model 
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which would be able to differentiate between a hyperbolic and a metaphoric 
statement.	  
As with Glucksberg, Giora does not explicitly discuss hyperbole. However, it is 
reasonable to speculate that the Graded Salience Hypothesis would account for 
hyperboles of the type X is Y in the same way as it accounts for metaphors of the 
same type; the Graded Salience Hypothesis is a general account of language 
comprehension, which means that the premise that salience determines initial 
processing is applied to all types of utterances. 
The Structure-Mapping account posits that metaphorical and literal comparisons can 
be processed via a single mechanism; the only difference between the two types of 
comparisons being the type of predicates that are mapped (attribute vs. relation). 
Therefore, I argue that, presumably, hyperbole would lie somewhere along the 
continuum between literal comparisons and metaphors, with hyperbolic comparisons 
involving more mapping of object attributes than metaphoric comparisons, but less 
than literal comparisons.  
 
Finally, hyperbolic statements pertain to mappings between domains, just as 
metaphoric statements do. Thus, the existence of stable metaphoric mappings in long-
term memory would facilitate comprehension of hyperboles just as Gibbs claims they 
facilitate the comprehension of metaphor, as if novel metaphoric comparisons are 
nearly always built on existing metaphoric mappings between domains in long-term 
memory, then surely so are novel hyperbolic comparisons. 
 
In table 1, each of the accounts are contrasted with respect to the five issues discussed 
above. 
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No Yes Yes 
Graded Salience 
Hypothesis 
 No  Yes Yes 
Structure-
Mapping account 
Implicit similes No Yes Yes 
Direct Access 
account 
 No Yes. Only 
completely novel 






1.7 ADULT PROCESSING PREDICTIONS OF THE ABOVE ACCOUNTS 	  
1.7.1 METAPHOR 	  	  
The current accounts discussed make a number of processing predictions, many of 
which have been empirically tested over the last few decades. Before discussing the 
existing data in chapter 2, I will discuss in some detail, the predictions made by each 
of the accounts.	  	  
General predictions	  
Does metaphor processing involve sequential stages, starting with arrival at a literal 
interpretation (as suggested by neo-Gricean accounts)? 
Non-sequential 
The class-inclusion account, the Relevance Theoretic account, and the Direct Access 
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account, all propose that the literal interpretation only has priority over the figurative 
one at the local, lexical level, not at the global level of the utterance. 	  
The Relevance Theoretic account states that the lexically encoded vehicle concept is 
‘accessed’ during the search for relevant features with which to construct the occasion 
specific communicated concept, but a literal interpretation of the entire utterance is 
not arrived at by default before an alternative, more appropriate interpretation can be 
derived. Relevance theorists posit that ‘mutual adjustment of the explicit content and 
contextual implications takes place in parallel rather than in sequence’ (Sperber and 
Wilson 2006:14).  
The class-inclusion account holds that it is both the linguistic and the discourse 
context which guides the hearer as to whether a vehicle term such as ‘shark’ is being 
used to refer to the basic-level category or the superordinate category; the literal 
meaning of the utterance is not derived first, before it is assumed that the vehicle term 
is being used to refer to the superordinate category.  
Finally, Gibbs’ Direct Access view holds that while hearers may access concepts in 
order to analyze aspects of word meaning, hearers need not derive a literal meaning of 
the sentence as a whole before arriving at the intended figurative meaning; they can 
access the figurative interpretation directly via pre-existing mappings between 
domains in long-term memory.	  
The structure-Mapping account also avoids a sequential processing account. The 
Structure Mapping Engine can derive two interpretations of a comparison (literal and 
figurative) in parallel. Therefore, according to this account, figurative comparisons of 
the type ‘My lawyer is a shark’ are processed in the same way as a literal comparison, 
and there is no special metaphor interpretation process, which needs to be triggered.   
Processing predictions 
On this basis, all of the accounts discussed above, unlike neo-Gricean accounts 
(which posit a sequential processing account), predict that, all other things being 
equal, metaphors should take no longer to process than comparable literal statements. 
Moreover, there should be no delay in the availability of a metaphoric interpretation. 
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Both sequential and non-sequential – salience dependent 
Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis account of familiar metaphors is in line with the 
other accounts discussed above, as she also claims that such metaphors do not 
undergo a ‘literal first’, sequential comprehension procedure. However, her account 
of novel metaphor interpretation differs. Giora argues that the literal meaning of a 
novel metaphor is accessed first, and rejected on the basis of poor contextual fit, 
before an accurate non-literal interpretation can be arrived at, because there is only 
one salient meaning in such instances; the literal meaning.  
Processing prediction 
On this basis, according to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, we would expect novel 
metaphor comprehension to be more effortful, and consequently, more time-
consuming than comparable literal statements, and familiar metaphors. (See 
discussion below for all the discussed accounts’ predictions with respect to the novel 
vs. familiar distinction). 
Are metaphoric interpretations ‘richer’ and thus, harder to process? 
The Relevance Theoretic account (Wilson and Carston 2007; Carston and Wearing 
2011) predicts that the more implicatures an interpretation generates (the number of 
cognitive effects it yields), the heavier the dependence on memory will be. This is 
because the context (previous conversation and surrounding linguistic material) must 
be recalled in order for the implicatures to be integrated into the discourse (backwards 
and forwards inferences are required). Therefore, the account predicts that the more 
implicatures there are, the longer the interpretation process will take.  
However, the output of the lexical adjustment procedure Relevance Theorists posit for 
the processing of non-literal utterances contributes to the propositional content of the 
utterance, not the implicit content. This means that according to this account, non-
literal utterances do not necessarily yield any more implicatures than a comparable 
literal utterance. Having said that, the lexical adjustment procedure is highly likely to 
also result in implicatures being derived, especially if the figurative statement is 
embedded within a rich context. Thus, although metaphoric interpretations do not 
necessarily generate any more implicatures than literal interpretations, it is likely that 
they frequently do.  
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Processing prediction 
On this basis at least, metaphors may take longer to process than literal statements. 
Any such processing time differences could either be attributed to the processes 
involved in arriving at the explicit content of the utterance, or the richness of the 
interpretation arrived at (number of implicatures). As the Relevance Theoretic 
comprehension procedure is not sequential, but that of mutual adjustment, it is not the 
case that we derive the metaphoric meaning first (as part of the explicature), and then 
go on to derive various rich implicatures. As these processes are said to be 
simultaneous and feed in to one another, there is no way to set them apart temporally 
in an experimental setting.	  
Notions of implicit and explicit content, cognitive effects and richness of an 
interpretation are associated with pragmatics accounts, and thus the other accounts 
discussed here do not make any predictions in relation to this issue.	  
What happens to relevant and irrelevant information during processing?	  
The Relevance Theoretic account, the class-inclusion account, and the Structure 
mapping account, all entail that the activation level of the concept associated with the 
metaphor vehicle will be reduced during novel metaphor comprehension (either due 
to active suppression or passive decay. See section 2.1.4 for full discussion).  
Glucksberg’s class inclusion account states that an occasion specific concept is 
constructed based on metaphor relevant features of the superordinate concept denoted 
by the vehicle term, and metaphor inconsistent features become deactivated due to 
lack of attention, or active suppression (see section 2.1.4 for full discussion of the 
mechanism of suppression). 
The Relevance Theoretic lexical pragmatic account states that an ad hoc, occasion 
specific concept is constructed on the basis of the metaphor relevant properties of the 
lexically encoded vehicle concept, and metaphor irrelevant feature(s) are ‘dropped’ or 
‘demoted’ (Carston 2007:334-358). The authors leave open for interpretation what the 
process of ‘dropping’ or ‘demotion’ would involve in lexical processing terms 
(passive decay as a result of lack of attention, or active suppression). However, a 
number of recent studies suggest that the process they describe would result from 
active suppression (Gernsbacher. M.A, Keysar. B, Robertson. R, and Werner. N. 
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1995, 1997, 2001, McGlone & Manfredi, 2001, and Rubio-Fernandez 2004, 2007). 
See section 2.1.4 for full discussion. 
Gentner and colleague’s Structure-Mapping account states that metaphor 
interpretation is a comparison process in which hearers must keep active relational 
correspondences between the vehicle and the topic and must not be distracted by 
surface differences, thus, less attention must be paid to these surface differences, or 
they may even need to be actively suppressed.  
Contrary to the above accounts, Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis states that the 
contextually incompatible ‘literal’ meaning is not discarded at all in a metaphor 
biasing context, provided it plays a role in the construction of the compatible 
meaning, and that it does not ‘disrupt’ the derivation of the compatible, metaphoric 
interpretation. She argues that it is when processing a familiar metaphor in a ‘literal’ 
biasing context, that inhibition might take place. Furthermore, she maintains that the 
contextually incompatible, yet equally salient metaphoric meaning would require 
suppression in such instances. 	  
Since Gibbs does not present a processing model of metaphors, but instead makes a 
more general claim about the metaphorical nature of our conceptual representations, 
and the role that stable conceptual mappings might play during metaphor 
comprehension, the DA account does not make clear predictions with respect to 
activation and suppression.	  
Activation pattern predictions 
According to the current accounts that make predictions in this respect, we might 
expect the following patterns of activation: 	  
1. Familiar metaphors in a metaphor-biasing context:	  
Graded Salience Hypothesis - Literal and metaphoric meanings will be initially 
activated, and will remain equally activated.	  
Relevance Theory, Class-inclusion, and Structure-Mapping - Although the literal and 
metaphoric meanings will be initially activated, the literal meaning will show signs of 
suppression after initial processing.	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2. Familiar metaphors in a literal-biasing context:	  
Graded Salience Hypothesis - Literal and metaphoric meanings will be initially 
activated, and will remain equally activated.	  
Relevance Theory, Class-inclusion, and Structure-Mapping - Although both the literal 
and metaphoric meanings will both be initially activated, the metaphoric meaning will 
show signs of suppression after initial processing.	  
Novel metaphors in a metaphor-biasing context:	  
Graded Salience Hypothesis – Only the literal meaning will initially be activated, and 
after some delay, both the literal meaning and the metaphoric meaning will show 
signs of activation.	  
Relevance Theory, Class-inclusion, and Structure-Mapping - Although both the literal 
and metaphoric meanings will both be initially activated, the literal meaning will 
show signs of suppression – or at least reduction - after initial processing.	  
Novel metaphors in a literal-biasing context:	  
Graded Salience Hypothesis – Only the literal meaning will be activated.	  
Relevance Theory, Class-inclusion, and Structure-Mapping - Only the literal meaning 
will be activated. Presumably, according to all accounts, a novel metaphorical 
expression is understood literally in such a literal biasing context.	  
Are there processing differences between novel and familiar metaphors?	  
Empirical research suggests that familiarity (as well as aptness) affects metaphor 
comprehension (Blasko Blank, 1988; Blasko & Connine, 1993; Camac & Glucksberg, 
1984; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Martin, 
1992). In line with these findings, all the accounts discussed in this section predict 
that familiar and/or conventionalised metaphors may be easier to process than 
unfamiliar metaphors (Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Glucksberg 2001, 2003; Gibbs 
1992). 	  	  
Relevance-theorists explicitly state that their account is intended as a model of novel 
figurative language comprehension. Conventionalised figurative statements (e.g. She 
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is an Angel) most likely undergo a faster, less attentional process of disambiguation 
(Swinney 1979), as such conventionalised metaphor vehicles have most likely 
become polysemous through frequent use in a metaphoric context (Wilson and 
Carston 2007:26). 	  	  
Furthermore, Glucksberg (2001:112) states ‘...metaphors become conventional [when 
they] ideally represent their attributive categories’ i.e. they become prototypical of the 
‘originally’ ad hoc category referred to in frequently used metaphors, and thus may go 
on to lexically encode the ‘ad hoc category’. In such instances, the hearer would be 
able to retrieve the intended meaning from long-term memory. 	  	  
Giora posits processing distinctions between novel and familiar metaphors, since she 
states that in the case of familiar metaphors (not just highly conventional metaphors, 
but also in any way familiar ones), both salient literal and metaphoric meanings are 
available from the beginning of processing, however there is only one salient meaning 
available during the initial processing of a novel metaphor; the metaphoric meaning 
must be subsequently arrived at. 	  	  
Finally, not only does the Direct Access account entail that familiar metaphors (e.g. 
My sister is an Angel) and novel metaphors based on an existing metaphorical 
mapping (e.g. My day has been a tsunami) will be quicker to process than completely 
novel metaphors (e.g. My family is a mirror) because there are relevant, stable 
conceptual mappings already in place in long-term memory. Thus, this account 
predicts that a novel metaphor (e.g. the road is a worm) which is based on the same 
conceptual mapping as a conventional metaphor (e.g. the road is a snake), would be 
quicker to process than a novel metaphor which does not pertain to any stable 
conceptual mapping (e.g. my husband is a curtain). 
 
The above accounts do differ with respect to how familiar or novel a metaphor needs 
to be to warrant a different comprehension procedure. Relevance theorists (Wilson 
and Carton 2007), Gentner and colleagues, and Glucksberg and colleagues 
(Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001), for example, only posit a distinct 
processing model for the most highly conventionalized metaphors, which, they argue, 
will have acquired an additional sense through such frequent use. Whereas, as any 
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account based on salience would have to predict, the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
entails that any metaphor that is at all familiar will be quicker to process than one 
which is not, because both a literal and a metaphoric interpretation will be available 
right from the beginning of processing in the case of the familiar metaphor. However, 
in the case of the completely novel metaphor, only a literal interpretation will be 
available at first.	  
What other processing predictions do the specific theories make?	  
Concept construction accounts 	  
These accounts predict a main effect of aptness (Glucksberg & McGlone 1999); as 
aptness decreases (i.e. the metaphor vehicle is not a good enough exemplar of the 
relevant category), the likelihood of comprehending the statement metaphorically 
decreases, and therefore the likelihood of successful categorization also decreases. 
Moreover, even if a non-apt metaphor is eventually understood, it would presumably 
take longer to process than an apt metaphor. Thus, preference for the metaphor 
(categorical) form should be greater for highly apt statements than for less apt 
statements.	  	  
In addition, if metaphors are processed in category assertion form as the concept 
construction accounts claim then they should, in general, be non-reversible (i.e. not 
retain the same meaning when reversed). 	  
Class-inclusion account specific predictions	  
This account, perhaps counter-intuitively, entails an early alignment process just as 
the Structure Mapping account does “A first step is alignment of the vehicle and the 
topic concepts so that dimensions of attribution of the topic can be matched against 
candidate properties of the vehicle” (Glucksberg 2001.p. 54). Therefore, any 
evidence suggesting the existence of an early alignment process would not be 
evidence against this account (e.g. Wolff and Gentner’s (2011) findings. See section 
2.1.3 for full discussion of such evidence).  
However, according to this account, the early alignment process would not be role 
neutral as the Class-inclusion account’s claim is that the topic and vehicle concepts 
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input different things to the alignment/comparison process (i.e. that which is 
aligned/compared is different for topics and vehicles). Therefore, the input to the 
alignment process would be different for the metaphor ‘the surgeon was a butcher’ 
than it would be for the metaphor ‘the butcher was a surgeon’. In the first instance, 
dimensions of attribution of the concept SURGEON would be aligned with properties 
of the concept BUTCHER. Whereas in the second instance, dimensions of attribution 
of the concept BUTCHER would be aligned with properties of the concept 
SURGEON (i.e. the alignment process would be role specific). Therefore, any 
evidence of role neutrality during the very initial stages of processing would go 
against the class-inclusion account.	  
Structure-mapping account specific predictions	  
According to the Structure-Mapping account, conventional metaphors can be 
processed categorically. Therefore, since metaphors have a categorical structure (X is 
a Y), people should prefer to see conventional metaphors in metaphor form rather 
than in simile form. On the other hand, Gentner and colleagues claim that novel 
metaphoric statements are processed as comparisons, and thus, despite the fact that 
metaphors have a categorical structure, it follows that novel statements should be 
preferred in simile form, since they are processed as such anyway. Processing effort 
would be reduced if the statement does not have to be converted from categorical 
form to simile form in order to be interpreted.	  
Although this account does entail that overall, topics and vehicles have specific roles 
during metaphor comprehension (inferences are projected from the vehicle to the 
topic), topic and vehicle role sensitivity arises late in processing. The authors argue 
that there is an initial symmetrical alignment process of the topic and vehicle concepts 
which is ‘role neutral’. The presentation of any metaphor, whatever its kind, should 
immediately trigger the property matching process, and thus metaphor comprehension 
should be facilitated (primed) by immediate prior exposure to the same metaphor.	  
Moreover, this account predicts that the proposed early symmetrical alignment 
process should be easier (quicker) when the topic and vehicle are similar with respect 
to the properties/predicates that the metaphor pertains to i.e. alignment should be 
easier for when topics and vehicles are similar. Thus, what Wolff and Gentner (2000) 
refer to as high-similarity metaphors such as ‘That soldier is a pawn’ should be faster 
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to process than low-similarity metaphors such as ‘That senator is a pawn.’ “This is 
because the abstraction associated with a pawn-‘being controlled from above’ is also 
present to some degree in representations of soldier, resulting in a rather large 
match.” Wolff and Gentner 2000:5)	  	  
In addition, this account predicts that metaphor processing should be facilitated when 
the two terms being compared are close in the text (as in predicative metaphors over 
referential metaphors) as this triggers the predicate alignment process to begin. 	  	  
Finally, Gentner and colleagues claim that metaphoric mappings can be 
‘incrementally extended’ in order to process extended metaphors (Gentner and 
Bowdle 2008), and that this facilitates interpretation. The authors thus predict that 
novel metaphors will be quicker to process if they are an extension of a preceding 
metaphor.	  	  
On the other hand, according to the ‘career of metaphor’ hypothesis, a conventional 
metaphor may be processed as a categorization, and thus should not benefit from pre-
existing domain mappings created during the processing of a preceding metaphor of 
which it is an extension.	  	  
Direct Access account predictions	  
This account makes the general prediction that metaphor processing will be facilitated 
by a preceding metaphor if that metaphor is based on the same domain mapping (i.e. 
‘This relationship is a long and bumpy road’ would be facilitated by a preceding 
metaphor ‘it is a dangerous path to take’).	  
 
Graded Salience Hypothesis predictions	  	  
According to this account, during the processing of familiar metaphors, both salient 
metaphoric and literal meanings are activated in both metaphor and literal biasing 
contexts (as discussed above, only in a literal biasing context would suppression take 
place – the contextually inappropriate metaphoric meaning would be suppressed). 
However, during the early stages of processing a novel metaphor, only a literal 
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meaning is activated; an appropriate metaphoric interpretation is derived and 
therefore, will become active later during processing. 
 
The table below illustrates the comparable processing predictions each of the accounts 
make with respect to metaphor interpretation. 
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Table 2. Metaphor processing predictions 
 Is a literal interpretation 
processed first? 
Does metaphor irrelevant 
information associated with the 
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begin with an 
alignment of 
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concepts? 
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1.7.2 HYPERBOLE	  	  
Perhaps, with the exception of Carston and Wearing’s (2011) discontinuity account, 
the accounts discussed above either explicitly propose, or suggest that the same 
comprehension procedures underlie metaphor and hyperbole. Therefore, the above 
predictions in relation to sequential vs. non-sequential processing, richness of the 
interpretation, deactivation of context irrelevant features, and effects of familiarity, as 
well as the theory specific predictions, would also apply to the processing of 
hyperbolic statements. 	  
As discussed, Relevance Theorists (Sperber and Wilson 2006; Wilson and Carston 
2007), draw no distinction between the comprehension procedures involved in the 
derivation of metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations. They place the two 
interpretive outcomes on a broadening continuum in which features of the lexically 
encoded concept are dropped during the construction of the metaphoric interpretation. 
Therefore, other things being equal (i.e. number of implicatures)18, this account does 
not predict any processing differences between metaphor and hyperbole.	  
Carston and Wearing (2011; Carston 2010) however, have put forward an adapted, 
discontinuous version of the Relevance Theoretic ad hoc concept construction 
account. Though Carston and Wearing are committed to the unification of loose use, 
hyperbole, metaphor and narrowing under one process of lexical adjustment, they are 
not content with the notion that metaphoric interpretations are simply a further 
broadening of the encoded meaning than approximate and hyperbolic interpretations. 
Instead they propose that metaphor interpretation necessarily involves a narrowing as 
well as a broadening of the lexically encoded vehicle concept. Narrowing and 
broadening are not, however, psychologically distinct pragmatic processes. Each 
would not come with its own default ‘cost’ in processing time. Therefore, the 
processing predictions of Carston and Wearing’s (2011) discontinuity account would 
not differ from the Relevance theoretic unified lexical pragmatic account, on this 
basis at least.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  This is unlikely to be the case, as metaphors are often richer and yield more such implicatures. 
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Gentner and colleagues (Clement and Gentner 1991; Gentner 1983; Wolff and 
Gentner 2000; 2011) only discuss metaphoric and literal comparisons, but they claim 
that all comparisons are processed in the same way; during the processing of all 
comparisons (of which they believe novel metaphors of the form X is Y to be 
processed as) the Structure Mapping Engine searches for common relational features 
between the vehicle and the topic concepts. Thus, according to this account novel 
hyperboles of the form X is Y must, ipso facto, be processed in the same way.  
Therefore, like the original RT concept construction account, all other things being 
equal, this account would not predict processing differences between metaphor and 
hyperbole.	  
Although Glucksberg and colleagues (1990; 2001) do not discuss hyperbole within 
the class-inclusion account, it would be a limitation of the account if it were not 
extendable to closely related tropes such as hyperbole. This account claims to deal 
with metaphorical category assertions of the form X is Y (e.g. the university is a 
forest). Just like metaphors, hyperboles frequently take this form (e.g. the back yard 
was a forest), and in both cases the vehicle is not referring to its lexically encoded 
category. Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that the class inclusion account 
would not discriminate between the two tropes and, all other things being equal, 
would not predict processing differences between the two tropes.	  
Like Gentner and Glucksberg and colleagues, Giora (1997; 1999; 2002) does not 
explicitly discuss hyperbole, however the GSH is a general account of language 
comprehension, not just of metaphor, hence, the premise that salience determines 
initial processing is applied to all types of utterances. Therefore, this account predicts 
that in the case of familiar hyperboles, both salient ‘literal’ and ‘hyperbolic’ 
interpretations will be activated and there will be no signs of subsequent suppression 
taking place. However, in the case of unfamiliar hyperboles, only one salient ‘literal’ 
meaning is activated, necessitating further processing triggered by the rejection of this 
salient meaning based on lack of contextual fit. Thus, again, all other things being 
equal, this account does not predict processing differences between the two tropes.	  
Gibbs (1990; 1992; 2000; 2002; 2006) also focuses his application of the Direct 
Access view on metaphor, as well as idioms and irony. However, the claim that the 
hearer need not arrive at a literal interpretation at utterance level, before inferring a 
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figurative interpretation, must apply to all ‘non-literal’ language. Similarly, it is 
reasonable to presume that any effect on metaphor comprehension that the presence 
of permanent metaphoric conceptual mappings in long term memory might have, 
would surely have a comparable effect on the comprehension of hyperbolic 
statements. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this account would predict that 
hyperbole processing will be facilitated by a preceding hyperbole if that hyperbole is 
based on the same domain mapping, just as metaphor processing is.	  
The fact that all but perhaps Carston and Wearing’s (2011) account propose, entail, or 
suggest identical comprehension procedures and processing mechanisms for metaphor 
and hyperbole, provides strong motivation to investigate and contrast the processes 
and mechanisms underlying both tropes. Chapter 3 will be dedicated to presenting the 
findings from a series of studies in which we do just that. Evidence of similar 
comprehension processes underlying both tropes would serve to support the claims 
made by those accounts discussed above, and endorse the arguments made by 
Relevance Theorists for a ‘deflationary account of metaphor’.  
 
1.8 SUMMARY 	  
In this chapter, I have attempted to present the details of those theories of figurative 
language that raise interesting questions with respect to the cognitive processes and 
mechanisms that might be responsible for the interpretation of non-literal language. 
What processes and mechanisms are involved in arriving at metaphoric and 
hyperbolic interpretations? What factors affect our ability to derive such figurative 
interpretations, and the speed at which we can derive them? Are metaphoric 
interpretations just a further broadening of the encoded meaning than hyperbolic 
interpretations, or is there something unique about metaphor, due to the 
comprehension processes involved and/or the interpretation arrived at?  
The current theories suggest that metaphoric interpretations are available from the 
beginning of processing and that metaphoric interpretations should not necessarily 
take any longer to process than literal interpretations, as there is no default literal 
meaning that must be arrived at before an alternative, more appropriate interpretation 
can be derived. Many of the current theories also suggest that metaphor irrelevant 
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information is discarded/dropped during processing. This raises the question ‘how 
might that discarding take place?’ Do we allow such irrelevant information to decay 
through lack of attention, or must it be actively suppressed so as to avoid 
interference? If so, what cognitive mechanisms would be recruited for the task of 
suppression?  
Finally, the Relevance Theoretic lexical pragmatic account strips metaphor of its 
sense of uniqueness, by positing a unified lexical pragmatic processing model which 
they claim can account for the interpretation of all less than literal utterances, 
including hyperbole and approximation. In fact, under closer inspection there is no 
reason why any of the current metaphor theories discussed could not be extended to 
account for hyperbole interpretation as well as metaphor interpretation. This presents 
us with an interesting research question – will we find evidence to suggest that 
metaphors and hyperboles are processed in the same way as the theories suggest, or 
might we find evidence of processing differences? 
In chapter 2, I will discuss the findings from various studies that have attempted to 
shed light on some of the aforementioned questions. Having critically reviewed the 
existing empirical literature, and isolated some remaining research questions, in 
chapter 3, I will present new findings from a series of on-line experiments that not 
only aim to shed light on some unresolved issues with respect to metaphor, but also 
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2 ADULT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INVESTIGATING FIGURATIVE 
LANGUAGE PROCESSING 
 
This chapter will be dedicated to the presentation of existing empirical findings that 
shed light on some of the questions we were left with after having discussed the 
details of the current accounts of metaphor. Are metaphors as quick to process as 
comparable literal statements, as current theories suggest? Similarly, are metaphoric 
interpretations available right from the beginning of processing? Do the activation 
levels of relevant and irrelevant properties associated with the lexically encoded 
vehicle concepts differ after arriving at a metaphoric interpretation, as many of the 
accounts suggest? Does the deactivation of irrelevant information result from passive 
decay (due to lack of attention), or are these properties/features actively suppressed in 
order to avoid interference? Are familiar and unfamiliar metaphors processed 
differently? 
Most empirical research investigating the processing of figurative language has 
focused on metaphor. The large bulk of experiments have been designed to 
investigate what it is we are doing, or what processes our cognitive mechanisms are 
engaging in when we understand metaphorical statements. Interesting findings have 
come out of such studies; many of which I will discuss in this chapter. To the best of 
my knowledge, however, there have been no significant published psycholinguistic 
studies investigating hyperbole despite recent lexical pragmatic unified theories, 
which explicitly aim to account for all types of lexical adjustment, including metaphor 
and hyperbole (Wilson and Carston 2007; Recanati 2001; 2004). However, some 
research has investigated hyperbolic irony, which I will discuss after reviewing the 
empirical literature investigating metaphor. 
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Current pragmatic and psychological accounts 
 
Psychological and pragmatic categorization/concept construction accounts propose 
that metaphors serve to categorize topics within an ad hoc, occasion specific category 
which is derived from the vehicle term, thus allowing features of that ad hoc category 
to be projected from the vehicle to the topic (Sperber and Wilson 2006; Wilson and 
Carston 2007; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990). The Relevance Theoretic categorization 
account (Wilson and Carston 2007) (section1.6.1) proposes that it is an expectation of 
relevance that guides our selection of relevant features with which to construct our ‘ad 
hoc concept’, where the Class-inclusion categorization account (Glucksberg and  
Keysar 1990) (section 1.6.2) claims it is the topic’s dimensions of attribution, as well 
as the prototypical features of the metaphor vehicle which guide our construction of 
the ad hoc category of which the metaphor vehicle is an exemplar.  
 
In contrast, the Structure-Mapping account (section 1.6.4) (Clement and Gentner 
1991; Wolff and Gentner 2011) claims that metaphoric statements are processed as 
comparison statements, rather than as categorization assertions. Gentner and 
colleagues state that novel metaphor comprehension involves the structural alignment 
of the topic and vehicle concepts, and the subsequent projection of relevant predicates 
from the vehicle to the topic.   
 
The Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH) (1997,1999)  (section 1.6.3) proposes that it 
is salience rather than literality/ non-literality, or contextual relevance, that determines 
the initial processes involved in metaphor comprehension (or any utterance 
comprehension), but does not state whether metaphors are processed as categorization 
assertions or comparison statements. 
 
Finally, the Direct Access (DA) account (section 1.6.5) claims that pre-existing 
conceptual mappings are utilized during the processing of seemingly novel 
metaphors.  
 
Each of these accounts makes a number of testable processing predictions in relation 
to the research questions mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.  
 







Are metaphors as quick to process as comparable literal statements, and are 
metaphoric interpretations available from the beginning of processing? 
All of the above accounts, with the exception of Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis 
(which posits a sequential processing model for novel metaphors) propose some sort 
of ‘parallel processing model’ which means that we are not required to go via the 
literal interpretation of a figurative statement in order to arrive at an appropriate novel 
metaphoric interpretation. Thus, on this basis at least, these accounts predict that a) all 
other things being equal, metaphors should take no longer to process than literal 
statements, and b) metaphoric interpretations should be available right from the 
beginning of processing. 
Do the activation levels of relevant and irrelevant properties associated with the 
lexically encoded vehicle concepts differ after arriving at a metaphoric 
interpretation?  
The Relevance Theoretic account, the class-inclusion account, and the Structure 
mapping account, all entail that metaphor inconsistent features become deactivated 
during the comprehension of novel metaphors (either due to lack of attention or as a 
result of active suppression. See section for discussion of the mechanism of 
suppression). Therefore, these accounts would predict that activation levels of 
metaphor inconsistent features of the vehicle would be significantly lower in a 
metaphor biasing context, than in literal or neutral biasing context. 
 
However, in contrast, Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis (1997, 1999, 2002, 2003) 
states that the contextually incompatible ‘literal’ meaning of a metaphor is not 
discarded at all in a metaphor biasing context, provided it plays a role in the 
construction of the compatible meaning, and that it does not ‘disrupt’ the derivation of 
the compatible, metaphoric interpretation. Therefore, the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
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makes the opposite prediction to the other accounts with respect to metaphor 
inconsistent feature activation levels in a metaphor biasing condition. Giora would not 
expect to see any difference in activation levels of metaphor inconsistent features of 
the vehicle concept in metaphor, literal or neutral biasing contexts. 
 
Are familiar and unfamiliar metaphors processed differently? 
 
All the current accounts discussed in chapter 1 (the Relevance Theoretic account, the 
class-inclusion account, the Graded Salience Hypothesis, the Structure-Mapping 
account, and the Direct Access account) predict that familiar and/or conventionalized 
metaphors may be easier to process than novel metaphors. 
Relevance-theorists explicitly state that their account is intended as a model of novel 
figurative language comprehension, whereas highly conventionalised figurative 
statements (e.g. She is an Angel) most likely undergo a faster, less attentional process 
of disambiguation (Swinney 1979), as such conventionalised metaphor vehicles have 
most likely become polysemous through frequent use in a metaphoric context (Wilson 
and Carston 2007:26). 	  	  
Furthermore, Glucksberg (2001:112) states “...metaphors become conventional [when 
they] ideally represent their attributive categories’ i.e. they become prototypical of 
the ‘originally’ ad hoc category referred to in frequently used metaphors, and thus 
may go on to lexically encode the ‘ad hoc category’. In such instances, the hearer 
would be able to retrieve the intended meaning from long-term memory.”	  	  
Giora posits processing distinctions between novel and familiar metaphors, since she 
states that in the case of familiar metaphors (not just highly conventionalised, but in 
any way familiar), both salient literal and metaphoric meanings are available from the 
beginning of processing, however there is only one salient meaning available during 
the initial processing of a novel metaphor; the metaphoric meaning must be 
subsequently arrived at. 	  	  
Finally, not only does the Direct Access account entail that familiar metaphors (i.e. 
My sister is an Angel) and novel metaphors based on an existing metaphorical 
mapping (i.e. My day has been a tsunami) will be quicker to process than completely 
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novel metaphors (e.g. My family is a mirror) because there are relevant, stable 
conceptual mappings already in place in long-term memory. 	  
 
In addition to the above predictions, each of the accounts make their own theory 
specific predictions (see section 1.7 for full discussion), which we will also be able to 
measure up against the findings discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.1 ADULT METAPHOR FINDINGS 	  
 
In this section, I will review the adult empirical literature in relation to the series of 
questions discussed above, which presented themselves after careful consideration of 
the current theoretical accounts of metaphor comprehension. 
	  
2.1.1 FINDINGS FOR AND AGAINST A NON-
SEQUENTIAL ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR 
PROCESSING 
 
Does the evidence suggest that metaphor comprehension involves sequential stages 
of processing, starting with the arrival at a default literal interpretation? 
Evidence against a sequential processing model 
As discussed in chapter 1, early accounts of metaphor comprehension, although 
different in their approaches, share the assumption that metaphor is derived from the 
literal meaning, which is processed first. This standard assumption has largely been 
rejected on the basis of a number of studies, which show that the comprehension of 
metaphoric utterances can be as quickly and as readily accessible as comparable 
literal expressions.  
Ortony, Shallert, Reynolds and Antos’ (1978) findings suggest that metaphorical 
interpretations are as quick to arrive at as literal interpretations. 
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Reading times of sentential metaphors such as “regardless of the danger, the troops 
marched on” placed in a literal context (“Approaching the enemy infantry, the men 
worried about setting off land mines. They were anxious that their presence would be 
detected prematurely. Their fears were compounded by the knowledge that they might 
be isolated from their reinforcements. The outlook was grim.”), and in a metaphoric 
context (“The children continued to annoy their babysitter. She told the little boys she 
would not tolerate any more bad behaviour. Climbing all over the furniture was not 
allowed. She threatened to spank them if they continued to stomp, run and scream 
around the room. The children knew that her spankings hurt.”) were compared. 
When the context passage consisted of only the 1st sentence of the context, plus the 
target sentence (short context condition), reading times following the literal context 
were significantly quicker than proceeding the metaphoric context. However, when 
the full context was used (long context condition), the difference disappeared. Thus, 
provided there was enough context, there was no difference in reading times between 
metaphor and literal conditions. The authors venture that this was presumably because 
without a properly supportive context, there remained some ambiguity over the 
intended meaning of the utterance, which caused a processing delay in the short 
context condition. 
This experiment was replicated by Inhoff, Lima and Carrol (1984). However, rather 
than looking at time, they tracked eye fixations on appropriate words as participants 
read each sentence. As before, both short and long contexts were used. Again, the 
subjects read metaphors just as quickly as literal sentences, but this time it was 
regardless of the context length. This methodology has been criticized because it only 
used eye-tracking; comprehension questions were not included. This means that we 
can’t be sure whether the sentences were actually being understood metaphorically. 
Blasko and Connine (1993) used a cross-modal priming study to assess the processing 
of metaphors more accurately. Participants listened to metaphorical phrases in neutral 
contexts, such as “Jerry first knew that loneliness was a desert....when he was very 
young”. While the participants were listening, a letter string would appear on a 
computer screen either immediately after, or 300ms later. When the visual target 
appeared, the participants had to decide as quickly and as accurately as they could, 
whether or not it was an English word. On half the trials, the target was a word and on 
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half it was a non-word. There were three types of word, targets defined in terms of 
their relation to the metaphorical phrase: metaphorical, literal and control (e.g. isolate, 
sand and moustache). Faster lexical decisions to metaphorical or literal targets 
relative to control targets would indicate activation of metaphorical or literal 
meanings, respectively. Decisions for literal targets were faster than controls both 
immediately, and after 300ms delay, indicating that literal meanings were always 
activated. Metaphorical targets were also activated faster than controls at both delays, 
but only when metaphors were considered to be apt, e.g. when they were rated as 
good metaphors by an independent group of experimental participants. 
In the studies discussed above, participants were either explicitly or implicitly asked 
to focus on and comprehend metaphorical interpretations. In doing so, investigators 
were able to determine the processing times of metaphoric statements over literal 
statements in order to determine whether a sequential, literal first processing model is 
plausible. However, another way to test the plausibility of literal first accounts is to 
determine whether metaphoric interpretations are non-optional and therefore available 
right from the beginning of processing, or whether they are optional and generated 
only if the literal meaning is ‘defective’ and not informative enough, as might be seen 
to be suggested by Grice and has been maintained by Neo-Griceans (Clark and Lucy 
1965; Janus and Bever 1985; Lyons 1977).  Indeed, a series of studies have found that 
metaphoric interpretations are non-optional and available from the beginning of 
processing, providing further evidence against a sequential account (Glucksberg, 
Gildea & Bookin 1982; Keysar 1989; McElree and Griffith 1995; and McElree and 
Nordlie 1999).  
Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin (1982) adapted Stroop’s (1935) task, which illustrated 
that people cannot ignore literal linguistic meanings. Stroop presented colour words 
printed in various colours and asked people to name the colour of the ink, not read the 
words themselves. When colour words were printed in any colour other than the one 
they referred to (e.g. Yellow), people found it difficult to name the colour of the ink, 
indicating that they were experiencing competition from the involuntary reading and 
processing of the words. People seemed not to be able to inhibit their reading of 
words.  
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Glucksberg et al. (1982), hoped that this logic would apply to metaphorical 
interpretations. These interpretations would be hard for participants to inhibit, even 
when a given task required them to only interpret a sentence literally. Participants 
were shown a series of sentences (some roads are snakes; some offices are icebergs), 
and asked to judge whether the sentence was literally true or literally false. Four types 
of sentences were used: literally true, literally false, metaphors (but literally false), 
and scrambled metaphors. If the participants were able to just ignore the metaphorical 
interpretations, then they should not take any longer to judge the metaphors as false, 
than they do to judge the scrambled metaphors as false. If however, participants do 
automatically have the metaphorical interpretations available, then they should take 
longer to judge the metaphor sentences as false, than they do to judge the scrambled 
metaphors. Indeed, for appropriate metaphors, there will be competition between the 
true non-literal meanings, and the false literal meanings of the metaphor sentences.  
Glucksberg et al. (1982) found that participants were significantly slower to judge the 
metaphorical interpretations as literally false, than they were to judge the scrambled 
metaphors as so. They therefore concluded that metaphorical interpretations are 
available automatically and are non-optional, even when their availability inhibits 
performance on a given task. 
McElree and Nordlie (1999) carried out an additional experiment using the same truth 
value judgment task, but they also added a ‘meaningfulness judgment task’ to see 
whether literal falsehood interfered with participants’ ability to judge that ‘true’ 
metaphors were indeed meaningful. In addition, they used a response deadline 
procedure, in which participants are forced to respond within a certain time frame.  
They found speed-accuracy tradeoff functions (in which the tradeoff between speed 
and accuracy is measured when carrying out a given task (Fitts 1954) that were 
consistent with a system that used parallel information sources with equal time-
courses, when people made both literal truth judgments and meaningfulness 
judgments about metaphorically true sentences. They concluded that people generate 
literal and metaphorical interpretations in parallel rather than sequentially, and the 
time-courses for the two parallel processes are the same. On this basis, the authors 
concluded that neither literal, nor metaphorical interpretations are default.  
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In contrast with the usual focus on metaphor, Frisson and Pickering (1999) carried out 
an eye-tracking study investigating metonymy. Metonymy is a trope in which a 
category is referred to not by its own label, but by another term, the denotation of 
which is broadened to include that category (e.g. ‘table 3 left without paying’ or ‘the 
whole house went to the party’).   Frisson and Pickering (1999) found that hearers are 
able to obtain place-for-event and place-for-institution metonymic interpretations as 
soon as the target word is encountered (inferred by a lack of disruption in the eye-
movement record). However, words with no relevant metonymic interpretation caused 
disruption in the eye movement record. The authors argue that the results are 
incompatible with a literal-first model of figurative language processing, but that they 
support a parallel processing model. 
 
Summary of evidence against a sequential account of metaphor processing 
The studies discussed above, indicate that metaphor comprehension does not seem to 
be optional, more complex to process, or dependent on first ascertaining the literal 
interpretation of the utterance. On the contrary, they suggest that the encoded content 
and the contextually appropriate content are processed in parallel. On the basis of 
these findings, current theorists have rejected, as discussed in Chapter 1, standard 
‘literal first’ approaches to metaphor comprehension (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; 
Wolff and Gentner 2011; Wilson and Carston 2007; Gibbs 1990).  
One criticism that could be directed at some of the studies discussed above is related 
to the familiarity of the metaphoric items used (Ortony et al. 1978; Inhoff et al. 1984; 
Blasko and Connine 1993). Items included expressions such as ‘the troops marched 
on’ and ‘loneliness was a desert’. Glucksberg and colleagues’ study (Glucksberg et 
al., 1982) also used some highly conventionalised metaphoric expressions such as 
‘some roads are snakes’. Given empirical evidence suggesting that familiar 
metaphors are easier to process than novel metaphors (Blasko and Connine 1993; 
Blank 1988; Gentner and Wolff 1997), and theoretical accounts which posit different 
comprehension procedures for conventional and novel metaphors (Glucksberg 
2001:99; Wilson and Carston 2007:26), it is likely that the use of conventionalised 
materials skewed these findings. Moreover, not all studies have found evidence of 
metaphors being as quick and/or easy to process as equivalent literal statements. 
Some studies with conflicting findings are discussed below. 
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Evidence in support of a sequential processing model 
Despite the build up of evidence that is potentially indicative of a non-sequential 
account, we are not without evidence that fits with a sequential processing model. 
Gold, Faust and Goldstein (2010) avoided the criticisms leveled at reading-time 
studies presented as evidence against a sequential processing model by including both 
conventional and novel metaphors in their stimuli, as two separate conditions. In 
contrast with the previous findings, Gold and colleagues found that reading times 
were shorter for both statements containing literal word pairs (soft blanket) and 
conventional metaphors (juicy gossip) over those containing unrelated word pairs 
(sink dispute) and novel metaphors (wilting hope), suggesting that novel metaphors do 
take longer to process than literal statements. 
Lemaire and Bianco (2003) also found a reading-time difference between metaphors 
and literal expressions, but this time with respect to referential metaphors. They found 
that (referential) metaphors (e.g. the scientist) took longer to read than literal 
referential statements (e.g. the boy) when embedded within a context passage: 
e.g.(translated)   Aged 10, Pierre is a surprising child. 
He likes teasing girls with his friends. 
It does not prevent him from being serious at school. 
One day, he was playing with his mother. 
Someone said: "Who knows the origin of the Olympics?" 
The boy/scientist exclaimed: "It's the Greeks!". 
The instructor turned round. 	  
Similarly, Gibbs (1990) presented participants with a series of stories, each of which 
contained some narrative setting and dialogue between people, and an early sentence 
in each story contained a noun referring to some person. This noun was then referred 
to again in the last sentence of the story either using a metaphoric referring 
expression, or a literal referring expression. Like Lemaire and Bianco (2003), Gibbs 
found that participants took longer to read the final sentence of the story when it 
contained a metaphoric referring expression than when it contained a literal referring 
expression. Gibbs does not take his findings as support for a sequential account. 
Rather, he argues that the reading time difference may be caused by the fact that the 
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referential metaphors used in his experiment did not explicitly compare two concepts 
in the way that the predicative metaphors of the form X is Y used in previous studies 
did, which he argues “….probably made these figurative expressions particularly 
difficult to comprehend” (Gibbs 1990:60).  
Onishi and Murphy (1993) lend support to Gibbs’ theory. They found that metaphors 
were understood as quickly as literals when the two terms were located in the same 
sentence (e.g., That boxer is a creampuff); yet, metaphors were harder to interpret 
than literal comparisons when the two terms were expressed in separate sentences. 
However, contrary to this claim, the metaphors used in some of the studies which 
found no difference in reading-times between metaphoric and literal statements  were 
also referential (e.g. ‘the troops marched on’)(Ortony et al., 1978; Inhoff et al., 1984). 	  
Noveck, Bianco and Castry (2001) also found there to be a time cost to metaphor 
processing among 9 to 14 year olds. They found longer reading times for metaphors 
over literal statements among developing readers. Noveck and colleagues argue that 
the neutral contexts (e.g. lines (a)-(f), and (h)) in which their metaphoric items (line 
(g)) were placed led to the reading-time difference. 
e.g. (translated)  (a) The second-grade pupils went to the pool with their teacher. 
(b) The lifeguard organized a few games for them. 
(c) He then asked that they do a few laps. 
(d) Before the end of the class, the phone rang. 
(e) The lifeguard went to answer it. 
(f) Returning, he cried out: 
(g) “All toads to the side of the pool.” 
(h) The class went to the lockers and back to school. 	  
The authors claim that previous findings suggesting that metaphors are as quick and 
easy to process as literal statements are the result of the particular contexts used in the 
experimental materials. They argue that there are often richer, more supportive 
contexts in the metaphoric conditions than in other conditions. 	  
 “…any claims about effort are relative to a provided context.”  
      (Noveck et al. 2001:12).  
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Noveck and colleagues do not see their findings as support for a sequential model of 
metaphor processing. Instead, they argue that the data support a Relevance Theoretic 
account of metaphor; if hearers aim to maximize cognitive effects, and metaphors 
have the potential to yield more cognitive effects than literal statements (which they 
claim is the case), and an increase in cognitive effects correlates with an increase in 
processing effort, then all other things being equal (as their neutral contexts control 
for), metaphors should take longer to process than literal statements.  
Janus and Bever (1985), on the other hand, do interpret their reading-time findings as 
support for a sequential account. Their revealed that metaphors (e.g. ‘The fabric had 
begun to fray’ referring to a troubled marriage) required significantly longer reading 
times over literal statements. Although they interpret their findings as evidence of a 
sequential or ‘serial’ model of metaphor processing, they argue that the machinery 
behind literal and metaphoric may well be the same (i.e. context being used to 
pragmatically adjust interpretations), but that metaphoric language may consistently 
require more support from the context than literal statements. 
Arzouan, Goldstein and Faust (2007) used Event Related Potentials (ERPs)19 to 
compare the processing of novel metaphors, familiar metaphors, and literal 
statements. They found that N400 amplitude20 increased from literal statements, 
through familiar metaphors, with the greatest amplitude corresponding to novel 
metaphor comprehension. In addition, novel metaphors also elicited a ‘right-sided late 
negativity’ (delayed N400 residing in the right hemisphere), suggesting continued 
attempts to reconcile the lexically encoded content with the context. The authors 
interpret these findings as support for a sequential model of novel metaphor 
comprehension in which an initial context incompatible interpretation must be arrived 
at and rejected on the base of poor contextual fit, before an accurate ‘metaphoric’ 
interpretation can be arrived at.  However, an N400 component is generally regarded 
as an index of the degree of mismatch between a word and a previously established 
semantic context (Luck 2005) and cannot tell us anything about the processing of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 An Event Related potential (ERP) is a form of brainwave which consists of peaks and troughs which ‘reflect the 
sum of several relatively independent underlying or latent components’. (Luck 2005) 
 
20 The N400 component is regarded as an index of the degree of mismatch between a word and a previously 
established semantic context, and it is often used to determine which of two sets of words is perceived as being 
more incongruous. (Luck 2005)	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utterance as a whole. As we saw in Chapter 1, the Relevance Theoretic lexical 
pragmatic account (Wilson and Carston 2007) still holds that words have a literal 
interpretation that is accessed prior to arriving at the proposition expressed, which 
would explain a finding of greater N400s during the processing of a metaphoric 
utterance in which the lexically encoded vehicle concept would not fit with the 
context. In short, Arzoun and colleagues’ findings can be explained by literalness at 
the local (lexical) level, rather than having to appeal to the notion of a default literal 
interpretation of the entire utterance.	  
Summary 
There is a substantial body of evidence against a sequential model of metaphor 
processing (Ortony et al. 1978; Inhoff et al. 1984; Glucksberg et al. 1982; Keysar 
1989; McElree and Griffith 1995; and McElree and Nordlie 1999). In light of the 
contradictory reading-time findings (Gold et al. 2010; Lemaire and Bianco 2003; 
Gibbs 1990; Noveck et al. 2001; Janus and Bever 1985), it is perhaps the findings 
from alternative paradigms (speed-accuracy trade off, truth value judgment tasks, 
lexical priming) which most strongly support a parallel processing model, and 
therefore, the current accounts which are not based on the ‘literal first’ assumption. 
 
2.1.2 FINDINGS INDICATING EFFECTS OF 
FAMILIARITY 	  
Are familiar and unfamiliar metaphors processed differently? 
All of the current theoretical accounts discussed in Chapter 1 are consistent with 
findings suggesting that conventionality facilities metaphor processing (Blank, 1988; 
Blasko & Connine, 1993; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Gernsbacher, 1984; Camac & 
Glucksberg, 1984; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; 
Martin, 1992; Grauwe; Swain, Holcomb and Kuperberg 2010).  
Blank (1988) used a word naming task to investigate the processing of several 
different types of lexicalized metaphors (i.e. metaphors in which the metaphoric 
meanings of the vehicle term are thought to be lexically encoded) taken from Lakoff 
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and Johnson (1980), (e.g. time is money and love is a sickness), as well as novel, 
poetic metaphors. Participants were presented with a series of incomplete sentences 
(with the remaining few words missing), and were asked to complete them. Blank 
found that the last word of highly familiar conventional metaphors, such as "spend 
your weekend," were named as fast as their literal counterparts ("spend your 
income"). However, naming the last word of novel poetic metaphors, such as "I heard 
the thunder gossip," took longer than in the literal condition, i.e. "I heard the thunder 
rumble."  
Blank (1988) argues that his findings are indicative of a two stage process in which 
the lexicon is first checked for relevant encoded senses, and if no such sense is found, 
an automatic check for an alternative, appropriate interpretation begins. This would 
explain why conventional metaphors, which are likely to have an appropriate lexically 
encoded sense would be quicker to process than novel metaphors in which the only 
lexically encoded sense is the ‘literal’ one. 
However, like Blasko and Connine (1993), I would argue that Blank’s study has 
certain, key limitations. Blank did not collect familiarity ratings for his materials, 
instead familiarity was determined post hoc on the basis of naming times, and 
sensibleness ratings. Furthermore, the novel metaphors used were rated as less 
‘sensible’ than the anomalous control items (1.1 for novel metaphors and 1.3 for 
anomalous items, on a scale of 1 (low)-5 (high)). This is most likely because the novel 
metaphors were sourced from poetry and were therefore, rather obscure. Blasko and 
Connine also rightly point out that many of the familiar metaphors were in fact ‘stock 
phrases’ (e.g. spending your time) rather than familiar metaphors. The items used in 
Blank’s study clustered around polar extremes with highly familiar metaphors (in 
which the ‘figurative’ sense has been lexicalized as an additional sense, e.g. spending) 
at one end, and highly novel metaphors, that may never have been encountered 
before, and that lack the high degree of contextual relevance that some entirely new 
metaphors have in every day speech, at the other end. It seems more appropriate to 
treat familiarity as a continuum.  
Blasko and Connine (1993) report similar findings from a cross-modal lexical priming 
study. They presented metaphorical sentences (e.g. The belief that HARD WORK IS A 
LADDER is common to this generation) auditorily, and asked participants to make a 
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lexical decision about a visually presented target. The visual targets were either a 
word related to the metaphorical meaning (e.g. advance), a word related to the literal 
meaning of the final word of the metaphor (e.g. rungs), or a control which was 
unrelated to both the metaphor and the final word (e.g. Pastry). Only 
nominal/predicate metaphors (X is Y) were used. The metaphorical sentences varied 
in familiarity across conditions, but were comparable in aptness. In Experiment 1, the 
visual target was presented immediately at the offset of the metaphorical vehicle, 
while in Experiment 2, the visual target was presented 300 ms later in the sentence. 
Like Blank (1988), Blasko and Connine (1993) found that reaction times differed 
depending on familiarity at both time delays (immediately after the offset of the 
metaphor vehicle, and 300ms later). The highly familiar condition showed facilitation 
for both the literal meanings of the final word of the metaphor (e.g. rungs) and the 
metaphorical meanings (e.g. advance), in comparison with the controls which were 
unrelated to both the metaphor and the final word (e.g. Pastry), suggesting that both 
the meaning of the metaphor and the literal meaning of the final word in the metaphor 
were available. In contrast, the low-familiar condition showed facilitation only for the 
literal meanings of the final word of the metaphor. The metaphorical meanings were 
actually slower than the controls, suggesting that the metaphorical meanings were not 
immediately available for unfamiliar metaphors.  
In addition, Grauwe, Swain, Holcomb and Kuperberg’s (2010) ERP findings reveal 
that conventionalised metaphors elicit no larger N400s than literal statements, 
suggesting that conventional metaphors require no more processing effort than 
comparable literal statements. 
The findings discussed in this section are suggestive of processing differences 
between familiar and unfamiliar metaphors with respect to the speed at which they are 
processed, the processing effort required, and the immediate availability of a 
metaphoric interpretation. This pattern is consistent with all the current accounts 
discussed in Chapter 1, as each account posits some way in which 
conventionalized/familiar metaphors are processed differently from novel/unfamiliar 
metaphors.  
The theoretical accounts do differ with respect to how familiar or novel a metaphor 
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needs to be to warrant a different comprehension procedure. Relevance theorists 
(Wilson and Carton 2007), Gentner and colleagues, and Glucksberg and colleagues 
(Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001), for example, only posit a distinct 
processing model for the most highly conventionalized metaphors, which, they argue, 
will have acquired an additional sense through such frequent use. Whereas, as any 
account based on salience would have to predict, the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
entails that any metaphor that is at all familiar will be quicker to process than one 
which is not, because both a literal and a metaphoric interpretation will be available 
right from the beginning of processing in the case of the familiar metaphor. However, 
in the case of the completely novel metaphor, only a literal interpretation will be 
available at first. As it is impossible to determine whether the metaphors used in the 
studies discussed in this section have additional encoded senses or not, it is difficult to 
say which of the accounts is more accurate in this respect. 
 
2.1.3 FINDINGS RELATING TO CONTEMPORARY 
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS 
 
What empirical support is there for the theory specific claims made by each of the 
accounts? 
Numerous studies have been carried out with the aim of providing evidence for or 
against the current theoretical accounts discussed in Chapter 1. Some findings 
contribute to the categorization vs. comparison debate by providing support for a 
categorization account over a comparison account, or vice versa. Other findings 
provide more specific evidence in support of, or against the specifics of certain 
accounts. Many of these findings are discussed below. 
General support for concept construction accounts/categorization accounts over 
the Structure-Mapping account  
Several studies provide evidence in support for the general claims and predictions 
made by the concept construction accounts. 
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Firstly, Glucksberg, McGlone and Manfredi’s (1997) findings support the claims of 
the property attribution/categorization accounts (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; 
Wilson and Carston 2007); namely that metaphors are understood as categorizations 
for the purpose of attributing properties from the vehicle to the topic term, rather than 
as comparisons (implicit similes).	  	  
Recall from the predictions laid out at the end of Chapter 1 that if metaphors are 
processed as category assertions, in which it is asserted that the topic is a member of 
the category denoted by the vehicle, then metaphors should generally be nonsensical 
when reversed. In line with the concept construction, categorization accounts, 
Glucksberg et al. found that less than 4% of metaphoric statements remained 
meaningful when reversed. Participants were required to paraphrase metaphors and 
reversed metaphors to indicate what the intended meaning might be. 
Secondly, Glucksberg and Haught (2006) found potential evidence in support of the 
concept construction/categorization accounts and against the structure mapping 
account. They asked participants to rate metaphors and similes for aptness. As 
discussed in section 1.6.4, the Structure Mapping account predicts that novel 
metaphors are processed as comparisons (implicit similes) rather than as 
categorizations as their form suggests. Thus, Gentner and colleagues would predict 
that participants would find novel metaphorical comparisons more apt in simile form 
than in metaphor form. However, contrary to this prediction, Glucksberg and 
Haught’s rating questionnaires found that novelty did not privilege comparison over 
categorization; novelty did not privilege simile over metaphor in terms of aptness. 
Finally, in contrast with the Structure-Mapping prediction that novel metaphors are 
processed as comparisons, Jones and Estes (2006) found that aptness rather than 
conventionality predicts preference for metaphors over similes. This finding supports 
the concept construction accounts, which state that novel metaphors are processed as 
categorizations, rather than comparisons (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Wilson and 
Carston 2007). In three separate experiments, using three different paradigms, the 
authors manipulated conventionality by varying the vehicle concepts (some vehicles 
were novel and some were conventional) and manipulating aptness by varying the 
topic (e.g. Dancers can be butterflies is more apt than Soccer players can be 
butterflies).  
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The first experiment used the form preference task (based on Bowdle and Gentner 
2005) in which participants indicate whether they prefer a given statement in 
metaphor or simile form. Experiment 2 (also modeled on Bowdle and Gentner 2005) 
measured comprehension latencies and assessed comprehensibility ratings. Finally, 
Experiment 3 used the metaphorical categorization task devised by Jones and Estes 
(2005).	   
Contrary to the predictions of the Structure Mapping Account (Clements and Gentner 
1991; Wolff and Gentner 2011), but in line with the predictions of the concept 
construction accounts (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Wilson and Carston 2007) (see 
section 1.7 for discussion), the authors found that conventionality did not reliably 
affect metaphor processing: conventional metaphors were no more likely to be 
preferred in metaphor form than novel metaphors. Conversely, the findings did 
suggest that aptness affects choice of metaphor form over simile form, as well as 
processing speed, and processing effort.  
If it is accurate to take preference for categorical or simile form as a reliable indicator 
of the form in which metaphors are processed, then this collection of findings strongly 
suggest that the Structure-Mapping account’s claim that only conventionalized 
metaphors are processed as categorizations is inaccurate. Moreover, Glucksberg et 
al.’s reversibility findings suggest that the concept construction accounts, which 
predict a directional comprehension procedure in which properties of the vehicle are 
attributed to the topic, capture the processes underlying metaphor comprehension 
better than straight forward comparison accounts, which entail that metaphors should 
be reversible. 
 
Specific support for the Class-inclusion account  
 
Is there any evidence in support of the Class-inclusion accounts’ claim that topics 
provide dimensions for attribution, while vehicles provide properties for 
attribution? 
 
As well as the more general findings discussed above, Glucksberg, McGlone and 
Manfredi’s (1997) findings also provide evidence for the Class-inclusion account’s 
claim that the topic and vehicle terms play differing roles in metaphor comprehension.	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Contrary to the predictions of the Structure Mapping account (see section 1.7), 
Glucksberg and colleagues found that comprehension of a given metaphor (e.g. My 
lawyer is a shark) is only facilitated by immediate prior exposure to the metaphor 
vehicle (e.g. shark), in the case of a certain kind of metaphors; namely those with 
high-constraining topics (e.g. my lawyer) and unambiguous vehicles (e.g. shark), 
rather than those with low-constraining topics (e.g. my brother) and ambiguous 
vehicles (e.g. virus). Glucksberg et al. (1997:63) argue that this effect arises because 
high-constraining topics may be characterized in fewer ways, and therefore they 
“…generate fewer expectations than low-constraining topics regarding the 
dimensions upon which they were likely to be characterized by a vehicle”. Likewise, 
unambiguous vehicles generate fewer expectations than ambiguous vehicles regarding 
which properties are potentially being attributed to the topic. The authors argue that as 
a result, it is “high-constraint topics and unambiguous vehicles [that] offer more 
advance information when presented as primes than their low-constraint and 
ambiguous counter parts.” 
Specific support for the Structure-Mapping account 
Is there any evidence in support of the claim that novel metaphors are processed as 
comparisons rather than categorizations, or the claim that conventional metaphors 
are processed as categorizations rather than comparisons? Is there any evidence of 
an early neutral alignment process during metaphor processing?  
A number of studies are interpreted by their authors as providing support for the 
Structure Mapping account and its sister account, ‘The career of metaphor’ over other 
current accounts (Zharikov and Gentner 2002; Wolff and Gentner 2000; Wolff and 
Gentner 2011; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Onishi and Murphy 1993; Gentner and 
Bowdle 2008; Coulson and Van Petten 2002; Onishi and Murphy 1993). However, as 
I will discuss, it is not always clear whether the findings exclusively support the 
Structure-Mapping account. 
Recall that the Structure Mapping account predicts that the initial stages of metaphor 
comprehension involve neutral structural alignment – the role that the topic and 
vehicle concepts play is not considered at this stage. Gentner and Wolff (1997) found 
potential evidence of this alignment process in finding that metaphors were no 
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quicker to process in a context in which the vehicle had been primed, than in a context 
in which the topic had been primed.  
The authors claim that the class-inclusion account predicts that metaphor 
comprehension should receive more facilitation from priming of the vehicle than from 
priming of the topic	   because	   “whereas alignment first models begin with a 
comparison process, abstraction-first models [particularly the class-inclusion 
account] begin by finding or deriving an abstraction from the base [vehicle] which is 
then projected to the target [topic]” (Gentner and Wolff 1997:336). This finding 
therefore provides evidence against such accounts.	  	  
However, it is not clear that the class-inclusion account predicts that priming of the 
topic would not also facilitate metaphor comprehension.	   Contrary to Gentner and 
Wolff’s claims, the class-inclusion account does involve an early comparison process:  
“A first step is alignment of the vehicle and the topic concepts so that dimensions of 
attribution of the topic can be matched against candidate properties of the vehicle” 
(Glucksberg 2001.p. 54). Thus, the topic is also involved in processing early on. 
Coulson and Van Petten (2002) argue that their ERP findings also provide evidence of 
an early alignment process.	  They found that larger N400s were elicited when reading 
both ‘literal mappings’ (e.g. What I thought was petty theft, the judge thought was 
grand larceny) and metaphors (e.g. I knew she was out to steal his heart, but that kiss 
was grand larceny) than when reading straight forward ‘literal statements’ (e.g. They 
just announced that the governor was charged with grand larceny).	  	  
The authors argue (2002:966) that the amplified N400 in the metaphoric and literal 
mapping conditions is caused by the “invitation to discover the similarity between 
two entities, and that the similarity between those entities is only partial”, and that 
these findings support the Structure mapping account over Glucksberg and Keysar’s 
class-inclusion account because only the former posits this early alignment process.  
However, as mentioned above, it is not clear that evidence of an early alignment 
process per se goes against the class-inclusion account, as the categorization account 
also proposes an initial comparison process.	   Moreover, the larger N400 elicited 
during the processing of metaphors (comparable to that elicited during the comparison 
of literal comparisons) could be attributed to any number of independent factors 
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affecting processing effort. Like most accounts of metaphor processing, 
categorization accounts also posit extra processing effort for metaphors over literal 
statements. 	  
Onishi and Murphy (1993) argue that their findings provide evidence in support of the 
Structure Mapping account. They found that metaphors were understood as quickly as 
literal statements when the two terms (the topic and the vehicle) were located in the 
same sentence (e.g. That boxer is a creampuff). However, metaphors were harder to 
interpret than literal comparisons when the two terms were expressed in separate 
sentences. Therefore, the Structure-Mapping account’s prediction that metaphor 
processing should be facilitated when the two terms being compared are close in the 
text is borne out in this data (as this triggers the predicate alignment process to begin). 
However, I would argue that this finding would be predicted by any account, as 
additional effort would be required for the hearer/reader to recall the topic term if it 
was heard/read in a previous sentence. 
Alternative, potentially supportive evidence is presented by Gentner and Boronat 
(1992). They found that participants were faster to read novel metaphors that were an 
extension of a novel metaphor (i.e. that were reliant on the same domain mapping) 
that appeared earlier in the passage (e.g. he had to steer his course carefully in the 
competition – his skill left his opponent far behind him at the finish line), than they 
were to read novel metaphors that were preceded by an unrelated novel metaphor (e.g. 
he had to steer his course carefully in the competition – he had to use every weapon 
at his command in the competition). The authors claim that this finding supports the 
Structure-Mapping claim that metaphoric mappings can be ‘incrementally extended’ 
in order to process extended metaphors (See section 1.6.4), and that such extensions 
of existing mappings can facilitate interpretation. Gentner and colleagues also point 
out that this finding is consistent with Gibbs’ (1990; 1994) Direct Access account in 
which most metaphors are based on existing conceptual mappings (see below for 
further support for the Direct Access account).  
Interestingly though, Gentner and Boronat did not find the same reading-time 
difference when they used conventional metaphoric items; conventional metaphors 
were not facilitated by being preceded by a related metaphor. The authors interpret 
this second finding as evidence for the ‘career of metaphor’ aspect of the Structure-
	   123 
Mapping account. They argue that conventional metaphors may not be processed via 
structure mapping, but rather as categorizations, which would explain why they do 
not benefit from a recently constructed, related mapping. 
Gentner and Boronat’s findings nicely illustrate facilitation effects during novel 
metaphor processing. However, I would argue that Gentner and colleagues are not 
alone in predicting facilitation from a preceding, related metaphor when processing a 
novel metaphor. The class-inclusion account, the Relevance Theoretic account, the 
Graded Salience Hypothesis, and the Direct Access account all also entail that the 
presence of a related metaphor in the preceding linguistic context, would facilitate 
processing of a novel metaphor, as information relevant to the processing of the 
second metaphor would have received additional activation as a result of processing 
the preceding metaphor.  
Perhaps one of the more robust findings in support of the Structure-Mapping account 
is presented in Wolff and Gentner (2000). The authors argue that their sentence 
verification findings suggest that initial processing is role-neutral (non-directional); a 
claim that is unique to the Structure-Mapping account. The alignment process posited, 
for instance, by Glucksberg and colleagues is not role-neutral; the topic and vehicle 
make different contributions to the comparison.	  	  	  
Wolff and Gentner (2000) found that the ‘metaphor interference effect’ (MIE) (See 
Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin 1982, section 2.1.1) is present in both metaphors and 
reversed metaphors (i.e. participants were slower to judge reversed metaphors and 
forward facing metaphors, as literally false, than they were to do so with scrambled 
metaphors). The authors argue that this is evidence of an early neutral alignment 
process in which properties are matched, but directionality is not yet processed.	  	  	  Furthermore, in line with the predictions of the Structure Mapping account (see 
section 1.7), they found that ‘high-similarity’ metaphors (i.e. metaphors in which the 
topic and vehicle terms have similar salient features, such as ‘some Giraffes are 
skyscrapers’) exhibited more of a MIE than ‘low-similarity’ metaphors (i.e. ‘some 
plays are doors’), regardless of whether the metaphors had been reversed or not.	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The authors interpret this finding as support for the early alignment process in 
general. If early alignment is quicker when the topic and vehicle are similar, then 
more predicates would have been matched (i.e. more sense would have been made of 
the comparison) at the point in which the participants are required to make the 
true/false decision, which means that the MIE would be greater in the high-similarity 
condition, as was the case.  
 
However, it could be argued that this finding points to an early symmetrical alignment 
that is symptomatic of the verification task (because of the speed constraints 
associated with such tasks), rather than an early symmetrical alignment process that is 
a naturally occurring part of metaphor processing. 	  
In a further series of experiments, Wolff and Gentner (2011) replicated their earlier 
findings. However, they argue that this time, by using a simpler task, they have ruled 
out the above alternative interpretation of their earlier (2000) findings.	  Participants 
saw both forward and reversed versions of the same series of high similarity and low 
similarity metaphors used in Wolff and Gentner (2000), and were required to make a 
comprehensibility judgment about the sentence after one of 5 possible time delays 
(1200ms; 600ms; 500ms and 1800ms; 1600ms).	   Here,	   they	   found no difference in 
comprehensibility ratings between forward and reversed metaphors at the earlier 
delay (either 600ms, or 500ms). However at the later deadlines forward metaphors 
had significantly higher comprehensibility ratings than reversed metaphors.	  
Moreover, they could be sure that processing had begun at the early delay because 
scrambled metaphors were already judged to be less comprehensible than both 
forward and reversed metaphors at the early delay. These findings suggest that 
directionality is not considered early in processing, but that it does become a factor 
later on in processing, as the Structure Mapping account claims. 
 
It is unclear how such evidence for an early neutral alignment process can be 
explained within the framework proposed by Glucksberg and colleagues, since they 
maintain that the topic and vehicle are compared on the basis of different features; 
vehicle properties on the one hand and topic dimensions on the other are the relevant 
inputs for comparison. Therefore, the comparison process is, by definition, not role-
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neutral.  
However, it is worth noting at this point that there is some disparity between the 
objectives of the Structure Mapping and Class-inclusion account, which results in 
stylistic differences between the two accounts.  
The Structure Mapping account has a temporal dimension; Gentner and Colleagues 
posit step-by-step comprehension processes and mechanisms, which means that they 
are able to make predictions regarding events which might or might not be taking 
place at different delays during processing (i.e. early initial neutral alignment 
followed by subsequent directional projection of predicates).  
The class-inclusion account on the other hand, is an ‘end state’ or ‘outcome’ account. 
Glucksberg and colleagues were concerned with a) how we recognise metaphors as 
such, b) how we infer their intended meaning, and c) what that intended meaning 
might be. In addressing these concerns, they did not posit step-by-step comprehension 
processes, and thus cannot necessarily be held to account for evidence of events 
taking place at different time delays. 
It could be argued that Wolff and Gentner’s (2000; 2011) findings suggest that at the 
earliest testable stage of processing (500ms), participants have merely ‘accessed’ the 
topic and vehicle concepts, and that before ‘processing proper’ has begun, they are 
interrupted by the request to judge comprehensibility. In order to answer this request, 
they quickly compare the respective concepts, and thus, rightly judge the forward and 
reversed metaphors to be more ‘comprehensible’ than the scrambled ones.  
Neither categorization account claims that such initial ‘accessing’ of the topic and 
vehicle concepts does not take place, and thus, in light of this alternative 
interpretation of the data, Wolff and Gentner’s (2000; 2011) arguments do not appear 
as robust as they claim. 
Even without the above clause, it is worth noting here that although the Relevance 
Theoretic concept construction account does not discuss an early neutral alignment 
process, evidence of such a process is not inconsistent with the Relevance Theoretic 
account. The Relevance Theoretic processing model for lexical broadening is such 
that the surrounding linguistic content affects the activation levels of encyclopaedic 
properties associated with the encoded concept. Therefore, among other things, the 
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topic dictates which features of the vehicle concept become highly activated. For 
example, in the metaphor ‘The politician’s speech was noxious’, the ‘topic’ of the 
metaphor ‘The politician’s speech’ would prime particular encyclopaedic properties 
of the encoded concept NOXIOUS (e.g. unpalatable, distasteful, dangerous). Features 
associated with the concept NOXIOUS which could not be applied to ‘the politicians 
speech’ would not be highly activated.  
Later on during processing, like the Class-inclusion account and the Structure-
Mapping account, Relevance Theorists propose that the processing model becomes 
direction specific, as features must be attributed to the topic from the vehicle. 
However, evidence of an early directionless processing stage in which the topic and 
vehicle concepts are aligned is consistent with the earliest stages of processing posited 
by Relevance Theorists. According to the Relevance Theoretic account the encoded 
content is decoded and a range of logical and encyclopaedic properties associated 
with the lexically encoded constituents are activated on the basis of their relationship 
to one another and the surrounding context. Thus, contrary to the Class-inclusion 
account which posits different roles for the topic and vehicle concepts right from the 
beginning of processing, the Relevance Theoretic account would not have difficulty 
explaining evidence of an early stage in processing in which the topic and vehicle are 
considered in relation to one another. 
Summary 
The studies discussed in this section yield some very interesting findings that 
contribute considerably to our understanding of metaphor processing - i.e. evidence of 
facilitation effects from preceding metaphors, the proximity of the topic in relation to 
the vehicle in the discourse, and the existence of related stable concepts, as well as 
evidence of an early alignment process. However, it is not clear that the findings 
discussed in this sub-section favour the Structure-Mapping account over any of the 
other accounts discussed in Chapter 1. 
Support for the Direct Access View 
Is there any evidence in support of the claim that the vast majority of metaphors 
(including fairly novel ones) are processed via a network of stable mappings 
between domains in our mental lexicon? 
	   127 
As I discussed in section 2.1.1, empirical evidence has lent support to the notion that 
metaphoric interpretations can be accessed directly, without going via a default, literal 
interpretation. However, the question remains at to whether there is any more specific 
evidence in support of the facilitating role conceptual metaphors might have on our 
comprehension of metaphors. I am not aware of any such evidence with respect to 
metaphors, but Gibbs and colleagues present some idiom findings that, they argue, 
provide support for the Direct Access account. Although the processing of idiomatic 
expressions is not the focus of this thesis, these studies deserve some attention here. 
Firstly, Gibbs and O’Brien (1990) report findings from a series of studies 
demonstrating that people's mental images for idioms are constrained by other, related 
conceptual metaphorical mappings. They found that participant’s images of the 
idioms ‘blow your stack’, ‘flip your lid’, and ‘hit the ceiling’ share similar 
characteristics such that stacks are blown, lids are flipped, and ceilings are hit because 
of internal pressure that causes the involuntary release of some substance upward in a 
violent manner.  
Gibbs and Obrien argue that the consistency of meanings for different idioms with 
similar figurative interpretations results from the influence of stable conceptual 
metaphoric mappings that provide a mapping between an idiom and its figurative 
meaning. On the other hand, the authors argue that mental images for non-idiomatic 
phrases, such as ‘blow your tire’, ‘flip your hat’, or ‘hit the wall’, are much more 
varied because those phrases are not motivated by pre-existing conceptual metaphors. 
 
I would argue that, though interesting in its own right, this finding does not support 
the Direct Access account over other accounts. Evidence suggesting that many idioms 
pertain to similar mappings between domains does not constitute evidence for an 
account in which metaphor interpretations, both familiar and unfamiliar, are accessed 
directly from existing, stable mappings in long-term memory. This finding does not 
rule out the possibility that figurative interpretations are constructed on-line during 
processing, regardless of pre-existing relevant domain mappings.  
 
Secondly, Nayak and Gibbs (1990) argue that their findings suggest that the 
metaphorical description of emotion concepts like anger (e.g. anger is animal 
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behavior, and anger is a heated fluid in a container) in discourse contexts facilitates 
participants’ understanding of different idiomatic phrases, such as ‘bite your head off’ 
and ‘blow your stack’. Subjects were presented with short scenarios as shown in (1) 
and (2) and rated how appropriate the target sentence was to their corresponding prior 
context on a 1-7 scale. 
 (1) ANGER IS A FEROCIOUS ANIMAL  Mrs. Simmons is a bear about 
cleanliness. Her house is always sparkling clean. She's always prowling around the 
house with a duster in her hand. She attacks every spot of dust like a personal enemy. 
It's not easy on her kids. She watches them like a hawk to see whether they make a 
mess. The moment they become a little careless, she   
a. bites their heads off (metaphorical congruence)  
b. blows her top (metaphorical incongruence)  
(2) ANGER IS HEAT IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER  Mrs. Simmons is a 
stickler for cleanliness. She is always very tense when she is cleaning her house. It 
makes her fume when her family does not cooperate. She gets hot every time she finds 
another dusty spot. The pressure really builds up when she is cleaning her kids' 
rooms. Her tolerance of their untidiness really reaches its limits. And when they walk 
in carelessly with muddy feet, she   
a. blows her top (metaphorical congruence)  
b. bites their heads off (metaphorical incongruence)  
The authors found that in example (1), target sentence a. was rated significantly more 
appropriate than target sentence b., and the opposite was true for example (2). The 
authors argued that this congruency effect is evidence of existing, stable mappings 
between domains being used when interpreting idioms.  
Although the authors highlight one interpretation of their findings, I would argue that 
there is at least one other plausible interpretation of these data. The task is such that 
participants are asked to rate the appropriateness of an idiom in relation to a preceding 
text. Clearly, the findings suggest that ‘after the fact’ participants are able to detect 
that the target sentence (b) and the preceding text (1) pertain to different conceptual 
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mappings, and thus, they judge the target sentence to be less appropriate than one that 
pertains to the same conceptual mapping (a). This ‘after the fact’ judgment tells us 
little about the on-line processing of the target sentences. Contrary to Nayak and 
Gibbs’ claims, we cannot be sure that when processing the target sentence on-line, 
participants used the conceptual mapping from the preceding text, to interpret the 
target sentences. 
Finally, Gibbs (1992) presents findings from a study in which participants were asked 
questions about their understanding of events corresponding to particular source 
(vehicle) domains in various conceptual metaphors (e.g. the source domain of heated 
fluid in a container for the metaphor anger is heated fluid in a container). For 
example, when presented with the scenario of a sealed container filled with fluid, the 
participants were asked something about causation (e.g. “What would cause the 
container to explode?”), the intentionality (e.g. “Does the container explode on 
purpose or does it explode through no volition of its own?”), and manner (eg. “Does 
the explosion of the container occur in a gentle or violent manner?”) 
 
Gibbs found that the participants were remarkably consistent in their responses to the 
various questions (78% when averaged across the difference source domains and 
questions). For example, participants responded that the cause of a sealed container 
exploding was the internal pressure caused by the increased temperature of the fluid 
inside the container, and that the explosion was unintentional because containers and 
fluid are not agents, and finally that the explosion occurred in a violent manner. 
Perhaps more importantly, participants’ intuitions about various source domains 
mapped neatly onto their conceptualisations of different target domains, in very 
predictable ways.  
 
Gibbs argues that this data illustrates how the metaphorical mappings between source 
and target (topic) domains in long-term memory directly influence people’s 
understanding of idioms, suggesting that conventional idiomatic expressions do not 
simply reflect temporary, ad hoc categories, but more permanent metaphorical 
categorisations of experience. 
 
Again, I would argue that the off-line nature of this study means that the findings tell 
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us little about the on-line processing of idiomatic expressions. Moreover, the findings 
cannot be generalized to metaphors, which are the focus of investigation in this thesis, 
as the materials used in the studies discussed above, are all highly idiomatic, and it is 
generally accepted that idiomatic expressions require a different explanation from 
novel (e.g. The politician’s speech was noxious) and even familiar (e.g. My job is a 
jail) metaphoric statements 
Evidence against the Direct Access account 
Is there any evidence to suggest that the Direct Access account may not accurately 
capture the comprehension process underlying metaphor comprehension? 
Camac and Glucksberg’s (1984) data support the class-inclusion account of metaphor 
processing, and provide evidence against the Direct Access view, which claims that 
the majority of metaphors are based on pre-existing metaphoric mappings in long-
term memory.	  According to the Direct Access account, topic and vehicle concepts are 
associated in long-term memory (see section 1.6.5), which suggests that such topic 
and vehicle terms would have a priming effect on each other. Contrary to this 
prediction, findings from Camac and Glucksberg’s lexical decision task revealed that 
topic and vehicle pairs (e.g. surgeons-butchers; schools-zoos; words-daggers) drawn 
from good and interpretable metaphors are not associatively related to one another; 
lexical decisions on vehicle terms were not facilitated by being presented together 
with their respective topic term as one would expect if the two words were 
associatively related (due to known priming effects from associates). It is hard to see 
how the Direct Access account could explain this finding given the fact that its central 
claim is that the metaphoric mappings necessary for understanding the vast majority 
of metaphors are already instantiated in long-term memory. 
Support for the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
Is there any evidence to suggest that metaphor interpretation is guided by salience? 
Is there any evidence to suggest that both metaphoric and literal interpretations are 
immediately available when processing a familiar metaphor in a metaphoric 
context or literal context, or that only a literal interpretation is immediately 
available when processing a novel metaphor in a metaphoric context? Moreover, is 
there any evidence to suggest that in a literal context, a metaphoric interpretation of 
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a familiar metaphor is discarded, whereas in a metaphoric context, a literal 
interpretation remains active? 
A number of papers present findings in support of the priority of salient meanings 
(see, Giora, Fein and Schwartz 1997; Giora and Fein 1999a among others) .   	  
Firstly, Giora, Fein and Schwartz (1997) found equal reading times for metaphoric 
target sentences in both literally and metaphorically biasing contexts, which supports 
the Graded Salience Hypothesis’ claim that the most salient interpretation will be 
accessed first, regardless of whether it is ‘literal’ or ‘non-literal’. However, I would 
argue that these findings do not only support the Graded Salience Hypothesis, they 
provide evidence in support of any of the current accounts discussed in this thesis; all 
of which posit some sort of parallel processing model in which there is no default 
literal interpretation. 	  
Secondly, Giora and Fein (1999) argue that they found evidence in support of the 
Graded Salience Hypothesis’ claim that salient metaphoric and literal meanings are 
activated in both types of context. The authors present findings from ‘fragmented 
word completion tasks’ in which after reading a series of target sentences in literal 
and metaphoric and literal biasing contexts (3) and (4), the participants were required 
to complete two fragmented words with ‘the first words that come to mind’. One of 
the fragmented words was related to the literal meaning (e.g. rise), and one was 
related to the metaphoric meaning (e.g. act). 
 
(3) The Saturday night party went on for hours. Drinks were poured, and we danced 
all night. We were probably less than considerate when, the next evening, we called 
on our friends who had been partying with us. When they opened the door we 
realised: only now did they wake up. 
 
(2) A bloody war has been going on in central Europe for a few years. Thousands of 
innocent women, men and children got massacred, and no one budged or lifted a 
finger. At last a decision was made to intervene in the fights: only now did they wake 
up. 
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Participants’ responses were rated as either related or unrelated to the metaphoric and 
literal interpretation of the target sentence. Firstly, the results illustrate that in both a 
metaphoric and a literal context, words associated with the literal and the metaphoric 
interpretation are produced (both contextually compatible and incompatible words). 
Secondly, in a metaphoric context, participants produced an equal amount of 
compatible (with a metaphoric interpretation) and incompatible (with a literal 
interpretation), whereas in a literal context participant produced far more compatible 
words than incompatible words. 
 
The authors argue that this finding suggests that in the contexts biasing the 
metaphoric meaning as well as in the contexts biasing the literal meaning, 
contextually inappropriate yet compatible meanings are retained even after a long 
delay. In contrast, they argue that their findings suggest that meanings conflicting 
with the compatible meaning (i.e. metaphoric meanings in a literal context) are 
discarded, and thus lose activation, exactly as predicted by the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis.  
 
Though interesting in its own right, I would argue that this finding tells us little with 
respect to the on-line processing of metaphors. Participants were asked to make an 
‘after the fact’ judgment, which does not necessarily reflect the on-line processing 
that has just taken place. 
 
Although Giora and colleagues’ findings are insightful with respect to metaphor 
processing in general, it is not clear that they a) support the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis over other accounts, and b) provide robust evidence of the on-line 
processes that underlie metaphor comprehension. 
 
In the next section, with the current theoretical accounts and their processing 
predictions in mind, I will critically discuss empirical evidence that sheds light on the 
activation levels of contextually relevant and irrelevant information during metaphor 
processing, as well as which cognitive mechanisms might be involved in regulating 
these activation levels. 
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2.1.4 POTENTIAL EVIDENCE OF SUPPRESSION 
DURING METAPHOR COMPREHENSION 
 
Do the activation levels of relevant and irrelevant properties associated with the 
lexically encoded vehicle concepts differ after arriving at a metaphoric 
interpretation, as many of the accounts suggest? Does the deactivation of irrelevant 
information result from passive decay (due to lack of attention), or are these 
properties/features actively suppressed in order to avoid interference? 
 
The Relevance Theoretic account, the class-inclusion account, and the Structure 
mapping account (see section 1.6 for full discussion), all entail that metaphor 
inconsistent features are not attended to during the construction of a metaphoric 
interpretation. Therefore, according to these accounts activation levels of metaphor 
inconsistent features of the vehicle should be significantly lower in a metaphor 
biasing context, than in a literal or neutral biasing context. These accounts do not 
make specific predictions about whether the deactivation of metaphor inconsistent 
features would result from ‘passive decay’ or ‘active suppression’. However, a 
number of empirical studies claim to have found evidence of suppression taking place 
during novel metaphor comprehension (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner 
1995; 1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 2005; 2007; 
Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe 2010).  
 
Some studies have shown that activation levels of metaphor irrelevant information 
associated with the encoded meaning are significantly reduced after having arrived at 
a metaphoric interpretation. Such findings have generally been interpreted as evidence 
of active suppression of irrelevant information taking place during metaphor 
comprehension. However, I will argue that these findings are not as clear-cut as many 
of the authors claim. It is not clear that any of the findings I will discuss, provide 
decisive evidence of active suppression. Instead, it is likely that they provide evidence 
of deactivation, but not of the exact cause of that deactivation. 
 
Other studies have found indirect evidence of suppression by showing that cognitive 
mechanisms known to be responsible for suppression and activation regulation are 
employed during metaphor comprehension. I will also review these findings, and 
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discuss their scope with respect to what they can tell us about suppression during 
metaphor comprehension. 
 
Before discussing these experiments, I will briefly introduce the notions of ‘passive 
decay’ and ‘active suppression’. 
 
Active suppression vs. passive decay 
In the context of language processing, suppression is understood as an active 
reduction of activation of a given representation, which is in contrast with a 
representation automatically decaying. Gernsbacher and Faust (1991), Gernsbacher 
and St John (2002) posit a ‘general mechanism of suppression’ within their ‘structure 
building framework’. They argue that incoming information consistent with already 
represented information would be mapped onto the structure under construction. 
However, incoming information that is inconsistent, irrelevant, or confusing would be 
actively suppressed. 
In contrast, according to early models of cognition (e.g. Anderson 1983) un-
stimulated mental representations are left to automatically decay. For example, the 
activation level of the contextually inappropriate meaning of a polysemous word or 
the literal meaning of a metaphor vehicle, in a metaphor biasing context would 
automatically decay, because it would not be stimulated by the context. However, as 
discussed above, many current accounts of metaphor processing propose that 
irrelevant meanings, or at least features associated with irrelevant meanings are 
actively suppressed. 
Both the passive decay and the active suppression hypotheses predict that the 
activation of irrelevant meanings in a metaphoric context will decrease after a certain 
delay. However, in a neutral context, the two hypotheses make differing predictions. 
According to the decay hypothesis, both meanings would lack stimulation, and thus, 
both would decay. On the other hand, the suppression hypothesis would predict that, 
after a delay, both meanings would remain as activated as they were initially, as the 
context offers no trigger for suppression (Gernsbacher and Faust 1991).  
Gernsbacher and Faust’s (1991) data support the suppression hypothesis; both 
meanings of ambiguities were equally activated after a delay, suggesting that based on 
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biasing contextual information, irrelevant meanings are actively suppressed during the 
resolution of ambiguities. It would therefore follow, that the same is true of irrelevant 
meanings in a figurative biasing context, during the processing of a figurative 
statement. Indeed, many findings (which I discuss in some detail below), suggest that 
active suppression does take place during the processing of novel metaphors. 
Evidence from on-line studies 
All the current accounts discussed, with the exception of the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis are supported by various on-line findings that indicate that deactivation of 
lexically encoded, metaphor irrelevant meanings takes place, and tentatively suggest 
that this deactivation is the result of suppression (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and 
Werner 1995; 1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 
2005; 2007; Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe 2010). 
Priming effects are generally taken as a measure of word activation (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt 1971). Such facilitation effects are usually interpreted as the result of a 
spreading activation process, according to which, when processing a word such as 
‘tea’, activation spreads to conceptually associated words like ‘coffee’, speeding up 
their identification (Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1973). This assumption is the basis for 
most studies investigating context effects on lexical processing. 
Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner (2001)21  claim that their sentence 
verification findings indicate that suppression takes place during metaphor 
comprehension. After reading a prime sentence, a metaphor (e.g. “that defense lawyer 
is a shark”), a literal statement (e.g. “that hammerhead is a shark”), a nonsensical 
statement (e.g. “his English notebook is a shark”) or an unrelated statement (e.g. “that 
new student is a clown”), participants were asked to verify a property statement. 
Verification latencies for property statements relevant to the metaphoric meaning of 
the vehicle (e.g. “Sharks are tenacious”) were faster after participants read the 
metaphor prime sentence (e.g. “that defense lawyer is a shark”) than after they read 
the literal or nonsensical prime sentence (e.g. “that hammerhead is a shark” or “his 
English notebook is a shark”). In contrast, verification latencies for property 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Glucksberg, Newsome and Goldvarg (2001) replicated this study, with similar findings, but their study faces the 
same criticism as that discussed above in relation to Gernsbacher et al.’s (2001) findings (see Rubio-Fernandez 
(2004) for further discussion) 
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statements relevant to the literal meaning of the vehicle (e.g. “sharks are good 
swimmers”) were slower following the metaphor prime versus the literal or 
nonsensical prime sentences.  
The authors concluded that metaphor interpretation involves enhancing attributes that 
are relevant to the metaphorical interpretation of the vehicle while suppressing those 
that are irrelevant, as is proposed in all the accounts discussed above (Carston 2002, 
Wilson and Carston 2007, Recanati 2004, Clement & Gentner, 1991).  
However, Rubio-Fernandez (2004) points out that Gernsbacher et al.’s (2001) 
experimental design is not without problems; the literal and nonsensical control 
sentences used, end in the same word as the corresponding metaphorical statement, 
meaning that the control sentences were not properly unrelated to the target sentences. 
The control sentences will have been facilitated/primed by the target sentences. 
Rubio-Fernandez emphasizes that this would have led to the activation level of the 
target properties (TENACIOUS/SWIMS), after reading a control sentence, being 
above zero (the target properties TENACIOUS/SWIMS would have been primed by 
the presence of the metaphor vehicle ‘shark’).	  Therefore, the control conditions in this 
study do not provide a true baseline, which is essential in a study of this kind.	  	  
The same criticism can also be directed at the Gernsbacher, Keysar and Robertson 
(1995), and Glucksberg, Newsome and Goldvarg (1997), which used the same type of 
related controls as in the first two experiments in Gernsbacher et al. (2001).  
Gernsbacher et al. (2001), aware of the limitations of their studies that lacked an 
unrelated control condition, report a final experiment which did in fact use properly 
unrelated controls. However, as Rubio-Fernandez (2004) observes, the findings from 
this third experiment did not replicate the findings from their first two experiments. 
Instead, they found that participants were faster to verify a metaphor irrelevant 
statement after reading a metaphor, than after reading a control.	  Gernsbacher et al. 
(2001) appeal to a ‘repetition effect’ to explain these findings. The design of the final 
experiment was such that in the critical sentence pairs, the metaphor vehicle was 
repeated (e.g. “My defense lawyer is a shark” and “Sharks are good swimmers”), but 
this was not the case in the control conditions (e.g. “The new student was a clown”) 
and (e.g. “Sharks are good swimmers”).	  The authors’ argue that the appearance of the 
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same word shortly before, could have had a priming effect on participants’ 
verification latencies in the metaphor conditions. In light of this, Gernsbacher and 
colleagues calculated z-scores22 for the verification latencies, which back in line with 
their earlier findings, illustrated a suppression effect.	  	  
Yet, as Rubio-Fernandez (2004) points out,  although a priming effect was most likely 
present due to the repetition in their design, it is not clear whether, without the 
facilitation, the activation levels of the metaphor irrelevant statements would have 
been below baseline. As a result of this, Gernsbacher et al.’s (2001) findings are 
inconclusive. 
McGlone and Manfredi (2001) also argue that their findings provide evidence of 
suppression during metaphor processing. They found that metaphor (e.g. “Some 
lawyers are sharks”) comprehension was facilitated by prior exposure to a) the topic 
or vehicle concept, presented on its own (e.g. “Some Lawyers are ****” or “Some 
**** are sharks”), b) a sentence ascribing a metaphor-relevant property to either the 
topic or the vehicle (e.g. “Lawyers can be ruthless” or “Sharks can be ruthless”), or 
c) a sentence ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to the topic (e.g. “Lawyers can 
be married”). However, comprehension of the metaphor was not facilitated by prior 
exposure to a sentence ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to the vehicle (e.g 
“Sharks can be blue”). The authors argue that the failure of these sentences (but not 
the equivalent sentences ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to the topic) to 
facilitate metaphor comprehension is due to their priming an inconsistent ‘literal’ 
interpretation of the vehicle, which is suppressed during the interpretation process.  	  
Unlike the studies discussed above (Gernsbacher et al. 2005, 2001; Glucksberg et al. 
1997), as well as the conditions already mentioned, this design did also incorporate a 
true baseline condition, in which the prime was just the framework of the metaphoric 
sentence, without the topic or the vehicle term (e.g. Some **** are *****).	  However, 
because of comparisons with this baseline condition, it is not clear that the authors can 
legitimately conclude that their data provide evidence of suppression taking place 
during metaphor comprehension.	   With respect to novel metaphors (the metaphor 
condition was divided into two sub-conditions; novel and conventional), primes that 	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  A z-score quantifies the original score in terms of the number of standard deviations that that score is from the 
mean of the distribution.	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were sentences ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to the vehicle produced 
verification latencies that were on average, equal to the baseline condition.	   Primes 
that were sentences ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to the vehicle only 
produced verification latencies that were below baseline (on average) in the 
conventional metaphor condition. It could be argued that these findings are indicative 
of a lack of facilitation or a dampening of priming, but not necessarily of suppression, 
as suppression should operate below baseline. 
 
As Rubio-Fernandez (2006) suggests, it could be argued that if facilitation is 
understood as a positive activation, suppression should be understood as a negative 
activation. This assumption is indeed supported by empirical evidence suggesting this 
pattern (e.g. Neurmann & Deschepper 1992; Neurmann, Cherau, Hood & Steinnagel 
1993). However, whereas facilitation with respect to the baseline level of unrelated 
words is usually taken as indicative of activation, it is not always the case that a below 
baseline effect is required in order for data to be considered indicative of suppression. 
For example, it is claimed that contextually irrelevant meanings of a homonym are 
suppressed, even though reaction times to associates of that meaning are similar to 
rather than slower than reaction times to unrelated controls (e.g. Swinney 1979; 
Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman & Bienkowski 1982; Tanenhaus et al. 1979). 
Therefore, McGlone and Manfredi are not alone in concluding that suppression has 
taken place on the basis of an ‘equal to baseline’ effect.	  
 
Although McGlone and Manfredi’s (2001) data suggest that suppression takes place 
during the comprehension of conventional metaphors, without a below baseline 
suppression effect in the novel metaphor condition, these findings are perhaps more 
tentative with respect to suppression taking place during novel metaphor 
comprehension. Furthermore, there is a general consensus among many current 
theorists that conventionalized metaphors are processed differently to novel 
metaphors (Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Wilson and Carston 2007; Giora 2002; 
Glucksberg 2001). Thus, findings with respect to conventionalized metaphors cannot 
be generalized to novel metaphors.  
Rubio-Fernandez (2004, 2007) moved beyond sentence verification, and used a cross-
modal priming paradigm which made it possible to get an on-line measure of property 
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activation across time, and to determine at which point in processing, there is a loss of 
activation of irrelevant literal properties of the metaphor vehicle.	  	  
Her cross-modal lexical priming studies were adapted from Swinney’s (1979), in 
which he found that the irrelevant meanings of homonyms were suppressed as early 
as 200-300ms from the offset of the ambiguous words. Rubio-Fernandez (2004, 2007) 
however, found that in metaphor conditions (e.g. “John doesn’t like physical contact. 
Even his girlfriend finds it difficult to come close to him. John is a cactus”), there was 
loss of activation of superordinates (e.g. “plant”) between 400ms and 1000ms, which, 
she argues, is the result of active suppression of metaphor irrelevant properties.	  	  
In contrast, she found that in neutral baseline contexts (e.g. “Mary bought her mother 
a cactus”), superordinates remained active up to 1000 ms, where no property of that 
prime was particularly relevant or irrelevant for interpretation (Rubio-Fernandez 
2004, 2007). Rubio-Fernandez argues that the loss of activation of superordinates in 
metaphoric contexts could not, therefore, have been the result of passive decay (which 
would have taken place in the neutral contexts) but has to be due to active 
suppression23. 	  
Rubio-Fernandez argues that active suppression is required during metaphor 
comprehension because metaphor irrelevant features of the encoded vehicle concept 
are frequently not just irrelevant but also inconsistent and in direct conflict with the 
metaphoric meaning. She also argues that the difference in time course of suppression 
of irrelevant properties or meanings in disambiguation and metaphor interpretation 
(evident in the difference between Swinney, 1979, and Rubio-Fernandez’, 2004; 
2007, findings) is due to the different suppression processes involved. She argues that 
the pragmatic processes involved in novel metaphor interpretation involve some level 
of awareness and need time to develop; whereas those involved in disambiguation do 
not require this level of attention and awareness. Therefore suppression operates 
faster in disambiguation than in metaphor interpretation.   
However, the nature of the neutral baseline condition in Rubio’s study means that 
there is potentially an alternative interpretation of the data. It could be argued that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Rubio-Fernandez follows the distinction made by Gernsbacher and colleagues (Gernsbacher & Faust 1991; 
Gernsbacher & St. John 2002) between passive decay and active suppression; “suppression is understood as ‘a 
directed reduction in activation’, which is different from the outcome of other inhibitory mechanisms such as 
decay or compensatory inhibition” (Rubio-Fernandez 2004:114)	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neutral contexts (e.g. Mary bought her mother a cactus) were not completely neutral. 
It is quite possible that superordinates (e.g. plant) were relevant to interpretation, and 
were, therefore, primed in the neutral condition, causing them to remain activated up 
to 1000ms. On this basis, we cannot be sure that the neutral condition provided a true 
baseline (in which superordinates were definitely not primed) from which to compare 
the activation patterns in the metaphor condition. True neutrality could only have 
been achieved by a series of Xs (e.g. XXXX XXX XXXXX XXXX cactus), or 
something of that kind. 
Inconclusive findings? 
These studies indicate that figurative language affects priming. Each study illustrates 
that priming affects are dampened by the derivation of an alternative, metaphoric 
interpretation of that term. However, it could be argued, contrary to the authors 
claims, that none of these findings provide conclusive evidence that active 
suppression takes place, as it is not possible to determine whether deactivation 
(dampening of priming) occurs as a result of lack of attention or active suppression. It 
could be argued that evidence of active suppression must come in the form of a below 
baseline effect, in which activation levels of literal meanings in metaphor biasing 
contexts are found to be lower than in completely neutral contexts (i.e. a series of Xs). 
Rubio-Fernandez (2006), on the other hand, argues that in typical communication, 
suppression does not operate below-baseline at the lexical level. On the basis of her 
cross-modal lexical priming findings, she argues, that the distinction between passive 
decay and active suppression is not reflected in the degree to which activation is 
decreased (at or below baseline), but the speed at which activation reduction takes 
hold.  
Rubio-Fernandez found that central properties (e.g. BUBBLE) of primes (e.g. 
‘champagne’) were initially activated when processing the prime words, both in 
neutral contexts (e.g. “For the dinner, Mary brought champagne”) and cancelling 
contexts (e.g. “Even though the bottle had been opened for a week, John finished off 
the champagne”). However, whereas in neutral contexts, central properties remained 
active at an intermediate delay (400ms), in the cancelling contexts, the activation of 
central properties had dropped to baseline level by 400ms. Rubio-Fernandez argues 
that given the central properties remained active at 400ms in neutral contexts, in 
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which they are not particularly relevant to interpretation, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the loss of activation in the cancelling contexts is the result of active suppression, 
but that the mechanism of suppression must not operate below baseline, as even at 
1000ms, activation level was not below baseline in cancelling contexts. 
 
Given the potential criticism of Rubio-Fernandez’ baseline condition I presented 
above, I am not sure that the findings on which this argument is founded are robust 
enough to backup Rubio-Fernandez’ claim, however, the argument is highly 
plausible, and there is no evidence to suggest that in typical communication, 
suppression operates below baseline. 
 
Correlation between executive function and metaphor comprehension 
 
If suppression takes place during metaphor comprehension then we might expect to 
find evidence of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for suppression being 
employed during the processing of metaphors. Is there any such evidence? 
 
‘Executive functions’ is an umbrella category which denotes those processes that 
serve to “monitor and control thought and action, including self-regulation, planning, 
behavior organization, cognitive flexibility, error detection and correction, response 
inhibition, and resistance to interference” (Carlson and Moses 2001: 1; see also, 
Eslinger 1996; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). This section is dedicated to 
the discussion of evidence that suggests that at least sub-processes (i.e. inhibitory 
control and working memory) within our general ‘executive functions’ are employed 
during metaphor comprehension in order to suppress the activation of metaphor 
irrelevant information associated with the encoded meaning. 
 
Inhibitory control and working memory are sub-processes of our executive functions. 
Inhibition control is the ability to maintain attention on 
responses/representations/information in order to achieve a given goal, while 
inhibiting responses/representations/information that may interfere with achieving 
said goal, and working memory is the system that keeps representations active for use 
in verbal and nonverbal tasks, such as reasoning and comprehension, and makes them 
	   142 
available for further information-processing. Both inhibitory control and working 
memory are basic executive functions that make it possible for more complex 
executive functions like problem-solving to develop (Senn, Espy and Kaufmann 
2004), and are among the earliest executive functions to appear, with initial signs 
observed in infants 7 to 12-months old (Luca, Cinzia, Leventer, Richard 2008; 
Anderson 2002) 
 
Empirical findings suggest that inhibitory control and working memory are important 
components during metaphor comprehension (Pierce, Mclaren and Chiappe 2010; 
Monetta and Pell 2007; Gold, Faust and Goldstein 2010; Papagno, Lucchelli, Muggia, 
and Rizzo’s 2003; Amanzio et al. 2007). Indeed, metaphor relevant information must 
be attended to, while ensuring that information that is irrelevant to, or inconsistent 
with, a metaphoric interpretation does not interfere with processing. 
 
Some of the studies discussed below have attempted to provide evidence of 
suppression taking place during metaphor comprehension, by observing a correlation 
between executive function capacities and metaphor comprehension capacity. 
However, although all the findings below suggest that attention mechanisms are 
employed during metaphor comprehension, we cannot conclude from them that active 
suppression takes place during interpretation. 
 
Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe (2010) found that individuals with higher-working 
memory span exhibited less of a MIE (see Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin (1982), 
section 2.1.1) than those with low-working memory span. Indeed, high-WM 
individuals were able to arrive at a metaphoric interpretation faster than low-WM 
individuals, and thus they were also able to judge that metaphoric interpretation to be 
literally false more quickly. This finding suggests that working memory span effects 
metaphor comprehension.  
High working memory span is indicative of good executive functioning. The 
executive component of Working Memory is involved in ensuring that behavior is 
guided by goal-relevant information and in reducing the effect of irrelevant responses 
(Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). For example, Kane and Engle (2003) 
found that high-WM individuals were less distracted by word names in the Stroop 
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task (Stroop 1935; see section for description of the task). Similarly, in the Metaphor 
Interference Effect task, people must resolve the conflict in truth-value arising from 
automatically apprehending metaphorical meanings. Success requires them to manage 
the interference produced by “true” metaphorical meanings when responding that the 
statement is literally false (Glucksberg et al. 1982. See page 92 for a full description 
of the task). 
Pierce et al.’s (2010) findings indicate that executive functions are employed during 
metaphor comprehension. This shows that regulatory capacities responsible for 
controlling activation levels are utilized when arriving at a metaphoric interpretation, 
yet these findings do not themselves indicate that active suppression takes place in 
such instances. 
 
Based on their ERP findings, Gold, Faust and Goldstein (2010) conclude that 
inhibition (suppression) is a component of metaphor comprehension. They recorded 
ERPs from individuals with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and neuro-typical 
individuals while they read novel metaphoric statements. They found that the ASD 
group was slower to process metaphors than the neuro-typicals. In contrast, N400 
latency recordings revealed no difference between the two groups when reading novel 
metaphors (i.e. N400s occurred at around 200ms for both groups in the metaphor 
condition). The disparity between the reaction time data (which reveal a difference 
between the two groups) and the N400 latency data (which reveals no difference 
between the two groups) suggests that the stages following semantic integration may 
be slower for individuals with an ASD than for neuro-typical individuals. So why do 
individuals with an ASD have difficulty with semantic integration? 
 
According to Jung-Beeman (2005), following semantic integration, a ‘semantic 
selection’ stage occurs, in which competing activated concepts are sorted out, and one 
concept is selected (i.e. an appropriate concept remains active, while inappropriate 
concepts are suppressed/inhibited); thus our inhibitory control capacities must be 
responsible for this process of semantic selection/integration. Moreover, studies 
suggest that inhibition/suppression relies on inferior frontal brain mechanisms (e.g., 
Barch et al., 2000), which are known to play a role in executive processes, too 
(Bookheimer 2002), and have been found to be deficient in individuals with an ASD 
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(e.g. Kleinhans, Akshoomoff and Delis 2005; Rinehart et al. 2006). This could 
explain why the ASD group show signs of difficulty with the meaning selection 
process.  	  
In summary, Gold and colleagues’ findings suggest that selection of an appropriate 
meaning takes place during metaphor comprehension, and thus inappropriate 
meanings must be deselected/inhibited, which is why ASD individuals, in whom the 
cognitive mechanisms required for inhibition are deficient, are slower to read 
metaphors than neuro-typical individuals. 	  
In addition, Monetta and Pell (2007) found that participants with Parkinsons disease 
who were identified as having impaired working memory (one of the ‘executive 
functions’), have serious difficulty with metaphor comprehension. These findings 
again suggest that working memory capacities (of which inhibition control is a key 
component) are employed during metaphor comprehension. 
Similarly, Papagno, Lucchelli, Muggia, and Rizzo’s (2003) study also provided 
support for the idea that active suppression is required in order to derive non-literal 
interpretations. They tested patients with a diagnosis of mild Alzheimer’s on their 
ability to correctly interpret idioms. Patients with Alzheimer’s disease have been 
found to have impaired executive functioning, leading Papagno et al. to hypothesise 
this would affect their ability to comprehend idioms, which requires the literal 
meaning to be suppressed first. Patients were tested using a sentence-to-picture 
naming task. They had to choose which of two pictures best matched a given 
sentence. In the first experiment one picture represented the figurative interpretation 
and the other the literal interpretation. In the second experiment one picture 
represented the figurative interpretation and the other was unrelated. Patients chose 
the literal interpretation when it was plausible, but chose the idiomatic interpretation 
if the alternative choice was completely unrelated to the idiomatic interpretation. 
These results are particularly interesting because they show that the Alzheimer’s 
patients could comprehend the idiomatic interpretation as long as there was not some 
highly activated, idiomatic inconsistent, literal interpretation interfering. The results 
indicate that the literal interpretation of an idiomatic utterance is activated, as well, 
and must be suppressed in order to arrive at the idiomatic interpretation. 
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Finally, Amanzio, Geminiani, Leotta, Cappaalso (2007) found a correlation between 
performance on executive function tasks and the ability to comprehend novel 
metaphors in Alzheimer’s patients. Again, suggesting that executive functions are 
employed during metaphor comprehension as suppression is a component of 
metaphor processing.  
Taken together, the evidence discussed in this section strongly suggests that our 
executive functions are active during metaphor processing in order to regulate the 
activation levels of relevant and irrelevant information associated with the 
linguistically encoded content. However, the question remains as to whether the 
evident deactivation of metaphor irrelevant information is the result of active 
suppression, or passive decay. If it is correct to assume that suppression should bring 
activation levels down to below base-line, then until we find evidence of such a below 
baseline effect, we cannot conclude that the observed deactivation patterns are the 
result of suppression. If however, Rubio-Fernandez’ arguments are accurate, and the 
distinction between passive decay and active suppression is not reflected in the degree 
to which activation is decreased (at or below baseline), but the speed at which 
activation reduction takes hold, then we can look at the findings presented in this 
section as evidence of suppression effects during metaphor processing.  
Our word naming experiments reported in Chapter 3 were designed to further 
investigate activation levels of relevant and irrelevant information during novel 
metaphor (and hyperbole) comprehension, and the developmental experiments 
reported in chapter 4 investigate a potential correlation between the development of 
executive function capacities and metaphor and hyperbole comprehension in young 
children. 
2.2 ADULT HYPERBOLE FINDINGS 
 
 
The above discussion of empirical findings relating to metaphor comprehension 
illustrates how numerous and diverse the research studies are investigating metaphor 
processing. However, there is little, if any, research investigating the on-line 
processing of hyperbole, and to my knowledge, there is no published research 
comparing the processing of metaphor and hyperbole.	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The unified accounts of figurative language, as well as those that suggest or entail that 
metaphoric and hyperbolic statements are processed in the same way, provide 
motivation for contrasting the processing of the two tropes. Moreover, Rubio-
Fernandez’ (2004; 2007) arguments could be suggestive of processing differences 
between metaphor and hyperbole.  
Rubio-Fernandez claims that metaphor comprehension does involve active 
suppression due to metaphor irrelevant features frequently being not just irrelevant 
but also inconsistent with the intended metaphoric meaning. For example, many 
features associated with the encoded concept DALMATIAN (i.e. features associated 
with the superordinate DOG) will not just be irrelevant but also in direct conflict with 
a metaphoric interpretation of the utterance “you are a Dalmatian” when said of 
someone covered in spots of milkshake after a blender has exploded. If this claim is 
correct then it raises the question of whether active suppression is required in the 
processing of other tropes such as hyperbole, where irrelevant features may not 
actually be inconsistent. 
It is possible that hyperbole irrelevant features are frequently irrelevant, but not also 
inconsistent (in direct conflict) with the intended hyperbolic interpretation. For 
example, many features associated with the encoded concept NOXIOUS will be 
irrelevant to the hyperbolic interpretation of “ the earl grey tea was noxious” (i.e. 
features associated with the superordinate HARMFUL, TOXIC AND POISONOUS 
THINGS), but they are not necessarily inconsistent or in direct conflict with a 
hyperbolic interpretation. This being the case, active suppression may not be required 
in order to arrive at a hyperbolic interpretation. 
If hyperbole does not require active suppression as metaphor does then we may find 
that metaphors take longer to read than hyperboles, or that word naming latencies are 
longer following metaphoric statements than following hyperbolic statements.  
As already mentioned, recent on-line empirical research has focused almost 
exclusively on metaphor despite the new unified accounts of figurative language 
discussed above, coming to the forefront of theoretical discussion. Therefore, there 
are no previous studies that can test the unified accounts and shed light on the above 
prediction. This is a gap that I intend to fill when I present findings (see Chapters 3 
and 4) from several studies in which metaphor and hyperbole are directly contrasted 
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using a number of different paradigms (reading-time; word naming; eye-tracking; 
developmental). Firstly, though, I will discuss some of the few existing studies for 
which hyperbole was the focus of investigation. 
Colston and Keller (1998) carried out one of very few psycholinguistic studies 
investigating the processing of hyperbole. They investigated hyperbole as a tool for 
expressing surprise using an opinion task, in which participants read a series of 
scenarios and marked on a rating scale the degree to which they thought the speakers 
expected the situations in which they found themselves. They found that hyperbolic 
expressions conveyed a sense of surprise in the speaker, more than an equivalent 
literal statement. Furthermore, when hyperbole was combined with irony, an even 
greater degree of surprise was expressed. Interestingly, they found that no greater 
degree of surprise was communicated by the use of ‘outlandish’, totally unrealistic 
hyperbole, than was conveyed by the use of ‘very slight, realistically possible 
hyperbole’. These findings suggest that hyperbolic utterances are a pragmatic 
phenomenon which serve to implicitly convey a sense of surprise.  	  
Hyperbole and hyperbolic irony have received some attention from discourse analysts 
and corpus linguists. Kreuz and Roberts (1995) discuss hyperbole as a cue for 
ironicity, while Mora (2003) and Carter and McCarthy (2004) explore ways in which 
hyperbole is used during communication, by analyzing instances of hyperbole in 
naturally-occurring conversations in large corpora (e.g. the British National Corpus).	  
Based on analysis using a conversation and discourse analysis framework, Mora 
concludes that contrary to current empirical approaches, hyperboles should be viewed 
‘interactively’, by including listeners’ responses and subsequent contributions within 
one hyperbolic item. She argues that hyperboles should not be studied as ‘single, 
creative acts by the speaker alone’. In addition, she argues that hyperboles may be so 
prevalent in everyday conversation because they ‘might be classified as ‘low-risk’ 
figures’, since the chances of misunderstanding are low.  	  
Likewise, Carter and McCarthy (2004) argue that “an interactive approach to 
hyperbole is indispensible” as the ‘listener reaction’ is essential to its interpretation 
and the success of hyperbolic communication depends on the listener “entering a pact 
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of acceptance of extreme formulations, the creation of impossible worlds, and/or 
apparent counterfactuality.” 	  
Colston and O’Brien (2000) were concerned with the pragmatic roles played by 
tropes such as irony and hyperbole. They found that tropes that present ‘contrasts of 
kind’ (e.g. irony and metaphor) perform certain pragmatic functions (i.e. 
condemnation, humor, and speaker protection) to a greater extent than tropes that 
‘present contrasts of magnitude’ (e.g. hyperbole). 	  
Although these studies provide insights regarding the pragmatic function of 
hyperbole, there is, as yet, no study investigating the on-line processing of hyperbole, 
the findings of which might indicate the nature of processes and mechanisms 
underlying the comprehension of hyperbolic statements. In Chapter 3, I will report 
findings from on-line studies, which aimed to do precisely that. 
 
2.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
 
Together, the empirical findings discussed in this chapter reveal an interesting picture 
of metaphor processing. It appears that literal meanings are not default, and 
metaphoric interpretations are available from the beginning of processing. Familiar 
metaphors are quicker and easier to process than unfamiliar metaphors. Metaphor 
irrelevant information associated with the linguistically encoded content appears to 
lose activation after a metaphoric interpretation has been derived, possibly as a result 
of active suppression. Furthermore, while there are empirical data presented in 
support of all of the current accounts of metaphor discussed in this thesis, perhaps the 
most robust findings support the concept construction accounts in which all but the 
most conventionalized metaphors are interpreted as category assertions, with the 
category being constructed on the basis of the context and the encoded content.  
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Against a sequential processing account of metaphor processing 
There is a substantial body of evidence against a sequential model of metaphor 
processing (Ortony et al. 1978; Inhoff et al. 1984; Glucksberg et al. 1982; Keysar 
1989; McElree and Griffith 1995; and McElree and Nordlie 1999). In light of the 
contradictory reading-time findings (Gold et al. 2010; Lemaire and Bianco 2003; 
Gibbs 1990; Noveck et al. 2001; Janus and Bever 1985), it is perhaps the findings 
from alternative paradigms which most strongly support a parallel processing model, 
and therefore, the current accounts which are not based on the ‘literal first’ 
assumption. 
Suppression during metaphor comprehension 
Although there is some evidence of suppression taking place during novel metaphor 
comprehension (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner 1995; 1997; 2001; 
McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 2005; 2007; Gold, Faust and 
Goldstein 2010; Papagno et al. 2003; Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe 2010), this would 
be consistent with all the accounts discussed here, except for the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis. The findings from studies which directly assess activation levels of 
metaphor relevant and metaphor irrelevant properties of the vehicle concept during 
novel metaphor comprehension, are not always clear-cut or particularly convincing. It 
is unclear whether an ‘equal to baseline’ effect on metaphor processing conditions is 
indicative of active suppression taking place during metaphor comprehension. 
 Our word naming experiments, which are reported in Chapter 3, were designed to 
further investigate activation levels of literal meanings immediately after deriving a 
non-literal interpretation.  
Familiarity effects 
There is strong evidence of familiarity effects during metaphor comprehension, which 
is consistent with all of the accounts discussed (Blank, 1988; Blasko & Connine, 
1993; Camac & Glucksberg, 1984; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, 
& Bookin, 1982; Martin, 1992; Grauwe; Swain, Holcomb and Kuperberg 2010). 
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Structure-Mapping account 
Gentner and colleagues present a wealth of empirical data, which they interpret as 
support for their Structure Mapping account over categorization accounts (Zharikov 
and Gentner 2002; Wolff and Gentner 2000; Wolff and Gentner 2011; Gentner and 
Wolff 1997; Onishi and Murphy 1993; Gentner and Bowdle 2008; Coulson and Van 
Petten 2002; Onishi and Murphy 1993).	  However, I argue, that it is not clear that 
many of these findings do in fact go against the concept construction accounts which 
propose that metaphors are processed as categorizations, as a) neither rule out an early 
alignment process per se (Glucksberg even explicitly states that processing likely 
begins with such a comparison process), b) the Relevance Theoretic account is even 
consistent with a neutral early alignment process, and c) we cannot be certain whether 
Wolff and Gentner’s (2011) findings are evidence of a neutral alignment process 
intrinsic to metaphor processing or intrinsic to the experimental task. 
Furthermore, findings suggesting that familiar metaphors are processed as 
categorizations (Gentner and Bowdle 2008), do not go against concept construction 
accounts, and finally, evidence of facilitation resulting from the close proximity of the 
topic and vehicle concepts (Onishi and Murphy 1993) can surely be explained by any 
of the accounts by appealing to memory load and recall demands. 
Concept construction accounts 
Much of the evidence (Glucksberg, McGlone and Manfredi 1997; Glucksberg and 
Haught 2006; Jones and Estes 2006) presented as support for the concept construction 
accounts over the Structure Mapping account (i.e. the irreversibility of metaphors; 
novel metaphors not privileging simile form over categorization form) seems robust, 
and the onus does appear to be on Gentner and colleagues to reconcile their account 
with these data. 
To date, there have been few studies that have aimed to empirically test the claims of 
the relevance theory, unified account of broadening. To my knowledge, Rubio-
Fernandez’s (2004; 2007) lexical priming studies are the only such studies, and as 
discussed, her property activation findings tentatively support all those accounts that 
posit suppression as a component of metaphor comprehension (See section 2.4 for 
discussion). Therefore, there is a lack of empirical evidence that might allow us to 
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determine which of the two concept construction accounts is most adequate (i.e. 
whether it is the recognition of a vehicle’s dual reference or the presumption of 
optimal relevance which initiates the ad hoc concept construction process). 
The Direct Access account 
Although some evidence (Nayak and Gibbs 1990) suggests metaphor comprehension 
is facilitated by pre-existing mappings between domains - triggered by a preceding 
metaphor pertaining to the same conceptual mapping, it is not apparent that this 
evidence goes against the accounts other than the Direct Access view.	   It does not 
constitute evidence of pre-existing conceptual mappings. Instead it suggests that 
metaphor processing is less effortful when there is a preceding metaphor pertaining to 
the same mapping/relevant properties.	  	  
Nayak and Gibbs’ evidence fits nicely with the Graded Salience Hypothesis, as the 
salience of the metaphoric meaning would be increased as a result of a preceding 
similar metaphor. Likewise, the Relevance Theoretic account entails that the 
discourse context primes relevant encyclopaedic properties of the lexically encoded 
vehicle concept and that these relevant properties/features therefore receive additional 
activation and are thus more accessible.	  Therefore, if a related metaphor is present in 
the immediately surrounding discourse, such facilitation would be predicted by 
Relevance Theorists (Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2006; Carston 
2002).	   Furthermore, Gibbs (1992) himself acknowledges that the Class-inclusion 
model does suggest that permanently established conceptual structures are used to 
create ad hoc categories from which verbal metaphors arise, suggesting that they 
would predict facilitation from any metaphor which made these conceptual structures 
(and thus, the relevant ad hoc category) salient.  
Moreover, Camac and Glucksberg’s (1984) findings suggest that, in contrast to the 
Direct Access account’s prediction, topic and vehicle pairs (with respect to their 
experimental items, at least) are not associatively related to one another. 
Graded Salience Hypothesis 
Giora and colleagues’ findings in support of the Graded Salience Hypothesis (e.g. 
Giora and Fein 1999; Giora 2002), appear to conflict with Rubio-Fernandez’ (2004; 
2007) findings. While Giora and colleagues’ findings suggest that metaphoric and 
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literal meanings are activated in both types of context, Rubio-Fernandez’ findings 
indicate that there is loss of activation of superordinates (relating to the literal 
meaning only) between 400ms and 1000ms in metaphor conditions as a result of 
active suppression of metaphor irrelevant properties.  
Giora and colleague’s findings suggest that both the literal and metaphoric meanings 
are activated in both a literal and metaphoric context. While Rubio-Fernandez’ 
findings, show initial activation of superordinates (relating to the literal meaning) in 
both contexts (which is consistent with all the accounts discussed in this thesis).  
The cross-modal priming paradigm used in Rubio-Fernandez’ studies is far more fine 
grained, and allows us to observe activation levels at specific delays during 
processing, and her results clearly indicate that in a metaphor biasing context 
superordinates lose activation between 400 and 1000 ms. 
Empirical evidence relating to hyperbole processing 
There is a distinct lack of on-line findings relating to the processing of hyperbole, and 
this gap in the research needs to be addressed. 
2.4 SOME REMAINING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 	  
Are metaphor irrelevant meanings actively suppressed during metaphor 
comprehension? 
A number of studies suggest that active suppression of metaphor irrelevant 
properties/meanings takes place during metaphor comprehension. However, of those 
which directly assessed the activation levels of irrelevant information, few of the 
findings are free from alternative interpretations (see section 2.4). In order to 
confidently assert that metaphor interpretation requires the on-line suppression of 
metaphor irrelevant information, further evidence is required. By carrying out word 
naming experiments (the findings of which are discussed in Chapter 3) we aim to 
shed more light on how metaphor comprehension can affect the activation level of 
irrelevant information. 
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Can metaphor findings be generalized to hyperbole? 
In addition, as already discussed, there is little, if any, research comparing metaphor 
and hyperbole, and the vast majority of research investigating figurative language 
comprehension has focused exclusively on metaphor, which means that any 
predictions the theories make with regard to the relationship between the two tropes 
are yet to be tested. This is not a trivial issue, as recent theoretical accounts have, in 
one way or another, shed metaphor of the sense of ‘distinctness’ (Sperber and Wilson 
2006:172) that was long associated with it.  
The original Relevance Theoretic concept construction account (Wilson and Carston 
2007; Sperber and Wilson 2006; Carston 2002) conflates all instances of loose use 
(metaphor, hyperbole, approximation) into a single category of ‘broadenings’, while 
Gentner and colleagues (Clement and Gentner 1991; Bowdle and Gentner 2005) 
propose a single processing model for all comparisons; literal, metaphoric, and all 
those in-between. Moreover, Gibbs draws no distinction between tropes which are 
based on conceptual mappings (hyperbole and metaphor) when he proposes that 
mappings between domains are our tools for understanding the world. Finally, as 
discussed in section 1.7.2, I also speculate the class-inclusion account, as it is, would 
also have to account for hyperboles of the form X is Y.   
Carston and Wearing’s (2011) discontinuity account on the other hand, does posit a 
distinction between metaphoric and hyperbolic statements – while they retain the 
original Relevance Theoretic broadening account for hyperbole, they claim that 
metaphor interpretation on the other hand, always involves both broadening and 
narrowing. 
Although all but Carston and Wearing’s account do not necessarily predict processing 
differences between metaphor and hyperbole (see section 1.7.2), Rubio-Fernandez’ 
findings discussed in section 2.4, could suggest otherwise. Rubio-Fernandez (2004; 
2007) claims that metaphor comprehension does involve active suppression due to 
metaphor irrelevant features being frequently not just irrelevant but also inconsistent 
with the metaphoric meaning (see section 2.4). If this claim is correct then it raises the 
question of whether active suppression is required in the processing of other tropes 
such as hyperbole, where irrelevant features may not actually be inconsistent. 
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The five experiments presented in Chapters 3 and 4 were designed, for the most part, 
to address the broad questions above by attempting to answer the following more 
specific questions: 
2 Are there processing differences between metaphors and hyperboles? 
3 Does arriving at a metaphoric or hyperbolic interpretation of an utterance reduce 
the activation level of the lexically encoded content enough to dampen priming as 
has been found with respect to metaphor?  
4 If there are any processing differences between the two tropes, do these 
differences lie in the way in which the lexically encoded content is accessed and 
dealt with, or do any such differences occur further down the line when deriving 
inferences. 
The development of metaphor and hyperbole understanding has not been discussed in 
this chapter, but is also of great interest and will be discussed in Chapter 4, where the 
additional three questions will be addressed:	  
5 Do we see any difference in the age at which children acquire the ability to 
comprehend hyperbole and metaphor? 
6 Is there a correlation between the development of figurative language 
comprehension capacities and the development of inhibition control capacities? 
7 Do we see a difference in how contingent the different tropes are on the 
development of Inhibition Control? 
The findings reported in chapters 3 and 4 are important as they will contribute to our 
understanding of a) how figurative language processing differs from the processing of 
literal language, if it differs at all, b) how figurative language interpretation affects 
lexical processing, c) whether the processes and mechanisms underlying metaphor 
and hyperbole comprehension differ, d) When children develop the ability to 
accurately interpret metaphoric and hyperbolic language, and e) Whether that ability 
is contingent on the development of inhibitory control capacities. Moreover, in 
shedding light on these issues, our findings will serve to verify some of the claims 
made by the current pragmatic and psychological accounts discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2. 
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3 REPORT OF OUR ADULT STUDIES INVESTIGATING METAPHOR 
AND HYPERBOLE PROCESSING 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 	  
This thesis is centered round a number of important questions: What processes and 
mechanisms are involved in arriving at metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations? 
What factors affect our ability to derive such figurative interpretations and the speed 
at which we can derive them? Are metaphoric interpretations just a further broadening 
of the encoded meaning than hyperbolic interpretations, or is there something unique 
about metaphor due to the comprehension processes involved and/or the interpretation 
arrived at?   In an attempt to answer these questions, in this chapter I will report 
findings from a series of studies in which we directly contrast the processing of 
metaphoric and hyperbolic statements.  
Metaphor (e.g. the politician’s speech was noxious) and hyperbole (e.g. The earl grey 
tea was noxious) are two common types of figurative language. Both are seen as types 
of non-literal language, in which the meaning the speaker intends to communicate is 
not that which is lexically encoded. Both transfer information from a ‘vehicle’ term 
(e.g. Noxious) to a ‘topic’ term (e.g. Tea). It can be assumed that when a speaker 
chooses to use a metaphoric or a hyperbolic utterance of the form X is Y, they have a 
topic in mind, and certain properties or features they want to attribute to that topic. In 
order to do this, they choose a vehicle term that exemplifies this set of properties or 
features.  
In this thesis my aim is to investigate the processes and mechanisms involved in 
arriving at metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations, and in doing so, try to 
determine whether there might be something unique about metaphor due to the 
interpretation processes involved, or whether metaphoric interpretations are just a 
further broadening of the encoded meaning than hyperbolic interpretations.  
There is a plethora of past and current theoretical literature on metaphor (see chapter 
1), which over the last few decades has either been backed up, or drawn into question 
by an ever-increasing amount of psycholinguistic research investigating metaphor 
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processing (see chapter 2). In contrast, despite recent unified accounts of figurative 
language (Wilson and Carston 2007; Carston 2002) there has been little, if any 
empirical research looking at hyperbole or other tropes. This leaves us with an 
important question; can what we know about the processing of metaphor be 
generalised to other tropes such as hyperbole? With this question in mind, this chapter 
will be dedicated to the discussion of findings from four on-line studies, in which we 
directly contrast metaphor and hyperbole processing in a series of reading-time, word 
naming and eye-tracking experiments. 
 
3.1.1	  PREVIOUS FINDINGS AND SOME REMAINING QUESTIONS 	  
 
Together, the empirical findings discussed in chapter 2 reveal an interesting picture of 
metaphor processing. It appears that literal meanings are not default, and metaphoric 
interpretations are available from the beginning of processing. Familiar metaphors are 
quicker and easier to process than unfamiliar metaphors. Metaphor irrelevant 
information associated with the linguistically encoded content appears to lose 
activation after a metaphoric interpretation has been derived, possibly as a result of 
active suppression. Furthermore, while there are empirical data presented in support 
of all of the current accounts of metaphor discussed in this thesis, perhaps the most 
robust findings support the concept construction accounts in which all but the most 
conventionalized metaphors are interpreted as category assertions, where said 
category is constructed on-line on the basis of the context and the encoded content.  
Despite the quality and depth of research investigating metaphor processing, I can see 
two important remaining questions, which I hope the findings I present in this chapter 
will shed light on. 
1. Deactivation of irrelevant meanings - Active suppression or passive decay? 
As was discussed in chapter 1, whether figurative utterances of the form X is Y are 
processed as categorization statements (Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson 2006; 
Wilson and Carston 2007; Recanati 2001, 2004; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; 
Glucksberg 2001) as their syntactic structure suggests, or whether they are seen as 
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implicit comparison statements (Clement & Gentner, 1991, Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 
1994; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993, Wolff and Gentner 2011), and processed 
as such is a matter for debate. Moreover, whether it is ‘relevance’ or ‘salience’ that 
guides our interpretation of non-literal language, or whether metaphoric meanings can 
be accessed directly from the lexicon, is still a point of contention. However, most 
current accounts (with the exception of the Graded Salience Hypothesis) share the 
assumption that while processing novel nominal metaphors (e.g. My defence lawyer 
is a shark), features associated with the literal meaning of the metaphor vehicle lose 
activation, though no claims are made with respect to whether this deactivation would 
result from active suppression, or passive decay (due to lack of attention). 
As discussed in chapter 2, in the context of language processing, suppression is 
understood as an active reduction in the activation of a given representation, which is 
in contrast with a representation automatically decaying. Gernsbacher and Faust 
(1991) and Gernsbacher and St John (2002) posit a ‘general mechanism of 
suppression’ within their ‘structure building framework’. They argue that incoming 
information that is consistent with already represented information is utilized during 
meaning construction, whereas incoming information that is inconsistent or irrelevant 
must be actively suppressed. 
In contrast, other models of cognition (e.g. Anderson 1983) propose that un-
stimulated mental representations are left to automatically decay. For example, the 
activation level of the literal meaning of a metaphor vehicle, in a metaphor biasing 
context, would automatically decay, because it would not be stimulated by the 
context. However, as discussed above, many current accounts of metaphor processing 
propose that irrelevant meanings, or at least features associated with irrelevant 
meanings are actively suppressed. 
Both the passive decay and the active suppression hypotheses predict that the 
activation of irrelevant meanings in a metaphor biasing context will decrease after a 
certain delay. However it is in a neutral context that the two hypotheses make 
differing predictions. According to the decay hypothesis, both the literal and 
metaphoric meanings would lack stimulation, and thus, both would decay. On the 
other hand, as a neutral context offers no trigger for suppression, the suppression 
hypothesis predicts that, after a delay, both meanings would remain as activated as 
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they were initially (Gernsbacher and Faust 1991; see Rubio-Fernandez for full 
discussion).  
Gernsbacher and Faust’s (1991) data support the suppression hypothesis; both 
meanings of ambiguities were equally activated after a delay, suggesting that based on 
bias contextual information, irrelevant meanings are actively suppressed during the 
resolution of ambiguities. It would therefore follow, that the same is true of irrelevant 
meanings in a figurative biasing context, during the processing of a figurative 
statement. Indeed, many findings, suggest that active suppression does take place 
during the processing of novel metaphors. 
As discussed in chapter 2, a number of studies suggest that active suppression of 
metaphor irrelevant properties/meanings takes place during metaphor comprehension 
(see section 2.1.4). However, of those that directly assessed activation levels of 
irrelevant information, few of the findings are free from alternative interpretations 
(see section 2.1.4). It is unclear whether an ‘equal to baseline’ affect on metaphor 
processing conditions is indicative of active suppression taking place during metaphor 
comprehension. In order to confidently assert that metaphor interpretation requires the 
on-line suppression of metaphor irrelevant information, further evidence is required. 
By carrying out word naming experiments we aim to shed more light on how 
metaphor comprehension can affect the activation level of irrelevant information. 
2. Can we generalize what we know about metaphor to hyperbole? 
Most current accounts entail that all non-literal utterances of the form X is Y are 
processed in the same way, regardless of whether we might categorise such utterances 
as a metaphor (e.g. the politician’s speech was noxious) or as a hyperbole (e.g. the 
earl grey tea was noxious). Relevance theoretic lexical pragmatists (Wilson and 
Carston 2007; Carston 2002) explicitly posit a unified concept construction account of 
figurative language in which they claim that all utterances in which a vehicle term 
(e.g. ‘shark’ in ‘that defence lawyer is a shark’) is used to convey a broader sense than 
that which encoded (e.g. metaphor, hyperbole, approximation), are processed in the 
same way. Furthermore, although Glucksberg and colleague’s class-inclusion account 
(Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001), Giora’s Graded Salience 
Hypothesis (Giora 1997; 2002), Gibbs’ Direct Access account (Gibbs 1990; 1992) 
and Gentner and colleagues’ structure mapping account (Clement & Gentner, 1991, 
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Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1994; Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993, Wolff and 
Gentner 2011) only discuss metaphoric statements, all these accounts predict that 
hyperbolic statements with the same nominal structure would be processed via the 
same mechanisms and procedures (see chapter 1 for full discussion). 
As mentioned, there is little, if any, research comparing metaphor and hyperbole. 
Recent on-line empirical research has focused almost exclusively on metaphor despite 
the current, unified accounts discussed above. This means that, as yet, we are unable 
to determine whether those unified accounts discussed, adequately capture the 
processes involved in both metaphor and hyperbole comprehension, or whether earlier 
philosophical accounts (Black 1962, 1979; Davidson 1978) were right to treat 
metaphor as a unique phenomenon, worthy of its own account. 
The findings reported in this chapter will allow us to investigate the processes and 
mechanisms underlying metaphor and hyperbole, and they will also allow us to 
directly contrast the processing of metaphors and hyperboles. Our reading time data 
will allow us to observe potential differences in processing effort/time between the 
two tropes. Many factors effect reading-time, which means that any reading-time 
difference could be indicative of additional processing effort at the level of accessing 
the linguistically encoded meaning via the lexicon, or further down the line when 
deriving inferences about the implicit content of the statement. As word naming tasks 
allow concept activation levels to be measured, our word naming data will allow us to 
see whether there are any differences between metaphor and hyperbole 
comprehension with respect to processing of the linguistic form (i.e. the activation 
levels of irrelevant lexically encoded representations after arriving at hyperbolic and 
metaphoric interpretations). 
The findings from the 4 experiments reported in this chapter are important as they 
will contribute to our understanding of a) how figurative language processing differs 
from the processing of literal language, if it differs at all, b) how figurative language 
interpretation effects lexical access and processing, and c) whether the processes and 
mechanisms underlying metaphor and hyperbole comprehension differ. Moreover, in 
shedding light on these issues, our findings will serve to verify some of the claims 
made by the current pragmatic and psychological accounts discussed in chapters 1 
and 2. 
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3.2 EXPERIMENT 1: READING-TIME EXPERIMENT CONTRASTING 




The hyperbole and metaphor reading time data which are reported below will allow us 
to directly contrast the reading times of target sentences preceded by literal, 
hyperbole, and metaphor biasing contexts. Finding a significant difference between 
the reading times target sentences in the three different trope conditions will give us a 
preliminary indication, based on the predictions above, of whether those aspects of 
the current theories discussed in chapter 1, adequately capture the processes involved 
in metaphor and hyperbole comprehension, and of whether a unified account of the 
two tropes can be maintained.  
Most of the current accounts discussed in chapter 1 (Wilson and Carston 2007; 
Sperber and Wilson 2006; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001; Clement 
& Gentner 1991; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Gibbs 1990; Giora 1997, 2002) would not 
predict there to be any difference in reading times between metaphors, hyperboles and 
literal statements, other things being equal. Each of the accounts posit a non-
sequential processing model (i.e. there is no default literal interpretation from which 
an alternative interpretation must be subsequently derived) in which the lexically 
encoded content and the context dependent content are accessed and derived in 
parallel. This means that, all things being equal, figurative interpretations should not 
take any longer to process than literal interpretations. Moreover, as discussed above, 
all of the accounts explicitly propose or entail that metaphors and hyperboles are 
processed in the same way. Therefore, based on the workings of these accounts, other 
things being equal, we would not expect the processing of either trope to be more 
effortful or lengthly than the other. 
Participants were required to read a series of target sentences; each of which 
contained a specific target word (e.g. ‘it was an assault’), which was to be interpreted 
literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically depending on the biasing context. The 
reading-times of the target sentences in the three different trope conditions were 
recorded, allowing us to observe whether the same target sentence takes a different 
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amount of time to process depending on whether it is interpreted metaphorically, 
hyperbolically, or literally.  
In addition, we also measured whether context length affected the reading-times of 
the target sentences by having two context length conditions for each target sentence 
in each trope condition.	  Indeed, it was thought that context length may affect reading 
times: a longer context provides more time for appropriate features to be activated, 
and therefore perhaps lessens the need for suppression of irrelevant features, in the 
cases of metaphor and hyperbole. As discussed in section 2.1.1, Ortony et al. (1978) 
found that metaphors took no longer to read than literal statements, provided that the 
context was long enough. In the short context condition, metaphors took significantly 
longer to read than literal statements. The authors’ interpretation of this interaction 
was that the short context condition did not provide appropriate schemata for 
interpreting the metaphoric targets. 
 
3.2.2 PRELIMINARY OFF-LINE RESEARCH IN PREPERATION FOR 
EXPERIMENT 1 	  
Preliminary research was carried out in order to guide the construction of highly 
controlled figurative materials to be used in our first experiment, in which we 
compare the reading-times of target sentences when preceded by metaphor, 
hyperbolic and literal biasing contexts. Due to the sensitive nature of reading-time 
tasks, it was essential that the figurative materials used were completely novel and 
designed specifically for the experiments discussed in this thesis, and that they 
adhered to a specific set of criteria which was put in place to ensure that we were able 
to make an accurate, direct comparison between the processing of novel metaphoric, 
hyperbolic and literal sentences.  
A series of target sentences (the reading-time of which was to be measured) and 
context sentences (6 per target sentence (2 metaphoric (1 short, 1 long), 2 hyperbolic 
(1 short, 1 long), and 2 metaphoric, (1 short, 1 long)) were constructed for our first, 
reading-time experiment. Table 1. illustrates the 6 different context conditions for the 
target sentence ‘it was a forest’: 
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Table 1. Context sentences for target sentence ‘it was a forest’. 
Short Literal Context 
Sam and Mark went for a walk in a national park; 
Long Literal Context 
Sarah and Mark loved doing things together at the weekend. Sometimes they went shopping. 
Sometimes they decided to go and visit friends in different cities. They didn’t get to spend that 
much time with each other during the week so they looked forward to the weekends. This 
weekend it was sunny and they went for a walk in the local national park; 
Short Hyperbolic context 
The back yard definitely needed pruning; 
Long Hyperbolic Context 
When they had bought their house they had been attracted to it because of the size of the garden. 
They loved how it was big enough for the children to kick a ball around and have some fun. Their 
previous garden had been very small. They had not bargained for how much work it would 
involve though. It needed pruning all the time; 
Short Metaphoric context 
Sam always got lost. The university was enormous; 
Long Metaphoric context 
Sarah had begun her first year at university. Even though she had gone to a large state school, 
nothing could have prepared her for the size of her university campus. It took her a while to even 
find where her department was. In her first weeks, she was always getting lost. The university 
was enormous and pretty intimidating; 
 
The target sentences were designed using the criteria below; 
(a) In all of the descriptions (contexts and target sentences combined), an object or 
concept in the context, is described using the target word in the target sentence (e.g. A 
fridge is described as a monster, or earl grey tea is described as noxious).  
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(b) The hyperbolic and metaphoric descriptions differed in one way: A metaphorical 
description can never be literally true no matter how much you manipulate the 
context. However, a hyperbolic description can be literally true if the context is 
modified slightly. In the hyperbolic descriptions, if the contexts were changed 
slightly, the object or concept depicted in the context, could be literally described 
using the target word in the target sentence (e.g. a garden could literally be described 
as a forest if the land is in fact a large, dense area of trees). However, in the 
metaphoric descriptions, the object or concept depicted in the context, could never be 
literally described using that target word, even if the context were changed in some 
way to facilitate this (e.g. a politician’s speech can never be literally described as 
noxious).  
The contexts were all written with the following considerations in mind;  
a) The metaphor, hyperbole and literal contexts clearly induce either a metaphoric, 
hyperbolic or a literal interpretation. 
b) The contexts themselves were written using only literal language. Any loose uses 
which may be included were highly conventionalised. 
c) The contexts did not just translate the target sentence into literal language; it 
introduced the sentence, but without being sufficient to allow participants to guess its 
meaning.  
d) All efforts were made to ensure that the degree to which the target sentence 
followed the context was as similar as possible in the metaphoric, hyperbolic and 
literal conditions (i.e. it was ensured that all target sentences flowed as naturally as 
possible from the preceding context sentence). 
In order to ensure that the contexts and materials created adhered to the guidelines in 
(a) to (d), two questionnaires were constructed etc. The aim of the first questionnaire 
was to establish whether the experimental items constructed clearly biased either a 
hyperbolic, metaphoric or literal interpretation, as was intended. The aim of the 
second questionnaire was to ensure that the context passages/sentences were all free 
from words which might directly prime the target word in the target sentence (i.e. it 
was a forest. 
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Questionnaire 1 
Procedure 
Thirty-eight native, English speaking participants (recruited via email) were presented 
with 27 target sentences. Each participant saw 7 of the target sentences in metaphoric 
contexts, 7 in hyperbolic, and 7 in literal contexts. Which target sentences appeared in 
which context was counterbalanced across participants. In addition, 21 participants 
saw the target sentences in short contexts and 17 saw them in long contexts. They 
were asked to decide whether each target sentence should be interpreted literally, 
hyperbolically or metaphorically. They were then asked to rate how much the target 
sentence related to the context on a scale of 1- 7 (1 being if the context and target 
sentence bear no relation to one another, and 7 being if they are extremely related). 
We calculated the mean sliding scale score (between 1 and 7) for each target item in 
each context.  
Results 
If a target sentence had a mean sliding scale score of below 3 in any of the contexts 
then it would not have been included. However, all target items had a mean sliding 
scale of above 3, and were therefore not rejected on that basis. If a target sentence was 
consistently misinterpreted, then it was rejected and removed from the experimental 
materials. If it was fairly consistently correctly interpreted in two context conditions, 
but was often misinterpreted in one of the context conditions, then we changed that 
context, in order that it more clearly biased the intended interpretation24.	   These 
changes were checked with a group of eight UCL linguists, who all verified the 
materials. Any contexts which were biasing a literal interpretation, in a figurative 
condition, or a figurative interpretation, in a literal condition, three or more times, 
were changed, and the target item was kept. If they were misinterpreted in the wrong 
way more than five times, then the whole target sentence was removed. Target 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  One problem (which was detected after the questionnaire was run), was that the first task relied upon 
people having a clear understanding of the distinction between hyperbole and metaphor, which they did not. 
Although it was explained what hyperbole was at beginning of the questionnaire, it is a complex notion to 
comprehend and use accurately in a task of this nature. This invalidated participants responses on whether they 
interpreted something metaphorically or hyperbolically. When participants stated that they interpreted a target 
sentence in a metaphor biasing context, hyperbolically, or vice versa, this could not be taken as an indication of 
whether this was in fact the case, because they could not reliably distinguish between hyperbole and metaphor. 
Thus, we did not always change or reject target sentences in which participants had interpreted them 
metaphorically in hyperbolic biasing contexts, or vice versa.	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sentences were also removed if it was impossible to change the context, which was 
inducing misinterpretations. In addition, all target sentences were checked by the 
same group of scholars, and a whole target item was removed if the feedback from the 
group had been that the item was too conventional, or did not adhere to the criteria.  
Questionnaire 2 
We also ensured that all contexts were free of any words that may have had a direct 
priming effect on the target sentence.  In order to achieve this, a questionnaire based 
on the research of Rosch and Mervis (1975) and Barsalou (1987), was used to identify 
strong associates of the target words within the target sentences, which may have had 
a direct priming effect.  
Procedure 
21 native, English speaking adults also recruited via email (a different set of 
participants from those who responded to the first questionnaire) completed the 
questionnaire, which comprised two different tasks: a brief definition task and a free 
association task. Again, the questionnaire included the list of 27 target words which 
could potentially have been included in the critical target sentences in the experiment 
(i.e. chewed, noxious, novel, tree, etc.), of which 21 were finally selected for the 
study. For each target word, participants were asked to first, briefly define the word, 
and then secondly, list up to 5 words which they associated with the target word.  
Results 
It was the case that none of the words which were present in the participants’ answers 
had been included in the contexts25. Thus, no words which participants either 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Probably because materials were constructed with this issue in mind.	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3.2.3 METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty native English speaking adults aged between 18 and 40 took part in this study. 
They were recruited through the University College London psychology subject pool, 
and received a £3 compensation for their time.  
Procedure 
We measured the time it took participants to read a target sentence under different 
conditions of target interpretation (in hyperbolic, metaphoric, and literal contexts). 
We used a now standard reading time methodology (see, e.g., Ortony et al. 1978 and 
Inhoff et al. 1984 among many others) in which reading-times of a series of sentences 
were recorded from the onset of the sentence on the screen, until the participant hit a 
designated key on the keyboard or response box. The specific design of our reading-
time experiment was, however, completely novel. Participants were asked to read a 
series of short target sentences preceded by a literal, hyperbolic or metaphoric 
context, on a laptop screen. The target sentences contained a target word which 
should have been interpreted either literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically, 
depending on the biasing context. For example ‘it was a forest’ (see table 1 above). In 
the present study, the context conditions were between subjects, such that the 
preceding contexts were short (5-13 words) for half the participants, and long (55-86 
words) for the other half 
For example:  
Short: ‘The back yard definitely needed pruning;’ 
Long: ‘That night was the first night that I had ever walked home from town on my 
own. I usually got a taxi with some friends. I just couldn’t be bothered to pay loads of 
money that night. I was walking past a bar and this guy just shouted at me. I was a bit 
tipsy and I just felt really angry. I couldn’t control myself. That is when I got involved 
in the crime.’ 
 After reading and understanding the context passages, which appeared in one 
complete passage on a single computer screen, participants were asked to press the 
spacebar to bring up a new screen on which the target sentence appeared. Participants 
were asked to press the spacebar again when they had read and understood the 
sentence. Following one third of the target sentences, they were then asked to answer 
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a comprehension question (e.g., for metaphor context and target sentence ‘our new 
flat had a huge silver, double fridge- It was a monster’, the comprehension question 
was ‘do you think the fridge is alive’). This was to ensure that they were focused on 
understanding the passages and not just reading them. Target sentences were 
randomly selected to be followed by a comprehension question. Before the critical 
materials began, participants saw five practice trials. These trials all had the same 
structure as the critical trials, and they all had literal interpretations.  
	  
Participants were tested individually. Prior to the start of the experiment, each 
participant received instructions regarding the procedure (i.e. what buttons to press 
and what they will see on the screen). They were told that the experiment is a simple, 
computer-based experiment that is looking at how we process language. No 
information about the exact relationship between the context and target was provided. 
	  
Materials 
As discussed above, all stimulus materials were designed for the purposes of this 
experiment and were judged to be completely novel. For half of the participants, the 
target words were preceded by short contexts, for the other half they were preceded 
by long contexts. See Table 2 below, for a complete set of contexts for the target 
sentence ‘it was noxious’. 
Table 2.  A complete set of context sentences for the target sentence ‘it was noxious’ 
Short Literal Context 
The varnish he was using was a new brand;  
Long Literal Context 
John was decorating his bedroom. He had been meaning to do it for ages. Something always 
came up that meant it wasn’t a good time to start it. Finally, he had enough money and time, and 
he had started the job. He started by varnishing his old wardrobe. He bought a special varnish 
which his friend recommended; 
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Short Hyperbolic context 
Earl grey was a drink I was always forced to have at work, and I hated it; 
Long Hyperbolic Context 
I am pretty fussy about what tea I drink. I do often like a hot mug of fruity tea just before I go to 
bed. That way I am not kept awake from the caffeine. Mostly I just like a good cup of English 
breakfast tea. You can’t go wrong with it, it’s nice and simple. The other day, I was forced to 
drink earl grey; 
Short Metaphoric context 
The politician’s end of year speech was typical;  
Long Metaphoric context 
I had to watch that politician on TV last night. I cannot believe how out of date his policies are. 
He just drones on with the party line the entire time. He doesn’t seem to have any positive new 
ideas of his own. People like him will drag the country backwards. His style of politics was 
typical of today; 
The target sentences and contexts were constructed using a strict set of criteria and 
considerations (see section 3.1.1-3.1.2). 
Counterbalancing 
Three experimental sentence lists were created, each list containing the same 21 target 
sentences. The three lists differed with respect to their prior contexts. No target 
sentence was seen twice by a single participant, so in each list, 7 target sentences were 
preceded by a context consistent with a literal interpretation, 7 were preceded by a 
metaphor biasing context, and 7 target sentences were preceded by hyperbolic biasing 
contexts. Which target sentences were preceded by which type of context was 
counterbalanced across the three lists. For example, if a target sentence (e.g. It was 
noxious) was preceded by a metaphoric consistent context (The politician’s style of 
politics was typical) in the first list, then it was placed in a literal context (The varnish 
he was using was a new brand) in the second list, and a hyperbolic context (He had to 
drink earl grey and he hated it) in the third list, and so on. Each list contained seven 
passages in each of the three conditions (literal, metaphoric, hyperbolic). The order in 
which the target sentences appeared was randomized for each participant. The trope 
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condition was within subjects, so each participant was randomly assigned to one list 
so that they only saw each target sentence once, in one condition. The context length 
condition was between subjects, so half of the participants saw the target sentences in 
long contexts, and half saw them in short contexts.  
Apparatus 
The experiment was carried out using a small laptop computer, positioned on a table. 
Participants sat on a chair, up to the table and operated the computer. The texts were 
presented in lower case, font size 24. The experiment was programmed using e-prime 
(Psychology software tools inc.). 
Data analysis 
The dependent measure in this experiment was sentence reading time. The 
independent variables were type of trope, and context length. Trope was within-
subjects, and context length was between subjects. The sentence reading time was 
calculated by the length of time from the onset of the target sentence text, to the 




Participants reading times of target sentences in the three different trope conditions, 
and the two context length conditions are illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Mean reading times 
	  	  
Analysis of variance in reading times, between (context length condition) and within 
(trope conditions) groups, was calculated using a split plot ANOVA (with participants 
as the random variable (F1) and items as the random variable (F2)), with context 
length group as the between subjects factor, and trope as the within subjects factor. A 
main effect of the context length (F1(1, 56)=5.69 p=.020, F2(1, 40)=20.49 p<.001) 
indicated a difference between reading times in the long and short conditions. We also 
found a main effect of trope (F1(2, 112)=15.57 p<.001, F2(1.89, 75.77) = 9.54, 
p<.001) pointing to a difference between reading times in the three trope conditions. 
Yet, there was no significant interaction between factors (F1(2, 112)=.959, p=0.387, 
F2(1.89, 75.77)=1.49,  p=.231), indicating that the relationships between all three 
tropes were the same in both long and short contexts.  
Contrary to our expectation (based on Ortony et al.’s (1978) findings) that a longer 
context might facilitate interpretation, as illustrated in Figure 1, participants took 
significantly longer to read the target sentences in the long condition than in the short 
condition. The most obvious interpretation of this result is that the longer contexts 
required a heavier dependence on memory and generally more processing effort.  
In contrast with previous reading-time studies (Ortony et al. 1978; Inhoff et al. 1984), 
post hoc Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicate that target sentences 
	  
	  
Hyp	  Lit	  Met	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took longer to read when preceded by a metaphoric biasing context than when 
preceded by a literal biasing context (p<.001), and in contrast with the predictions of 
most of the current accounts discussed in this thesis (Wilson and Carston 2007; 
Carston 2002; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001; Clement and Gentner 
1991; Wolff and Gentner 2011; Gibbs 1990; Giora 2002), there were significantly 
longer reading times for metaphors over hyperboles (Bonferroni, p=.002).  
Finally, further post hoc pairwise tests revealed no significant difference between 
reading times of hyperboles and literal sentences (Bonferroni, p=.245). Hyperboles 




The context length effect 
Participants in Experiment 1 read target sentences that could be interpreted 
metaphorically, literally or hyperbolically, depending on the bias of the preceding 
context. Overall, we found that when the context was longer, response times on target 
sentences were longer. This result is likely to be due to the fact that richer/longer 
contexts require a greater call on memory when deriving inferences; in the long 
contexts, the participants had more context to recall in order to mutually adjust the 
context and the explicit content of the utterance in order to arrive at its final 
interpretation. Furthermore, the extra information contained in the longer contexts 
would mean that there were likely to be more inferences drawn. This effect may have 
outweighed any positive effect the context may have had in facilitating understanding 
(i.e. priming relevant features of the vehicle concept).  
Metaphoric vs. literal conditions 
The significant difference between the reading times of the target sentences in the 
literal and metaphor conditions seems to be in contradiction with earlier findings (see 
section 2.1.1). Indeed, Ortony et al. (1978) and Inhoff et al. (1984) found that 
metaphors took no longer to read than literal statements, provided that the context was 
such that it heavily biased the metaphoric interpretation, and provided that the context 
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was long enough. One possible explanation for our differing findings, is that the 
metaphors used in the above studies were conventionalized, if not idiomatic (e.g. 
“regardless of the danger, the troops marched on”), whereas the metaphors and 
hyperboles designed for our study were completely novel. Among others, (Blank, 
1988; Blasko & Connine, 1993; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Gernsbacher, 1984; Camac 
& Glucksberg, 1984; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Grauwe; Swain, Holcomb 
and Kuperberg 2010) Bowdle and Gentner (2005) show that figurative meanings can 
become conventionalised, and are then processed more like literal language. Such 
conventionalised metaphors are considered to be instances of polysemy, in which 
both the figurative and literal readings have been stored in the lexicon as separate 
entries. If the metaphors used in Ortony et al.’s study were conventionalised, then the 
reading times for metaphors may not have differed from literal statements, because 
their processing may in fact be akin to that of an ambiguous literal sentence. 
The reading-time difference between the metaphor and literal conditions is not 
inconsistent with the current accounts discussed in chapter 1. It could be explained, at 
least in part, by the number of inferences derived in the two conditions. The more 
inferences an interpretation generates, the heavier the dependence on memory will be, 
since the context (previous conversation and surrounding linguistic material) must be 
recalled in order for the inferences to be integrated into the discourse. Therefore, the 
more inferences there are, the longer the interpretation process will take. Metaphoric 
interpretations are likely to yield many more inferences than equivalent literal 
statements, especially if the figurative statement is embedded within a rich context. 
The richness of a metaphoric interpretation, could mean that it takes longer to derive 
than a comparable literal interpretation, which would explain why our target 
sentences took longer to read when they were to be interpreted metaphorically, than 
when they were to be interpreted literally. 
Another factor that could potentially be influencing reading-times is suppression. 
Previous findings (Rubio- Fernandez’s 2004, 2007; Gernsbacher et al. 2001; 
McGlone and Manfredi 2001) suggest that suppression of figurative irrelevant 
features takes place during metaphor comprehension. Such findings empirically 
support all the current pragmatic and psychological accounts discussed in this thesis 
(all of which entail that the lexically encoded vehicle concept would lose activation 
during processing in a metaphor biasing context in which it is irrelevant), with the 
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exception of Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora and Fein 1997; Giora 2002), 
which claims that metaphor irrelevant information is not discarded during the 
processing of novel metaphors. If metaphor interpretation does require the active 
suppression of irrelevant information, then perhaps this could, at least in part, explain 
why metaphors take longer to process. 
 
Rubio-Fernandez concluded from her (2004;2007) findings that the kind of 
suppression involved in metaphor interpretation is a more time-consuming attentional 
process which occurs later on in processing than the automatic suppression involved 
in other pragmatic processes such as disambiguation. If this is the case, then any 
comprehension process which requires the active, attentional suppression of irrelevant 
information would potentially take longer than one which does not. Therefore, if 
metaphor irrelevant meanings must be actively suppressed in order to arrive at an 
appropriate metaphoric interpretation, then it is plausible that the processing of a 
metaphoric utterance would take longer than that of a literal utterance, which 
corresponds to what we find.  
 
Metaphoric vs. hyperbolic conditions 
 
We also found that hyperbolic interpretations took no longer to arrive at than literal 
interpretations, and both took significantly less time to process than metaphoric 
interpretations. It is possible that metaphoric interpretations are richer than hyperbolic 
interpretations (more inferences are derived when arriving at a metaphoric 
interpretation than when arriving at a hyperbolic interpretation), meaning that 
metaphors take longer to interpret than hyperboles, however, as both our metaphoric 
and hyperbolic items are completely novel, it seems unlikely the interpretations 
arrived at in the metaphoric condition would be richer than those arrived at in the 
hyperbolic condition. 
 
Another possible explanation for the lack of difference between the reading times of 
hyperboles and literal sentences, and the significant difference between the reading 
times of hyperboles and metaphors, is that hyperbolic interpretations do not draw on 
costly attentional suppression processes as metaphoric interpretations do.  
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Rubio-Fernandez argued that it is only metaphor inconsistent features which require 
active suppression because such features are in direct conflict with arriving at a 
figurative interpretation, it is possible that figurative irrelevant features in hyperbolic 
utterances are not inconsistent, but just irrelevant, and therefore do not require active 
suppression. For example, the feature LOSS OF SIGHT is completely inconsistent 
with the interpretation of ‘blinding’ which will be constructed when comprehending 
the metaphor ‘The new novel was blinding’. However, the same feature LOSS OF 
SIGHT would be irrelevant when deriving a hyperbolic interpretation of ‘my new 
lamp is blinding’, as the lamp will not likely be so powerful that it will cause loss of 
sight, but it is not inconsistent with the interpretation that the lamp is so bright that it 
hurts one’s eyes, or affects one’s sight. 
 
This interpretation of the data needs to be further investigated in a follow up study, 
which will enable us to specifically look at the activation levels of figurative 
inconsistent features, at different stages of processing of both hyperboles and 
metaphors. Findings from a word naming study (experiment 3), which allows us to do 
this are discussed in section 3.4. 
 
How do the theoretical accounts measure up to our findings? 
A unified account of metaphor and hyperbole? 
If metaphors and hyperboles do have processing differences, then this is not predicted 
by either the Relevance theoretic unified account (Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber 
and Wilson 2006), or any of the current accounts that entail that metaphoric and 
hyperbolic utterances of the same form are processed in the same way (Glucksberg 
and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001; Clement and Gentner 1991; Wolff and Gentner 
2011; Giora 2002; Gibbs 1990). Our findings are not inconsistent with the broad 
outline of these accounts, as the same processes and mechanisms may well still be 
involved in metaphor and hyperbole comprehension, but there must be something 
unique about a metaphoric interpretation which means that it takes longer to arrive at 
than hyperbolic and literal interpretations.  
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The reading-time differences observed in our data could be caused by processing 
differences either at the level of accessing and processing the lexically encoded 
respresentations (i.e. whether irrelevant lexically encoded information must be 
suppressed or not), or further down the line, when deriving inferences (i.e. how rich 
the interpretation arrived at is). 
A discontinuity account? 
The finding of a significant difference between the reading-times of metaphors and 
hyperboles does not go against Carston and Wearing’s (2011) Relevance Theoretic 
discontinuity account of figurative language, as they manage to retain a unified 
account while proposing that there is something unique about metaphor. According to 
their account metaphor is not unique because the processes and mechanisms involved 
in metaphor interpretation are distinct from those involved in other broadening tropes, 
but because metaphoric interpretations are different. A metaphoric interpretation 
contains an occasion specific concept that has a narrower, as well as broader 
interpretation than that which was encoded by the metaphor vehicle. However a 
hyperbolic interpretation contains an occasion specific concept that has just a broader 
denotation than that which was encoded by the hyperbole vehicle.  
The dual directionality of the lexical adjustment procedure during metaphor 
interpretation may result from the category violation that is typically present in 
metaphoric interpretations (e.g. politician’s speeches cannot be literally described as 
‘noxious’, thus the metaphoric utterance ‘the politician’s speech was noxious’ 
contains a category violation). 
Moreover, it is perhaps this category violation that triggers the active suppression 
process. The category violation may mean that the core features of the encoded 
vehicle concept are in direct conflict (inconsistent) with the metaphoric interpretation, 
requiring them to be actively suppressed, and if there is no category violation in 
hyperbolic statements, then the core features of the encoded concept may be irrelevant 
but not inconsistent. 
A possible alternative explanation of our reading-time experiment 
There is, potentially, an alternative interpretation of the above reading-time data. 
Although, in pre-tests for the reading-time experiment, we used a brief definition task 
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and a free association task to ensure that the contexts did not contain any direct 
associates which may have a priming effect on the target word (see section 3.2.2), this 
cannot rule out the possibility of the presence of indirect associates, which may also 
have a priming effect on the target sentence.  
By running the priming experiment discussed, which is discussed in the next section, 
we hope to rule out the possibility that our hyperbole and literal target sentences were 
quicker to read because the preceding context sentences had more of a priming effect 
on the target word, than the contexts preceding the metaphor target sentences. 
 
3.3 	  EXPERIMENT 2: FOLLOW-UP WORD NAMING EXPERIMENT, 




The aim of the experiment was to rule out an alternative, priming interpretation of the 
reading-time difference found in the previous study. We wanted to ensure that the 
reading-time differences observed in the reading-time data were not due to facilitation 
effects in the literal and hyperbolic conditions, resulting from the presence of indirect 
associates in the latter conditions. 
For this experiment, and experiment 3, we used a word naming task (Macdonald and 
Just 1989), which allows us to measure of the activation level of a concept when 
placed in different contexts. In this paradigm, a subject reads a text followed by a 
probe word that he or she must then name out loud into a microphone. It has been 
found that the response to the probe word is generally faster if it is related to a word 
or multiple words that have just been read (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980), as a result of 
priming. Priming effects are generally taken as a measure of word activation (Meyer 
& Schvaneveldt 1971). Such facilitation effects are usually interpreted as the result of 
a spreading activation process, according to which, when processing a word such as 
‘tea’, activation spreads to conceptually associated words like ‘coffee’, speeding up 
their identification (Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1973). Therefore, via spreading 
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activation, words within a context sentence could activate some concept(s), which 
may facilitate a naming response to the following probe word, by priming the concept 
encoded by that probe word. 
For this experiment, participants read the same context sentences (plus nine additional 
items) as in experiment 1. However, this time, the target sentences, which followed 
the contexts in the previous experiment, were removed. Therefore, for each trial, 
participants only read one sentence; a context sentence. Following the context 
sentences, participants were presented with a probe word, which in the case of the 
experimental items, was always the target word from the target sentence which had 
been removed (e.g. for the target sentence ‘it was noxious’, the probe word was 
‘noxious’). When this probe word appeared, participants were required to name the 
word out-loud, and word naming latencies were recorded.  
If the quicker reading times for the hyperbolic and literal items, over the metaphoric 
items was due to the context sentences in the literal and hyperbolic conditions 
containing more indirect associates than in the metaphoric condition, then the context 
sentences alone, as presented to the participants in this present experiment, would 
have a priming effect on the probe (target) words, causing word naming latencies to 





Thirty-eight monolingual, adult speakers of English, aged between 18 and 40 were 
recruited through the UCL psychology experiment subject pool to take part in the 
experiment, and were compensated with £4 for their time. 
Materials 
Twenty-one of the experimental items used were adapted from those used in the 
reading-time experiment discussed above. A further 9 experimental items of the same 
format as those constructed for the reading-time experiment were constructed to be 
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used in experiment 3, and were adapted for use in this experiment, resulting in 30 
experimental items. 
For example: 
Metaphor: A politics degree gives you a clearer perspective of society; it is a window. 
Hyperbole: I can see out of that hole in the wall you made for the gas pipe; it is a 
window. 
Literal: There is something at the top of the stairs which lets so much light into the big 
hall way; it is a window.  
These materials were constructed using the same criteria as the ones used for 
Experiment 1, and also underwent the same questionnaire pre-tests (see section 3.2.2) 
on a sample of 30 monolingual, English speaking adults26. 
As in the first experiment, there were 3 experimental conditions: (a) Metaphoric, (b) 
Hyperbolic, and (c) literal. However, for the purposes of this priming experiment, the 
target sentences were removed, so the participants only read the context sentence for 
each item (e.g. A politics degree gives you a clearer perspective of society.) In 
contrast to the first experiment, we had only one, short context length condition. All 
context sentences were between 5 and 13 words in length (the short contexts from 
experiment 1+9 additional items).  
In addition, one probe word was paired with each item (context sentence). This probe 
word appeared on a single screen, after the participant had read the context sentence. 
Participants were required to name the probe word aloud when it appeared on the 
screen. All probe words for experimental items were the target word from the target 
sentence, which were removed for this experiment. 
For example: 
Context sentence: A politics degree gives you a clearer perspective of society. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  However, for this set of new materials, the questionnaire participants were not asked to judge whether they 
interpreted the items literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically because it was thought that the participants did not 
have a firm enough grasp of the distinction between hyperbole and metaphor to have accurate intuitions about 
whether they interpreted the items metaphorically or hyperbolically.	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Probe word: Window 
In addition to the 30 experimental trials (context sentence + probe word), there were 
60 filler trials, and 6 practice sentences. As with the experimental trials, each filler 
trial consisted of a context sentence, followed by one probe word (e.g. I would quite 
like to go on holiday to America but it is very expensive; Afford). Twenty of the filler 
items contained a context sentence which biased a literal meaning of its 
corresponding target sentence had the target sentence been present (e.g. I would quite 
like to go on holiday to America but it is very expensive; I don’t think I can afford it 
actually.), but as with the experimental items, the target sentence was removed, 
leaving just a context sentence, a further 20 of the filler items contained a context 
sentence which biased a conventional hyperbolic meaning of its corresponding target 
sentence (e.g. The car hit me so hard as I was cycling along; I was catapulted through 
the air.), but again, the target sentence was removed, and 20 biased a conventional 
metaphoric meaning of its corresponding target sentence (Tom can’t wait to replace 
his old car as it has become a bit rusty and unreliable; it is an old tin can these days.), 
but again, the target sentence was removed. Forty-five of the filler context sentences 
were followed by ‘false’ probe words, which were not the target word which appeared 
in the target sentence that was removed for the purpose of this experiment, and 15 
were followed by probe words which did occur in the target sentence that had been 
removed (true probes), just as in the experimental trials. This distribution of true and 
false probe trials ensured that true and false probes were counterbalanced across the 
experiment; all experimental context sentences were followed by a true probe, while 
¾ of the filler context sentences were followed by a false probe, and ¼ were followed 
by a true probe, such that 45 trials included a true probe, and 45 trials included a false 
probe. 
Participants saw 6 familiarization trials before the main experiment began. These 
were put in place to ensure that participants understood and were familiar with the 
procedure. The experimenter remained in the room with participants while they 
responded to the familiarization trials, and corrected them on any aspect of the 
procedure that they appeared to have misunderstood, or reacted incorrectly to. These 
familiarization trials had the same form and structure as the experimental and filler 
items. 
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Procedure	  
Subjects began by reading a page of instructions and were then required to press 
SPACEBAR to initiate the first familiarization trial after the instructions page. The 
context sentences were then presented on a computer screen in an adaptation of a 
moving-window display (Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982). At the start of each trial, 
the display contained a line or two of dashes, representing all non-space characters of 
the stimulus sentence. Context sentences were read word-by-word; participants hit 
SPACEBAR to reveal one word at a time. Following the first press of SPACEBAR, 
the first word of the context sentence appeared at the left margin on the top line, 
replacing the dashes corresponding to that word. Participants then pressed 
SPACEBAR in order to advance the moving-window display and reveal each word of 
the context sentence, one at a time. When SPACEBAR was pressed, the second word 
appeared, and the first was replaced again by its dashes; subsequent words appeared 
and were replaced with each successive pressing of SPACEBAR throughout the 
sentence. Pressing SPACEBAR at the end of the sentence replaced the last word with 
dashes and the screen changed to the probe word in the centre of an otherwise blank 
screen. Subjects were required to say the probe word aloud as soon as it appeared. 
After the 6 familiarization trials, the participants were asked to press SPACEBAR if 
they were ready to start the main experiment. This initiated the first screen of the first 
trial, and the same procedure was followed for all 90 experimental items and fillers. 
The participant’s naming of the probe word out-loud triggered the program to move 
on to the next trial.  Subjects wore a small microphone attached to their shirt, and 
naming time was measured via a Serial Response box which was linked to the E-
prime experiment software. The probe word naming latencies were recorded. 
Subjects were informed that their response times were to be recorded, and they were 
encouraged to read and respond quickly while maintaining good comprehension and 
response accuracy. 
Counterbalancing 
Three lists were created. The three lists differed with respect to the contexts. In the 
first list, 10 probe words were preceded by a context consistent with the literal 
interpretation (had the target sentence been present), 10 were preceded by metaphoric 
consistent contexts, and 10 were preceded by hyperbolic consistent contexts. In the 
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second and third lists, the probe words appeared in different contexts, so the probe 
words which were placed in a literal context in list 1, were placed in a context 
consistent with a metaphoric interpretation in the second list, and in the third with a 
hyperbolic interpretation. If a probe word (e.g. noxious) was preceded by a 
metaphoric consistent context (The politicians style of politics was typical) in the first 
list, then it was placed in a literal context (The varnish he was using was a new brand) 
in the second list, and a hyperbolic context (He had to drink earl grey and he hated it) 
in the third list, and so on. Each list contained ten passages in each of the three 
conditions (literal, metaphoric, hyperbolic). The trope condition was within subjects, 
so each participant was randomly assigned to one list so that they only saw each probe 
word once, in one condition. The order in which the probe words appeared was 
randomized for each participant (except the 6 familiarization trials, which were 
always presented in the same order).  
Apparatus 
The experiment was carried out on a laptop computer, positioned on a table. 
Participants sat on a chair, up to a table and operated the computer. The texts were 
presented in lower case, font size 24. The experiment was programmed using e-prime. 
Data analysis 
The dependent measure in this experiment was probe word naming latency. The 
independent variable was type of trope. Trope was within-subjects. The probe word 
naming latencies were calculated by the length of time from the onset of the probe 
word, to the voice onset of the naming response. 
	  
3.3.3 RESULTS 	  
Participants’ word naming latencies for probe words after the three different trope 
conditions are illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure.2 Mean word naming latencies 
	  
 
Analysis of variance in word naming latencies, within groups was analysed using a 
One-way ANOVA (with participants as the random variable (F1) and items as the 
random variable (F2)), and trope as the within subjects factor. There was no main 
effect of trope (F1(2, 108)=.098 p=.907, F2(2, 86) = 1.133, p=.327) indicating that 
there was no difference between word naming latencies in the three trope conditions. 
Outlier data points which were more than 3 standard deviations from the mean were 
removed before analysis. 
Pairwise comparisons indicate that there is no difference in probe word naming 
latencies between the three conditions (Lit – Hyp p=1.000, Hyp-Met p=1,000, Lit-
Met p=1.000). This finding indicates that the literal and hyperbolic contexts do not 
prime the probe word any more than the metaphoric contexts, and therefore, the 
reading time difference found in our previous experiment must be due to some factor 




Participants in Experiment 2 read the context sentences that preceded the target 
sentences in our previous reading-time experiment (either biasing a literal, hyperbolic 
or metaphoric interpretation of the target sentences), followed by a probe word, which 
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was always the target word from the target sentences which were removed for the 
purposes of this experiment. They were then required to respond to a probe word 
appearing in the centre of the screen by naming it out loud.  
The fact that there was no difference in probe word naming latencies in all three 
conditions suggests that activation levels of the probe word concepts in all three 
conditions was similar. This suggests that we can rule out an alternative interpretation 
of our reading-time data; namely that the significantly quicker reading times of 
hyperboles over metaphors could have been the result of the hyperbolic contexts 
having more of a priming effect on the target sentences than the metaphoric contexts. 
If this were the case, then the hyperbolic and literal contexts alone should have 
primed the probe words, causing the activation level of the lexically encoded probe 
word concepts to be higher in those conditions, than in the metaphoric condition. 
This finding means that the reading-time difference found in experiment 1 must be 
caused by some difference in the processes required in order to arrive at a metaphoric 
or hyperbolic interpretation, and we cannot rule out the tentative conclusion that the 
significant reading-time difference between hyperboles and metaphors is due to the 
time-consuming active suppression process being unique to metaphor interpretation.  
In the next section I will present our findings from a second word-naming study in 
which participants read the same series of context sentences and probe words, as in 
the priming study discussed in this section, only this time, the target sentences were 
re-inserted after the context sentence for each item. Comparing probe word naming 
latencies in the different context biasing conditions, will allow us to observe 
activation levels of concepts encoded by the probe words. In all three experimental 
conditions, the concept encoded by the probe word would have been primed by the 
presence of the probe word in the preceding target sentence. Thus, finding a 
difference between any of the three experimental conditions with respect to probe 
word activation levels would allow us to infer that the priming effect has been 
dampened in whichever condition(s) exhibit(s) slower word naming latencies.  
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3.4  EXPERIMENT 3: WORD NAMING EXPERIMENT INVESTIGATING 





It was hypothesised, based on the results of the previous reading-time experiment, 
that one of the factors contributing to longer reading-times for metaphors over 
hyperbolic and literal statements is the role of active suppression during the 
processing of novel metaphors. If the interpretation of novel hyperbolic statements 
does not involve the time consuming process of active suppression, then this would 
explain why hyperbole reading times were significantly shorter than metaphor 
reading-times, and akin to the reading-times of literal statements. 
In this current word naming experiment, participants read the same series of context 
(e.g. Sam and Mark went for a walk in a national park;) and target sentences (e.g. it 
was a forest) as were used in experiment 1 (plus, 9 additional items (e.g. My husband 
always manages to hide and block out all the negative things about life; he is a 
curtain to hide behind)- all pretested in the same way as the initial items. See section 
3.2.2). However this time, the sentences were followed by a probe word-naming task 
(the probe word being the target word from the target sentence, e.g., ‘forest’). It was 
hypothesized that the manipulation of the context to prime either a literal, hyperbolic 
or metaphoric interpretation would affect the activation level of the mental 
representation of that probe noun, and thus, affect the probe word naming latencies, 
causing these latencies to significantly differ in the different contexts.  
In all three experimental conditions, the concept encoded by the probe word would 
have been primed by the presence of the probe word in the preceding target sentence. 
Thus, finding a difference between any of the three experimental conditions with 
respect to probe word activation levels would allow us to infer that the priming effect 
has been dampened in whichever condition(s) exhibit(s) slower word naming 
latencies. If either or both of the figurative conditions exhibit slower word naming 
latencies, then we will be able to infer that figurative language interpretation affects 
priming.  
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Significantly slower word naming latencies in the metaphor condition over the 
hyperbole condition would support our hypothesis (based on our findings from 
experiment 1) that active suppression of inappropriate meanings takes place during 
the processing of metaphors, but not during the processing of hyperboles. In both 
conditions, aspects of the encoded vehicle concept are irrelevant for interpretation, 
which means that, unless active suppression of that encoded meaning has taken place 
in one condition, but not the other, activation levels in the two conditions should be 
similar.  
If we do find similar activation levels in both the hyperbole and metaphor conditions, 
then this would indicate that the reading-time difference between the metaphor and 





40 monolingual, adult speakers of English, aged between 18 and 40 were recruited 
through the UCL psychology experiment subject pool to take part in the experiment. 
Participants were compensated for their time with £4. 
Materials 
As Experiment 2, each participant saw 30 experimental trials. Twenty one were the 
same as in Experiment 1 and had therefore, already been pretested to ensure that they 
adhered to a number of formal criteria (see section 3.2.2), and a further 9 were 
constructed for the purpose of this experiment, and experiment 2 (and all were pre-
tested using the same questionnaires as were used for pre-testing the original 21 
items. See section 3.2.2). For the purpose of this experiment, coda material was added 
to the end of each of the target sentences in order to avoid the target word being at the 
end of the target sentence, and subsequent wrap up effects (e.g. “Sam always got lost 
because the university was enormous; it was a forest with winding paths.”). There is 
evidence from reading experiments (Aaronson & Scarborough, 1976; Just & 
Carpenter, 1980; Rayner, Sereno, Morris, Schmauder, & Clifton, 1989) that the 
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processing load on working memory is greatest at the end of a clause, and therefore 
eye fixations in this area are longer. Therefore, constructing our items such that the 
target word is at the end of the sentence could mean that participants would fixate on 
this word for longer than they would if it were earlier on in the sentence, which could 
then affect activation levels of the encoded concept, which would affect the outcome 
of a word naming task. The coda material was added to each item to avoid this 
problem.	  	  
As in experiment 2, in addition to the 30 experimental items, there were 60 filler trials 
(20 literal fillers, 20 conventionalised metaphoric fillers and 20 conventionalised 
hyperbolic fillers) and 6 practice sentences (however, as with the experimental items, 
the target sentences were re-inserted for the purpose of this experiment). As with the 
experimental items, each filler context sentence + target sentence (e.g. The car hit me 
so hard as I was cycling along; i was catapulted through the air) was followed by one 
probe word. Again, forty-five of the fillers were followed by false probes (probe 
words which did not occur in the preceding target sentence) and 15 were followed by 
true probes (probe words which did occur in the preceding target sentence), like the 
experimental items. This counterbalanced true and false probes across the experiment, 
as all the experimental items were followed by true probes. 
A comprehension statement (which participants had to verify) followed 50% of fillers 
and experimental items (5 of the experimental literal items, 5 of the experimental 
metaphoric items, and 5 of the experimental hyperbolic items, 10 of the literal fillers, 
10 of the metaphoric fillers, and 10 of the hyperbolic fillers). Again, comprehension 
statements were counterbalanced so all comprehension statements for the 
experimental items and 15 of the filler comprehension questions required a true 
response, and 45 of the comprehension statements for the fillers required a false 
response (5 true and 15 false for literal fillers, 5 true and 15 false for metaphoric 
fillers, and 5 true and 15 false for hyperbolic fillers). The comprehension statements 
were designed to ensure that the participants have understood the sentences either 
hyperbolically, metaphorically or literally. 
Participants saw 6 familiarization trials before the main experiment began. These had 
the same form and structure as the experimental and filler items (2 literal/2 
metaphoric/2 hyperbolic). Three of these trials were followed by comprehension 
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statements to ensure that participants were properly reading and attempting to 
understand the sentences. 
Procedure 
The procedure was exactly the same as in the priming, word-naming experiment, 
discussed above. However, for the purposes of this experiment, the target sentences as 
well as the context sentences were presented on the computer screen in an adaptation 
of a moving-window display (Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982). At the start of each 
trial, the display contained a line or two of dashes, representing all non-space 
characters of the stimulus sentence. Context and target sentences were read word-by-
word; participants hit SPACEBAR to reveal one word at a time. Following the first 
press of SPACEBAR, the first word of the context sentence appeared at the left 
margin on the top line, replacing the dashes corresponding to that word. Participants 
then pressed SPACEBAR in order to advance the moving-window display and reveal 
each word of the context and target sentences, one at a time. Having read both the 
context and target sentences, participants hit SPACEBAR one final time to reveal the 
probe word in the centre of an otherwise blank screen. Subjects were required to say 
the probe word aloud as soon as it appeared. After the 6 familiarization trials, the 
participants were asked to press SPACEBAR if they were ready to start the main 
experiment. This initiated the first screen of the first trial, and the same procedure was 
followed for all 90 experimental items and fillers. The participant’s naming of the 
probe word out-loud triggered the program to move on to the next trial.  Subjects 
wore a small microphone attached to their shirt, and naming time was measured via a 
Serial Response box, which was linked to the E-prime experiment software. The 
probe word naming latencies were recorded. 
Subjects were informed that their response times were to be recorded, and they were 
encouraged to read and respond quickly while maintaining good comprehension and 
response accuracy. 
In addition, for the purpose of this experiment, following 50% of trials, an entire 
comprehension statement was presented on a new screen when the subject responded 
to the probe. Subjects were required to judge whether this statement was consistent 
with the sentence by pressing Y for yes or N for no. In the other 50% of trials in 
which there was no comprehension statement, the program moved straight on to the 
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next trial.  Again, probe word naming latencies as well as the responses to the 
comprehension statements were all recorded. 
Again, subjects were informed that their reading and response times were to be 
recorded, and they were encouraged to read and respond quickly while maintaining 
good comprehension and response accuracy. 
Counterbalancing 
Counterbalancing was exactly the same as in the priming, word naming experiment 
discussed above (see section 3.3.2 above) 
Apparatus 
All apparatus was the same as in the priming experiment discussed above (see section 
3.3.2 above). 
Data analysis 
Again, the dependent measure in this experiment was probe word naming latency. 
The independent variable was type of trope. Trope was within-subjects. Again, the 
probe word naming latencies were calculated by the length of time from the onset of 




Participants’ word naming latencies for probe words after the three different trope 
conditions are illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 3. Mean word naming latencies
	  
Analysis of variance in word naming latencies, within groups was analysed using a 
One-way ANOVA (with participants as the random variable (F1) and items as the 
random variable (F2)), and trope as the within subjects factor. A main effect of trope 
(F1(2, 80)=3.380 p=.039, F2(2, 58) = 3.166, p=.050) pointed to a difference between 
reading times in the three trope conditions. Outlier data points that were more than 3 
standard deviations from the mean were removed before analysis. 
Pairwise comparisons indicate that probe words took longer to name when preceded 
by a metaphoric item than when preceded by a literal item (p=.014). However, in 
contrast to our expectations based on our previous reading-time data, post hoc 
pairwise tests also revealed significantly longer word naming latencies after 
hyperboles than after literal items (p=.046) (marginal by participants, p=.066), and no 
significant difference between word naming latencies after metaphoric and hyperbolic 
items (p=.699).  
Finally, further analysis (see figure 4 below) revealed that all three filler conditions 
(literal, conventional hyperbole, conventional metaphor), in which the probe word 
was not the same as the target word in the preceding target sentence (false probes), 
differed significantly (F1 p <.0001; F2 p=.03) from the experimental literal condition 
(difference between the hyperbole filler condition and the literal experimental 
condition was just marginal by items p=.07) only, and did not differ from the 
experimental metaphor and hyperbole conditions (F1 p=.904; p=.765; F2 p=.501; 
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p=.547). In short, probe word naming latencies when the probe word was not present 
in the preceding context (and thus priming had not occurred) were comparable to 
those in which the probe word had appeared in the preceding target sentence (and had 
therefore been primed), but in a hyperbolic or metaphoric biasing context.  




Participants in our third study read target sentences that could be interpreted 
metaphorically, literally or hyperbolically, depending on the bias of the preceding 
context. They were then required to respond to a probe word (the target word from the 
target sentence just read) appearing in the centre of the screen by naming it out loud.  
Longer probe word-naming latencies in the metaphor and hyperbole conditions over 
the literal condition suggest that activation levels of the lexically encoded target 
concept in the literal condition are higher than in both figurative conditions. Longer 
word naming latencies are a reliable indicator of the concept denoted by that word, or 
at least core features of it, having lost activation, and as we can see in our data, word 
naming latencies are slower after hyperbolic items than after literal items, just as they 
were after metaphoric items, indicating that deactivation takes place in hyperbole 
interpretation, just as it does in metaphor interpretation. Thus, the reading-time 
difference between metaphors and hyperboles, and the lack of difference between the 
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hyperbole and literal conditions, observed in experiment 1, cannot be attributed to 
metaphor comprehension requiring active suppression, where hyperbole does not. 
Deactivation of the lexically encoded vehicle concept, whether resulting from active 
suppression or passive decay, occurs during the interpretation of both tropes, to the 
same degree. 
Furthermore, comparable probe word naming latencies in all three filler conditions (in 
which the probe word had not appeared in the preceding target sentence) and the 
experimental metaphor and hyperbole conditions (in which the probe word had 
appeared in the preceding target sentence), suggest that deactivation of the encoded 
vehicle concept occurred in both the experimental figurative conditions, enough to 
completely dampen the effects of priming.  
A reduction in priming in the figurative conditions, could result from two factors: 
1. Suppression 
2. A lack of attention on the linguistic representation due to it not being utilised 
during the derivation of inferences  
	  
It seems reasonable to conclude that a complete negation of priming effects is likely 
to be the result of active suppression, but this cannot be confirmed. We did not get a 
below baseline (filler conditions) effect, which would have provided conclusive 
evidence of suppression during metaphor and hyperbole comprehension, but as 
Rubio-Fernandez’ (2006) data (see section 2.1.4) suggest, suppression may not in fact 
operate below baseline.  
Moreover, as activation levels of the linguistic representations corresponding to the 
metaphor/hyperbole vehicles did not differ, the reading-time difference cannot be 
attributed to a differing role of suppression during metaphor and hyperbole 
interpretation. Whether the difference between the literal and both figurative 
conditions is the result of active suppression, or lack of attention is yet to be 
determined, but our results clearly illustrate that figurative language interpretation 
negates the effects of priming. 
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We have shown that the reading-time difference (between metaphors on the one hand, 
and literal and hyperbolic statements on the other) does not stem from processing 
differences at the level of accessing and processing the lexically encoded vehicle 
representation (i.e. irrelevant lexically encoded information is suppressed during both 
metaphor and hyperbole comprehension). Therefore, the reading time difference must 
be caused either by differences between metaphors and hyperboles with respect to the 
lexical items that input to this process (i.e. there may be differences between typical 
metaphor topic and vehicle pairings and typical hyperbole topic and vehicle pairings), 
or by differences further down the line, when constructing an accurate interpretation 
of the utterance as a whole, complete with inferences (see section 3.7 for full 
discussion).  
How do the theoretical accounts measure up against this finding? 
This finding supports most of the current pragmatic and psychological accounts 
discussed in this thesis. The Relevance Theoretic lexical pragmatic accounts, 
Glucksberg and colleague’s class-inclusion account, Gentner and colleagues’ 
structure-mapping account (Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2006; 
Carston 2002; Carston and Wearing 2011; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 
2001; Clement and Gentner 1991; Wolff and Gentner 2011) all entail that the 
lexically encoded vehicle concept should lose activation during processing in a 
metaphor biasing context in which it is irrelevant. Moreover, they all entail that all 
figurative statements of the form X is Y are interpreted via the same processes and 
mechanisms, regardless of whether we categorize them as hyperboles or metaphors. 
Therefore our finding that the activation levels of lexically encoded vehicle concepts 
pattern the same in metaphoric and hyperbolic context, is consistent with these 
accounts.  
 
On the other hand, Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis states that metaphor 
irrelevant information is not discarded during the processing of novel metaphors. 
Therefore, it is not clear how the Graded Salience Hypothesis can account for these 
word-naming data. 
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3.5 	  EXPERIMENT 4: EYE-TRACKING EXPERIMENT CONTRASTING 





The reading-time data discussed in section 3.2, suggests that there are processing 
differences between the two tropes; metaphors took significantly longer to process 
than both hyperboles and literal statements, which did not differ significantly from 
one another. The aim of running an eye-tracking study (in collaboration with Nicola 
Spotorno (PhD candidate at the L2C2 lab, Lyon) with the same materials, is to obtain 
a more detailed analysis of participants’ reading patterns.  
 
Having found evidence of strong deactivation of lexically encoded vehicle concepts 
taking place during the processing of both metaphors and hyperboles (see section 
3.2), it has been possible to rule out the possibility that the reading-time difference 
between metaphors and hyperboles stems from processing differences at the level of 
accessing and processing the lexically encoded vehicle representation (i.e. irrelevant 
lexically encoded information is not suppressed during metaphor comprehension, but 
not during hyperbole comprehension). However, the question still remains as to what 
it is about the derivation of a metaphoric interpretation that causes it to take longer 
than the derivation of a literal or hyperbolic interpretation.  
Eye-tracking is a more fine-grained paradigm than reading-time, and should therefore, 
allow us to draw more precise conclusions about where the difference(s) between 
metaphor and hyperbole interpretation lies. There is a large literature validating the 
use of fixation time measure to access higher order cognitive processing (see Rayner 
and Morris 1990 for a thorough review). This literature strongly suggests that there is 
a close relationship between what a reader is looking at, and what a reader is 
processing. For example, word frequency and lexical ambiguity have been found to 
directly influence the initial processing time that readers spend fixating on a word. 
Moreover, Poyner and Morris (2003) demonstrate that the eye-fixation duration 
measures are sensitive to the process of generating inferences. Furthermore, Folk and 
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Morris (1995) discovered that if readers are forced to abandon an interpretation mid 
way through a text (on the basis of some new conflicting information) in order to 
arrive at an appropriate interpretation, they tend to spend additional processing time 
on the new information which has led to them having to abandon their original path of 
interpretation, and/or to re-analyse the preceding text, which is reflected in ‘second-
pass’ reading-times. 
 
By tracking the participants’ eye fixations as they interpret target sentences 
metaphorically, hyperbolically and literally, we will be able to see in real-time, the 
regions within the contexts and target sentences that they are fixating on at any given 
point during processing. Reading-times provide us with a measure of a quantitative 
difference between the processing of the two tropes, but the use of different kinds of 
eye-tracking measures (e.g. total reading time, total first-pass time, total second-pass 
time; frequency of regressions to preceding text) should allow us to make inferences 
about the existence of qualitative differences between the processing of metaphors 
and hyperboles, and to identify if and where difficulties arise when processing the 
different tropes.  
 
First-pass time is all the time spent in a region of a sentence before exiting to either 
the left or the right of that region. Second-pass time includes all the time spent re-
reading in a region. First-pass time gives some indication of early processing, whereas 
second-pass time and regressions into a region allow one to make inferences about 
reanalysis and the process of integrating interpretations into the given context. 
 
It will be necessary to analyse several regions of interest in our experimental items: 
the topic in the context sentence (e.g. the politician’s), the rest of the context sentence, 
which helps subjects to interpret the figurative meaning of the target sentence (e.g. 
end of year speech was typical;), the topic in the target sentence (e.g. it), the vehicle 
in the target sentence  (e.g., noxious), the coda/spill-over region (e.g. and disgusting).  
Potential findings 
Based on the reading-time difference (between metaphors on the one hand, and 
hyperboles and literal statements on the other) observed in experiment 1, it is 
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reasonable to predict that at least one of the following potential findings will be borne 
out in the data from this experiment. 
1. We may replicate the previous reading-time data, and find that the target 
sentences in the metaphor condition take longer to read than in the literal 
condition. However there are some critical differences between the design of this 
present experiment and experiment 1. Firstly, coda/spill over material has been 
added to the target sentences (e.g. it was noxious and disgusting) for the purpose 
of this experiment (as well the word naming experiments), which could have an 
affect on reading-times (of the main target sentence i.e. it was noxious). Secondly, 
the context and target sentences will be presented together on one screen in this 
experiment27, where they were presented on separate screens in experiment 1, 
which could also effect reading-times. 
2. We may find that the first-pass time on the target word/vehicle region (e.g. 
noxious) will be longer in the metaphor condition than in the hyperbole/literal 
conditions, as more processing effort may be required in the metaphor condition 
in order to access relevant conceptual information from the vehicle concept. 
3. We may find that the second-pass time on the target word/vehicle region will be 
longer in the metaphor condition than in the hyperbole/literal conditions, as more 
reanalysis of the context may be required during metaphor processing, and/or 
because the contextual integration process (i.e. the process of integrating 
inferences into the surrounding discourse) may be longer in during metaphor 
processing. 
4. We may find that total time in the target word/vehicle region is longer in the 
metaphor condition over the other two conditions, as a result of longer first-pass 
and/or second-pass times in that region in the metaphor condition. 
5. The sum of fixations from the time that the vehicle region is first entered until a 
saccade transgresses the right region boundary (regression path reading-time) may 
be greater in the metaphor condition than in the hyperbole and literal conditions, 
as this includes fixations made to re-inspect earlier portions of text, and is usually 
taken to reflect early processing difficulty along with (at least some) time spent re-
inspecting the text in order to recover from such difficulty.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 As we need to be able to track regressions from the target sentence back to the context sentence. 
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6. Total fixation time and/or second-pass time in the spill-over/coda region may also 
be longer in the metaphor condition than in the hyperbole/literal conditions as a 
result of differing integration times in the three conditions (i.e. integration of 
inferences into the surrounding context being more time consuming in the 
metaphor condition).  
7. There may be more regressions to and/or longer second-pass time spent on the 
portion of the context that supports the figurative interpretation of the target 
sentence in the metaphor condition than in the hyperbole and literal conditions. 
This could a) reflect a greater dependence on the context when interpreting a 
metaphor, in order to construct a ‘common ground’ between the vehicle and topic 
concepts (as the topic and vehicle concepts are typically less semantically related 
in metaphoric statements than in hyperbolic and literal statements. See section 
3.7), and b) suggest that more effort is required in order to integrate a metaphoric 
interpretation into the surrounding context, than is required when doing the same 
with a literal or hyperbolic interpretation. 
8. Finally, there may be more regressions to and/or longer second-pass time spent on 
the topic region (potentially to both the pronoun in the target sentence and the 
actual topic term in the context sentence) in the metaphor condition than in the 
hyperbole/literal conditions, as a) more reanalysis of the topic may be required 
during metaphor processing, and/or b) because the contextual integration process 
(i.e. the process of integrating inferences into the surrounding discourse) may be 
longer during metaphor processing. 
If differences like the ones illustrated above are also found between the hyperbole and 
literal conditions, this means that the two phenomena differ at a level of grain that 




Thirty monolingual, English speaking adults, aged between 18 and 40 were recruited 
from the UCL psychology subject pool. Participants were compensated with £4 for 
their time. 
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Materials 
Twenty-one of the experimental items were exactly the same as those used in 
experiment 1, except with additional coda material added to the target sentences (e.g. 
Earl grey was a drink I was always forced to have at work, and I hated it; it was 
noxious and disgusting) in order to avoid subsequent ‘wrap up effects’ (Aaronson & 
Scarborough, 1976; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Rayner, Sereno, Morris, Schmauder, & 
Clifton, 1989). In addition, a further 9 items with exactly the same format (context+ 
target sentences), which were constructed for the purpose of experiment 2 and 3 (e.g. 
The rug which was hanging on the washing line is thankfully giving us some shade; it 
is a curtain to hide behind) were also used, meaning that there were a total of 30 
experimental items (see appendix for full list of materials). 
The 60 fillers constructed for the purpose of experiment 2 and 3 were also used as 
fillers in this present experiment (20 target sentences preceded by a literal biasing 
context (e.g. There was an enourmous cake on the table; it was chocolate and rich), 20 
target sentences preceded by a conventional metaphor biasing context (e.g. The car hit 
me so hard as I was cycling along; I was catapulted through the air), and 20 target 
sentences preceded by a conventional hyperbole biasing context (e.g. That cheese on 
toast was just what I wanted; it was a feast to remember).  
As with the previous experiments, there were 6 familiarization trials (2 literal/2 
hyperbolic/2 metaphoric). These were in place to ensure that participants were 
familiar with the format and procedure by the time the main experiment started. 
Procedure 
Each trial consisted of a context sentence (e.g. The rug which was hanging on the 
washing line is thankfully giving us some shade;) and a target sentence  (e.g. it is a 
curtain to hide behind) presented on a computer screen. Both sentences were 
presented together on one screen. Participants were required to ‘read-for-
understanding’ the context and target sentence, at a normal rate, and hit SPACEBAR 
to indicate that they had read and understood them. The pressing of SPACEBAR 
initiated the next trial. The eye-tracker scanned participants’ eye movements as they 
read the materials.  
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As in experiment 1, following half of the target sentences, they were asked to answer 
a comprehension question (e.g. for the metaphor context and target sentence "our new 
flat had a huge silver, double fridge; it was a monster, it was”, the comprehension 
question was “Do you think the fridge is alive?”). The comprehension question was to 
ensure that they were focused on understanding the passages, and not just reading 
them without understanding. Target sentences were randomly selected to be followed 
by a comprehension question.  
Before the critical materials began, participants saw five practice trials. These trials 
had the same structure as the critical trials, and they all had literal interpretations. 
Apparatus 
Materials were presented on a desktop computer screen positioned on a table. 
Participants sat on a chair, up to the table and operated the computer using the 
keyboard. Text was presented in lower case, font size 24. A Tobii eye-tracker was 
used to track participants’ eye-fixations while reading. 
Data analysis 
We measured the time spent reading target sentences in novel metaphor, hyperbole 
and literal biasing contexts. We also measured first-pass and second-pass time for 
single word and multi word regions of interest within the context and target sentences 
(e.g. the topic in the context sentence, the rest of the context sentence, the topic in the 
target sentence, the vehicle in the target sentence, and the spill over region of the 
target sentence). We also measured regressions into each of the regions of interest in 
the context and target sentences. I report ANOVAs treating participants and items as 





Figures 5-7 illustrate participants’ first-pass and second-pass fixation times in the 
regions in which differences were found. Outlier data points that were more than 3 
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standard deviations from the mean were removed before analysis, as were all fixations 
above 800ms or below 80ms. All data corresponding to 9 participants were also 
removed (leaving 21 remaining participants) before analysis, either because a) they 
made fixations on region 4 (the vehicle in the target sentence) in fewer than 17 
experimental trials and/or b) they recorded eye-fixations on fewer than 15 
experimental trials (due to a hardware malfunction). Furthermore, data corresponding 
to 5 experimental items (i.e. items corresponding to the target sentences ‘it was a 
curtain’, ‘it was an athlete’, ‘it was a backpack’, ‘it was a dictator’, and ‘it was a 
monster’) were removed (leaving 25 remaining experimental items) before analysis 
due to an error in the presentation of these items. 
Figure 5. First-pass fixation-times region 4 (the vehicle in the target sentence) 
	  
Figure 6. Total fixation-time region 3 (the topic in the target sentence) 
	  
Figure 7. Total fixation-time region 4 (the vehicle in the target sentence) 
	  
Analysis of variance in fixation times, within groups was analysed using a One-way 
ANOVA (with participants as a random variable (F1) and items as a random variable 
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variability in our data, only one of the observed differences were significant. A main 
effect of trope (F1(2, 62)=4.767 p=.012, F2(2, 73)= 3.570, p=.033) points to a 
difference between first-pass times in the vehicle region in the three trope conditions.  
Pairwise comparisons indicate that first-pass fixation times on the vehicle were longer 
when preceded by a hyperbolic item than when preceded by a literal item (p<.001). 
The same difference can also be observed between metaphoric and literal items, but 
this difference is only marginally significant (p=.084). There is no significant 
difference between the hyperbole and metaphor conditions with respect to first-pass 
fixation times on the vehicle (p=.161) 
No other differences between groups with respect to any of the measures (i.e. first-
pass time, second-pass time, total time, or regressions any of the regions were found 




Participants’ eye movements and fixations were recorded while reading target 
sentences preceded by metaphoric, hyperbolic, and literal biasing context sentences. 
We found that participants’ first-pass fixations on the vehicle region of the target 
sentence were significantly longer when the target sentence was preceded by a 
hyperbole biasing context than when it was preceded by a literal biasing context. 
Likewise, participants fixated longer on the vehicle when the target sentence was 
preceded by a metaphor-biasing context than when it was preceded by a literal biasing 
context, but this difference was just marginal. 
This difference likely reflects early processing difficulties when arriving at the vehicle 
(e.g. noxious). Participants may fixate longer on the vehicle because it is unexpected 
following the topic. Furthermore, in both figurative conditions, some pragmatic work 
must be done in order to arrive at an accurate interpretation of the vehicle term; a set 
of features associated with the encoded vehicle concept must be selected for 
attribution to the topic. However, in the literal condition, the vehicle term is just 
decoded. 
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It is surprising that we found no difference between the metaphoric and hyperbolic 
conditions with respect to first-pass fixation times. Our reading-time data clearly 
illustrate that metaphors take longer to read than hyperboles. If the reading-time 
differences observed in experiment 1 were caused by longer fixations on the vehicle, 
then we would expect fixations on the vehicle to be significantly longer following a 
metaphor biasing context, than following a hyperbole biasing context, but this is not 
borne out in the data.  
Our eye-tracking data suggest that it is not early processing differences that cause the 
reading-time difference we observed in experiment 1. On the contrary, like our word 
naming findings from experiment 3, our eye-tracking data suggest that early 
processing of target sentences (i.e. accessing the encoded vehicle concept and 
selecting appropriate associated features) is the same in both hyperbolic and 
metaphoric biasing contexts i.e. more lengthily than in a literal context. 
It is surprising that the data did not reveal any significant differences between 
conditions with respect to any of the other measures (i.e. second-pass time, total time, 
regressions, regression path). Our reading-time findings (see experiment 1) illustrate 
that target sentences take significantly longer to read when preceded by a metaphor 
biasing context than when preceded by a literal or hyperbole biasing context; some 
factor must have caused this reading-time difference, and the eye-fixation measures 
recorded in this experiment are designed to pick up on these factors. If there were 
differences between conditions with respect to reanalysis of the context sentence 
and/or the process of integrating inferences into the context, then our second-pass 
fixation times and regression patterns would reflect those differences. 
 
My assumption is that the gaps in our data, caused either by participants skipping 
regions altogether while reading, or their fixations falling outside of the regions of 
interest, resulted in the data set not being sizeable enough to reveal some of the 
predicted differences mentioned above, particularly with respect to second-pass and 
regression measures. Many participants made no second passes at all, meaning that 
our second-pass data set was very patchy. Many more participants would be required 
in order to allow for this kind of data loss. 
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In summary, firstly, our eye-tracking data reveal an important finding; first-pass 
fixations on vehicles/target words (e.g. it was noxious) are significantly longer when 
preceded by a metaphor or hyperbole biasing context, than when preceded by a literal 
biasing context. This finding is in line with our previous word naming data, which 
suggest that the process of accessing and processing the encoded content of a target 
sentence is the same in a metaphoric and hyperbolic context, but different in a literal 
context. Secondly, our eye-tracking data do not suggest that there are any differences 
in processing with respect to the integration of inferences into the context (no 
differences between conditions with respect to second-pass fixations and/or 
regressions to the context region. This is surprising as our findings from experiment 1 
indicate that metaphors take significantly longer to process than hyperboles (and 
literal statements), and this reading-time difference must result from some 
difference(s) in the processes underlying the interpretation of the two tropes.  A more 
complete and sizeable data set needs to be collected by running the experiment again 
with many more participants in order to account for the loss of data which is often 
associated with eye-tracking studies (i.e. due to eye-gaze wandering from the regions 
of interest and participants missing regions all together during reading). 
 
3.6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter, I have presented findings from 4 on-line experiments, investigating 
the processes and mechanisms underlying the comprehension of metaphoric and 
hyperbolic statements. 
 
Are there processing differences between metaphors and hyperboles? 
 
Experiment 1 yielded some important findings with respect to the processing of 
metaphoric and hyperbolic statements. We found that target sentences (e.g. it was 
noxious) took significantly longer to read when preceded by a metaphor biasing 
context (e.g. The politician’s end of year speech was typical) than when preceded by a 
hyperbole (e.g. Earl grey was a drink I was always forced to have at work, and I hated 
it) or literal (e.g. The varnish he was using was a new brand) biasing context, and that 
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there was no reading-time difference between the literal and hyperbolic conditions; 
this suggests that there are processing differences between metaphors and hyperboles, 
and that hyperboles are processed like literal statements. 
These findings are not inconsistent with the broad outline of the Unified Relevance 
Theoretic lexical pragmatic account, or any of the other accounts that suggest or entail 
that hyperbolic statements are processed in the same way as metaphors; the same 
processes appear to be involved in metaphor and hyperbole comprehension. However, 
there must be something unique about a metaphoric interpretation that means that it 
takes longer to arrive at than hyperbolic and literal interpretations, and this warrants 
some explanation from the current accounts discussed. 
The finding of a significant difference between the reading-times of metaphors and 
hyperboles is consistent with Carston and Wearing’s (2011) Relevance Theoretic 
discontinuity account of figurative language, as they manage to retain a unified 
account while proposing that there is something unique about metaphor. They argue 
that metaphoric interpretations result from a narrowing as well as a broadening of the 
encoded vehicle concept. It is plausible that this dual-directional adjustment in some 
way causes metaphor processing to be more lengthy than that of hyperbole. 
Our findings from experiment 2 confirmed that the reading-time difference found in 
experiment 1 can’t be explained by additional priming effects in the literal and 
hyperbolic conditions. The word-naming data clearly indicate that the context 
sentences in all three conditions (metaphoric, hyperbolic, and literal) have an equal 
priming effect on the target word in the target sentence (e.g. it was noxious). 
Therefore, the reading-time difference must be caused by some difference in the 
processes required in order to arrive at a metaphoric or hyperbolic interpretation. 
Does irrelevant information associated with the literally encoded content lose 
activation after arriving at a metaphoric interpretation? Is the same pattern of 
activation visible after arriving at a hyperbolic interpretation? 
In line with the previous findings discussed in section 2.1.4, and all of the current 
accounts discussed in chapter 1 (with the exception of the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis), our word-naming data from experiment 3 indicate that metaphor 
interpretation involves the deactivation of irrelevant information associated with the 
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encoded content, potentially as a result of suppression. Secondly, these findings 
strongly suggest that the reading-time difference between metaphors and hyperboles 
does not does stem from processing differences at the level of accessing and 
processing the lexically encoded vehicle representation.  
Thus, these data indicate that the reading time difference must be caused either by 
differences between metaphors and hyperboles with respect to the lexical items that 
input to this process (i.e. typical metaphor topic and vehicle pairings may differ in 
some way from typical hyperbole topic and vehicle pairings), or by differences further 
down the line, when constructing an accurate interpretation, and deriving inferences 
(see section 3.7 for full discussion).  
Our findings are inconsistent with Giora’s account of novel metaphor processing, in 
which she argues that literal meanings are not discarded during the processing of a 
novel metaphor in a metaphoric context. 
Finally, our eye-tracking data in experiment 4 revealed one important finding: First-
pass fixations on vehicles/target words (e.g. it was noxious) are significantly longer 
when preceded by a metaphor or hyperbole biasing context, than when preceded by a 
literal biasing context. This finding is in line with our previous word naming data 
from experiment 3, which suggest that the process of accessing and using the encoded 
content of a target sentence is the same in a metaphoric and hyperbolic context, but 
different in a literal context.  
What is it that is causing the reading-time difference between metaphors and 
hyperboles? Why does it seem that we can’t fully generalize from what we know 
about metaphor to hyperbole? 
Our findings from experiments 3 and 4 mean that we are yet to explain the reading-
time difference found in experiment 1. This difference must lie outside of the 
processes and mechanisms posited for accessing and regulating the activation of the 
encoded content, as our findings suggest that these processes are the same for the two 
tropes. In the next section, I will discuss two factors which, I will argue, may 
contribute to the longer processing times of metaphors over hyperboles and literal 
statements, and whether the theoretical accounts discussed in chapter 1 can allow for 
these factors. 
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3.7	  ARRIVING AT METAPHORIC AND HYPERBOLIC INTERPRETATIONS 
– DIFFERENCES IN PROCESSING EFFORT 	  	  
The experiments reported in chapter 3 suggest that a) Metaphoric statements take 
longer to process than hyperbolic and literal statements, which do not differ with 
respect to processing time, and b) that the processing-time difference between 
metaphors and hyperboles cannot be attributed to processing differences at the stage 
of accessing and processing the encoded content of the metaphor/hyperbole vehicle 
(e.g. it was noxious). Activation levels of encoded vehicle concepts (e.g. NOXIOUS) 
were found to be the same after interpreting a sentence metaphorically and 
hyperbolically (dampened in both contexts, enough to negate the effects of priming), 
and the same time was spent initially processing (fixating on) the vehicle term 
regardless of whether the vehicle term was being processed in a metaphor or 
hyperbole biasing context (fixations on the vehicle term were longer in both trope 
conditions than in the literal condition). 
Having found that activation levels of encoded vehicle concepts are the same after 
arriving at both metaphoric and hyperbolic interpretations (dampened in both trope 
context conditions, relative to the literal context condition), we have ruled out the 
possibility that the reading-time difference between metaphors and hyperboles could 
have been caused by active suppression (of irrelevant information associated with the 
encoded meaning) being unique to the process of metaphor interpretation. Thus we 
are left wanting for an explanation of the reading-time difference between metaphors 
and hyperboles; there must be something about deriving a metaphoric interpretation, 
which is more time consuming than deriving a hyperbolic or literal interpretation. I 
can see two possible explanations; the cause of this reading-time difference could lie 
in (a) the relationship between the topic and the vehicle concepts, and (b) the 
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The longer reading times for metaphors over hyperboles could be due not to the 
processes and mechanisms involved in constructing an appropriate interpretation from 
that which is encoded, but instead, due to the lexical items that input to those 
processes. The topics in the literal and hyperbolic items are structurally/semantically 
far more related to the vehicle terms than in the metaphoric items, and, as I will argue, 
this may have an effect on processing time. See table 3 below. 
Table 3. Topic and vehicle terms for a selection of our hyperbole and metaphor items 
Hyperbole Metaphor 
Topic Vehicle Topic Vehicle 
Rug Curtain Husband Curtain 
Hole in the wall Window A degree Window 
Kitchen Factory Public school Factory 
Mobile phone Computer Brain Computer 
Messy desk Art exhibition Life Art exhibition 
Big jumper Duvet Primary school Duvet 
Ski mask Blindfold Privileged childhood Blindfold 
Teacher Dictator One’s conscience  Dictator 
Nursery school Festival Bright fish swimming Festival 
Back yard Forest University  Forest 
Earl grey tea Noxious Politician’s speech Noxious 
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Last season’s dress Mouldy A music band Mouldy 
Someone pushing past An assault An interview An assault 
Living room Corridor A mind Corridor 
Knee Smashed Confidence Smashed 
 
All of the accounts discussed in this thesis (see chapter 1) hold that the ‘topic’ concept 
plays a role in the interpretation process, and more importantly, the concept 
construction accounts at least, entail that the semantic relationship between the topic 
and vehicle may have an effect on interpretation. Moreover, Wolff and Gentner 
(2011) found evidence of an early symmetrical alignment of the topic and vehicle 
during the processing of metaphors such as ‘some brains are warehouses’. Contrary to 
Wolff and Gentner’s arguments, which are perhaps based on a misunderstanding of 
the class-inclusion account, this finding seems to be compatible with all the accounts 
discussed in this thesis. Below, I will illustrate the importance of the relationship 
between the topic and vehicle during processing, and how this is captured within each 
of the accounts discussed. 
The class-inclusion account 
The class-inclusion model states that metaphor vehicles and topics play different but 
interactive roles – a metaphor topic provides dimensions for attribution, while a 
metaphor vehicle provides properties to be attributed to the topic. Glucksberg states 
though, that this does not mean that the relationship between the topic and vehicle 
concept is not considered (see section 1.6.2 for discussion).  
As discussed in section 1.6.2, Glucksberg argues that although the semantic 
relationship between the vehicle and topic concepts is not considered,  topics do vary 
in terms of the level of constraint they place on interpretation due to how many 
relevant (to the vehicle) dimensions of attribution they provide. Glucksberg argues 
that it is how constraining the topic is, along with how good an exemplar the vehicle 
term is of the properties the speaker intends to attribute, which determines how apt a 
metaphor is. It follows therefore, that the more relevant (to the vehicle and context) 
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dimensions of attribution a topic provides (the less constraining it is), the less 
processing time and effort will be required for interpretation. There is no obvious 
reason why the topic of a metaphorical utterance should necessarily be any more 
constraining than the topic of a hyperbolic or literal utterance. In fact, we can clearly 
see from the selection of topic/vehicle pairings shown in figure 3, that the topic terms 
alone, are no more or less constraining in the hyperboles than they are in the 
metaphors. However, when aligned with the superordinate vehicle concept, it is clear 
to see that the topics in the hyperbole list would clearly provide many more 
RELEVANT (to the vehicle) dimensions for attribution than those in the metaphor 
list. This could mean that this alignment process is faster in the processing of 
hyperboles than it is in the processing of metaphors, which in turn, could make the 
whole interpretation process quicker for hyperboles than for metaphors. In the case of 
literal class-inclusions, the topic would be aligned with the basic level vehicle concept 
and you would again expect the topics of these literal sentences to provide many more 
RELEVANT dimensions for attribution than those in the metaphoric sentences, thus 
making the alignment process, and hence, the whole interpretation process, quicker in 
these cases. 
The Relevance Theoretic accounts 
Although the unified, Relevance Theoretic account doesn’t mention the topic as 
having a direct role in the comprehension procedure, the account does entail that the 
topic (and the discourse context) primes relevant encyclopaedic properties of the 
lexically encoded vehicle concept and these relevant properties/features therefore 
receive additional activation and are thus more accessible (see section 1.6.1 for full 
discussion). This means that the more semantically related the topic and vehicle terms 
are (the more features/properties they share), the more accessible and salient features 
there will be associated with the vehicle concept, thus speeding up comprehension 
time.  
Relevance theorists Carston and Wearing (2011) claim that dual directional concept 
adjustment is a defining feature of metaphoric statements, which is intuitive if the 
topic and the vehicle concepts are less semantically related in metaphoric statements 
than they are in literal or hyperbolic statements as we can observe in the examples 
above; the minimal ‘semantic overlap’ between the topic and vehicle concepts in the 
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metaphoric items results in the category violation which is characteristic of 
metaphors, and is therefore, the cause of the required dual directional adjustment of 
the encoded vehicle concept. The finding of longer reading times for metaphors over 
hyperboles might, therefore, be predicted by Carston and Wearing’s (2011) account, 
because the topics in hyperbolic statements must prime more relevant features in the 
vehicle concept than in metaphoric statements, meaning that less processing effort is 
required during interpretation of the former. 
This potential distinction between metaphor and hyperbole put forward by Carston 
and Wearing (2011) is a quantitative, not a qualitative one. Therefore, although it 
potentially explains the longer reading times for metaphors over hyperboles, it does 
not mean that there are any differences between the processes and mechanisms 
involved in the comprehension of hyperboles and metaphors. Therefore, the unified 
account originally posited by Wilson and Carston (2007) is upheld.  
The structure Mapping account 
Structure mapping theory also states that topics play a crucial role in the metaphor 
interpretation process, as they argue that the comprehension procedure begins with 
the hearer searching for common predicates between the topic and vehicle (see 
section 1.6.4 for full discussion). However, crucially, unlike the other accounts 
discussed in this paper, the structure-mapping account does not talk in terms of 
‘shared features’, or ‘semantic similarity’. Instead, it talks in terms of structural 
similarity. This potentially means that it is not as easy to explain the reading-time 
difference we found between hyperboles and metaphors, using this account.  
Gentner and colleagues argue that the interpretation of comparisons, involves ‘the 
syntactic properties of the knowledge representation’ (Gentner 1983:1) and not the 
specific content of the conceptual domains. They argue that knowledge is represented 
as propositional networks of nodes and predicates, and that the predicates express 
propositions about the nodes. Therefore, according to this account, it is predicates that 
are mapped between domains, and not features, thus, both attribute predicates (similar 
to conceptual features or properties in other accounts) and relation predicates are 
considered in the interpretation process. The consequence of this is that semantic 
relatedness of topic and vehicle alone, will not determine processing effort, as 
according to this account, two domains can share few or even no attribute predicates, 
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but many relation predicates (as in the case of metaphoric comparisons) and the 
comparison process will proceed just as easily. The structure-mapping engine does 
not preference one type of predicate over another.  
As discussed earlier, according to Gentner (1983), literal comparisons and metaphoric 
comparisons lie on a continuum. A comparison’s positioning on this continuum is 
determined by the number of attribute predicates (e.g. the base object is YELLOW or 
LARGE) that are mapped from base to topic. Literal comparisons involve many 
attribute predicates being mapped from base to target, as well as many relation 
predicates (e.g. the base object interacts with another object, in the same way as the 
topic object does), whereas metaphoric or analogous comparisons involve few 
attribute predicates being mapped, but many relation predicates being mapped.  It is 
clear from looking at the topic/vehicle pairings in a selection of our items in figure 3, 
that the topics and vehicles in the hyperbole items, share far more attribute predicates 
than the topic and vehicle pairings in the metaphor items. Furthermore, the topic and 
vehicle pairings in the literal items (e.g. National park – forest) share even more 
attribute predicates than in the hyperbole items.  
Just as Gentner and colleagues claim, our metaphor items involve many relation 
predicate mappings from base to target, but few attribute mappings, and our 
hyperbole items seem to involve many mappings of both types of predicate. 
Therefore, it seems that Gentner and colleagues would place hyperbolic comparisons 
somewhere between literal comparisons, and metaphoric/analogous comparisons on 
the continuum. What isn’t clear according to this account though, is if literal 
comparisons and metaphoric/analogous comparisons differ only in the amount of 
attribute predicates mapped from base to target, and the structure-mapping engine 
does not preference attribute predicates over relation predicates, then why would 
literal and hyperbolic comparisons be significantly quicker to process than metaphoric 
comparisons?  
Without arguing that the structure-mapping engine preferences attribute predicates 
over relation predicates, it seems that Gentner’s structure mapping account does not 
readily offer an explanation for the reading-time difference we found between literal 
and hyperbolic items on the one hand, and metaphoric items, on the other. 
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The Graded Salience Hypothesis 
Recall that the Graded Salience Hypothesis entails that figurative statements 
pertaining to highly salient features of a vehicle concept would be easier to process 
than those pertaining to less salient features of the same vehicle concept. Again, this 
aspect of this account could be used to explain how the differing relationship between 
the topic and vehicle concepts in metaphoric and hyperbolic statements, could 
contribute to the reading-time difference we found in experiment 1. For example, it 
could be argued that the statement ‘it had been his duvet for years’ preceded by the 
metaphoric context ‘Jimmy didn’t want to go to secondary school and leave his lovely 
comforting primary school behind’ would be harder to process than the same 
statement preceded by the hyperbolic context ‘Hannah didn’t want to throw away her 
big, old jumper’ (both items taken from our experimental materials), because although 
the metaphor relevant features ‘comforting’ and ‘protective’ are indeed associated 
features of the concept DUVET, they are perhaps not as salient as the features 
‘warm’, ‘soft’, or ‘cosy’, which are the relevant features in the hyperbolic context.	  	  
Clearly, how salient the relevant features are of the vehicle concept will vary to some 
degree within tropes, but when examining the experimental materials used in the 
above experiments (see table 3 for topic and vehicle pairings), it is immediately clear 
that the hyperbole relevant features of the vehicle concept are far more salient than 
the metaphor relevant features of that same concept. It is easy to see how this would 
result from the observed difference in semantic relatedness between the topic and 
vehicle concepts, in the two trope conditions. The more semantically related the topic 
and vehicle are, the more likely the relevant (to the topic) features of the vehicle 
concept are to be particularly salient features of that concept.  
Therefore, as I have already discussed, as the topic and vehicle concepts are more 
semantically related in the hyperbole items than in the metaphor items, it is 
reasonable to conclude that there is likely to be a salience imbalance between the 
relevant features of the vehicle concept in the hyperbole and metaphor conditions. 
This could explain how the metaphor items, in which the relevant features of the 
vehicle concept are less salient, may take longer to process than the hyperbole items, 
in which the relevant features are more salient of that same vehicle concept. 
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Having said this, as already discussed in section 3.6, our word-naming findings go 
against Giora’s Graded Salience account of novel metaphor processing. Therefore, 
our findings as a whole can be better explained by the concept construction accounts 
discussed, both of which can account for our findings from each of the experiments. 
Summary 
I have argued that the reading-time difference between metaphoric and hyperbolic 
statements, could, at least in part, be due to the topics in the literal and hyperbolic 
items being structurally/semantically far more related to the vehicle terms than in the 
metaphoric items. This idea is consistent with the Relevance Theoretic account, the 
Class-inclusion account, and the Graded Salience Hypothesis as the details of each of 
these accounts are such that the semantic relationship between the topic and vehicle 
would effect the processing of the metaphoric statement they are embedded in. The 
Structure-Mapping account on the other hand, does not appear to be able to explain 
the reading-time difference between metaphors and hyperboles without making some 
critical adaptations. 
 
3.7.2 THE RICHNESS/COMPLEXITY OF METAPHORIC AND 
HYPERBOLIC INTERPRETATIONS 	  
The theoretical framework on which the Relevance Theoretic (RT) accounts are based 
provides another possible explanation for the reading-time difference present in our 
data. According to Relevance Theory, Relevance is a ‘cognitive principle’, which 
guides the human cognitive system, and thus guides communication.   
It follows from the communicative principle of relevance that a hearer is justified in 
expecting an utterance to be optimally relevant “that it is relevant enough to be worth 
her processing effort, but also that it is the most relevant one compatible with the 
speaker’s abilities and preferences” (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 266-278; Wilson 
and Sperber, 2004: 612).  
According to Relevance Theory, the act of ostensive communication alone 
automatically communicates this ‘presumption of optimal relevance’. A hearer is 
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driven to satisfy their expectation of ‘relevance’, and the more implicatures (intended 
inferences) derived, the more relevant an interpretation will be (provided there is a 
balance with processing effort).	  	  
The more implicatures an interpretation generates, the heavier the dependence on 
memory will be, since the context (previous conversation and surrounding linguistic 
material) must be recalled in order for the implicatures to be integrated into the 
discourse. Therefore, the more implicatures there are, the longer the interpretation 
process will take. Metaphoric interpretations are likely to yield many more inferences 
than equivalent literal statements, especially if the metaphoric statement is embedded 
within a rich context. Therefore, the richness of metaphoric interpretations could go 
some way towards explaining the longer reading times for metaphors over 
comparable literal statements. In addition, it might also be possible to appeal to this 
notion of ‘richness of interpretation’ to explain the reading time difference between 
metaphors and hyperboles.  
It is possible that hyperbolic interpretations yield fewer implicatures than metaphoric 
interpretations. Although Ortony’s (1979) Salience-imbalance account of metaphor 
comprehension has been found to be flawed in several ways (see section 1.4, and 
Glucksberg 2001 p.33-36 for full discussion) as a psychologically real account of how 
we process metaphor, it is not to say that this notion of salience-imbalance cannot be 
used to draw a distinction between metaphors and hyperboles. In both metaphors and 
hyperboles, the properties of the vehicle, which are attributed to the topic are more 
salient/characteristic of the vehicle than of the topic, therefore it is informative to 
attribute them to the topic and raise the hearer’s awareness of these properties in the 
topic.  
Moreover, when looking at the lists of topic-vehicle pairings in table 3, it becomes 
immediately apparent that this ‘salience imbalance’ is far greater in the metaphoric 
items than in the hyperbolic items. This means that the attribution of relevant 
properties from vehicle to topic in the metaphors would yield more cognitive effects 
than the same process in the case of the hyperboles. The more inferences derived, the 
longer the interpretation process takes, and hence the longer reading times for 
metaphors over hyperboles. 
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3.7.3  SUMMARY 	  
 
I have argued that there are potentially two factors which could be contributing to this 
reading-time difference between metaphors on the one hand, and hyperboles and 
literal statements on the other; (1) the fact that the topic and vehicle concepts in 
metaphors are less semantically related than those in hyperboles and literal 
statements, and (2) metaphoric interpretations may be richer/more complex (yield 
more implicatures) than hyperbolic and literal interpretations.  
 
3.8 SUMMARY OF ADULT FINDINGS IN RELATION TO CURRENT 
PRAGMATIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS  
 
We found that metaphors took significantly longer to read than comparable 
hyperboles and literal statements, suggesting that metaphors require additional 
processing effort than hyperboles and literal statements, either at the level of 
accessing and processing the linguistic representation via the lexicon, or further down 
the line, in deriving inferences.  
Furthermore, we found that the derivation of metaphoric and hyperbolic 
interpretations completely dampens priming of the lexically encoded vehicle concept, 
which is tentatively suggestive of suppression taking place during the processing of 
both metaphoric and hyperbolic statements. This finding is backed up by our eye-
tracking findings which suggest that early processing (the stage of accessing and 
processing the encoded content) of a target sentence is the same in a metaphoric and 
hyperbolic context; first-pass fixations on vehicles/target words (e.g. it was noxious) 
were significantly longer when preceded by a metaphor or hyperbole biasing context, 
than when preceded by a literal biasing context.  
Any such evidence of the deactivation of the ‘literal’ meaning during novel metaphor 
comprehension is consistent with the processing models posited by the Relevance 
Theoretic account, the Class-inclusion account, and the Structure-Mapping account, 
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but difficult for the Graded Salience Hypothesis to explain, as it states that the literal 
meaning is not discarded during the comprehension of novel metaphors. 
Our reading-time findings are not inconsistent with the broad outline of the unified 
Relevance Theoretic account, or any of the other accounts that suggest or entail that 
metaphor and hyperbole are processed in the same way. Our word naming findings 
suggest that the cause of the reading-time difference between metaphors and 
hyperboles, lies outside of the lexical access and activation regulation processes 
posited by these accounts. However, the onus is on each of these accounts to explain 
what other factors, consistent with the processing models they posit, might be 
contributing to the reading-time difference between metaphors and hyperboles. 
I have argued that there are potentially two factors which could be contributing to the 
reading-time difference between metaphors and hyperboles; firstly, the fact that the 
topic and vehicle concepts in metaphors are less semantically related than those in 
hyperboles and literal statements, and secondly, that metaphoric interpretations may 
be richer/more complex than hyperbolic and literal interpretations.  
The first of the contributing factors that I argue for can be accounted for by the 
Relevance Theoretic account, the Class-inclusion account, and the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis, as all of these accounts entail that the semantic relatedness of a topic and 
vehicle pairing will affect processing. The Structure-Mapping account on the other 
hand, does not appear to be able to explain the reading-time difference between 
metaphors and hyperboles without making some critical adaptations.  
The second of the contributing factors that I argue for is motivated by the Relevance 
Theoretic framework, and as such, is not readily explainable by the other accounts, 
which a) do not discuss implicitly communicated content or its derivation and b) do 
not posit processing accounts in which a hearer is driven to satisfy their expectation of 
‘relevance’ by deriving implications.	  	  
Since the empirical evidence from experiment 1 is consistent with all of the current 
accounts discussed in this thesis, but the findings from experiment 3 discredits the 
Graded Salience Hypothesis, on the basis of the data alone we are left with three 
viable accounts: The class-inclusion account, the Relevance theoretic accounts 
(perhaps more specifically, Carston and Wearing’s adapted discontinuous version), 
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and the Structure-Mapping account. All are, on the whole, compatible with the data 
discussed in this work. 
The concept construction accounts on the one hand, and the Structure –Mapping 
account on the other, fall on either side of the comparison/categorization debate, and 
in this respect the two camps are experimentally distinguishable. As I concluded at 
the end of chapter 2, the evidence exclusively in support of the two concept 
construction category assertion accounts (Relevance Theory and Class-inclusion) 
appears more robust than that put forward as evidence exclusively in support of the 
Structure-Mapping account (see chapter 2 for full discussion). Unfortunately, by and 
large the two concept construction accounts are indistinguishable experimentally; by 
this I mean that, given the state of the art, empirical facts compatible with one are 
likely to be compatible with the other.  
Having said this, Relevance Theory provides a unified account of non-literal 
language, which explicitly predicts our findings that indicate that metaphor and 
hyperbole are processed via the same processes and mechanisms, whereas the Class-
inclusion account is posited as an account of metaphor alone. Moreover, Relevance 
theory provides an account of figurative language interpretation which is embedded 
within a wider account of communication, and even more generally, human cognition. 
As such, it provides a justification of why processing might go the way it proposes. If 
human cognition is driven by the search for relevance, then communication will be 
driven by the search for relevance, and a hearer’s interpretation will be the optimally 
relevant one, not the most literal one. As a psychological account of metaphor 
processing alone, the Class-inclusion account lacks this dimension. 
In the final chapter, I will present findings from a developmental study in which 
young children’s comprehension of metaphors and hyperboles is contrasted. The 
experiment reported is grounded in the theoretical issues outlined in the previous 
chapters, and may shed some new light on them (i.e. the role of suppression during 
figurative language interpretation will be further explored, and their ability to 
comprehend metaphors and hyperboles will be compared), but their prime focus is 
developmental: they try to uncover young children’s figurative language 
comprehension capacities and why they differ from adults’.  
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4 	  CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 	  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
General overview 
This chapter is dedicated to the presentation of findings from two novel 
developmental experiments investigating young children’s capacity to interpret novel 
metaphors and hyperboles. The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
processes and mechanisms involved in arriving at novel metaphoric and hyperbolic 
interpretations, and in doing so, try to determine whether there might be something 
unique about metaphor due to the interpretation processes involved, or whether 
metaphoric interpretations are just a further broadening of the encoded meaning than 
hyperbolic interpretations. However, the aim of these developmental experiments is 
two fold. The first of our objectives is purely developmental: we try to uncover young 
children’s figurative language comprehension capacities and why they differ from 
adults. We try to determine the age at which children understand figurative language 
and how this progresses through childhood. However, the experiments reported are 
also grounded in the theoretical issues outlined in the previous chapters, and may shed 
some new light on them. Firstly, the role of suppression during figurative language 
interpretation will be further explored by investigating a potential correlation between 
figurative language comprehension capacities and inhibition control. Secondly, 
children’s ability to comprehend metaphors and hyperboles will be contrasted in order 
to further investigate potential processing differences between the two tropes. 
The first of our experiments focuses on metaphor, and introduces a new paradigm 
looking at three age groups (3, 4 and 5 year-olds), while the second experiment 
directly contrasts metaphor and hyperbole with one age group. Both investigate the 
potential correlation between non-literal language comprehension and inhibition 
control. 
Despite the different theoretical accounts of figurative language interpretation (see 
chapter 1 for full review), and the different processing predictions each of them make, 
one thing can be claimed for sure; some sort of pragmatic processes are involved in 
the derivation of non-literal interpretations. As Pouscoulous (2011:55) explains, “no 
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matter how one accounts for metaphor comprehension, it involves some type of 
pragmatic process, and context will therefore play an essential role in retrieving the 
intended meaning”. Our developmental data presented in this chapter, taken with the 
existing literature, will give us some indication of the age at which children develop 
the necessary abilities to carry out these pragmatic processes, and thus, accurately 
interpret figuratively intended utterances. 
These two experiments are the first to (a) show that children as young as three years-
old can accurately interpret age appropriate metaphors despite the presence of a 
conflicting contextually inappropriate literal interpretation, (b) to contrast children’s 
understanding of metaphor and hyperbole, and (c) the first to investigate a correlation 
between children’s figurative language comprehension and inhibition control 
capacities. Our findings will a) contribute to the set of research detailing young 
children’s abilities at interpreting figurative language, and b) provide us with a better 
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and pragmatic comprehension procedures 
involved in figurative language comprehension.  
Consistent with current theoretical accounts (see chapter 1 for full discussion), there 
are good reasons to believe that active suppression is involved in the comprehension 
of both metaphoric and hyperbolic statements, both based on our word naming 
findings (see section 3.3), as well as on previous findings (Gernsbacher, Keysar, 
Robertson and Werner 1995; 1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-
Fernandez 2004; 2005; 2007; Gold, Faust and Goldstein 2010; Peirce, Maclaren and 
Chiappe 2010). Moreover, other research indicates that inhibition control, a sub-
capacity of our general executive function capacities, is the cognitive mechanism 
employed during active suppression.  
We also know that inhibition control rapidly improves in children around the age of 4 
(Gold et al. 2010; Monetta and Pell 2007; Papagno et al. 2003; Amanzio et al. 2007). 
If active suppression is required during the processing of figurative language, and the 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for suppression develop rapidly around the age of 
4, then we are likely to see a marked improvement in metaphor comprehension at 
around the same age.  
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As with the adult literature, the vast majority of the developmental research 
investigating figurative language comprehension has focused solely on metaphor. 
There has been little, if any, studies which have investigated very young children’s 
understanding of hyperbole, and none that have contrasted children’s understanding 
of the two tropes; the findings from this study will go some way towards filling this 
gap. In contrast with current theories that either overtly propose or entail that 
metaphors and hyperboles of the form X is Y are processed in the same way (see 
chapter 1 for full review), our reading-time findings (see section 3.1) suggest that 
metaphors are more difficult and time-consuming to process than hyperboles, which 
are processed as quickly as literal statements. Depending on the cause of the 
additional processing effort during metaphor interpretation, we may find that young 
children are more able with respect to hyperbole comprehension than metaphor 
comprehension.  
Previous developmental research 
To date, developmental metaphor studies have had two main objectives: To reveal the 
age at which children develop the capacity to understand metaphor, and to reveal how 
their abilities improve with age. Findings indicate that children do not understand 
metaphor until quite late on in childhood. Some even suggest that children are well 
into their teens before they can properly understand metaphoric language.  
As Pouscoulous (2011) argues, these findings are in stark contrast with a plethora of 
developmental research investigating children’s other pragmatic abilities, which 
suggest that very young children have advanced pragmatic abilities (See Tomasello 
2008 for a summary). In addition, (Tomasello 2003; Bloom 2000 or Clark 2003) 
suggests that these abilities are essential to language acquisition. In other words, 
competence in pragmatic inference is a prerequisite to language acquisition. So why is 
there a disparity between developmental research investigating metaphor 
comprehension, and those studies investigating children’s competence on other 
pragmatic tasks? 
 
Previous research investigating the metaphor comprehension capacities of children 
with a diagnosis of an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) has suggested that ‘Theory 
of Mind’ (TOM) is key to metaphor comprehension (Happé 1993), and we know that 
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young children (under the age of 4) typically fail standard false belief tasks. If non-
literal language interpretation is in fact contingent on the ability to represent the 
mental states of others (Happé 1993; Sperber and Wilson 1995), then we would 
expect children below the age of 4 to be fairly unsuccessful at interpreting metaphors 
and other tropes.  
Many of the early developmental metaphor studies (see below for discussion) appear 
to have methodological flaws, which serve to highlight factors that need to be 
controlled for if one is to ascertain at what age children develop the capacity to arrive 
at accurate metaphoric interpretations. Several studies have erroneously taken young 
children’s inability to explain the meaning of an utterance as evidence of them not 
having understood that utterance.  Moreover, some authors have interpreted the fact 
that young children are unable to correctly interpret metaphors that pertain to complex 
emotions with which they are not familiar as evidence for the fact that they cannot 
interpret all metaphors pertaining to psychological states. These conclusions do not 
follow from the evidence, as the experimental tasks were such that they were testing 
something other than metaphor interpretation (i.e. the ability to describe ones 
metaphoric interpretation and the ability to understand metaphors which pertain to 
completely unfamiliar emotions). Another limitation of previous developmental 
studies investigating children’s understanding of metaphoric language is that they 
failed to acknowledge the importance of familiarity in metaphor processing (see 
section 2.1.2 for discussion of familiarity effects). Many studies did not distinguish 
between highly conventionalized, familiar and novel metaphors, which likely had 
unreported effects on their findings. 
Subsequent research set about designing studies that could isolate some possible 
causal factors related to children’s abilities, such as richer semantic knowledge, 
understanding of psychological states, verbal intelligence, linguistic competence, and 
the novelty or conventionality of metaphors.  This bulk of research has been 
instrumental in chipping away at what it is that we mean when we talk of ‘the 
development of figurative language comprehension capacities’.   
Recent research (Pouscoulous and Tomasello 2011) has aimed to control for all of the 
above factors, by ensuring that metaphors used in experiments with very young 
children, only pertain to conceptual domains with which such young children are 
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familiar, and by ensuring that tasks and materials are simple, age appropriate, novel 
and entertaining. By controlling for these factors, they are better able to determine 
children’s novel metaphor comprehension levels, and infer from the results, the age at 
which children develop the cognitive mechanisms that enable this kind of context 
dependent interpretation. In fact, in contrast with the bulk of previous findings, their 
findings suggest that children as young as 3 can understand simple, age appropriate 
metaphors. This suggests that 3 year-old children already have in place the cognitive 
mechanisms required, and the ability to follow the inferential procedures necessary to 
understand non-literal language. However, I argue that, due to the task used in this 
recent research, it is not clear that the 3 year-old participants had anything like a full 
understanding of the metaphors used. Our new paradigm used in the experiments 
reported in this chapter is such that in order to give an accurate response to the 
experimental task, the children must have derived at least an approximation of the 
intended meaning of the figurative items used. 
Our developmental findings 
By ascertaining a) the age at which children possess the ability to accurately interpret 
novel metaphors, and b) whether this age correlates with their progress in inhibition 
control, we will be able to shed light on the processes and mechanisms that underlie 
novel metaphor comprehension.  
Moreover, by contrasting young children’s understanding of novel metaphor and 
hyperbole, we will be able to determine whether our finding of a reading-time 
difference (see section 3.1) between novel metaphors and hyperboles translates into a 
disparity between children’s capacity to interpret the two tropes (i.e. whether the 
additional processing effort required during metaphor interpretation means that young 
children have more difficulty interpreting metaphors than hyperboles).  
Before presenting findings from our developmental experiments, I will review the 
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4.2 METAPHOR COMPREHENSION IN CHILDREN 
 
The general consensus from extensive research carried out in the 60s, 70s and 80s was 
that pre-school children are unable to accurately interpret language non-literally (see 
Pouscoulous 2011 for overview, or Nippold 1988/1998 and Winner 1988/1997 for in-
depth review).  
Asch and Nerlove (1960) found that when questioned about the ‘literal’ and 
‘metaphoric’ meaning of adjectives such as ‘cold’ ‘hard’ and ‘sweet’ (e.g. Are people 
cold? Do you know any people who are cold? How do you know they are cold?), 
children under the age of 6 only interpreted such polysemous adjectives ‘literally’ 
(e.g. people are cold because they do not have enough clothes on). 
Winner, Rosenstiel and Gardner (1976) asked children to explain the meanings of 
metaphors; some described psychological states in physical terms, as in Asch and 
Nerlove (1960) (e.g. “After many years of working at the jail, the prison guard had 
become a hard rock that could not be moved”), and others described sensory 
experiences in terms of other sensory experiences (e.g. “her perfume was bright 
sunshine”). Again, they found that 3-6 year old children did not infer the non-literal 
meanings of these statements, and provided explanations such as “The perfume was 
bright yellow”. The children’s lack of alternative, metaphoric interpretation meant 
that they would even ignore the linguistic structure of the sentence, which was at odds 
with their literal interpretation (e.g. “ when she was standing outside in the sun, she 
smelt of perfume”). 
 
Johnson (1982) also found that when asked to freely come up with their own 
interpretation of context-free metaphors (e.g. “My sister is a rock”), children under 
the age of 6 provided explanations such as “ she is hard, like if you felt her hand, you 
couldn’t squish it or anything”, indicating that they had interpreted the metaphor 
vehicle literally. 
 
All three of these studies found that it isn’t until the age of 7-10 that children begin to 
arrive at metaphoric interpretations of such statements, although their interpretations 
were often inappropriate (e.g. describing a person described as a rock, as ‘fussy’), and 
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it was only the 11 and 12 year old children in each of these studies, who appeared to 
accurately interpret the metaphoric statements. 
 
These findings suggest that young children lack the cognitive capacities with which to 
carry out the relevant pragmatic processes required in order to accurately interpret 
figurative language. As Pouscoulous (in press) points out, this is puzzling, though, not 
least because of building evidence suggesting that, given the right experimental 
conditions, children as young as 3 or 4 years old appear to have the pragmatic ability 
to derive implicatures and understand presuppositions (Pouscoulous, Noveck, 
Politzer, and Bastide 2007; Katsos and Bishop 2011; Pouscoulous, Lieven, and 
Tomasello (in prep.); Berger and Höhle 2011), but also because there is plenty of 
evidence that suggests that young children could not learn to speak (i.e., understand 
and produce words as well as syntactic structures) without a plethora of  pragmatic 
abilities (see, e.g., Tomasello 2003; Bloom 2000 or Clark 2003). 
Recent findings suggest that under the right circumstances children are able to derive 
appropriate scalar implicatures. Papafragou and Musolino (2003) showed that 
children as young as five are able to produce scalar inferences (i.e. ‘not all’ from 
‘some’) given the right training and experimental conditions. Firstly, before the 
experiment, children were told that a puppet would be talking and that he would “say 
silly things” and that the point of the game was to “help the puppet say it better” (e.g. 
they would be asked whether the puppet described a dog appropriately by saying 
“This is a little animal with 4 legs” or whether the puppet appropriately described a 
scene in which ‘Mickey’ put all of his hoops around a pole by saying  “Mickey put 
some of the hoops around the pole”). The experimental paradigm was such that the 
focal point was on a protagonist‘s performance; which meant that children‘s 
expectations about the stronger case (all) were raised. In addition, children were given 
a little back story aimed to facilitate the derivation of scalar implicatures, i.e. they 
were told how the protagonist claimed to be especially good at the hoop throwing 
task. The specifics of this experimental paradigm meant that 5 year-olds appeared 
able to produce scalar implicatures, however, still less often than adults. 
Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, and Bastide (2007) found that when the experimental 
paradigm is designed to reduce cognitive effort, children as young as 4 years old can 
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successfully derive scalar implicatures. Four, 5 and 7-year-olds, as well as adults 
indicated a pragmatic understanding of ‘some’ (68%, 73%, 83% and 86% of the time, 
respectively). Furthermore, unlike Papafragou and Musolino’s (2003) study 
Pouscoulous et al.’s (2007) study shows that the youngest children (4 and 5 year-olds) 
can draw scalar implicatures without any previous training, again, provided the 
experiment is not too costly with respect to processing effort. Interestingly though, it 
is still the case that even in a task which strongly encourages scalar implicatures to be 
drawn, younger children are less likely to draw them than older children and adults, 
which is suggestive of a developmental trajectory with respect to the ability to derive 
scalar implicatures. More recently, Katsos and Bishop (2011) have replicated these 
findings with 4 year olds. 
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that children as young as 3 or 4 can draw 
presuppositional inferences. Berger and Höhle (2011) used a design adapted from 
Papafragou and Tantalou (2004) to investigate whether 3 and 4 year-olds could 
consider the ‘presuppositional import’ of ‘auch’(too). Children saw toy animals 
attempting to accomplish two tasks each. The child was allowed to reward the toys, if, 
and only if, they had finished both their tasks. For example, a lion had to eat an apple 
and a banana. In answer to the experimenter‘s questions about whether he had eaten 
the banana, the lion would respond with an utterance either with, or without, the 
particle auch – i.e. “I‘ve eaten the apple or “I‘ve eaten the apple, too”. Children from 
both age groups consistently rewarded the toy characters in the ‘auch’ condition. 
However, they rewarded the toy significantly less often in the condition without the 
particle. This finding suggests that pre-schoolers are able to consider the 
presupposition triggered by ‘auch’ when the experimental design is more child-
friendly. 
Similarly, Pouscoulous, Lieven, and Tomasello (in prep.) used a novel act-out 
paradigm to investigate young children’s presuppositional abilities. They found that 3 
year-olds were above chance at taking into account the presuppositions carried by 
both ‘auch’ and ‘nochmal’ (again), while 2;6 year-olds responded randomly. As 
Pouscoulous et al. conclude, it remains unclear whether the poor performance of 2;6-
year-olds is due to a genuine incapacity to interpret the presupposition linked to 
‘auch’, or whether the task was still too complex for such young children, but 
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together, the findings on children‘s presuppositional abilities seem to match those on 
scalar implicature.  
Recent findings suggest that given the right experimental conditions, children are able 
to derive complex pragmatic inferences given the right conditions. This raises the 
question as to whether, young children’s apparent failings with respect to metaphor 
comprehension might be linked to the experimental paradigms used, and whether, 
given the right conditions, children might be capable of making the pragmatic 
inferences necessary to interpret utterances non-literally.  
The developmental metaphor studies mentioned above did not fully account for why 
young children might have difficulty interpreting metaphors. Do they lack the 
required cognitive capacities and inferential abilities or did previous studies include 
potentially impeding factors? Did the metaphors they used pertain to world 
knowledge that was beyond that of a 6 year old? Were the tasks easy enough for such 
a young child to carry out? We know that children are poor at expressing themselves 
at this age, and the tasks used rely upon this skill. 
The next section is dedicated to the discussion of several potentially impeding factors 
relating to previous developmental research investigating metaphor. 
 
4.2.1 FACTORS AFFECTING COMPREHENSION 
 
Several factors (world knowledge; context; task difficulty; familiarity; Theory of 
Mind abilities) have been found to contribute to young children’s difficulties with 
non-literal language comprehension. 
World knowledge 
A number of studies have concluded that children’s poor performance on metaphor 
tasks may be the result of limited and patchy world knowledge (Gentner 1988; Evans 
and Gamble 1988; Dent 1984; Keil 1986. See Winner 1988 for full discussion). Lack 
of detailed knowledge and understanding of many conceptual domains could mean 
that children are not able to perceive similarities or make connections between those 
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domains. Children’s conceptual knowledge is often very sensory focused. For 
example, they know that clouds are fluffy, but they may not know that they are made 
up of water vapor, and that they are the cause of rain. This means that they could 
more easily interpret the metaphor “the cloud was a pillow” than the metaphor “his 
worries were a cloud above his head”. (Winner 1988) 
Evans and Gamble’s (1988) findings illustrate that in order to interpret a metaphor 
accurately, it is critical to have at ones’ disposal, a detailed encyclopaedic knowledge 
of the topic and vehicle domains. They used age appropriate materials when testing 
children (aged 8-12) on their ability to interpret metaphors, in order to ensure that 
children would not fail to interpret the metaphors due to lack of appropriate world 
knowledge. Children were asked to identify the important features of a list of topic 
vehicle terms, which had been taken from a series of metaphors. Six weeks later, the 
children were asked to explain what each of the metaphors meant. Performance 
improved with each age group, but more importantly, children were found to 
misinterpret the metaphors when they also listed incorrect or irrelevant features for 
the topic or vehicle. This suggests that children are not necessarily failing because of 
their lack of pragmatic ability, but because of their lack of semantic knowledge.  
 
Other studies suggest that the type of encyclopaedic information that a metaphor 
pertains to, can affect whether or not a child will be able to accurately interpret it 
(Gentner 1988; Nippold, Leonard and Kail 1984; Waggoner and Palermo 1989). 
 
Gentner (1988) illustrated that younger children found metaphors based on relational 
similarities (e.g., ‘A cloud is a sponge’) harder to understand than metaphors based on 
attribute similarities (e.g., ‘The sun is an orange’). Moreover, Cicone, Gardner and 
Winner’s (1981) findings indicated that young pre-school children find it difficult to 
interpret metaphors which pertain to psychological states. On the other hand, Cicone 
et al.’s findings were contradicted by Nippold, Leonard, and Kail (1984), who found 
that 7 year-old children performed just as well at comprehending psychological 
metaphors, as they did at other types of metaphor.  
 
However, Waggoner and Palermo (1989) have subsequently criticised Nippold et al’s 
(1984) methodology as they used a ‘forced choice’ task, in which the children were 
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asked to choose which, out of two interpretations, was the correct interpretation of a 
given metaphor. The choice was mostly between the correct ‘psychological’ 
interpretation and another incorrect non-psychological interpretation (e.g. The choice 
for “ Joey was a vacuum cleaner listening to the story” was either the correct 
psychological interpretation that he was listening very hard and taking it all in, or the 
non-psychological incorrect interpretation in which he was sitting in a big chair). 
Waggoner and Palermo (1989) point out that this contrasting forced choice task does 
not require the child to have made any particular inference with regard to the intended 
meaning of the metaphor; i.e. in what way could his behaviour or mental state be 
likened to a vacuum cleaner. All that is required of them is to determine that the 
metaphors referred to something psychological.  
Even if we do interpret Nippold et al’s (1984) findings as indicating that 7 year old 
children can infer that a non-literal interpretation is intended, and that the metaphor is 
describing a psychological state, Cicone at al’s (1981) findings suggest that as soon as 
children of the same age, and slightly younger, are asked to discriminate between 
different psychological states, their performance is much worse. Moreover, an 
alternative interpretation of Nippold and colleagues’ findings is that the child is 
simply going for the most likely scenario in the given context, without understanding 
anything about the metaphor. 
Waggoner and Palermo (1989) suspected that young children might do well at 
interpreting psychological metaphors, if it is ensured that the metaphors used, only 
pertain to psychological states with which children of that age are familiar (e.g. ‘Betty 
is a bouncing bubble’ in the context of a story in which Betty is extremely happy). 
Previous research had suggested that children as young as 5 can understand ‘emotion 
terms’ e.g. love, happiness, anger, fear and sorrow (Bretherton et al. 1986; Stein and 
Levine 1987; Trabasso et al. 1981). They constructed metaphors using only these 
emotion terms. They again used a forced choice task, to avoid failures due to an 
inability to explain the meaning.  However, unlike the Nippold et al. (1981) study, the 
choice was between two different emotions, therefore answering correctly required 
the child to have understood the metaphor to be pertaining to one emotion rather than 
another. In the first experiment the ambiguity was between two polarised emotions 
(e.g. Love- Hate, Happy- Sad etc.), and in experiment 2, the ambiguity was between 
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two emotions at one end of the spectrum (e.g. Pride-Love, Happy-Love or Anger-
Fear, Anger-Sorrow). 
They found that although 5 year-old children performed significantly above chance, 
they were just attending to the polarity of the metaphor and the emotions contrasted in 
the Love-Hate, Happy-Sad contrasts. The only ambiguity they had constructed which 
required the children to contrast two negative emotions, was the Anger-Fear contrast. 
The 5 year-old children struggled with this distinction and often interpreted anger 
metaphors as describing fear. On reflection Waggoner and Palermo proposed that this 
may have been because many of the stories had things in them, which could be 
frightening the younger children (sinking ships and stinging bees), and therefore fear 
was the overriding emotion for them when they heard the stories. Overall, their 
findings indicated that by the age of 7, children were able to grasp more than just 
metaphoric polarity, although their performance was far from adult levels. By the age 
of 9, children were as good at understanding the anger-fear metaphors as they were at 
any other emotion contrast.  
Gibbs (1990; 1992) claims that pre-existing conceptual mappings in long-term 
memory are used during metaphor comprehension. Therefore, we might expect 
children to find metaphor comprehension more difficult than adults, who have more 
life experience, on the basis of which they may have mentally represented mappings 
between domains. Although a child may exhibit signs of ‘knowing’ a category or 
‘being familiar’ with a domain, they may not have the experience on which to 
construct mappings between those categories (e.g. although they know the category 
‘ballerina’ enough that they know that ballerinas dance to music and that they are 
pretty, would they have seen enough ballet to know enough about the sorts of moves 
they make, to construct a mapping between the concept BALLERINA and LEAVES 
BLOWING IN THE WIND). If they haven’t then according to Gibbs, that child may 
find it more difficult to comprehend the metaphor ‘the leaf was a ballerina dancing in 
the garden’ than an adult who may well have such a mapping between domains. 
Dent (1984) investigated young children’s ability to draw comparisons between 
familiar domains. Five year-old children were asked to pick out pairs (map between 
domains); firstly, literal pairs such as two ballerinas dancing in different ways and 
then metaphorical pairs such as a spinning top and a spinning ballerina. After 
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identifying the pairs, the children were asked to explain the ‘ground’ (what they had 
in common). Even the 5 year-olds had some success at pairing metaphorically, 
provided that they had enough conceptual knowledge of the objects to make 
metaphorical pairings (mappings), but as expected, performance improved with age. 
Moreover, Keil (1986) found that five year-old children’s metaphor comprehension 
abilities appear to emerge in an “all or nothing” type way within conceptual domains. 
If they understood one metaphor within a conceptual domain, they were likely to 
understand the other metaphors within that conceptual domain, and vice versa. The 
children showed a basic understanding of several different metaphors involving the 
car/animate distinction (e.g. the car is dead) but they were not able to correctly 
interpret the metaphors about ideas or books (e.g. the idea bloomed). Presumably, 
their knowledge and understanding of ideas and the content of books is too limited for 
the children to make the link between that domain, and the domain of plants and 
flowers. Without this mapping, children fail to accurately interpret any metaphors that 
are dependent on that mapping. These findings support Gibbs’ notion of stable 
metaphorical mappings being used during the comprehension of related metaphors. 
Once a metaphorical mapping has been made between two domains, children are able 
to comprehend new metaphors that pertain to the same mapping.  
In summary, the findings discussed in this sub-section suggest that the development 
of metaphor comprehension capacities positively correlates with their acquisition of 
conceptual domain knowledge, and that once a metaphorical mapping between two 
domains is understood, children are readily able to interpret new metaphors pertaining 
to that same mapping.  
Although there may be a point at which children develop the cognitive mechanisms 
which enable them to comprehend metaphors, their ability to comprehend a wide 
repertoire of metaphors is still contingent on them having the relevant world 
knowledge.  
Context 
It is clear that little or no supporting context can make metaphor comprehension more 
difficult (Vosniadou et al. 1984), but likewise, placing metaphors in too rich or 
complex a context (see section 3.1) is likely to cause additional processing effort, 
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especially for children. Moreover, it has been established (Reynolds and Wilson 
1984) that the degree to which the metaphor ‘fits’ within the narrative of the context, 
affects processing.  
 
Many previous studies have presented children with metaphors with no supporting 
context, which must clearly impede their comprehension, as a linguistic context from 
which to draw relevant inferences is critical.  
 
Our adult reading-time findings (see section 3.1) illustrate that metaphors take longer 
to read when preceded by a long context, suggesting that even for adults, a rich and 
complex context requires more integration, and thus more processing effort. It is 
likely that this effect would be even greater for children, who are likely to find the 
processing, storing and recalling of information more challenging than adults. 
However, Vosniadou (1989) argues that children’s lack of conceptual/semantic 
knowledge leads them to be more reliant on context than adults. 
 
Reynolds and Wilson (1984) found that children understand metaphors better if they 
express a predictable outcome of the narrative in the previous context. For example, if 
Billy had stolen some cookies and was about to be caught by his mother, the 
metaphor a) “Billy was a squirrel burying his nuts” was easier to understand (he hid 
the cookies), even by preschoolers than the metaphor b) “Billy was a squirrel heading 
for his tree” (ran to his room), as the metaphor in a) is a more probable outcome of the 
narrative than the metaphor in b). 
 
Task difficulty 
In order to ensure that success or failure on a given task is indicative of a child’s 
metaphor comprehension capacity, it is critical to ensure that they are not failing the 
task because it calls upon cognitive resources that are underdeveloped in young 
children. This was found to be the case with studies investigating ‘scalar implicature’ 
understanding in young children (Pouscoulous et al. 2007).  They argued that children 
have less cognitive resources to use on making pragmatic inferences and that this will 
have an impact on their performance at complex tasks. 
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Many of the tasks used in previous studies investigating children’s understanding of 
metaphor, require the child to explain the meaning of the metaphors, or to make a 
truth value judgment about them. Therefore, as Pouscoulous (2011) discusses, these 
studies have not ruled out the possibility that children do poorly on these tasks, not 
because they lack the capability to accurately interpret the metaphors, but because 
they lack the ability to articulate and express themselves. The tasks used rely on 
children’s metalinguistic abilities rather than their understanding of the metaphor 
itself. 
Understanding what is meant by a metaphor and explaining one’s interpretation of 
that metaphor are two quite separate skills, and the two should not be confounded. 
Indeed, studies (Waggoner and Palermo 1989) using simple paradigms which avoid 
metalinguistic tasks such as explaining, describing or verifying, suggest that children 
may be much better at comprehending metaphoric language than earlier studies have 
led us to believe.  
In fact, as well as implementing the forced-choice task (in which 5 year olds 
performed significantly above chance), Waggoner and Palermo (1989) also asked 
children to explain their choice. Five year olds were unable to do this, 7 year olds 
were also poor at explanation, and 9 year olds were just beginning to show signs of 
being able to explain the metaphoric meaning. The poor performance for all age 
groups on the explanation task relative to the forced-choice task illustrates that 
children’s poor performance in many studies using expressive tasks could well be 
because they are unable to articulate themselves properly, rather than because they 
lack the ability to interpret metaphors. 
Pearson’s (1990) elicited repetition task provides further support for this hypothesis. 
Based on the assumption that it is harder to repeat back nonsense sentences than 
sentences we can make meaning out of, Children were asked to repeat back 
metaphorical (‘the stars are the moon’s children’), literal (‘ the fog comes in after the 
rain storm’), and anomalous (‘newspapers are stars wearing the bath’) sentences. 
Three year olds and five year olds were far better at repeating metaphorical and literal 
sentences, than they were at repeating anomalous ones, indicating that they are getting 
some interpretation out of the metaphors. 
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Familiarity 
 
As discussed in section 2.1.2, many metaphor studies have found evidence of 
familiarity effects in metaphor processing in adults (Blank, 1988; Blasko & Connine, 
1993; Camac & Glucksberg, 1984; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, 
& Bookin, 1982; Martin, 1992). Furthermore, it has been argued that qualitatively 
different comprehension processes underlie novel and conventionalised metaphor 
(Glucksberg 2001; Wilson and Carston 2007:26; Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Gibbs 
1990). It seems therefore important for developmental studies investigating early 
metaphor comprehension to differentiate between idioms, conventionalised 
metaphors, and novel metaphors. However, many of the studies discussed above, did 
not make this distinction. 
 
As Pouscoulous (2011) illustrates, idioms and novel metaphors lie at opposite ends of 
a familiarity spectrum. In fact, it is thought that idioms are stored in the lexicon as one 
long semantic constituent, and retrieved as such (Swinney and Cutler 1979). The 
meaning of key, individual words or compounds within an idiom can be unknown to a 
hearer who understands and uses the idiom as a whole perfectly accurately (e.g. the 
word ‘squib’ in the idiom ‘ it was a damp squib’, or the compound ‘dead-ringer’ in 
the idiom ‘she/he is a dead ringer for….’). Novel metaphors, however, are thought to 
be context-dependent and occasion specific (Wilson and Carston 2007; Glucksberg 
and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001; Gentner 1983; Wolff and Gentner 2011). An 
occasion-specific, non-literal interpretation is inferred on-line, based on the 
contextually relevant features of the encoded meaning. Across the middle of the 
spectrum, lie cases of metaphor which vary according to degree of familiarity, with 
highly conventionalised metaphors such as ‘she/he was an angel’, or ‘he/she was a 
pig’ at one end, and ‘he/she was feral’ being relatively novel at the other end. 
 
As Pouscoulous (2011) argues, the different processes and mechanisms underlying 
idioms and novel metaphors mean that the abilities required in order to interpret the 
two phenomena most likely have very different models of acquisition. The meanings 
of new idioms are likely to be learned case-by-case, and stored and retrieved like any 
new lexical item. If a child is not frequently exposed to a given idiom in context, they 
will not know its meaning.  
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I argue that many conventionalised metaphor vehicles (e.g. ‘pig’, ‘witch’, ‘dragon’) 
will most likely encode two meanings from a very early age through constant 
exposure to such terms in a metaphoric context. In such cases, the intended meaning 
would be arrived at through a process of disambiguation (meaning selection) in 
context.  In fact, for many young children, it is highly probable that certain 
conventionalised metaphor vehicles will encode only the ‘metaphoric’ meaning of the 
word (e.g. Angel or Heaven). They may only acquire the ‘literal’ meaning a little later 
on in childhood. In these cases, as with idioms, no disambiguation or meaning 
construction would be required for interpretation; the single encoded meaning would 
suffice. Other conventionalized metaphors likely start out as novel metaphors, the 
meaning of which they have to construct on-line in a first instance, before the word 
becomes used quite frequently in the conventional figurative meaning, and might then 
start to behave like a polysemous term. Vega Moreno (2007) experimentally 
investigated children’s comprehension of familiar/conventionalized metaphors in 
contrast with properly lexicalized metaphors, and presents evidence suggesting that 
children develop ‘pragmatic routines’ for dealing with metaphors which are familiar 
or conventionalized in their speech community, but are not properly lexicalized. 
 
In contrast, the meaning of a novel metaphor must be constructed on-line, using world 
knowledge, the encoded content, and the surrounding context. Rather than being 
learned, the cognitive capacities required in order to make this kind of inference must 
develop in early childhood. Once developed, they will equip the child to construct an 
on-line, occasion specific interpretation of any metaphor, regardless of whether they 
have ever heard it before.  
Even though interpretations of both conventionalised and novel metaphors must be 
inferred based on the given context, there is still good reason to believe that novel 
metaphor interpretation may require more processing effort and be more cognitively 
challenging than conventionalised metaphor interpretation. Our word naming findings 
(see section 3.3), together with previous sentence verification and lexical priming 
data, tentatively suggest that the interpretation of both novel and conventionalised 
metaphors (and hyperboles) involves the suppression of context irrelevant 
meanings/features associated with the lexically encoded content (Gernsbacher, 
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Keysar, Robertson and Werner 1995; 1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; 
Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 2005; 2007; Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe 2010). 
However, based on her findings, Rubio-Fernandez (2007) suggests that the kind of 
attentional, active suppression involved in novel metaphor interpretation is 
qualitatively different from the more automatic suppression process, which takes 
place during disambiguation. Rubio-Fernandez argues that suppression during 
disambiguation is much more automatic than during novel metaphor comprehension 
because the appropriate meaning is there from the start; it just needs to be selected, 
while inappropriate meanings are inhibited. Whereas during novel metaphor 
comprehension, the alternative non-literal interpretation only becomes available later 
on in the process and so greater demand is placed on attentional processes (i.e. 
executive functions). 
 Findings suggest that children under the age of 4 have underdeveloped inhibition 
control capacities (Diamond & Taylor 1996; Frye et al 1995; Gerstadt, Hong & 
Diamond 1994; Jerger, Martin & Pirozzolo 1988; Kochanska et al. 1996; Livesey & 
Morgan 1991; Reed, Pien & Rothbart 1984, see section 5.1.4 for full discussion). 
Inhibition control is the attentional cognitive capacity that is employed when 
automatic inhibition or suppression fails. It is therefore, reasonable to predict that 
children under the age of 4 might have difficulty suppressing the ‘literal meaning’ of 
a novel metaphor, and consequently, might interpret such metaphors literally. This 
hypothesis, and the relationship between inhibition control and figurative language 
comprehension are discussed in detail in section 2.1.4. 
Since many of the studies discussed in this review, fail to draw this distinction 
between novel and conventionalised metaphors, it is perhaps no surprise that there is a 
certain amount of inconsistency in the overall findings. If the objective of future 
research is to ascertain at what stage in development children are capable of 
constructing novel interpretations of utterances which are intended non-literally, then 
those studies must be certain that the stimuli are in fact novel metaphors. The only 
studies to date that have achieved this are Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s (2011) study, 
and the experiments reported in this chapter. It is important to note that the study of 
idiom understanding in children and conventional metaphors is also interesting, but it 
does not tackle the same questions as the study of novel metaphor comprehension in 
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children, i.e. young children’s capacity to construct novel interpretations of novel 
metaphoric statements. 
Theory of Mind 
Happé’s (1993) findings led to the, originally at least, widely accepted belief that a 
fully developed ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) is required in order to arrive at ‘non-literal’ 
interpretations. This belief provided an explanation of why young children (under the 
age of 4) and individuals on the Autistic Spectrum appear to have difficulty 
comprehending metaphors. Both populations fail ‘false belief tasks’ (e.g. The Sally-
Anne task (Winner and Perner 1983), which were taken to be indicative of whether or 
not an individual has a (1st order) ToM (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; Gopnik and 
Wellman 1994; Perner 1991; Wellman and Gelman 1998; Bartsch and Wellman 1995; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985; Winner and Perner 1983). 
ToM can be summarized as ‘the ability to attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to 
others’. Happe’s (1993) findings indicate that impaired ToM is one of the causes of 
general pragmatic impairment.  
Relevance Theorists Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) argue that “communication 
exploits the well-known ability of humans to attribute intentions to each other” (p. 
699). Therefore, according to Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95), 
individuals who have impaired theory of mind, and who as a result cannot attribute 
beliefs and intentions to other people proficiently, will have difficulty with 
comprehending ostensive-inferential communication. 
The cognitive principle of relevance entails that human cognitive processes and 
mechanisms attend to information that is relevant (see section 1.6.1). Moreover, it 
follows from the communicative principle of relevance (see section 1.6.1), and the 
definition of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 266-78), that by 
addressing someone, a speaker communicates that his or her utterance is relevant (at 
least relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s processing effort). 
These principles laid out by Relevance Theorists form the foundations of an 
inferential theory of communication. Speakers’ utterances carry with them a 
presumption of optimal relevance, and hearer’s use this presumption to infer the 
speakers’ intended meaning in a given context. The Relevance Theoretic 
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comprehension procedure entails that in order to infer the speaker’s meaning, the 
hearer must mentally represent the mental representation(s) of the speaker; a hearer 
must ‘metarepresent’ the speaker’s intention(s). 
Sperber (1994) discusses three different levels of sophistication with respect to 
‘expectations of relevance’: ‘naïve optimism’, ‘cautious optimism’, and sophisticated 
understanding.  
Sperber argues that a naïvely optimistic hearer assumes that the speaker is both 
competent and benevolent: competent enough to avoid misunderstanding, and 
benevolent enough not to lead him/her astray. (Sperber 1994) 
Suppose a mother utters “ I need to go to the bank” as the mother and child rush along 
the high street after school. The most accessible interpretation of this utterance which 
is relevant enough in the given context is that the mother needs to go to the finance 
establishment on the high street. If this was her intended meaning then she is speaking 
competently and benevolently; the most relevant interpretation is the intended 
interpretation. The child need not represent his mother’s thoughts/intentions in order 
to arrive at her intended meaning.  
“ the only time [a naively optimistic hearer] needs to metarepresent the speaker’s 
thoughts is when, having found an acceptable interpretation, he concludes that it is 
the intended one.” 
  (Wilson 1999:13) 
A cautiously optimistic hearer, on the other hand, must do an extra layer of 
metarepresenting. A cautious optimist assumes that a hearer is acting benevolently, 
but not that they are necessarily competent. Rather than just assuming that the most 
accessible interpretation, which is relevant enough is the intended one, the hearer 
considers what the speaker might have thought to be the most accessible relevant-
enough interpretation. This extra layer of metarepresentation allows the hearer to 
avoid misunderstanding where a naïve optimist wouldn’t (e.g. when an interpretation 
is accidentally relevant – the most accessible interpretation that satisfies the hearer’s 
expectations of relevance is not the one the speaker had in mind or when an 
interpretation is accidentally irrelevant – when a speaker accidentally tells something 
to a hearer, which they already know). 
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The final strategy, which Sperber labeled ‘sophisticated understanding’, is when a 
hearer does not assume that a speaker is always benevolent. A sophisticated 
understander is able to identify a speaker’s intended meaning, even if he knows she is 
lying, by determining under what interpretation the speaker might have thought he 
would think her utterance was relevant enough. The hearer is able to represent the 
speaker’s thoughts about the hearer’s thoughts. 
“A Naively Optimistic hearer need not metarepresent the speaker's thoughts at all in 
identifying the speaker’s meaning……A Cautiously Optimistic hearer considers what 
interpretation the speaker might have thought would be relevant enough: at the cost 
of an extra layer of metarepresentation, he can cope with cases where the speaker 
tries to be relevant enough, but fails. Finally, a hearer using the strategy of 
Sophisticated Understanding considers what interpretation the speaker might have 
thought he would think was relevant enough; at the cost of a further layer of 
metarepresentation, he can cope with deceptive cases in which nothing more than the 
appearance of relevance is attempted or achieved.”        (Wilson 1999:14) 
 
Sperber’s strategies have been found to correlate with (social and communication) 
developmental milestones. The move from Naive Optimism to Cautious Optimism 
(the ability to recognize that X is mutually manifest) roughly coincides with the 
acquisition of first-order ToM, and the move from Cautious Optimism to 
Sophisticated Understanding (the ability to recognize that the speaker intends to make 
X mutually manifest) roughly coincides with the acquisition of second-order ToM 
(Bezuidenhout and Sroda 1996; Wilson 1999). 
A simile (e.g. my brother is like a lion) can be interpreted (at least in a basic sense) by 
a naïve optimist, and thus, Happé (1993) argues, an individual without a ToM is 
readily able to interpret similes. However, Happé argues that in order to arrive at even 
an approximation of a metaphoric (e.g. my brother is a lion) interpretation some 
representing of a speaker’s intentions is required. The hearer must at least understand 
what the speaker might have thought to be the most relevant interpretation, and 
therefore they must have at least 1st order ToM. 
If metaphor interpretation requires first order ToM, and children under the age of 4 
typically fail traditional false belief tasks (Winner and Perner 1983), suggesting that 
they lack first order ToM, then this could go some way towards explaining why 
children under 4 would have difficulty interpreting metaphors.  
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However, there is some debate about whether individuals who fail traditional false 
belief tasks, such as the Sally-Anne task (Winner and Perner 1983), really lack first 
order ToM. Pouscoulous (in press) illustrates that pre-verbal children and even 9-18 
month-old infants have been shown to attribute intentions to others (Meltzoff 1995; 
Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello 2005a), and consider information in the common 
ground, when interpreting a communicative act.  Some such studies suggest that 
young toddlers can recognise communicative intentions (Behne, Carpenter, and 
Tomasello 2005b), and that they care about their own communicative intention being 
recognized, rather than just being pre-occupied with obtaining the object that they 
asked for (Shwe and Markman 1997). Moreover, 14- and 18-month-old infants have 
been shown to consider information shared with their interlocutor when interpreting 
an ambiguous communicative pointing gesture (Moll, Richter, Carpenter, and 
Tomasello 2008; Liebal, Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello 2009). 
Happé 1993 
Happé tested the predictions of the Relevance Theoretic account by testing 
individuals with a diagnosis of autism (since individuals on the autistic spectrum 
generally fail false belief tasks, indicating that they have impaired Theory of Mind, 
and therefore, impaired pragmatic inference abilities) on their comprehension of 
metaphors vs. similes. She found that individuals (aged between 9 and 28) who failed 
false belief tasks (with a diagnosis of Autism) were significantly poorer at 
understanding metaphor, than those with 1st or 2nd order ToM, but they were no worse 
at understanding similes. Happé interpreted her results to be supportive of the 
Relevance Theoretic (1986/95) claim that metaphor comprehension requires 1st order 
ToM.  
However, there may be alternative explanations for Happé’s finding. Reynolds and 
Ortony (1980) argue that children find similes easier to interpret than metaphors 
because similes have a syntactic clue that there is a comparison to be made (‘is like’). 
Furthermore, Norbury (2005) attempted to illustrate that semantic competence and 
language competence affect performance on metaphor comprehension tasks, while 
also being closely connected to performance of false-belief tasks, and that this could 
explain Happé’s findings. 
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Norbury 2005 
Norbury tested children with autism and/or language impairment on their 
understanding of metaphors and similes, with the aim of illustrating that ToM is not 
sufficient for metaphor comprehension. She found that linguistic ability affects 
metaphor comprehension. She found that children with language impairment (both 
with or without a diagnosis of Autism) had more difficulty with metaphor 
comprehension than children with an autistic spectrum diagnosis only. In addition, 
children passing the 1st order ToM task were more successful at metaphor 
comprehension than those who did not pass the 1st order ToM task. Finally, on further 
analysis, broad semantic knowledge, measured by the Test of World Knowledge 
(ToWK), was found to be a predictor of a significant amount of variance in metaphor 
comprehension, where as ToM performance was not. 
Norbury’s (2005) results suggest that ToM is necessary but not sufficient in 
explaining variance in metaphor comprehension. Norbury argues that it would be 
reasonable to assume that recognising the speaker’s intention may make the metaphor 
comprehension task easier in natural contexts, but that her findings suggest that it is 
not sufficient to ensure that the individual can comprehend metaphors.  
In summary, Happé’s (1993) study indicates that Theory of Mind is a necessary 
prerequisite for metaphor comprehension. Although Norbury’s (2005) findings did 
not rule out the possibility that ToM is a necessary prerequisite for metaphor 
comprehension, it did suggest that ToM is not sufficient to enable accurate metaphor 
comprehension; linguistic competence and semantic knowledge are also causal 
factors, which impinge on performance. 
Happé (1993) and Norbury’s (2005) findings suggest that children below the age of 4, 
who typically fail standard false-belief tasks, should find metaphor comprehension 
difficult. However, Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s (2011) findings (see section 4.2.1) 
suggest otherwise. 
The first of the experiments reported in this chapter directly contrasts 3, 4, and 5 year-
olds’ figurative language comprehension abilities, allowing us to further investigate 
this apparent 4 year-old watershed. 
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Summary 
 
The above discussion illustrates that there are a number of factors, which potentially 
affect our ability to accurately interpret metaphoric language; some of which are 
perhaps not fundamental to figurative language comprehension, but can nevertheless 
affect comprehension. If experiments fail to control for these factors in developmental 
studies investigating children’s comprehension of figurative language, we are not able 
to properly ascertain at what stage in development children are able to draw non-
literal inferences, and perhaps more importantly, what cognitive prerequisites there 
are to drawing such inferences.  
 
World knowledge and verbal intelligence develop slowly throughout childhood, 
which is why, if they play a dominant role in a metaphor comprehension task, very 
young children appear as unable to comprehend metaphors, and even adolescents 
have room for improvement.  
 
Pouscoulous (2011) argues that it is probable that children have the cognitive means 
to understand metaphor as early as when they begin to speak, but that their limited 
vocabulary and knowledge of the world hampers their ability to do so.  In the next 
section, I will discuss Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s recent study in which they have 
attempted to boil metaphor down to its essence, and shed their experimental stimuli of 
the impeding factors detailed in this section.  
 
4.2.2 VERY EARLY METAPHOR COMPREHENSION 
 
Pouscoulous and Tomasello (2011) is the first study to have controlled for most of the 
confounding factors discussed above. Three-year-olds were asked to pass the 
experimenter one of two objects referred to by a novel metaphor (e.g. ‘give me the 
bug with a jacket’ or ‘give me the car with the backpack’). The correct choice would 
be the object which could accurately be described using the relevant metaphor (e.g. a 
ladybird with big wings or a car with a roof box), rather than the other object, which 
although having its own unique feature (e.g. a car with no roof box, but with an 
identical box/parcel inside the car), could not be described using that metaphor. 
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In the metaphor condition, the correct object was chosen 73% of the time, which 
suggests that provided the metaphor materials pertain to child familiar conceptual 
domains, and the task is simple and independent of verbal intelligence, children as 
young as 3 can understand completely novel metaphors. The authors conclude that the 
ability to understand non-literal language seems to be in place from the earliest 
testable age. This finding casts doubt over the relationship between standard false 
belief tasks and metaphor comprehension since 3 year olds typically fail the standard 
false belief-tasks (see above for discussion). 
 
Are they really metaphors? 
 
Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s (2011) conclusions about children’s metaphor 
comprehension capacities are far more optimistic than previous analyses of metaphor 
production in very young children (See Pouscoulous 2011 for full discussion). Cases 
of spontaneous metaphor production in young children (e.g. calling a chimney a 
house-hat, calling a moving toy car a snake (Winner, McCarthy, Kleinman & Gardner 
1979), calling a man’s shaved head a kiwi (Pouscoulous, 2011), calling oneself a 
porcupine when coming out of the bath with wet hair (Pouscoulous, 2011) have 
mostly been reinterpreted as instances of overextension or pretense, rather than 
metaphor production. 
 
This is an issue that could be leveled at Pouscoulous and Tomasello in relation to their 
interpretation of their findings. Could it not be the case that the children are 
interpreting the metaphors as instances of pretense? It is possible that the children 
were able to choose the correct object because they were able to pretend that the bug’s 
wings were a jacket, or that the car roof box was a backpack, rather than appreciating 
the intended meaning (i.e. the bug’s wings cover their body in the same way a jacket 
covers a person’s body, or the car’s roof box is like a backpack because it sits on the 
car’s ‘back’ and allows it to carry things).  Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s findings 
cannot be indicative of over-extension, though, because all subjects were tested on 
their understanding and production of the literal meanings (e.g. a backpack), and on 
their comprehension and production of the intended metaphorical meaning (e.g. a car 
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roof box). In general, children did not overextend the meanings of the literal terms to 
include the objects described metaphorically. 
 
It is not possible for Pouscoulous and Tomasello to rule out the pretense interpretation 
of their data, but Pouscoulous (2011) does argue that although the pretense hypothesis 
might be a reasonable way to interpret some examples of early metaphor production, 
there are some which cannot be instances of overextension or pretense (e.g. pointing 
at an elevator from below and saying ‘we can see the elevator’s buttocks’). 
Pouscoulous claims that it is clear that in these cases, the children know that they are 
not using the ‘literal’ label for these objects. Moreover, she points out that in many of 
these cases, the children were reportedly giggling or ‘display[ing] obvious 
impishness’ when uttering such examples, further suggesting that they know that they 
are not using the conventional term. Pouscoulous uses a final example (calling a 
plastic shape a butterfly and then saying ‘in fact it is a flower, but it flew away, that’s 
why I called it a butterfly’) to illustrate that at least this 3.5-year-old girl clearly knew 
that she was not using the conventional label, as she was able to describe what it was 
about the plastic shape that made her want to describe it as a butterfly.  
 
Pouscoulous concedes that some instances of child metaphor production may well be 
cases of pretense, but rather than concluding that these instances say nothing about 
metaphor production capacities in young children, Pouscoulous highlights potential 
connections between the two. 
 
Pouscoulous points out that the ambiguity between metaphor production and pretense 
in young children serves to highlight the similarity between the two phenomena. 
Evidence suggests that children as young as 18 months can engage in pretend play 
(Leslie 1987, 1994), and that toddlers are capable of keeping fact apart from fiction 
(Rakoczy & Tomasello 2006), meaning that they clearly have the cognitive means to 
do so. Although the capacities required to intentionally produce a metaphor might be 
different, it is likely that there is some overlap, or that one phenomenon piggy-backs 
on the other. In fact, both behaviours may be manifestations of the same cognitive 
capacities.  
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Despite key differences between metaphoric comparisons and pretense, Pouscoulous 
(2011) emphasizes that there are undeniable similarities between the two phenomena, 
which have been acknowledged by metaphor theorists (Walton 1993; Grice 1989; 
Sperber and Wilson 1986, among others). Both involve some sort of analogy or 
property attribution process. The similarities serve to raise a question, though: why 
would young children be so good at pretense long before they show signs of 
capability with respect to metaphor interpretation? 
 
Pouscoulous (2011) argues that metaphor understanding is simply more difficult to 
demonstrate in very young children, because their language skills are underdeveloped. 
Finding evidence of metaphor understanding below the age of 3 seems unlikely as 
children don’t have enough vocabulary.  
 
Evidence suggests that children as young as 18 months are starting to show signs of 
engaging in pretend play, so if, as Pouscoulous argues, pretense and metaphor exploit 
some or all the same cognitive capacities, then we should not rule out the possibility 
that, at least as soon as they are verbal, children have the capacity to produce and 
understand metaphor.  
Another possible criticism which could be leveled at Pouscoulous and Tomasello 
(2011) is that it is possible that children are not understanding the metaphor, but are 
simply using some ‘association’ strategy to choose the correct object. When asked to 
pass the car with a backpack, the child might choose the car with a box/parcel on its 
roof instead of the car with a box/parcel inside the car, because the box/parcel on the 
roof is more associated with a backpack. Below I will discuss how the novel paradigm 
used in the experiments reported in this chapter, avoids this potential criticism. 
The new picture selection paradigm used in our developmental experiments reported 
in this chapter (see section 4.3), goes some way towards ruling out a pretence 
interpretation of our data, as well as an ‘association strategy’ interpretation. Children 
were read a series of short stories ending in novel metaphoric (and hyperbolic) 
statements, and for each story the child was required to choose which of three pictures 
(placed in front of them) went together with the story. The use of illustrations 
depicting an entire scene (see figure 1 below), together with the context described in 
the story (e.g. This weekend, Stephen is going on a day trip in his car. They have had 
	   244 
to stop because Stephen’s car has got a bad foot) makes it less feasible that the 
experimenter, or the individual or object in the picture is pretending.  
Figure.1 Illustrations for one of the metaphoric stories in our developmental 
experiment  
Control picture              Literal picture               Metaphoric picture 
                    
 
Like Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s (2011) study, our paradigm also controls for all 
the factors, which may impede children’s performance (i.e. world knowledge; context 
length; task difficulty; familiarity). We made sure to use words that are known to the 
particular age groups – and very familiar to them. We used very short, child friendly 
contexts corresponding to situations they would be used to, and with words we made 
sure they could understand. We piloted extensively to ensure that the task was simple 
enough, and didn’t require more attention than even the youngest age group could 
contribute (see section 4.3.1 for full discussion). 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the new paradigm introduces a third, 
potentially interfering choice for the child. Where Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s 
design presented the child with two objects to choose from, this new three-way 
picture selection paradigm includes a third picture, depicting, somewhere in it, the 
lexically encoded meaning of the metaphor vehicle (e.g a bad foot). This picture 
means that in order to accurately interpret the metaphor, and pick the correct picture, 
the child must resist the temptation to interpret the vehicle literally (resisting this 
temptation has been shown to be difficult for individuals with poor IC (Papagno et al. 
2003), and realize, based on the surrounding discourse and linguistic context (e.g. it is 
the car that has a bad foot, not a person) that the statement is intended non-literally, 
and decide which of the other two pictures depicts the intended metaphorical meaning 
(i.e. whether one would describe a car with a missing door, or a car with a missing 
wheel, as having a bad foot). This task is intended to mimic the processes taking place 
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during metaphor interpretation (i.e. the hearer must use the linguistic and discourse 
context in order to infer the intended meaning of an utterance). 
Due to the addition of the conflicting literal choice, it is not possible for children to 
use some sort of ‘association strategy’ to choose the correct ‘figurative picture’. If 
they were to use an association strategy, they would choose the literal picture. 
 
4.2.3 CONTRASTING WITH OTHER TROPES 
 
As mentioned above, like adult research, the majority of developmental research 
investigating figurative language has focused on metaphor (and to some degree, 
irony). To my knowledge there has been little, if any, research investigating very 
young children’s understanding of hyperbole, using up to date, child friendly 
experimental paradigms, and none that have contrasted children’s understanding of 
metaphor and hyperbole.  
Some studies have investigated the understanding of hyperbolic irony in the context 
of naturalistic positive and negative family conversations in the home (Recchia, 
Howe, Ross and Alexander 2010), but this is not comparable to controlled 
experimental conditions. Moreover, these studies are perhaps indicative of an 
assumption in the developmental psychology literature that has likely led to the lack 
of research specifically focusing on tropes other than metaphor and irony; as Wilson 
(2012) argues, in recent experimental literature the notion of irony has been 
broadened to include a whole range of phenomena (rhetorical questions, teasing, 
banter) including hyperbole. While hyperbole has been considered to be a form of 
irony, possible differences between the developmental trajectories of regular irony 
(e.g. ‘Isn’t John’s shirt lovely’ - said of a man wearing a clearly awful shirt) and 
hyperbole, for example, have not been properly explored. Some studies have 
investigated children’s understanding of irony in controlled experimental conditions, 
and have generally found that irony comprehension develops considerably later than 
other pragmatic phenomena, such as scalar implicature (Pouscoulous et al., 2007; 
Kastos & Bishop, 2011), or even metaphor, according to recent findings (Pouscoulous 
and Tomasello 2011). Typically, irony comprehension appears to develop between 
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the ages of five and six, when the ability to pass standard second-order false belief 
tasks has just emerged (Dewes et al. 1996, Happe 1993, Winner, 1988; Capelli et al., 
1990; Creusere, 1999, 2000; Keenan and Quigley, 1999; Nakassis and Snedeker, 
2002; Pexman and Glenwright, 2007). However, as Wilson (2012) points out, the 
breadth of the notion of irony used in much of this experimental literature (see Leggitt 
and Gibbs’ (2000:5-6) breakdown in d. below) means that, although the findings 
provide valuable insights into the nature and development of the cognitive 
mechanisms that allow us to understand echoic/attributive uses28, they provide little 
insight into the developmental trajectory of what Wilson (2012) argues to be several 
distinct mechanisms. 
d) ‘‘various forms of irony’’: 
 
Irony. ‘‘The speaker’s observation of a contradictory state of affairs, but not 
directly critical of the addressee.’’  
Sarcasm: ‘‘A statement that clearly contradicts the knowable state of affairs, 
and is harshly critical toward the addressee.’’  
Hyperbole/ Overstatement: ‘‘A description of the state of affairs in obviously 
exaggerated terms.’’  
Understatement: ‘‘A description of a state of affairs as clearly less important 
than it appeared in context.’’  
Satire: ‘‘A statement that appears to support the addressee, yet the speaker 
actually disagrees and mocks the addressee.’’  
Rhetorical question: A question that is obviously false in a given context 
      (Leggit and Gibbs 2000:5-6) 
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  Echoic use is a technical term in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: chapter 4, sections 7--10; Wilson, 
2006; Wilson and Sperber, 2012). An echoic account of irony claims that an ironical utterance is used to express 
the speaker’s own dissociative (e.g. mocking, scornful or contemptuous) attitude to a thought similar in content to 
the one expressed in her utterance, which she attributes to some source other than herself at the current time.  
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Wilson (2012) rightly argues that, although it is clear that irony and hyperbole can 
combine, as in (e), hyperbole is not inherently ironical, and therefore, the 
comprehension of hyperbolic utterances requires distinct mechanism(s) from those 
required to accurately interpret regular ironic utterances.  
e) I am going to have to put my bikini on in a minute, it is so hot in here (said in an 
extremely cold room) 
As discussed in chapter 1, Relevance theorists treat hyperbole as a type of broadening 
of the linguistically encoded content, closely related to metaphor (Wilson and 
Carston, 2007; Sperber and Wilson, 2008), “which does not involve the expression of 
a characteristic attitude or tone of voice, and combines as easily with non-echoic 
forms of parody as with irony” (Wilson 2012:15). Wilson (2012) welcomes 
developmental studies focusing specifically on hyperbole as they could provide 
valuable insights into how cognitive mechanisms relevant to hyperbole 
comprehension develop, and would also contribute to the construction of an adequate 
account of hyperbole. These are precisely the objective of the second developmental 
experiment reported in this chapter. 
In addition to those developmental studies already discussed, young typically and 
atypically developing children’s understanding of metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Tim 
is the sweets) have been investigated and directly contrasted using some up-to-date 
paradigms, yielding some interesting findings (Nerlich, Todd and Clarke 1999; 
Rundblad and Annaz 2010). Nerlich et al.’s (1999) metonymy findings were 
comparable to previous metaphor findings as they showed that children’s 
understanding of metonymies improved with age. Moreover, Rundblad and Annaz 
(2010) showed that children with a social-communication disorder such as Autism, 
are severely impaired with respect to both metaphor and metonymy comprehension, 
suggesting that the pragmatic processes and/or cognitive mechanisms underlying 
metaphor are the same or similar to those underlying metaphor. These findings 
illustrate that it is important to contrast children’s understanding of different tropes in 
order to determine whether it is something specific about metaphor that can cause 
problems for young children, or whether their problems can be generalizable to all 
figurative meanings. 
	   248 
In contrast with the current theories discussed in this thesis, which either overtly 
propose or entail that metaphors and hyperboles of the form X is Y are processed in 
the same way (see Chapter 1 for full review), our reading-time findings (see section 
3.1) suggest that metaphors are more difficult and time-consuming to process than 
hyperboles, which are processed as quickly as literal statements. Depending on the 
cause of the additional processing effort during metaphor interpretation, we may find 
that young children are more able with respect to hyperbole comprehension than 
metaphor comprehension.  
Our second developmental experiment presented in this chapter, allow us to directly 
contrast young children’s (3 year olds) understanding of metaphor and hyperbole, 
which means that our findings together with the adult findings presented in chapter 3, 
will allow us to assess whether the unified aspect (which is either explicit or implicit) 
of current accounts is accurate, and whether findings relating to metaphor can be 
generalized to hyperbole. 
One last aspect that is potentially crucial for the interpretation of figurative language 
and a difference between metaphor and hyperbole is executive function; and that is 
one other factor our experiments in this chapter will focus on. Following a discussion 
of Executive Functions and the connection between these attention and suppression 
capacities and figurative language comprehension capacities, I will present our 
developmental experiment and our findings. 
 
 4.2.4 INHIBITION CONTROL AND FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE  
 
Executive functions and inhibition control 
‘Executive functions’ is an umbrella category which denotes those processes that 
serve to “monitor and control thought and action, including self-regulation, planning, 
behavior organization, cognitive flexibility, error detection and correction, response 
inhibition, and resistance to interference”. (Eslinger 1996; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & 
Frye, 1997).  
 
Inhibitory control (IC) (the ability to maintain attention on 
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responses/representations/information in order to achieve a given goal, while 
inhibiting responses/representations/information that may interfere with achieving 
said goal) and working memory are basic executive functions that make it possible for 
more complex executive functions like problem-solving to develop (Senn, Espy and 
Kaufmann 2004), and are among the earliest executive functions to appear, with 
initial signs observed in infants, 7 to 12 months old (Luca, Cinzia, Leventer, Richard 
2008; Anderson 2002).  
IC allows us to inhibit responses to irrelevant stimuli while working towards a 
cognitively represented objective (Rothbart & Posner 1985), which is a situation that 
can be created for testing purposes by designing a task which requires the participant 
to concentrate as much on an interfering action schema, as on the desired action 
schema.  
A classic example of an IC test (for adults) is ‘the colour-word interference test’ 
(Delis et al. 2001) when subjects are presented with ‘colour words’ such as ‘blue’ or 
‘red’, but written in a different colour ink than the colour they depict (red or blue). 
Participants are asked to name the colour of the ink and not name the word itself. This 
task requires the subject to inhibit their reading capacity, which is highly activated 
when presented with written words in their own language. Another common test used 
to determine IC capacity is the Wisconsin card sorting test (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, 
Kay and Curtiss 1997), in which participants are asked to sort stimulus cards 
according to colour, shape, or number. This requires the subject to suppress their 
capacity to recognize colour and shape when sorting cards according to number, for 
example.   
The role of inhibition control in figurative language comprehension 
A discussed in detail in chapter 2 (section 2.1.4), previous evidence, together with our 
word-naming findings (presented in chapter 3) tentatively suggest that novel 
metaphor (and hyperbole) interpretation involves the active suppression/inhibition of 
metaphor irrelevant features (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner 1995; 
1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 2005; 2007; Gold, 
Faust and Goldstein 2010; Papagno et al. 2003; Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe 2010).  
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Furthermore, other empirical findings suggest that it is our IC capacities that are 
employed during metaphor comprehension, in order to carry out such activation 
regulation of relevant/irrelevant features (Pierce, Mclaren and Chiappe 2010; Monetta 
and Pell 2007; Gold and Faust 2010; Papagno, Lucchelli, Muggia, and Rizzo’s 2003; 
Amanzio et al. 2007). Metaphor relevant information must be attended to, while 
ensuring that information which is irrelevant to, or inconsistent with a metaphoric 
interpretation does not interfere with processing (see section 2.4 for full discussion). 
 
These findings fit with most of the current theoretical accounts (with the exception of 
the Graded Salience Hypothesis) discussed at the beginning of this thesis. Glucksberg 
and colleagues (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001) claim that the 
suppression of metaphor irrelevant features of the basic-level features takes place 
during metaphor comprehension. Structure-mapping theory states that hearers must 
keep active relational correspondences between the vehicle and the topic, while 
suppressing surface differences (Clement and Gentner 1991; Wolff and Gentner 
2011). Relevance theorists propose a ‘dropping’ process, in which content 
constitutive features of the encoded vehicle concept are ‘dropped’ or ‘demoted’ 
during interpretation (Carston 2002; Wilson and Carston 2007).  
If figurative language comprehension requires active suppression (or at the very least, 
attention regulation), as our word-naming findings, and others findings tentatively 
suggest, and IC is the cognitive capacity responsible for attention maintenance and 
inhibition (Eslinger 1996; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997), then the 
development of good inhibition control must be a pre-requisite to understanding 
figurative language (as suggested by previous findings: Pierce, Mclaren and Chiappe 
2010; Monetta and Pell 2007; Gold and Faust 2010; Papagno, Lucchelli, Muggia, and 
Rizzo’s 2003; Amanzio et al. 2007). In order to assess the strength of this hypothesis, 
it is essential to test young children on both their IC capacity, and their figurative 
language comprehension capacity, which was an important element of both of our 
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Children’s development of executive function  
Children reach important milestones in their development of IC between birth and 6 
years of age, but they show signs of rapid improvement at around the age of four, at a 
similar time to when they pass the false belief task (Diamond & Taylor 1996; Frye et 
al 1995; Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond 1994; Jerger, Martin & Pirozzolo 1988; 
Kochanska et al. 1996; Livesey & Morgan 1991; Reed, Pien & Rothbart 1984). 
Sudden development of IC is thought to contribute to various cognitive 
developmental changes, which take place at around this time in childhood, including 
general intelligence, attention, memory, as well as reading comprehension (Carlson 
and Moses 2001).  
A number of age appropriate tests have been used to assess young children’s 
inhibition control capacity. These tests broadly fall in to one of two categories; the 
first of which measures children’s ability to delay or completely suppress an impulse 
response to a stimuli when a task so requires it (e.g. to not look while an exciting 
present is being noisily wrapped; Kochanska et al. 1996). The second type of test 
requires the child to respond in a specific way despite a highly salient, alternative and 
conflicting response (e.g. to touch the green card when the experimenter says ‘snow’, 
or to touch the white card when the experimenter says ‘grass’; Carlson and Moses 
2001). Children’s performance on these tasks continues to improve throughout the 
pre-school period, with children performing at ceiling by the age of 5 or 6. 
This behavioural data patterns nicely with neurological data showing significant brain 
maturation in the areas of the brain thought to be responsible for IC (frontal lobe) 
between the ages of 4 and 7 (Luria 1973; Thatcher 1992). In addition, findings 
suggest that frontal lobe lesions in children, result in lack of IC (Dennis 1991). 
A strong correlation has been found between ToM and inhibition control (Carlson 
1997; Carlson and Moses 2001; Davis and Pratt 1995; Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai 1995; 
Gordon and Olsen 1998; Hughes 1998; Hughes et al. 1999; Perner and Lang 1999). 
Some theories propose that there is a functional dependency between the development 
of inhibition control and ToM, and some accounts suggest, in different ways, that 
inhibition control and ToM are two parts of the same process and/or that they are both 
mediated by the same brain region (See Perner and Lang 1999 for full discussion). 
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Summary 
If children do not develop good IC until around the age of 4 or 5, as findings suggest 
(Diamond & Taylor 1996; Frye et al 1995; Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond 1994; Jerger, 
Martin & Pirozzolo 1988; Kochanska et al. 1996; Livesey & Morgan 1991; Reed, 
Pien & Rothbart 1984), and IC plays a role in figurative language comprehension, as 
findings suggest (Pierce, Mclaren and Chiappe 2010; Monetta and Pell 2007; Gold 
and Faust 2010; Papagno, Lucchelli, Muggia, and Rizzo’s 2003; Amanzio et al. 
2007), then we would be justified in predicting that children younger than 4 years old 
will have difficulties with metaphor and hyperbole comprehension.  
One of the aims of our experiments discussed below was to test the above prediction. 
To my knowledge, these are the first developmental experiments to investigate the 
relationship between inhibition control and figurative language comprehension. We 
will compare children’s performance on tasks probing their understanding of 
metaphor and hyperbole with their performance on typical executive function tests. 
 
4.3 DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY CONTRASTING YOUNG CHILDREN’S 
COMPREHENSION OF METAPHOR AND HYPERBOLE 
 
We carried out two developmental experiments assessing children’s ability to 
understand novel metaphors and hyperboles. In the first experiment, 3-to-5-year-old 
children were read a series of short stories, each ending in a novel metaphoric 
statement (e.g. Emily was a hedgehog). Following this, the child was asked to pick 
which out of three pictures showed what happened in the story. In the second 
experiment, the exact same paradigm was used with a group of 3 year-olds, but this 
time metaphor and hyperbole were directly compared: in addition to the novel 
metaphoric stories, children were required to make a picture selection for a series of 
novel hyperbolic stories. In both experiments, children were also tested on their IC 
capacity using two age appropriate IC tasks taken from Carlson and Moses (2001), in 
order to determine the presence of a correlation between IC and figurative language 
comprehension. 
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The first experiment was designed to test whether children as young as 3 can 
accurately interpret age appropriate novel metaphors, provided that the items pertain 
to conceptual domains, which are familiar to pre-school children. A picture-selection 
paradigm (inspired by the act-out task used in Pouscoulous and Tomasello 2011) was 
used in both experiments rather than a task involving toys in order to make a pretense 
interpretation of the data less feasible, but it was ensured through pre-testing that the 
demands of the task were not too great for children of this age. In addition, following 
Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s lead, all the figurative statements used in our 
experiments were novel, so as to ensure that we were in fact measuring children’s 
ability to carry out the inferential processes required in order to construct an accurate 
novel metaphor interpretation, rather than their lexical knowledge of conventional 
metaphors. 
One of the aims of our experiments discussed below was to test the prediction that 
children under 4 will find novel figurative language comprehension harder than those 
over 4 because of the rapid improvement in IC capacity around that 4 year-old 
watershed (see section 4.1.4). To my knowledge, these are the first developmental 
experiment to investigate the relationship between inhibition control and figurative 
language comprehension.  
With this aim in mind, as well as testing the children on their IC capacity using 
standard IC tasks, (unlike any previous study investigating very young children’s 
understanding of figurative language) an attempt was also made to ensure that passing 
the metaphor and hyperbole tasks required the child to suppress the impulsive 
response to interpret the vehicle literally. It is not the first time that an object or 
picture selection paradigm has been used in a developmental study investigating 
metaphor comprehension, but this is the first time children have been presented with 
three pictures to choose from, rather than the standard two-choice (control and 
correct) paradigm.  
The third picture depicted somewhere in it, the lexically encoded meaning of the 
metaphor vehicle (e.g for the metaphor ‘the car has a bad foot’, a bad foot appears in 
the third ‘conflicting literal’ picture). Thus, in order to accurately interpret the 
metaphor, and pick the correct picture, the child must resist the temptation to interpret 
the vehicle literally (as described in many studies Gibbs 1994; Nippold 1988/1998 
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and Winner 1988/1997 for reviews), and realize, based on the surrounding discourse 
and linguistic context (e.g. it is the car that has a bad foot, not a person) that the 
statement is intended non-literally. This presents an advantage as it enable us to 
present more fine-tuned findings about whether the younger age groups of children 
truly understand metaphor or simply react with some kind of association strategy (as 
could be said of Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s (2011) findings). 
If children frequently choose the ‘literal’ picture then this would be suggestive of an 
interference effect from the availability of the literal interpretation of the 
metaphor/hyperbole vehicle, potentially due to underdeveloped IC. Indeed, Papagno 
et al. (2003) (see section 2.1.4) showed that Alzheimer’s patients found it difficult to 
arrive at the correct interpretation if there was a particularly salient but 
inconsistent/inaccurate literal interpretation available to them, suggesting that 
patients’ known difficulties with inhibition control were affecting their ability to 
suppress the literal interpretation. 
If the children are able to inhibit the literal interpretation of the metaphor/hyperbole 
vehicle then they will able to reject the third picture, and decide which of the other 
two pictures depicts the intended metaphorical meaning (e.g. whether one would 
describe a car with a missing door, or a car with a missing wheel, as having a bad 
foot). This task is intended to mimic the processes taking place during metaphor 
interpretation (i.e. the hearer must use the linguistic and discourse context in order to 
infer the intended meaning of an utterance). 
The paradigm was the same for both experiments; however the first experiment 
compared three different age groups (age 3, 4, and 5 years), whereas the second 
experiment focused in on just 3 year-olds. Moreover, where the first experiment 
focused on metaphors, the second experiment incorporated both metaphor and 
hyperbole in order to allow us to directly contrast children’s understanding of the two 
tropes. This is the first time metaphor and hyperbole have been contrasted in a 
developmental study, using an up-to-date, child friendly experimental paradigm. As 
discussed above, in contrast with most current accounts of figurative language 
(Wilson and Carston 2007; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Glucksberg 2001; Clements 
and Gentner 1991; Wolff and Gentner 2011) our reading-time findings (see section 
3.1) suggest that metaphors are more difficult and time-consuming to process than 
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hyperboles, which are processed as quickly as literal statements. Depending on the 
cause of the additional processing effort during metaphor interpretation, we may find 
that young children are more able with respect to hyperbole comprehension than 
metaphor comprehension. 
It is reasonable to infer from our word-naming findings, which suggest that lexically 
encoded vehicle meanings are equally deactivated after arriving at metaphoric and 
hyperbolic interpretations, that our inhibitory control mechanisms are no more 
involved in metaphor comprehension than they are in hyperbole comprehension. If 
the observed deactivation of lexically encoded content is the result of suppression, 
then IC mechanisms will have been equally employed during the interpretation of 
both metaphoric and hyperbolic statements during our word-naming task. Finding a 
difference between children’s performance on the metaphor and hyperbole tasks with 
respect to the degree to which their performance can be predicted by their 
performance on the IC tasks would suggest that IC might be more critical during the 
interpretation of one trope (e.g. metaphor) than it is during the interpretation of the 
other (e.g. hyperbole) e.g. inhibitory mechanisms may be necessarily required during 
the interpretation of metaphors, whereas they may just be beneficial during the 
interpretation of hyperboles. If this were the case, children with poor IC would, of 
course, find metaphor comprehension more difficult than hyperbole comprehension.  
 
4.3.1 EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Three, four, and five year-old children were tested on their ability to accurately 
interpret novel, age appropriate metaphors. Moreover, a potential relationship 
between children’s metaphor comprehension capacity and their inhibition control 
capacity was explored, as children’s inhibition control capacities were also tested. If 
the deactivation of the lexically encoded content of metaphor vehicles during novel 
metaphor interpretation (which can be observed in both our word-naming data (see 
chapter 3) and others’ lexical priming (Rubio-Fernandez 2007) and sentence 
verification data (Gernsbacher et al. 2001) is the result of active suppression, as these 
findings tentatively suggest, then we would expect to find a correlation between 
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Fifty monolingual, English speaking children aged between 3;0 and 5;11 years were 
recruited from two South-London nurseries. There were three groups; the first group 
contained sixteen children (7 boys and 9 girls) aged between 3;0 and 3;11 (mean age 
3;6), the second group contained fourteen children (7 boys and 7 girls) aged between 
4;0 and 4;11 (mean age 4;4) and the third group contained twenty children (11 boys 
and 9 girls) aged between 5;0 and 5;11 ( mean age 5;6) In addition, 10 UCL 
undergraduate students aged between 18 and 25 made up a small adult control group. 
The age groups were chosen on the basis of the rapid improvement in Inhibition 
Control at 4 years old. The three age groups enabled us to assess children’s 
performance on the experimental tasks before, at, and after that 4 year-old watershed. 
Metaphor task materials 
All the materials were constructed specifically for children aged as young as 3. 
Parents of 3 year-old children were consulted on their opinion of how well their child 
understood the relevant vocabulary. In addition, nine metaphor items were piloted on 
eleven 3 and 4 year-old children to a) ensure that children of this age had full 
command of the relevant vocabulary, and b) to determine whether the children were 
able to interpret the intended meanings. Based on the pilot results, 6 metaphor items 
were chosen for the experiment. Three were not chosen because of issues with the 
vocabulary which made them inadequate for children to understand. 
Based on previous findings in relation to the effects of context on children’s 
understanding of metaphor (Vosniadou et al. 1984; Reynolds and Wilson 1984), we 
endeavored to make the short stories as brief as possible so as not to overload the 
child with information, while ensuring that the brief narrative within the stories still 
supported the intended interpretation. Furthermore, we ensured that the child could 
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not choose the correct picture based on the context alone (i.e. there was nothing in the 
story, apart from the final metaphoric statement, which would  rule out either the 
literal or control picture). 
Table 1. Metaphor experimental items 
 Stories 
Metaphor 1 It’s Sunday afternoon, and Alex is playing outside in the fresh air. Today, Alex is a 
monkey. Can you find the picture in which Alex is a monkey? 
Metaphor 2 This weekend, Harry is going on holiday with his Daddy. Harry’s car has a backpack. 
Can you find the picture in which the car has a backpack? 
Metaphor 3 This weekend, Stephen is going on holiday in his car. They have had to stop because 
Stephen’s car has got a bad foot. Can you find the picture in which the car has a bad 
foot? 
Metaphor 4 It’s Saturday night, and Katy is playing with her toys before bed-time. Katy is a zebra 
playing with her toys.  Can you find the picture in which Katy is a zebra? 
Metaphor 5 This weekend, Emily is staying at her granny’s house. Emily has had a bath and now 
she is a hedgehog. Can you find the picture in which Emily is a hedgehog? 
Metaphor 6 It’s Saturday, and Archie is going to a party. Archie is ready to leave for the party and 
he has a bush on his head. Can you find the picture in which Archie has a bush on his 
head? 
Procedure 
Each child was presented with 4 tasks; a metaphor picture-selection task, two 
inhibition control tasks, and a word naming and pointing task (to ascertain whether 
the child had a good grasp of the vocabulary necessary for the metaphor picture 
selection task).  
The picture-selection task was piloted on a group of 11 children aged between 3 and 5 
to ensure that they were appropriate for children of this age. All 11 children 
completed the picture-selection task, and their performance on the literal practice 
trials indicated that they fully understood the task, and were able to pick the correct 
picture provided the language used was literal. 
The inhibition control tasks were taken from Carlson and Moses (2001), and the 
word-naming and pointing task was taken from Pouscoulous and Tomasello (2011) 
(adapted to be relevant to our metaphor items) and were, therefore, known to be 
appropriate for young children (they do not involve advanced linguistic abilities or 
knowledge that children of this age might lack). However, they were also included in 
our 11 piloting sessions, as we wanted to ensure that children as young as three were 
comfortable completing all 4 tasks sequentially (amounting to a 20 minute testing 
session).  
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We found that all of the children in our pilot group were capable of completing all 
four tasks in a row, and maintaining concentration on each task. 
The metaphor picture selection task 
The children were shown a picture book with some short stories. First, the children 
were read an introductory story on the first page of the picture book, about a class of 
children who are all friends at school. Then they were told that the rest of the picture 
book is about what each of the children in the class are doing at the weekend. The 
experimenter explained the following; “Let’s look at what each of the children are 
doing at the weekend!”, “Oh no, all the pictures have gone missing from the picture 
book, and have become all jumbled up! If we read each of the stories, can you help 
me find the right picture to go with each story?” (pointing at a pile of jumbled up 
pictures). 
Then, the children were read the stories, one at a time. Each story ended in a sentence 
that should be interpreted metaphorically in the given context (e.g. It’s Saturday night, 
and Katy is playing with her toys before bed-time. Katy is a zebra playing with her 
toys.). There were 6 metaphoric stories in the metaphor picture selection task (see 
table 1 above).  
After each story, children were asked to select which picture from a selection of 3 
pictures (see materials and counterbalancing below), which were placed in front of 
them, they thought showed what was happening in the story. There was a space for 
the child to stick the chosen picture below the story in the picture book. 
It was ensured that the three pictures from which the child could choose were as 
similar as possible, but that they differed in just one respect. One picture depicted an 
accurate figurative interpretation of the story (i.e. a car with a broken wheel), and the 
other two pictures depicted an inaccurate interpretation given the context.  
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Figure. 2 Correct metaphoric picture for the metaphor item 3 ‘the car has a bad foot’ 
     
 A second ‘control’ picture depicted a nearly identical image to the first one, except 
that in this image, there was always nothing relating to the figurative interpretation, 
but something else was depicted (e.g. in this case, the car door has fallen off), as 
illustrated in figure.3. 
Figure . 3 Control picture for metaphor item 3 ‘the car has a bad foot’ 
      
Finally, a third ‘literal conflicting’ image was again, almost exactly the same as the 
other two pictures, but this time, somewhere in the image, there was a conflicting 
literal interpretation of the metaphor vehicle (e.g. a bad foot). See figure.4 below. 
Figure. 4 Conflicting literal picture for metaphor item 2 ‘the car has a bad foot’.  
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As mentioned in the introduction, the three-choice picture selection paradigm is such 
that in order to choose the correct picture, the child must suppress the literal 
interpretation of the trope vehicle (i.e. not select the ‘literal’ picture on the basis of 
interpreting the vehicle literally), but also that the child arrives at (at least) an 
approximation of the intended meaning of the figurative statement. 
 
If the child picks the correct (metaphoric) picture, then they must have (at least 
approximately) interpreted the item accurately. The three pictures were always almost 
identical, and only differed with respect to one or two features (e.g. the car wheel or 
door falling off, or the broken leg in the background). If the child chose the correct 
picture, then they had rejected the literal picture (depicting a literal interpretation of 
the metaphor vehicle), indicating that they understood that the vehicle was not being 
used ‘literally’. Moreover, they had rejected the control picture, which like the correct 
and literal pictures, always depicted an event relevant to or coherent with the story 
(e.g. a car having stopped at the side of the road), but depicted some other possible 
salient feature or characteristic  (e.g. a door having fallen off) which could not be 
accurately described using the metaphor (e.g. ‘the car has a bad foot’). See appendix 
B for all items and illustrations.  
 
It was ensured that all three pictures were equally exciting, salient, colourful, and 
interesting for all items (e.g. that the one small difference between the three pictures 
did not cause one of the pictures to be more interesting to children than the others), as 
such differences may have skewed the results. This was verified during piloting. 	  
In addition to the experimental items, there were 3 practice trials. The practice items 
followed exactly the same format as the experimental items, but all were literal; there 
was a short story (e.g. This weekend, Sally is at the park. She is having lots of fun 
riding on her bike in the park. Can you find the picture of sally riding her bike in the 
park?), followed by a choice of three pictures, one of which was an accurate 
representation of the story, the other two were not (see figure.5 for an example). 
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Figure.5 Practice trial 3 pictures 
Correct    Incorrect   Incorrect
   
 
Inhibition control tasks (Carlson and Moses (2001) 
1 – Snow grass task: The child is showed two cards, a green one and a white one. The 
child is asked to point to the green card when I say “snow”, and to the white card 
when I say “grass”. They are asked to do this several times. Children’s responses 
were only recorded after they had responded correctly several times. 
2- Bear/unicorn task: The child is introduced to two hand puppets – ‘the nasty bear’ 
and the ‘nice unicorn’. They are told that the bear is not nice and therefore we must 
not do as he says. We must ignore everything that he tells us to do, but the nice 
unicorn is very nice and so we must always listen to him carefully and do exactly 
what he says. Then, the experimenter, using the bear and unicorn puppet, and putting 
on a mean and friendly voice respectively, asks the child to do a series of actions such 
as “tap your head” or “touch your nose”, or  “close your eyes”. Again, children’s 
responses were only recorded after they had responded correctly several times. 
Naming and pointing vocabulary task 
At the end of testing, as in Pouscoulous and Tomasello (2011), the children were 
given a naming-and-pointing game with a picture book designed specifically for this 
experiment, to determine their comprehension and production of the vocabulary used 
in the metaphor task.  
Firstly, the child was asked to name a series of objects/scenes in a picture book, which 
were pointed out by an experimenter (“what is this?”). This was to ensure that they 
could produce a label for all of the metaphor vehicles in the experimental tasks (e.g. 
Hedgehog; bad foot; backpack), and that they did not ‘over extend’, and use a 
‘figurative’ label to refer to something which should literally be described in different 
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terms (e.g. to ensure that they didn’t use the word ‘monkey’ to refer to a little boy 
hanging in a tree). This is important to establish, as if the child is ‘over-extending’ the 
term ‘monkey’ to include little boys hanging in trees, then they are, potentially at 
least, not interpreting the term non-literally. Instead, they may be interpreting it 
literally, according to their understanding of its literal denotation. 
Secondly, the child was required to point out objects/scenes named by the 
experimenter out of a number of objects on one page in a picture book (e.g. “Can you 
point to the monkey?” or “ Can you point to the hedgehog?”). Again, some of the 
pictures depicted the metaphor vehicles used in the experiment, and some depicted the 
scenes described in the metaphoric stories (e.g. ‘a little boy hanging from a tree’, or 
‘a person with spiky hair’).  
The picture book consisted of 12 pages (6 for naming, and 6 for pointing). Each page 
corresponded to one of the metaphor items. The first 6 pages had four pictures on 
each page; one of the literal interpretation of the metaphor vehicle (e.g. a monkey), 
one of the figurative interpretation of the story (e.g. a little boy hanging from a tree), 
one of an unrelated object or event (e.g. a shoe), and one of an unknown object. For 
each of the objects on these first 6 pages, the child was asked “what is this?” and the 
child was expected to produce a label for the object. Pages 7-12 had three pictures on 
each page; one of the literal interpretation of the metaphor or hyperbole vehicle (a 
different image from that used in the naming section of the picture book); one of the 
figurative interpretation of the story (again, a different image from that used in the 
naming section), and finally, an unrelated object or event. For each of the objects on 
these pages (6-12), the child was asked “can you point to the [        ]?”, and the child 
was expected to point to the correct object. 
It was ensured that the whole procedure took no longer than 15 minutes per child. 
Small play breaks were taken if a particular child became tired or distracted, but 
generally, the tasks were delivered quickly in order to hold the child’s attention. 
Counterbalancing 
The metaphor stories were presented in a random order for each participant. Random 
orders were generated using ‘Random.org’. In addition, the position of the three 
pictures was counterbalanced (between right, left and middle) across participants 
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using a Latin square (see below). This means that there were 6 lists for picture 
position (c= control, l = conflicting literal picture, f= correct figurative picture). 
Table. 2 Latin square for counterbalancing 
 List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 List 5 List 6 
1 c l f l c f l f c c f l f l c f c l 
2 f l c c l f c f l l c f f c l l f c 
3 l f c f l c c l f f c l l c f c f l 
4 l c f l f c f c l f l c c f l c l f 
5 c f l f c l l c f l f c c l f f l c 
6 f c l c f l f l c c l f l f c l c f 
 
The grass/snow tasks and bear/unicorn tasks were in a fixed order – each child saw 
the grass/snow task first, followed by the bear/unicorn task. 
 
The IC tasks were always presented after the metaphor picture book, and the 
vocabulary naming and pointing task was always presented last, to ensure it would 
have no carry-on effect on the metaphor task. 
 
Coding 
Children’s responses to all 4 tasks were hand recorded by a second experimenter 
(which varied from child to child as there were 8 ‘second experimenters’ in total) 
present in the room. Wherever possible (i.e. with parental consent), sessions were 
recorded using a small video camera. In order to ensure that there were no 
inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the coding, all video recordings were watched back 
and coded again by a third party - who had not taken part in the experiment and knew 
nothing of its purpose. No inconsistencies were detected. 
Metaphor task 
Children’s responses were recorded as either ‘metaphoric’, ‘literal’, or ‘control’ (a 
ternary coding system), depending on which of the three pictures they chose. For the 
	   264 
purpose of statistical analysis, these responses were later coded as 1s and 0s (a binary 
coding system); 1 if the child chose the picture depicting the correct metaphoric 
interpretation, or 0 if the child chose either the literal or the control picture. 
IC tasks 
Each child was given a score out of 13 for the grass/snow task (i.e. there were 13 
trials in this task, and each time the child touched the wrong coloured card, 1 point 
was deducted), and a score out of 6 for the bear/unicorn task (i.e. the child was asked 
to do 6 different things by the bear and the child and 1 point was deducted each time 
the child did as the bear asked them to). These two scores were then combined to 
obtain an overall score out of 19. Only the final choice made by the child was 
considered (e.g. subtle hesitations were scored as correct). 
Naming and pointing task 
For the naming section of the task, children’s responses were coded as 1s and 0s. 
Responses were coded as correct (1) if deemed to be an appropriate label for the given 
object/scene (i.e. ‘car’ ‘broken car’ or ‘car stuck’, for the picture of a car with a 
missing wheel) or incorrect (0) if considered to be an inappropriate label (i.e. ‘fridge’ 
or ‘table’ for the picture of a car with a missing wheel). Instances of ‘overextension’ 
were also coded as incorrect (e.g. ‘monkey’ for the picture of a little boy climbing a 
tree). Responses were not considered to be overextensions if they were in the form of 
a simile (e.g. ‘the boy like a monkey’), if they contained the verb ‘pretending’ (e.g. 
‘the lady pretending to be a zebra’ for the picture of the lady in striped pyjamas), or if 
they used the overextension as an adjective to describe the correct label (e.g. ‘the 
zebra lady’).  
For the pointing section of the task, the children’s responses were again coded as 1s 
and 0s. If the child pointed to the correct object on the page, they were scored as 1, 
and if they pointed to any of the incorrect pictures on the page, they were scored as 0 
for that item. 
Each child was then given a total score in the form of % correct for both the naming 
and pointing tasks separately, and combined. 
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RESULTS 
Adult control group 
The adult control group chose the correct picture 100% of the time, indicating that the 
novel metaphors we used were readily understandable. In addition, the adult control 
group was at ceiling on both inhibition control tasks. 
Initial analysis of child data 
In the metaphor task, no child was excluded on the pre-determined basis of answering 
more than 1 out of 3 practice trials incorrectly. The mean percentages of correct 
answers for the three age groups (3 year-olds, 4 year-olds, and 5 year-olds) across 
items were 60%, 88%, and 94% respectively. Comparisons with chance, reveal that 
all three age groups performed significantly (p<.0001) above chance (.33).  
Analysis of variance in performance, between age groups were analysed using a 
General Linear Mixed Model analysis (GLINMIX)29 in SAS, with age group as a 
fixed effect, and subject as a random effect. A main effect of age group (F 
(2,49)=12.5 p<.0001) indicated an age group difference in performance on the 
metaphor a tasks. 
Figure.6 Mean accuracy scores for each age group on the metaphor task 
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Analysis of differences between age groups on the task, adjusted for multiple 
comparisons (Sidak), reveals that 4 (p=0.0006) and 5 (p<0.0001) year olds performed 
significantly better than 3 year olds on the metaphor task. No other comparisons were 
significant. 
Breakdown of incorrect choices 
21.8% of incorrect answers in the metaphor task were cases in which the child chose 
the control picture, rather than the picture depicting the literal interpretation of the 
vehicle. For 3 year olds alone, this figure was 28.9%, for 4 year olds it was just 10%, 
and 5 year-olds never chose the control picture (0%). 
Pairwise comparisons reveal that there was a) a significant difference between 3 year 
olds and 4 year-olds (p = .03) and 3 and 5 year-olds (p<.0001), with respect to the 
percentage of incorrect choices which were instances in which the child chose the 
control picture.  
Vocabulary 
Although 96% of responses on the vocabulary test were accurate, there were some 
cases in which the child either produced an inappropriate label (e.g. ‘dog’ for a 
picture of a monkey), or produced an overextension (e.g. ‘monkey’ for a picture of a 
boy climbing a tree), or pointed to the wrong picture in the comprehension test. 
Therefore, the GLINMIX analysis was re-run with the metaphor item data points 
corresponding to these inaccuracies removed from the metaphor task data.  The main 
effect of age group remains (F(2,416)=10.58 p=<0.0001), and the analysis of 
differences between age groups, adjusted for multiple comparisons (Sidak), reveals 
the same significant differences between groups. Again, four (p=0.02) and five year 
olds (<0.0001) perform significantly better on the metaphor task than 3 year olds. 
With inhibition control as a covariate 
The mean inhibition scores for the three age groups were 9, 17.4 and 18, respectively. 
Analysis of differences between age groups, adjusted for multiple comparisons 
(Sidak), reveals that 4 (p<.0001) and 5 (p<0.0001) year olds performed significantly 
better than 3 year olds on the inhibition control tasks. Four and five year olds did not 
differ significantly in this respect (p=1.000).  
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The scatter plot in figure.7 suggests a positive correlation between age and inhibition 
control score, with older children scoring higher on the inhibition control tasks. 
Figure.7  Correlation between age (months) and inhibition control score. 
 
 
Furthermore, a correlation analysis (Kendall’s Tau) reveals that age and inhibition 
control scores are positively correlated (r=.485 , N=48, p<.0001). 
With performance on the inhibition control task factored into the GLINMIX analysis 
as a covariate, there was a main effect of inhibition (F(1,239)= 7.50 P = .0066), 
suggesting that performance on the inhibition control task was closely related to 
performance on the metaphor task. The main effect of age group disappeared (F (2, 
239)= 2.05 p=0.13), which was to be expected as performance on inhibition control 
scores were highly correlated to age.  
Analysis of differences between age groups in the different trope conditions, adjusted 
for multiple comparisons (Sidak), with inhibition scores factored in as a covariate, 
reveal that the differences between 3 and 4 year olds’ (p=0.71) and 3 and 5 year olds’ 
(p=0.13) when performance on the metaphor task are no longer significant, suggesting 
that the differences between age groups can, at least to some degree, be accounted for 
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With vocabulary as a covariate 
With vocabulary production and comprehension scores factored into the GLINMIX 
analysis as covariates, there was no main effect of vocabulary production 
F(1,239)=0.00 p=.96) or vocabulary comprehension F(1,488)=0.70 p=.40), suggesting 
that there was little connection between performance on the vocabulary naming and 
pointing task and performance on the metaphor task due to the fact that the children 
perform well on the vocabulary tasks. Furthermore, performance on the vocabulary 
tasks was factored into the GLINMIX analysis, there remained a main effect of age 
group (F(2,239)=11.26 p<.0001), which suggests that the differences between age 
groups, cannot be accounted for by performance on the vocabulary score. 
Furthermore, the analysis of differences between age groups reveals that the 
differences between 3 and 4 year olds’ (p= .0081) and 3 and 5 year olds’ (p<.0001) 





All three age groups performed above chance on the metaphor task, suggesting that 
children as young as 3 are able to interpret metaphors, provided the task and 
vocabulary used, as well as the pertinent world knowledge, are appropriate for this 
age group. This finding replicates that of Pouscoulous and Tomasello (2011), but with 
added strength, as this paradigm shows that children as young as 3 years old chose the 
correct picture 60% of the time, even with the interference of a conflicting literal 
interpretation of the metaphor/hyperbole vehicle (i.e. the children showed signs of 
being able to suppress the literal interpretation of the vehicle). 
Four year olds and five year olds performed significantly better on the metaphor task 
than three year olds. Five year-olds were at ceiling in the metaphor task, suggesting 
that they are highly competent at interpreting age appropriate metaphors. Although 
there is a slight improvement between the ages of 4 and 5, 4 year olds also show a 
high competence level on this task. This is a stark contrast with previous findings (See 
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Pouscoulous 2011 for overview, or Nippold 1988/1998 and Winner 1988/1997 for in-
depth review), which suggest that children of this age have little success at 
comprehending metaphor. 
As discussed in the preceding sections, there are a number of other factors that could 
have affected the 3 year olds’ ability to accurately interpret the metaphors. World 
knowledge is a factor which is unlikely to be at play in this data, as the naming and 
pointing task data confirms that 3 year olds were just as familiar with the vocabulary 
used in the experimental items, as the old two age groups, and performance on the 
vocabulary naming and pointing task and the metaphor and hyperbole picture 
selection tasks were not connected. Moreover, the metaphor and hyperbole items were 
designed such that they pertained to conceptual domains that are familiar to 3-year-
olds (confirmed by our pilot data).  
However, if Gibbs’ (1990; 1992) claims are accurate, and pre-existing conceptual 
mappings in long-term memory are used during metaphor comprehension, then the 
youngest children might be finding metaphor comprehension more difficult because 
of a lack of experience from which to construct mappings between the topic and 
vehicle categories (Person with wet, spiky hair – Hedgehog). However, the fact that 
the 5 year olds performed at ceiling is confirmation that the relevant mappings were 
not beyond the experience of pre-school children. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the picture selection task itself was not the cause 
of the difference between age groups. The 3-year-olds did not appear to have any 
more difficulty with the task than the 4-and-5-year-olds; concentration levels were 
high and no child was eliminated on the basis of answering more than 2 out of 7 
practice trials incorrectly.  
IC scores correlated closely with performance on the metaphor task. However, IC 
scores also correlated closely with age (illustrated by the fact that the difference 
between age groups was lost when the inhibition scores were added to the GLINMIX 
analysis as a covariate, and by the correlation analysis), which means that 3 year olds 
were significantly worse at the IC tasks than 4 and 5 year olds. This matches previous 
findings suggesting a marked improvement in IC at around the age of 4 (see Diamond 
& Taylor 1996; Frye et al 1995; Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond 1994; Jerger, Martin & 
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Pirozzolo 1988; Kochanska et al. 1996; Livesey & Morgan 1991; Reed, Pien & 
Rothbart 1984).  
While IC score correlated closely with age as well as performance on the metaphor 
task, it is not possible to infer that inhibition control capacity, rather than other age 
related factors, is responsible for performance on the metaphor task. Since we found 
the greatest amount of variability in 3 year olds’ IC scores, it would make sense to 
collect more data from children in this age range in order to separate IC score from 
age and further explore a potential correlation between IC capacity and metaphor 
comprehension capacity. This is one of the main aims of Experiment 2, reported 
below. 
Anecdotal evidence 
Some relevant comments recorded during testing (e.g. “Cars don't really have feet 
though do they?” (a 4 year-old); “That’s funny….we are calling her a hedgehog” (a 3 
year-old) suggest that (certainly in the case of these specific children) when the 
correct picture was chosen, the children were in fact interpreting the story 
figuratively, and not overextending the metaphor or hyperbole vehicles. Moreover, 
children frequently laughed when choosing the correct picture, which suggests that 
they were not only correctly interpreting the item figuratively, but that they were also 
appreciating the humorous nature of the stories, which would not be the case if the 
child believed the metaphor vehicle to be an appropriate label for the topic of the 
story (i.e. a ‘hedgehog’ to be an appropriate label for a girl with wet spiky hair). This 
evidence suggests that it may not be accurate to dismiss instances of apparent child 
metaphor comprehension as instances of overextension. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The data discussed above suggest that children as young as 3 years old can accurately 
interpret novel metaphors even when a literal interpretation of the metaphor vehicle is 
available, provided that the task and materials are age appropriate. This is in stark 
contrast with earlier findings, which suggest that children of this age are not able to 
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interpret language non-literally. However there is still substantial improvement in 
comprehension ability between 3 and 4 years old, and an improvement again between 
4 and 5 years old, with 5 year olds performing at ceiling, suggesting a developmental 
impact on cognitive processing. 
The correlation between metaphor comprehension capacities and IC needs to be 
further explored, and will be in Experiment 2 (see 4.3.2 below), in which an 
additional group of sixteen children aged between 3;1 and 3;11 will be tested using 
the same paradigm as in Experiment 1. By testing a group of children with a narrower 
age range, but with some variability in IC scores, we will be able to assess whether 
variability in performance on the metaphor task can be attributed to variability in 
performance on the IC tasks, irrespective of age.  
In addition, Experiment 2 will include a hyperbole task, which will allow us to 
directly contrast children’s ability to accurately interpret novel metaphors and 
hyperboles, in order to further explore the potential processing differences between 
metaphor and hyperbole suggested by our reading-time findings (see section 3.2). 
This is the first time metaphor and hyperbole will have been compared in a 
developmental study, using a paradigm of this kind. 
4.3.2 EXPERIMENT 2 
 
A new group of three year-old children were tested on their ability to accurately 
interpret novel, age appropriate metaphors and hyperboles. The same picture selection 
task and 6 metaphoric stories from Experiment 1 were used in this experiment. 
However, in addition, children were presented with a second picture selection task 
containing 6 novel hyperbolic stories. With trope as a within subject factor, we were 
able to directly contrast children’s ability to comprehend age appropriate novel 
metaphors and hyperboles. Any difference between children’s ability to interpret one 
trope over another would (a) not be predicted by the current theoretical accounts 
discussed in chapter 1, which either overtly propose, or suggest that metaphors and 
hyperboles are interpreted via the same pragmatic processes, and using the same 
cognitive mechanisms, and (b) would suggest that what we know about children’s 
understanding of metaphors cannot always be generalized to all non-literal language. 
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To my knowledge, there are no previous developmental studies that have investigated 
pre-school children’s understanding of novel hyperboles (without the presence of 
irony), and this is the first time metaphors and hyperboles have been directly 
contrasted using a paradigm of this kind. 
Again, children’s inhibition control capacities were also tested in order to further 
explore a potential relationship between children’s figurative language 
comprehension capacities and their inhibition control capacities. Finding a difference 
between children’s performance on the metaphor and hyperbole tasks with respect to 
the degree to which their performance can be predicted by their performance on the 
IC tasks would suggest that IC might be more critical during the interpretation of one 
trope (e.g. metaphor) than it is during the interpretation of the other (e.g. hyperbole), 
i.e. inhibitory mechanisms may be necessarily required during the interpretation of 
metaphors, whereas they may just be beneficial during the interpretation of 
hyperboles. If this were the case, children with poor IC would, of course, find 





A random opportunity sample of 18 monolingual, English speaking children aged 
between 3;1 and 3;11 years (6 boys and 12 girls, mean age 3;7) were recruited from  
three South-London nurseries. In addition, 10 adults aged between 21 and 57 made up 
a small adult control group. 
The age of the children was motivated by one of the sub-aims of this experiment; to 
further explore a possible correlation between metaphor comprehension capacity and 
IC capacity, by investigating whether IC score and performance on the metaphor 
comprehension task are correlated when there is no correlation between IC score and 
age. Three year-olds showed the greatest variability in IC scores of all three age-
groups in experiment 1, therefore, by testing just children in this narrow age range, we 
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had the best chance of properly investigating the relationship between IC capacity and 
metaphor comprehension, where age is not so much of a factor.  
Metaphor and hyperbole task materials 
As already mentioned, the metaphor task materials were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1. Again, all of the new hyperbole materials were constructed specifically 
for children aged as young as 3. Parents of 3 year-old children were consulted on their 
opinion of how well their child understood the relevant vocabulary. As with the 
metaphor items, nine hyperbole items were piloted on eleven 3 and 4 year-old 
children to a) ensure that children of this age had full command of the relevant 
vocabulary, and b) to determine whether the children were able to interpret the 
intended meanings. Based on the pilot results, 6 hyperbole items were chosen for the 
experiment.  
Again, based on previous findings in relation to the effects of context on children’s 
understanding of metaphor (Vosniadou et al. 1984; Reynolds and Wilson 1984), we 
endeavored to make the short stories which preceded the hyperbolic statements as 
brief as possible so as not to overload the child with information, while ensuring that 
the brief narrative within the stories still supported the intended hyperbolic 
interpretation. Furthermore, we ensured that the child could not choose the correct 
picture based on the context alone (i.e. there was nothing in the story, apart from the 
final hyperbolic statement, which would rule out either the literal or the control 
picture). 
Table 3. Metaphor and hyperbole experimental items 
 Stories 
Hyperbole 1 It’s Saturday, and Tom is playing outside in the rain. He is splashing in the lake 
outside of his house. Can you find the picture in which Tom is splashing in the lake 
outside his house? 
Hyperbole 2 This weekend, Jonny has been helping his mummy with the gardening. Now, the 
house is a forest. Can you find the picture in which the house is a forest? 
Hyperbole 3 It is Saturday, and Emma and her daddy are having a picnic. Emma is very thirsty; 
she is drinking a bucket of juice. Can you find the picture in which Emma is drinking 
a bucket of juice? 
Hyperbole 4 This weekend, Danny and his sister are playing in the living room. The sofa is a 
trampoline. Can you find the picture in which the sofa is a trampoline? 
Hyperbole 5 It is Sunday, and Charlotte is putting on her new shoes. Her shoelaces are so difficult; 
they are skipping ropes. Can you find the picture in which Charlotte’s shoelaces are 
skipping ropes? 
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Hyperbole 6 This weekend, Jane is playing in the garden with her daddy. Jane is flying through the 
air. Can you find the picture of Jane flying through the air? 
Metaphor 1 It’s Sunday afternoon, and Alex is playing outside in the fresh air. Today, Alex is a 
monkey. Can you find the picture in which Alex is a monkey? 
Metaphor 2 This weekend, Harry is going on holiday with his Daddy. Harry’s car has a backpack. 
Can you find the picture in which the car has a backpack? 
Metaphor 3 This weekend, Stephen is going on holiday in his car. They have had to stop because 
Stephen’s car has got a bad foot. Can you find the picture in which the car has a bad 
foot? 
Metaphor 4 It’s Saturday night, and Katy is playing with her toys before bed-time. Katy is a zebra 
playing with her toys.  Can you find the picture in which Katy is a zebra? 
Metaphor 5 This weekend, Emily is staying at her granny’s house. Emily has had a bath and now 
she is a hedgehog. Can you find the picture in which Emily is a hedgehog? 
Metaphor 6 It’s Saturday, and Archie is going to a party. Archie is ready to leave for the party and 
he has a bush on his head. Can you find the picture in which Archie has a bush on his 
head? 
Procedure 
Each child was presented with 5 tasks; a metaphor picture-selection task, a hyperbole 
picture-selection task, two inhibition control tasks (the same 2 tasks as were used in 
experiment 1), and a word naming and pointing task (to ascertain whether the child 
had a good grasp of the vocabulary necessary for both the metaphor and hyperbole 
picture selection tasks).  
We found that all of the children in our pilot group were capable of completing all 
five tasks in a row, and maintaining concentration on each task. 
 
The metaphor and hyperbole picture selection tasks 
In this experiment, each child was shown two picture books (a metaphor one, and a 
hyperbole one) containing some short stories. The metaphor picture book was exactly 
the same as that which was used in the first experiment, and exactly the same 
procedure was followed (see section 4.3.1). The hyperbole picture book contained the 
6 new hyperbolic stories, and the exact same procedure was followed as was followed 
for the metaphor picture book (see section 4.3.1).  Again, the children were read an 
introductory story on the first page of the picture book, about a class of children who 
are all friends at school. Then they were told that the rest of the picture book is about 
what each of the children in the class are doing at the weekend. The experimenter 
explained the following; “Let’s look at what each of the children are doing at the 
weekend!”, “Oh no, all the pictures have gone missing from the picture book, and 
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have become all jumbled up! If we read each of the stories, can you help me find the 
right picture to go with each story?” (pointing at a pile of jumbled up pictures). 
As in the metaphor picture book, after being read an introductory story about a class 
of children each doing something different at the weekend, the children were read a 
series of short stories, one at a time. Each story ended in a sentence that should be 
interpreted hyperbolically in the given context (e.g. This weekend, Jonny has been 
helping his mummy with the gardening. Now the house is a forest). Again, as with the 
metaphor picture book, there were 6 stories. 
Again, after each story, they were asked to select which picture from a selection of 3 
pictures (see materials and counterbalancing below), which were placed in front of 
them, they thought showed what was happening in the story. Again, there was a space 
for the child to stick the chosen picture below the story in the picture book. 
Again, it was ensured that the three pictures from which the child could choose were 
as similar as possible, but that they differed in just one respect. One picture depicted 
an accurate figurative interpretation of the story (e.g. a house full of plants), and the 
other two pictures depicted an inaccurate interpretation given the context.  
Figure.9 shows the correct, hyperbolic picture for the hyperbole item 2 ‘the house was 
a forest’. 
 
Figure. 9 Correct hyperbolic picture for the hyperbole item 2 ‘the house is a forest’ 
     
 A second ‘control’ picture depicted a nearly identical image to the first one, except 
for in this image, there was always nothing relating to the figurative interpretation, but 
	   276 
something else was depicted (e.g. lots of pictures on the wall), as illustrated in 
figure.10. 
Figure . 10 Control hyperbolic picture for the hyperbole item 2 ‘the house is a forest’ 
      
Finally, a third ‘literal conflicting’ image was again, almost exactly the same as the 
other two pictures, but this time, somewhere in the image, there was a conflicting 
literal interpretation of the metaphor vehicle (e.g. a forest in the background). See 
figure.11 below. 
Figure. 11 Conflicting literal picture for the hyperbole item 2 ‘the house is a forest’ 
    
As with the metaphor pictures, it was ensured that all three pictures were equally 
exciting, salient, colourful, and interesting for all items (i.e. that the one small 
difference between the three pictures did not cause one of the pictures to be more 
interesting to children than the others), as such differences may have skewed the 
results. This was verified during piloting. See appendix B for full list of materials. 
 
As with the metaphor picture book, before seeing the 6 experimental items, there were 
3 literal practice trials. In total, there were 6 practice trials, 3 at the beginning of each 
picture book. 
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Inhibition control tasks (Carlson and Moses (2001) 
The same two Inhibition Control tasks from experiment 1 (the grass/snow task and the 
bear/unicorn task) were used in this experiment (see section 4.3.1). 
Naming and pointing vocabulary task 
Again, at the end of testing, as in Pouscoulous and Tomasello (2011), the children 
were given a naming-and-pointing game with a picture book designed specifically for 
his experiment, to determine their comprehension and production of the vocabulary 
used in the metaphor and hyperbole tasks. The naming and pointing picture book was 
the same as that used in Experiment 1; however, additional pages were added to 
correspond to the new hyperbole items used in the hyperbole picture book. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this experiment, the picture book consisted of 24 pages: 12 for 
naming (6 corresponding to the 6 metaphor items, and 6 corresponding to the 6 
hyperbole items), and 12 for pointing (6 corresponding to the 6 metaphor items, and 6 
corresponding to the 6 hyperbole items). Again, the first 12 pages had four pictures on 
each page; one of the literal interpretation of the metaphor/hyperbole vehicle (e.g. a 
monkey or a lake), one of the figurative interpretation of the story (e.g. a little boy 
hanging from a tree or a little boy splashing in a puddle), one of an unrelated object 
or event (e.g. a shoe or a house), and one of an unknown object. For each of the 
objects on these first 12 pages, the child was asked “what is this?” and the child was 
expected to produce a label for the object. Pages 13-24 had three pictures on each 
page; one of the literal interpretation of the metaphor or hyperbole vehicle (a different 
image from that used in the naming section of the picture book); one of the figurative 
interpretation of the story (again, a different image from that used in the naming 
section), and finally, an unrelated object or event. For each of the objects on these 
pages (13-24), the child was asked “can you point to the [        ]?”, and the child was 
expected to point to the correct object. 
It was ensured that the whole procedure took no longer than 20 minutes per child, and 
on average it took between 15 and 20 minutes per child. Small play breaks were taken 
if a particular child became tired or distracted, but generally, the tasks were delivered 
quickly in order to hold the child’s attention. 
 
	   278 
Counterbalancing 
Whether the child saw the metaphor or hyperbole pictures first, was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
The stories within each (metaphor or hyperbole) picture book were presented in a 
random order for each participant. Random orders were generated using 
‘Random.org’. In addition, as in Experiment 1, the position of the three pictures was 
counterbalanced (between right, left and middle) across participants using a Latin 
square. This means that there were 6 lists for picture position (c= control, l = 
conflicting literal picture, f= correct figurative picture) (see table 2, section 4.3.1). 
Again, the grass/snow tasks and bear/unicorn tasks were in a fixed order – each child 
saw the grass/snow task first, followed by the bear/unicorn task. 
 
The IC tasks were always presented in between the two (hyperbole and metaphor) 




As in experiment 1, children’s responses to all 5 tasks were hand recorded by a 
second experimenter (which varied from child to child as there were 10 ‘second 
experimenters’ in total) present in the room. Again, wherever possible (i.e. with 
parental consent), sessions were recorded using a small video camera. Again, in order 
to ensure that there were no inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the coding, all video 
recordings were watched back and coded again by a third party (who knew nothing 
about the purpose of the experiment). Zero inconsistencies were detected. 
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RESULTS 
Adult control group 
The adult control group chose the correct picture 100% of the time in both the 
metaphor and hyperbole tasks. Due to a ceiling effect in the adult control group in 
Experiment 1, for the purposes of this experiment, the adult control group were not 
tested on the IC tasks. 
Initial analysis of child data 
Data corresponding to two children were excluded on the pre-determined basis of 
answering more than 2 out of 6 practice trials incorrectly. The mean percentages of 
correct answers for the two tropes (metaphors and hyperboles) were 64% and 77% 
respectively (both significantly above chance (p<.0001).  
Analysis of variance in performance between tropes was analysed using a General 
Linear Mixed Model analysis (GLINMIX) in SAS, with trope as a fixed effect, and 
subject as a random effect. A main effect of trope (F (1,175)=4.27 p=.04) indicated a 
significant difference between performance on the metaphor and hyperbole tasks. 
Figure.12 Mean accuracy scores for each picture-selection task 
  1= Metaphor     2= Hyperbole	  
Analysis of difference, adjusted for multiple comparisons (Sidak), between 
performance on the metaphor and hyperbole tasks, reveals that there is a significant 
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Breakdown of incorrect choices 
28.5% of incorrect answers in the metaphor task and 27.2% in the hyperbole task 
were cases in which the child chose the control picture, rather than the picture 
depicting the literal interpretation of the vehicle.  
Pairwise comparisons reveal that there was not a significant difference between the 
metaphor and hyperbole conditions with respect to the percentage of incorrect choices 
which were instances in which the child chose the control picture.  
With inhibition control as a covariate 
The scatter plot in figure.13 suggests that, as expected due to the narrow age range of 
the children, there is no correlation between age (in months) and IC score. 




Indeed, a correlation analysis (Kendall’s Tau) confirms that age and inhibition control 
scores are not positively correlated (r=.277 , N=18, p=.266). 
The scatter plot below (figure 14) suggests that there is a correlation between 
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Indeed, a correlation analysis (Kendall’s Tau) reveals that there is a strong positive 
correlation between inhibition control score and performance on the metaphor task 
(r=.622, N=16,p=.002).  
The scatter plot below (figure 15) suggests that there is less of a correlation between 
IC score and performance on the hyperbole task. 
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Indeed, a correlation analysis (Kendall’s Tau) reveals that there is not a significant 
correlation between inhibition control score and performance on the hyperbole task 
(r=.363, N=16, p<.084).  
Furthermore, with performance on the inhibition control task factored into the 
GLINMIX analysis as a covariate, there was a main effect of inhibition (F(1,175)= 
15.30 P<.0001), again, suggesting that performance on the inhibition control task was 
a predictor of performance on the two trope tasks, when both trope tasks are taken 
together. However, the main effect of trope remains (F (1,175)= 4.53 p=0.03), which 
suggests that the difference between children’s performance on the two trope tasks 
cannot be entirely attributed to their inhibition control capacity. There is likely to be 
some other factor(s) contributing to children’s differing performances on the 
metaphor and hyperbole tasks. 
Indeed, analysis of differences between tropes, adjusted for multiple comparisons 
(Sidak), with inhibition scores factored in as a covariate, reveal that the significant 
difference between children’s performance on the metaphor and hyperbole tasks 
remains (p=.03), which again, confirms that the trope effect cannot be entirely 
attributed to the tropes differing relationship with IC capacity. 
With vocabulary as a covariate 
With vocabulary scores factored into the GLINMIX analysis as a covariate, there was 
no main effect of vocabulary production (1,163)=0.41 p=.52) or vocabulary 
comprehension F(1,174)=2.90 p=.09), suggesting that there was little connection 
between performance on the vocabulary task and performance on the metaphor task. 
There was still a main effect of age group (F(1,174)=5.23 p=.02), which suggests that 
the differences between age groups, cannot be accounted for by performance on the 
vocabulary score. 
Furthermore, the analysis of differences between tropes reveals that the difference 
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DISCUSSION 
Metaphor task 
As in Experiment 1, the children performed above chance on the metaphor task, 
suggesting that children as young as 3 years old are able to interpret novel metaphors, 
provided the task and vocabulary used, as well as the world knowledge pertained to, 
are appropriate for this age group. As already discussed in Experiment 1, this finding 
replicates that of Pouscoulous and Tomasello (2011), but with added strength, as this 
paradigm shows that children as young as 3 years old chose the correct picture 64% of 
the time, even with the interference of a conflicting literal interpretation of the 
metaphor vehicle (i.e. the children showed signs of being able to suppress the literal 
interpretation of the vehicle). Again, it is important to reiterate that this is a stark 
contrast with previous findings suggesting that children of this age have little success 
at comprehending metaphor (See Pouscoulous 2011 for overview, or Nippold 
1988/1998 and Winner 1988/1997 for in-depth review) . 
Correlation between Inhibition Control and metaphor comprehension 
As expected, due to the narrow age range of the participants, IC scores did not 
correlate with age, but IC score and performance on the metaphor task were strongly 
correlated. This suggests, that IC capacity, at least in part, can explain the variability 
in children’s performance on the metaphor task. 
This suggests that our attention and regulation mechanisms (executive functions) are 
employed during metaphor comprehension, which is in line with previous findings 
(see section 2.1.4).  As we know that these mechanisms are responsible for 
suppressing irrelevant and/or conflicting information during processing, our findings 
tentatively suggest that metaphor interpretation involves active suppression.  
Hyperbole task 
As with the metaphor task, children performed above chance on the hyperbole task. In 
fact, they performed significantly better on the hyperbole task, than they did on the 
metaphor task. This indicates that some feature of metaphor comprehension makes it 
more difficult than hyperbole comprehension for children this age.  Our findings 
suggest that children may find hyperbole comprehension slightly easier than metaphor 
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comprehension because their ability to accurately interpret hyperbolic statements is 
not dependent on their IC capacity (which our data indicate is somewhat 
underdeveloped) in the same way as their ability to accurately interpret metaphoric 
statements is (see below). 
Relationship between Inhibition Control and hyperbole comprehension 
A correlation analysis revealed that IC score and performance on the hyperbole task 
were not significantly correlated as IC score and performance on the metaphor task 
were. Therefore, it cannot be claimed, based on our findings, that a child’s ability to 
accurately interpret hyperbolic statements is dependent on their inhibition control 
capacity in the same way a child’s ability to interpret metaphoric statements is. 
This is not expected given the fact that our word-naming data suggest that lexically 
encoded content becomes deactivated during novel hyperbole comprehension, just as 
it does during novel metaphor comprehension. If this deactivation is the result of 
active suppression, then we would expect those cognitive mechanisms responsible for 
active suppression (i.e. IC mechanisms) to be equally active during novel hyperbole 
and metaphor comprehension, which does not appear to be the case. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that suppression is necessary during metaphor 
comprehension (possibly because many features associated with the lexically encoded 
vehicle concept are in direct conflict with a metaphoric interpretation), but just 
optional and beneficial during hyperbole comprehension (where features associated 
with the lexically encoded vehicle concept may be irrelevant, but not inconsistent 
with a hyperbolic interpretation). Thus, children with poor IC can still get by at 
interpreting novel hyperboles (even though they will likely be slower than adults who 
have at their disposal, good IC capacities), whereas they struggle with novel metaphor 
interpretation. 
However, the GLINMIX analysis with inhibition factored in as a covariate 
highlighted that performance on the inhibition control task was not the only factor 
contributing to the difference between children’s performance on the two trope tasks. 
The analysis suggests that there is some other unmeasured factor(s) also contributing 
to the difference. 
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It is important to note that there were only 6 items for each trope. It could be argued 
that the difference between children’s performance on the metaphor and hyperbole 
tasks had nothing to do with trope, but rather with these specific hyperbole items 
being easier for the children than the specific metaphor items used. This is a possible 
explanation. However, I would argue that it is an unlikely one. Indeed, there is 
nothing obviously simpler in the hyperbolical material compared to the metaphorical 
one, and both sets of materials were constructed using the same constraints. 
Anecdotal evidence 
As in Experiment 1, some relevant comments recorded during testing on the 
hyperbole task (“It’s not really a lake though is it, it’s a puddle”, “They are calling the 
sofa a trampoline because they’re jumping on it”) suggest that (certainly in the case of 
these specific children) when the correct picture was chosen, the children were in fact 
interpreting the story figuratively, and not overextending the hyperbole vehicles.  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The data from Experiment 2 confirm that children as young as 3 years old can 
accurately interpret novel metaphors. In addition, they indicate that 3 year-old 
children are even better at accurately interpreting novel hyperboles. Provided that the 
task and materials are age appropriate, children are able to ignore the available, literal 
interpretation of the metaphor or hyperbole vehicle, and arrive at an accurate 
figurative interpretation of the statements.  
Again, it is important to emphasize that our metaphor findings are in line with 
Pouscoulous and Tomasello’s (2011) act-out task findings, which were suggestive of 
3 year-old children’s capacity to interpret metaphoric statements, provided that they 
are age appropriate, but our findings contrast with earlier findings, which suggest that 
children of this age are not able to interpret language non-literally. Moreover, this is 
the first time metaphor and hyperbole comprehension have been compared in a 
developmental study, using a paradigm of this kind. Finding a significant difference 
between children’s ability to understand metaphors and hyperboles is important, not 
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just because it raises questions for theoretical accounts of figurative language 
comprehension that posit the same comprehension processes and mechanisms for 
both tropes, but also because it draws into question the common practice of treating 
metaphor as representative of all non-literal language. Our findings suggest that it 
may not always be appropriate to generalize from what we know or learn about 
children’s abilities with respect to metaphor comprehension, to children’s abilities 
with respect to hyperbole comprehension, or other tropes, just as our reading-time 
findings suggested that it is not always appropriate to generalize from empirical 
findings relating to metaphor processing to hyperbole processing. 
In fact, our findings suggest that children’s ability to accurately interpret novel 
metaphors is dependent on their IC capacities, whereas children appear to be able to 
arrive at accurate interpretations of hyperbolic statements despite having poor IC, 
which suggests that cognitive mechanisms (i.e. IC mechanisms) which are necessary 
for metaphor interpretation might not be as critical when interpreting other tropes 
such as hyperbole. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our findings from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that children as young as 3 years old 
have the pragmatic capabilities to interpret language non-literally, provided other age 
related factors are controlled for (e.g. world knowledge, task difficulty, vocabulary), 
but that underdeveloped cognitive capacities such as inhibition control appear to, at 
least in part, contribute to 3 year-old children’s less than perfect metaphor 
comprehension capacities. A substantial improvement in metaphor comprehension 
ability between 3 and 4 years old at the same time as we see a rapid improvement in 
inhibition control capacity is suggestive of a developmental impact on cognitive 
processing. 
Our developmental finding of a positive relationship between Inhibition Control and 
metaphor comprehension sits alongside other findings from studies that have 
investigated this correlation in other neuro-typical and atypical adult populations 
(Pierce, Mclaren and Chiappe 2010; Monetta and Pell 2007; Gold and Faust 2010; 
Papagno, Lucchelli, Muggia, and Rizzo’s 2003; Amanzio et al. 2007). Yet, this is, to 
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my knowledge, the first time this relationship has been observed in a child population. 
As our IC capacities are known to be responsible for attention and suppression 
(Eslinger 1996; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997), these developmental findings 
provide further, tentative support for the hypothesis that active suppression takes 
place during metaphor comprehension, as is tentatively suggested by ours (see chapter 
3) and others’ previous findings (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and Werner 1995; 
1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 2005; 2007; Gold, 
Faust and Goldstein 2010; Papagno et al. 2003; Peirce, Maclaren and Chiappe 2010) . 
However, our findings indicate that IC capacity is significantly less predictive of 
hyperbole comprehension capacity than it is of metaphor comprehension capacity, 
which is unexpected given our word-naming data, suggesting that irrelevant, lexically 
encoded content becomes equally deactivated after having arrived at a hyperbolic 
interpretation, as it does after arriving at a metaphoric interpretation. If that 
deactivation is the result of active suppression, then we would expect the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for suppression to be equally involved during hyperbole 
comprehension and metaphor comprehension. 
One explanation is that, where metaphor comprehension generally, necessarily 
requires the suppression of irrelevant, literally encoded content, as it is in direct 
conflict with arriving at an accurate figurative interpretation, hyperbole 
comprehension may just benefit from it. In other words, if one is adept at inhibiting 
irrelevant information (as neuro-typical adults are), then it seems likely that this skill 
would be automatically utilized wherever it might speed up processing, even if it is 
not absolutely necessary for the task at hand (e.g. during hyperbole comprehension). 
This would explain why our word-naming findings (see chapter 3) indicate that 
irrelevant, lexically encoded content becomes equally deactivated during adult 
processing of metaphors and hyperboles, while our developmental findings suggest 
that young children with underdeveloped inhibition control capacities struggle more 
with metaphor comprehension, where suppression might be necessary, than they do 
with hyperbole comprehension, where it might not be. 
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CONCLUSION 	  
 
The aims of this thesis were to explore what would be an adequate processing model 
of figurative language, as well as an accurate developmental trajectory for figurative 
language comprehension capacities, and to examine how various theoretical 
explanations of figurative language measure up to the experimental evidence. In this 
conclusion I will first run through the main experimental findings discussed in 
Chapter 3, and then consider how they bear on the theoretical debate reviewed in the 
first chapter. 
Summary of adult experimental findings 
We found that metaphors took significantly longer to read than comparable 
hyperboles and literal statements, suggesting that metaphors require additional 
processing effort than hyperboles and literal statements, either at the level of 
accessing and processing the linguistic representation via the lexicon, or further down 
the line, in deriving inferences.  
Furthermore, we found that the derivation of metaphoric and hyperbolic 
interpretations completely dampens priming of the lexically encoded vehicle concept, 
which is tentatively suggestive of suppression taking place during the processing of 
both metaphoric and hyperbolic statements. This finding is backed up by our eye-
tracking findings which suggest that early processing (the stage of accessing and 
processing the encoded content) of a target sentence is the same in a metaphoric and 
hyperbolic context; first-pass fixations on vehicles/target words (e.g. it was noxious) 
were significantly longer when preceded by a metaphor or hyperbole biasing context, 
than when preceded by a literal biasing context.  
Summary of the theoretical implications of our adult experimental findings 
Before summarizing the consequences of the experimental results for the theories 
discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, I would like to point out that generally 
speaking, pragmatic theories yield very few precise predictions about processing. This 
is also true of theories that purport to offer cognitive accounts, such as those discussed 
in the latter half of chapter 1. The testable predictions they deliver are confined to a 
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few, rather specific aspects of pragmatic processing. Furthermore, it is very difficult 
to compare different theoretical approaches on the basis of experimental evidence 
alone, either because they make predictions about different aspects of processing or 
because their predictions aren’t sufficiently different. It has been argued that no single 
study can rule in favour of or against a theoretical account (see Bezuidenhout and 
Morris 2004, and Noveck, 2001). Still, converging evidence from several studies may 
narrow down the theoretical options. 
Lexically encoded meanings become deactivated during metaphor and hyperbole 
comprehension 
Our finding of the deactivation of the ‘literal’ meaning during novel metaphor 
comprehension is consistent with the processing models posited by the Relevance 
Theoretic account, the Class-inclusion account, and the Structure-Mapping account, 
but difficult for the Graded Salience Hypothesis to explain, as it states that the literal 
meaning is not discarded during the comprehension of novel metaphors. 
Metaphoric statements take significantly longer to read than hyperbolic statements, 
which are read and understood as quickly as literal statements 
Our reading-time findings are not inconsistent with the broad outline of the unified 
Relevance Theoretic account, or any of the other accounts that suggest or entail that 
metaphor and hyperbole are processed in the same way. Our word naming findings 
suggest that the cause of the reading-time difference between metaphors and 
hyperboles lies outside of the lexical access and activation regulation processes 
posited by these accounts. However, the onus is on each of these accounts to explain 
what other factors, consistent with the processing models they posit, might be 
contributing to the reading-time difference between metaphors and hyperboles. 
I have argued that there are potentially two factors which could be contributing to this 
reading-time difference between metaphors on the one hand, and hyperboles and 
literal statements on the other; (1) the fact that the topic and vehicle concepts in 
metaphors are less semantically related than those in hyperboles and literal 
statements, and (2) metaphoric interpretations may be richer/more complex (yield 
more implicatures) than hyperbolic and literal interpretations.  
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The first of the contributing factors that I argue for can be accounted for by the 
Relevance Theoretic account, the Class-inclusion account, and the Graded Salience 
Hypothesis, as all of these accounts entail that the semantic relatedness of a topic and 
vehicle pairing will affect processing. The Structure-Mapping account on the other 
hand, does not readily explain the reading-time difference between metaphors and 
hyperboles. To do so, it might require some critical adaptations.  
The second of the contributing factors that I argue for is motivated by the Relevance 
Theoretic framework, and as such, is not readily explainable by the other accounts, 
which a) do not discuss implicitly communicated content or its derivation and b) do 
not posit processing accounts in which a hearer is driven to satisfy their expectation of 
‘relevance’ by deriving implicatures.	  	  
Since the empirical evidence from Experiment 1 is consistent with all of the current 
accounts discussed in this thesis, but the findings from Experiment 3 discredits the 
Graded Salience Hypothesis, on the basis of the data alone we are left with three 
viable accounts: The class-inclusion account, the Relevance theoretic accounts, and 
the Structure-Mapping account. All are, on the whole, compatible with the data 
discussed in this work. 
The concept construction accounts on the one hand, and the Structure-Mapping 
account on the other, fall on either side of the comparison/categorization debate, and 
in this respect the two camps are experimentally distinguishable. As I concluded at 
the end of Chapter 2, the evidence exclusively in support of the two concept 
construction category assertion accounts (Relevance Theory and Class-inclusion) 
appears more robust than that put forward as evidence exclusively in support of the 
Structure-Mapping account (see Chapter 2 for full discussion). Unfortunately, by and 
large the two concept construction accounts are indistinguishable experimentally; i.e., 
given the state of the art, empirical facts compatible with one are likely to be 
compatible with the other.  
This being said, Relevance Theory provides a unified account of non-literal language, 
which explicitly predicts our findings indicating that metaphor and hyperbole are 
processed via the same processes and mechanisms, whereas the Class-inclusion 
account is posited as an account of metaphor alone. Moreover, Relevance theory 
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provides an account of figurative language interpretation which is embedded within a 
wider account of communication, and even more generally, human cognition. As 
such, it provides a justification of why processing might go the way it proposes. If 
human cognition is driven by the search for relevance, then communication will be 
driven by the search for relevance, and a hearer’s interpretation will be the optimally 
relevant one, not the most literal one. As a psychological account of metaphor 
processing alone, the Class-inclusion account lacks this dimension. 
Developmental experimental findings 
Our findings from our developmental Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that children as 
young as 3 years old have the pragmatic capabilities to interpret language non-
literally, provided other age related factors are controlled for (e.g. world knowledge, 
task difficulty, vocabulary), but that underdeveloped cognitive capacities such as 
inhibition control appear to, at least in part, contribute to 3 year-old children’s less 
than perfect metaphor comprehension capacities. A substantial improvement in 
metaphor comprehension ability between 3 and 4 years old at the same time as we see 
a rapid improvement in inhibition control capacity is suggestive of a developmental 
impact on cognitive processing. 
Implications of our developmental experimental findings 
Our finding of a positive relationship between Inhibition Control and metaphor 
comprehension sits alongside other findings from studies that have investigated this 
correlation in other neuro-typical and atypical adult populations (Pierce, Mclaren and 
Chiappe 2010; Monetta and Pell 2007; Gold and Faust 2010; Papagno, Lucchelli, 
Muggia, and Rizzo’s 2003; Amanzio et al. 2007). Yet, to my knowledge, this is the 
first time this relationship have been observed in a child population. 
As our IC capacities are known to be responsible for attention and suppression 
(Eslinger 1996; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997), these developmental findings 
provide further, tentative support for the hypothesis that active suppression takes 
place during metaphor comprehension, as is tentatively suggested by ours (see 
Chapter 3) and others’ previous findings (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson and 
Werner 1995; 1997; 2001; McGlone and Manfredi 2001; Rubio-Fernandez 2004; 
2005; 2007; Gold, Faust and Goldstein 2010; Papagno et al. 2003; Peirce, Maclaren 
	   292 
and Chiappe 2010) . 
However, our findings indicate that IC capacity is significantly less predictive of 
hyperbole comprehension capacity than it is of metaphor comprehension capacity, 
which is unexpected given our word-naming data, which suggest that irrelevant, 
lexically encoded content becomes equally deactivated after having arrived at a 
hyperbolic interpretation, as it does after arriving at a metaphoric interpretation. If 
that deactivation is the result of active suppression, then we would expect the 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for suppression to be equally involved during 
hyperbole comprehension and metaphor comprehension. 
One explanation is that, where metaphor comprehension generally, necessarily 
requires the suppression of irrelevant, literally encoded content, as it is in direct 
conflict with arriving at an accurate figurative interpretation, hyperbole 
comprehension may just benefit from it. In other words, if one is adept at inhibiting 
irrelevant information (as neuro-typical adults are), then it seems likely that this skill 
would be automatically utilized wherever it might speed up processing, even if it is 
not absolutely necessary for the task at hand (e.g. during hyperbole comprehension). 
This would explain why our word-naming findings suggest that irrelevant, lexically 
encoded content becomes equally deactivated during adult processing of metaphors 
and hyperboles, while our developmental findings suggest that young children with 
underdeveloped inhibition control capacities struggle more with metaphor 
comprehension, where suppression might be necessary, than they do with hyperbole 
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Endnotes 
iAccording to Recanati (2004), rather than properties or features, a concept has certain ‘conditions of 
application’ associated with it. Therefore, concept narrowing would consist in restricting the denotation 
of a concept by contextually providing further conditions that are not linguistically encoded. Concept 
loosening would be the opposite process: some condition of application associated with the lexically 
encoded concept is contextually dropped so that the extension of the concept is widened (Recanati 
2004). Despite the clear similarities between the accounts, there are some major theoretical differences 
between Recanati’s and the relevance theoretic account. 
Recanati (1995; 2001; 2004) claims that there are two types of pragmatic process; primary pragmatic 
processes, and secondary pragmatic processes. According to Recanati (2004), narrowing and loosening 
are ‘primary pragmatic processes’. This type of pragmatic process is characterized in the following 
ways: 
a) By being pre-propositional (i.e. such processes do not require that a proposition has been 
identified already). 
b) By being unconscious (i.e. hearers are not aware of the processes taking place). 
c) By being purely associative (i.e. they operate in a blind mechanical fashion that does not 
involve inferential processing) (Recanati 2004).  
According to Relevance theorists all pragmatic processes are inferential rather than some (primary, pre-
propositional ones) being merely associative (i.e. the input and output of pragmatic processes are like 
premises and conclusions in an argument), and all are constrained by considerations of relevance (i.e. 
they tend to maximize cognitive effects while minimizing processing effort).  
However, for Recanati, accessibility guides lexical interpretation (and other primary pragmatic 
processes), rather than relevance: according to Recanati, when processing a word, its literal 
interpretation is accessed first, which then triggers the activation of associatively related 
representations (Recanati 2004). Both the literal concept activated by the linguistic expression and 
some of the other representations activated by association are possible candidates for the concept that 
will be selected to constitute part of the proposition expressed. Although these associated candidates 
are considered after the literal concept, they are all processed in parallel and compete for activation. 
The representation that is most active or accessible when the interpretation process stabilizes will be 
selected together with the other components to make up the proposition expressed, while all other 
candidates for the meaning of the word (i.e. the lexically encoded one) are suppressed (Recanati 1995, 
2004). 
As with the Relevance theoretic account, according to Recanati (2004), a global literal interpretation 
does not necessarily precede figurative interpretation (as is suggested by Grice 1975, 1989). However, 
as both accounts propose that literalness exists at the local lexical level, the literal interpretation of the 
constituents of a metaphorical expression is accessed before the figurative interpretation of the 
utterance is derived (Wilson and Carston 2007; Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson 2002).  
It is clear that, with respect to the testable predictions that are relevant to this thesis, Recanati’s and the 
relevance theoretic account are indistinguishable: both propose that a default literal interpretation of an 
utterance need not be arrived at before an alternative, metaphoric interpretation can be arrived at, both 
accounts describe narrowing and loosening in terms of property promotion and demotion, which could 
be understood in terms of degree of activation of the properties in question i.e. metaphor irrelevant 
features associated with the encoded concept should be less activated than metaphor relevant features 
(Rubio 2005), and both provide a unified account of all instances in which a narrower or broader 
meaning is conveyed than that which is lexically encoded. 
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APPENDICES: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS AND PRE-TESTING 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
A. Experiment 1 : Reading time experiment 
 
1.   Pretesting questionnaires 
 
Questionnaire 1 (one of three counterbalanced versions) 
 
This is a questionnaire about how you understand sentences. You will be asked to read a series of 
sentences presented in pairs. You will then be asked whether you interpreted the second sentence 
metaphorically, hyperbolically, or literally. 
 
1. Jane’s mind was very complex.    
2. It was a novel, which was very long. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? (When 
something is hyperbolic, the meaning is exaggerated. For example; you might say that your cup of tea 
is ‘boiling’ when it is not quite boiling but just too hot.) 
 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. The beautiful sunflower was so impressive.            
2. It was a tree, which stood strong. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Sam and Mark went for a walk in a national park.   
2. It was a forest, with winding paths. 
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Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1.  The cleaner he was using was a new brand.   
2. It was noxious, and disgusting. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
    1. I really don’t like that music band.     
    2. It is mouldy, and I hate it. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Strong acid must not touch your face.   
2. It is blinding, and dangerous. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
      1. Working on an oil rig can have medical repercussions.  
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Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. They had developed the land next to the church.   
2. It was a cemetery now. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1.   The interview had been really hard.         
2.  It had been an assault of the worst kind. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
      1. He left and took all his love with him.   
      2. He was a thief, nothing less. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
     1. The little baby was always breaking things.   
     2. He was a terrorist of the worst kind. 
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Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. The car parked outside my house was in a state.   
2.  It had been vandalised very badly. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. He is extremely healthy and very supple.   
2. An athlete, in fact. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. My dad once clipped me round the ear, but I got him back.        
2. It was a really good boxing match that day.  
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. It is great when my two kids perform for me.  
2. I’ve got my own orchestra playing in here. 
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Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I feel tired of my thoughts. My mind is exhausting.  
2. It is a long dark corridor in there. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I will tell you what the best way to make a gammon is.   
2. It is poached in hot water. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. The easiest way to get there is on that new route .   
2. It is a motorway along there. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I’m always carrying you around everywhere in my arms.   
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Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. Here is your new snorkel. Put it in and get used to it.  
2. Give it a good chew before we go ahead. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. The car hit the bird so hard. It was found 20 metres away.  
2. It was catapulted up high. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. They have found out who did all of those brutal murders.        
2. It was a monster; a really big one. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I won’t be able to keep running. My knee is too bad.           
2. It is smashed, beyond repair. 
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Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. Mum, these spots on my face are ruining everything.    
2. They could be fatal, in fact. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. My family have come to be so much like each other.   
2. It is a big mirror, now. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. My husband is always hanging around me. He is too clingy.  
2. He is a backpack, a heavy one as well. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Although it isn’t well paid. I am happy with my first job.   
2. It is scaffolding to get higher up. 
 
Would you interpret the SECOND sentence literally, hyperbolically or metaphorically? 
On a scale of 1-7, how well did the SECOND sentence relate to the rest of the passage? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Please try and give a brief definition of the following words: 
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Scaffolding: 
2) For each of the words below, can you name up to 5 associated words, which immediately come to 
mind. 
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2. Practice trial target and context sentences 
 
 Context sentence Target sentence Comprehension statement 
Alice likes to walk to the shops every morning to get 
some milk and the newspaper; 
it is her routine these 
days. 
Having a routine keeps you 
organized. 
My daughter loves to dance around the kitchen 
listening to her favourite music;  
it is a joy to watch her.  
Becky was so good at swimming and moving through 
the water;  
she was a fish I would 
say. 
Fish live in water 
Tom smelt so bad because he didn’t wash often 
enough;  
he was a skunk, most 
people thought. 
 
It was almost impossible to eat those cakes you made 
yesterday;  
they were concrete in 
your mouth. 
Concrete is hard 
I can hardly move after that race today;  I am dead now.  
 
 
3. Experimental target and context sentences 
 
 Context sentence Target sentence Comprehension statement 
Metaphor Sam always got lost because the 
university was enormous;  
it was a forest with 
winding paths. 
 The university was big and 
confusing. 
Hyperbole The back yard definitely needed 
pruning;  
it was a forest with 
winding paths. 
The back yard had become 
overgrown. 
Literal Sam and Mark went to a 
national park for the weekend;  
it was a forest with 
winding paths. 
There are lots of trees in the 
national park. 
Metaphor The politician’s style of politics 
was typical; it was noxious and 
disgusting. 
it was noxious and 
disgusting. 
He was not a fair and honest 
politician. 
Hyperbole I had to drink earl grey and I 
hated it;  
it was noxious and 
disgusting. 
The tea tasted bad. 
Literal The varnish he was using was a 
new brand;  
it was noxious and 
disgusting. 
The varnish smelt bad. 
Metaphor I really don’t like that music 
band;  
it is mouldy and I 
hate it. 
She thought the music band 
was out of date and bad. 
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Hyperbole I don’t want to wear last year’s 
dress;  
it is mouldy and I 
hate it. 
Her dress was out of date and 
unfashionable. 
Literal I am cleaning the bathroom 
window sill;  
it is mouldy and I 
hate it. 
The bathroom windowsill is 
damp and dirty. 
Metaphor The new novel by that young 
writer is so radical;  
it is blinding and 
dangerous. 
The new novel is different to 
most novels around today. 
Hyperbole My new lamp is so powerful;  it is blinding and 
dangerous. 
The light  is far too bright. 
Literal Strong acid must not touch your 
face; 
it is blinding and 
dangerous. 
Acid can cause permanent loss 
of sight. 
Metaphor Her big house was not a home 
anymore; 
it was a cemetery 
now. 
Her house felt sad and empty. 
Hyperbole They had said goodbye to so 
many pets in the garden;  
it was a cemetery 
now. 
There were lots of animals 
buried in the garden. 
Literal They had developed the land 
next to the church;  
it was a cemetery 
now. 
The land next to the church 
was used for burying people. 
 
Metaphor The interview had been really 
hard;  
it was an assault of 
the worst kind. 
He wasn’t physically wounded 
in the interview. 
Hyperbole Her brother pushed past her to 
get more cake;  
it was an assault of 
the worst kind. 
Her brother didn’t intend to 
attack her. 
Literal He had been involved in a 
crime;  
it was an assault of 
the worst kind. 
The crime he was  involved in 
was a violent crime 
8Metaphor He came in here and broke all 
my dreams;  
he was a terrorist 
of the worst kind. 
 
Hyperbole The little baby was always 
breaking things;  
he was a terrorist 
of the worst kind. 
 
Literal The man who targeted the office 
block did an awful thing;  
he was a terrorist 
of the worst kind. 
 
Metaphor Having an argument affected my 
mood;  




Hyperbole Someone had put a sticker on 
my new school bag;  
it had been 
vandalised very 
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badly. 
Literal The car parked outside my 
house was in a mess;  




Metaphor My car is very nimble and 
efficient;  
it is an athlete in 
fact. 
 
Hyperbole Look, he is such a good worker, 
doing all that ironing;  
he is an athlete in 
fact. 
 
Literal The champion is extremely 
powerful and supple;  
he is an athlete in 
fact. 
 
Metaphor I am so hungry that my belly is 
making so much noise;  




Hyperbole It is great when my two kids 
perform for me;  




Literal I wanted to throw a party which 
would make a statement;  




Metaphor I am so tired of worrying, my 
mind has become empty;  
it is a long dark 
corridor in there. 
 
Hyperbole The living room is 
claustrophobic and depressing;  
it is a long dark 
corridor in there. 
 
Literal When you enter the main block, 
follow the signs;  
it is a long dark 
corridor in there. 
 
Metaphor I can’t think because my brain 
isn’t working anymore;  
it is poached in hot 
water. 
 
Hyperbole I have been in the bath too long 
and my toe is wrinkly;  
it is poached in hot 
water. 
 
Literal I will tell you what the best way 
to make a gammon is;  
it is poached in hot 
water. 
 
Metaphor I seem to always be carrying 
you around everywhere in my 
arms today;  
I am your taxi 
today. 
 
Hyperbole I have been giving you a lift 
everywhere today;  
I am your taxi 
today. 
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Literal Hello, are you the man who 
ordered a lift to the airport?   
I am your taxi 
today. 
 
8Metaphor Our new flat had a big silver 
double fridge;  
it was a monster; a 
huge one. 
The fridge was much bigger 
than average. 
Hyperbole They found out which dog it was 
that attacked the child; It was a 
monster; a huge one. 
it was a monster; a 
huge one. 
The dog was ferocious and 
vicious. 
Literal The adventure storybook had 
one main character;  
it was a monster; a 
huge one. 
The character in the storybook 
was a big monster. 
Metaphor I can’t take anymore, my 
confidence has gone;  
it is smashed 
beyond repair. 
Her confidence has been 
damaged. 
Hyperbole I won’t be able to keep running 
because my knee is too bad;  
it is smashed 
beyond repair. 
Her knee is injured. 
Literal It was a shame that I knocked 
the jug off the table;  
it is smashed 
beyond repair. 
The jug is broken into pieces. 
Metaphor Easter eggs could tempt me 
from quitting chocolate because 
I love them so much;  
they could be fatal 
in fact. 
Easter eggs could bring an end 
to her commitment to giving 
up chocolate. 
Hyperbole Mum, these zits on my face are 
ruining everything;  
they could be fatal 
in fact. 
She feels that the zits on her 
face could ruin her life. 
Literal Certain conditions can be very 
serious if left untreated;  
they could be fatal 
in fact. 
Some illnesses and diseases 
end in death. 
Metaphor My family have come to be so 
much like me;  
it is a big mirror 
now. 
 
Hyperbole I spent so long polishing this 
vase and making it clean;  
it is a big mirror 
now. 
 
Literal I have got lots of antiques and 
my favourite one is always 
changing;  
it is a big mirror 
now. 
 
Metaphor My husband is too clingy and he 
is always hanging around me;  
he is a backpack; a 
heavy one as well. 
Her husband is quite needy. 
Hyperbole This new hand bag I have 
bought is too big.  
it is a backpack; a 
heavy one as well. 
Her handbag is not small and 
elegant. 
Literal I have bought something to take 
my books around in.  
it is a backpack; a 
heavy one as well. 
The backpack has shoulder 
straps. 
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Metaphor Although it isn’t well paid, I am 
happy with my first job;  
it is scaffolding to 
get higher up. 
His job is a good starting 
point. 
Hyperbole Why is that chair still in front of 
the window?  
it is scaffolding to 
get higher up. 
The chair is there to stand on. 
Literal They are staining our window so 
there is loads of stuff outside 
the door;  
it is scaffolding to 
get higher up. 
The scaffolding is made of 
metal 
Metaphor He left and took all his love 
with him;  
he was a thief and 
nothing less. 
 
Hyperbole My boyfriend was always 
grabbing the last chocolate;  
he was a thief and 
nothing less. 
 
Literal He grabbed a watch from a shop 
and didn’t pay;  
he was a thief and 
nothing less. 
 
Metaphor People walk so fast along 
Oxford Street in London;  
it is a motorway 
along there. 
 
Hyperbole Vans go so quickly along our 
small residential street;  
it is a motorway 
along there. 
 
Literal The easiest way to get there was 
along the new route;  
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B. Experiment 2: Word-naming experiment 1 
 
1. Practice context sentences and probe words 
 
Context sentence Probe word 
Alice likes to walk to the shops every morning to get some milk and the newspaper; Routine 
My daughter loves to dance around the kitchen listening to her favourite music;  Surprise 
Becky was so good at swimming and moving through the water;  Fish 
Tom smelt so bad because he didn’t wash often enough;  Squirrel 
It was almost impossible to eat those cakes you made yesterday;  Stone 
I can hardly move after that race today;  Dead 
 




Context  sentence Probe 
Metaphor My husband always manages to hide and block out all the negative things 
about life;  
Curtain 
Hyperbole Thank goodness we have got that rug on the washing line to give us some 
shade;  
Curtain 
Literal In the corner of the room, we have put some beautiful new cloth on a rail to 
make a concealed changing section;  
Curtain 
Metaphor A politics degree gives you a better perspective on society;  Window 
Hyperbole John could see out of the hole in the wall he made for the gas pipe;  Window 
Literal There is a feature at the top of the stairs which lets so much sunshine into 
the big hall way;  
Window 
Metaphor My mind is systematic, thorough and organised;  Computer 
Hyperbole My new microwave has so many buttons and switches which make it do so 
many different things;  
Computer 
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Literal There is always something which people become completely reliant on to do 
everything for them;  
Computer 
Metaphor A good public school turns out an abundance of smartly dressed, polite and 
clever kids;  
 
Factory 
Hyperbole When I bake cakes with my kids, we make so many in our tiny little 
kitchen;  
Factory 
Literal Nearly everyone in my small town is employed in the same place;  Factory 
Metaphor Sometimes I think life is just all about showing off and seeing who is the 
most exuberant;  
Exhibition 
Hyperbole Your desk is covered in so many scraps of paper with lovely doodles all 
over them;  
Exhibition 
Literal There is a big cultural event going on in the entrance of the building;  Exhibition 
Metaphor Jimmy didn’t want to go to secondary school and leave his lovely primary 
school behind;  
Duvet 
Hyperbole Hannah didn’t want to throw away her big, old, jumper;  Duvet 
Literal She had kept the same bedding nearly all her life;  Duvet 
Metaphor A privileged childhood can often conceal the harshness of reality;  Blindfold 
Hyperbole This skiing mask is steaming up all the time so I am very disorientated;  Blindfold 
Literal I am just going to put this on your face before the challenge starts;  Blindfold 
8Metaphor Tim’s conscience was always making him feel bad and stopping him from 
doing things;  
Dictator 
Hyperbole James’ teacher was a serious and bossy man;  Dictator 
Literal Hitler was not a good leader;  Dictator 
Metaphor Look at all the brightly coloured fish swimming in the pond;  Festival 
Hyperbole I chose the nursery at the end of the road for my child because it is always Festival 
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full of fun and games;  
Literal The village at the bottom of the valley has a big community gathering every 
year, with dancing and games;  
Festival 
Metaphor Sam always got lost because the university was enormous;  Forest 
Hyperbole The back yard definitely needed pruning;  Forest 
Literal Sam and Mark went to a national park for the weekend;  Forest 
Metaphor The politician’s style of politics was typical;  Noxious 
Hyperbole I had to drink earl grey and I hated it;  Noxious 
Literal The varnish he was using was a new brand;  Noxious 
Metaphor I really don’t like that music band;  Mouldy 
Hyperbole I don’t want to wear last year’s dress;  Mouldy 
Literal I am cleaning the bathroom window sill;  Mouldy 
Metaphor The new novel by that young writer is so radical;  Blinding 
Hyperbole My new lamp is so powerful;  Blinding 
Literal Strong acid must not touch your face;  Blinding 
Metaphor Her big house was not a home anymore;  Cemetery 
Hyperbole They had said goodbye to so many pets in the garden;  Cemetery 
Literal They had developed the land next to the church;  Cemetery 
Metaphor The interview had been really hard;  Assault 
Hyperbole Her brother pushed past her to get more cake;  Assault 
Literal He had been involved in a crime; Assault 
8Metaphor He came in here and broke all my dreams;  Terrorist 
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Hyperbole The little baby was always breaking things;  Terrorist 
Literal The man who targeted the office block did an awful thing;  Terrorist 
Metaphor Having an argument affected my mood;  Vandalised 
Hyperbole Someone had put a sticker on my new school bag;  Vandalised 
Literal The car parked outside my house was in a mess;  Vandalised 
Metaphor My car is very nimble and efficient;  Athlete 
Hyperbole Look, he is such a good worker, doing all that ironing;  Athlete 
Literal The champion is extremely powerful and supple;  Athlete 
Metaphor I am so hungry that my belly is making so much noise;  Orchestra 
Hyperbole It is great when my two kids perform for me;  Orchestra 
Literal I wanted to throw a party which would make a statement;  Orchestra 
Metaphor I am so tired of worrying, my mind has become empty;  Corridor 
Hyperbole The living room is claustrophobic and depressing;  Corridor 
Literal When you enter the main block, follow the signs;  Corridor 
Metaphor I can’t think because my brain isn’t working anymore;  Poached 
Hyperbole I have been in the bath too long and my toe is wrinkly;  Poached 
Literal I will tell you what the best way to make a gammon is;  Poached 
Metaphor I seem to always be carrying you around everywhere in my arms today;  Taxi 
Hyperbole I have been giving you a lift everywhere today;  Taxi 
Literal Hello, are you the man who ordered a lift to the airport?   Taxi 
8Metaphor Our new flat had a big silver double fridge;  Monster 
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Hyperbole They found out which dog it was that attacked the child;  Monster 
Literal The adventure storybook had one main character;  Monster 
Metaphor I can’t take anymore, my confidence has gone;  Smashed 
Hyperbole I won’t be able to keep running because my knee is too bad;  Smashed 
Literal It was a shame that I knocked the jug off the table;  Smashed 
Metaphor Easter eggs could tempt me from quitting chocolate because I love them so 
much;  
Fatal 
Hyperbole Mum, these zits on my face are ruining everything;  Fatal 
Literal Certain conditions can be very serious if left untreated;  Fatal 
Metaphor My family have come to be so much like me;  Mirror 
Hyperbole I spent so long polishing this vase and making it clean;  Mirror 
Literal I have got lots of antiques and my favourite one is always changing;  Mirror 
Metaphor My husband is too clingy and he is always hanging around me;  Backpack 
Hyperbole This new hand bag I have bought is too big; Backpack 
Literal I have bought something to take my books around in.  Backpack 
Metaphor Although it isn’t well paid, I am happy with my first job;  Scaffolding 
Hyperbole Why is that chair still in front of the window?  Scaffolding 
Literal They are staining our window so there is loads of stuff outside the door;  Scaffolding 
Metaphor He left and took all his love with him;  Thief 
Hyperbole My boyfriend was always grabbing the last chocolate;  Thief 
Literal He grabbed a watch from a shop and didn’t pay;  Thief 
Metaphor People walk so fast along Oxford Street in London;  Motorway 
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Hyperbole Vans go so quickly along our small residential street;  Motorway 
Literal The easiest way to get there was along the new route;  Motorway 
 
3. Filler context sentences and probe words 
 
Context sentence Probe 
Vegetarians often find it hard to find exciting dishes to cook every evening;  Exhausting 
Telling identical twins apart can be hard but mothers and fathers of twins often develop 
special tactics;  
Challenging 
I am forever loosing pens down the backs of sofas, in the bottom of bags;  Hopeless 
I would quite like to go on holiday to America but it is very expensive;  Afford 
Owning a car is expensive and not always necessary when you live in a big city like London;  Transport 
 
My mum and dad are coming to visit this weekend;  Exciting 
There was a shard of glass on the street;  Jagged 
There was an enourmous cake on the table;  Delicious 
The saucepan was shiney and clean;  Smart 
Apricots can be dried to make a snack;  Nice 
Alison always wears red trousers;  Best 
The tiger was wandering around its cage;  Sad 
I always wanted to try different foods when I was young;  Interested 
Happy people always get on better in life;  Aspirational 
A bottle of water is easy to carry around;  Little 
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The curtains will be drawn at midnight; ok. Regulations 
Having a hood on your coat is imortant when it rains;  Defence 
Children love christmas time because they get presents;  Magical 
Apples are better for you than bananas;  Nutrients 
Giant ants live in the amazin rainforest;  Bugs 
John was never delicate about the way he dealt with people’s worries and problems;  Bulldozer 
Amy had become so greedy when she was eating;  Pig 
Jane was a malicious and unkind in the meeting this afternoon;  Witch 
Helen’s teacher always got angry for no reason and shouted at everyone;  Dragon 
Mary’s daughter was such a good girl and always helped her do the washing;  Angel 
Tim’s new car was very fast and could pull away from traffic lights very quickly;  Spaceship 
Alex’s mum was fed up of having to ask him to tidy his room;  Cess Pit 
Today was a horrible day from start to finish;  Horror film 
My new job is so fun and interesting I can hardly believe it;  Fantasy 
Sarah’s friend was always trying to cheat on the weekly spelling test by looking over her 
shoulder and copying her answers;  
Crocodile 
Little Matthew was so fast at running that he beat all of the other children on sports day;  Gun shot 
Daniel’s life was full of drama, happiness and tragedy;  Drama 
Sam was a good friend who was always there to support his best mates;  Pillar 
Thomas’ was so in love with his fiancé and believed she was a rare and exceptional woman;  Ruby 
Scott loved to go jogging in the evenings to keep fit and he was actually quite fast;  Leopard 
Tom can’t wait to replace his old car as it has become a bit rusty and unreliable;  Drum 
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We really need to smarten up and renovate our garden;  Dung heap 
I hate my school because it is a horrible and depressing building which I have to go to every 
day;  
Jail 
That little boy that lives next door is a grubby, naughty little thing;  Mouse 
I have been looking for that rare copy of that book for so long that I can’t belive I have got it 
now;  
Treasure 
That puddle that has formed in the middle of the playground is huge;  Lake 
The cold weather has made the roads so dangerous;  Ice rink 
I can’t walk up this street with all these shopping bags it is too steep;  Mountain 
I can’t believe how tall your dad is;  Giant 
This cup of tea is too hot for me to drink;  Boiling 
I can’t believe how cold it is in my bedroom;  Icy 
I am so tired after such a busy day;  Running 
Can you make sure you draw the shower curtain next time you shower because there is water 
all over the floor every time you shower;  
Swimming 
I felt fitter on my morning jog today;  Flying 
I managed to jump so high over that log;  Sailed 
Your house is so big and spacious;  Palace 
I ran around my usual running route so fast this morning;  Performance 
That cheese on toast was just what I wanted;  Banquet 
The car hit me so hard as I was cycling along;  Shot 
This path is so muddy along here;  Wading 
He was drinking wine out of such a large glass;  Bath 
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There was a woman in the park lying in the sun for so long;  Grilling 
June spent so much time sunbathing when she was young that now here skin is very damaged;  Canvas 
Hannah has become so thin that I am starting to get worried about her;  Bones 
It is so hot in this shop that I am going to have to leave;  Baking 
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C. Experiment 3: Word-naming experiment 2 
 









Alice likes to walk to the shops every morning to get some milk 
and the newspaper; it is her routine these days. 
Routine Having a routine keeps you 
organized. 
My daughter loves to dance around the kitchen listening to her 
favourite music; it is a joy to watch her. 
Surprise  
Becky was so good at swimming and moving through the water; 
she is a fish, I would say. 
Fish Fish live in water 
Tom smelt so bad because he didn’t wash often enough; he was a 
skunk, most people thought. 
Squirrel  
It was almost impossible to eat those cakes you made yesterday; 
they were concrete in your mouth. 
Stone Concrete is hard 
I can hardly move after that race today; I am dead now. Dead  
 
2. Experimental target sentences, context sentences, probe words, and comprehension 
statements. 
 
 Context and target sentence Probe Comprehension statement 
Metaphor My husband always manages to hide and block 
out all the negative things about life; He is a 
curtain to hide behind. 
Curtain Her husband protects me. 
Hyperbole Thank goodness we have got that rug on the 
washing line to give us some shade; it is a curtain 
to hide behind. 
Curtain The rug blocked out the sun. 
Literal In the corner of the room, we have put some 
beautiful new cloth on a rail to make a concealed 
changing section; it is a curtain to hide behind. 
Curtain The curtain is made of cloth. 
Metaphor A politics degree gives you a better perspective on 
society; it is a window to look out of. 
Window A politics degree teaches you 
about society. 
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Hyperbole John could see out of the hole in the wall he made 
for the gas pipe; it was a window to look out of. 
Window There was no glass in the 
window. 
Literal There is a feature at the top of the stairs which lets 
so much sunshine into the big hall way; it is a 
window to look out of. 
Window You could see out of the 
window. 
Metaphor My mind is systematic, thorough and organised; it 
is my computer these days. 
Computer My brain is good at processing. 
Hyperbole My new microwave has so many buttons and 
switches which make it do so many different 
things; it is a computer these days. 
Computer My microwave is very modern 
and sophisticated. 
Literal There is always something which people become 
completely reliant on to do everything for them; it 
is a computer these days. 
Computer We are reliant on computers 
these days. 
Metaphor A good public school turns out an abundance of 
smartly dressed, polite and clever kids; it is a 
factory making products. 
 
Factory The school consistently 
produces very good students. 
Hyperbole When I bake cakes with my kids, we make so 
many in our tiny little kitchen; it is a factory 
making products.  
Factory The kids are good helpers. 
Literal Nearly everyone in my small town is employed in 
the same place; it is a factory making products. 
Factory The factory employs lots of 
people. 
Metaphor Sometimes I think life is just all about showing 
off and seeing who is the most exuberant; it is an 
exhibition of an artists’ work. 
Exhibition Life can be about proving 
yourself and being competitive. 
Hyperbole Your desk is covered in so many scraps of paper 
with lovely doodles all over them; it is an 
exhibition of an artists’ work. 
Exhibition She has drawn lots of doodles. 
Literal There is a big cultural event going on in the 
entrance of the building; it is an exhibition of an 
artists’ work. 
Exhibition The exhibition will display 
artists’ work. 
Metaphor Jimmy didn’t want to go to secondary school and 
leave his lovely primary school behind; it had 
been his duvet for years. 
Duvet  
Hyperbole Hannah didn’t want to throw away her big, old, Duvet  
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jumper; it has been her duvet for years. 
Literal She had kept the same bedding nearly all her life; 
it had been her duvet for years. 
Duvet  
Metaphor A privileged childhood can often conceal the 
harshness of reality; it is a blindfold that stops you 
seeing. 
Blindfold  
Hyperbole This skiing mask is steaming up all the time so I 
am very disorientated; it is a blindfold that stops 
you seeing. 
Blindfold  
Literal I am just going to put this on your face before the 
challenge starts; it is a blindfold that stops you 
seeing. 
Blindfold  
8Metaphor Tim’s conscience was always making him feel 
bad and stopping him from doing things; it was a 
dictator of the worst kind. 
Dictator  
Hyperbole James’ teacher was a serious and bossy man; he 
was a dictator of the worst kind. 
Dictator  
Literal Hitler was not a good leader; he was a dictator of 
the worst kind. 
Dictator  
Metaphor Look at all the brightly coloured fish swimming in 
the pond; it is a festival down there. 
Festival The fish were shining brightly in 
the water. 
Hyperbole I chose the nursery at the end of the road for my 
child because it is always full of fun and games; it 
is a festival down there. 
Festival The children always have lots of 
fun at the nursery. 
Literal The village at the bottom of the valley has a big 
community gathering every year, with dancing 
and games; it is a festival down there. 
Festival Festivals are fun and happy 
events. 
Metaphor Sam always got lost because the university was 
enormous; it was a forest with winding paths. 
Forest  The university was big and 
confusing. 
Hyperbole The back yard definitely needed pruning; it was a 
forest with winding paths. 
Forest The back yard had become 
overgrown. 
Literal Sam and Mark went to a national park for the 
weekend; it was a forest with winding paths. 
Forest There are lots of trees in the 
national park. 
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Metaphor The politician’s style of politics was typical; it 
was noxious and disgusting. 
Noxious He was not a fair and honest 
politician. 
Hyperbole I had to drink earl grey and I hated it; it was 
noxious and disgusting. 
Noxious The tea tasted bad. 
Literal The varnish he was using was a new brand; it was 
noxious and disgusting. 
Noxious The varnish smelt bad. 
Metaphor I really don’t like that music band; it is mouldy 
and I hate it. 
Mouldy She thought the music band was 
out of date and bad. 
Hyperbole I don’t want to wear last year’s dress; it is mouldy 
and I hate it. 
Mouldy Her dress was out of date and 
unfashionable. 
Literal I am cleaning the bathroom window sill; It is 
mouldy and I hate it. 
Mouldy The bathroom windowsill is 
damp and dirty. 
Metaphor The new novel by that young writer is so radical; 
It is blinding and dangerous. 
Blinding The new novel is different to 
most novels around today. 
Hyperbole My new lamp is so powerful; It is blinding and 
dangerous. 
Blinding The light  is far too bright. 
Literal Strong acid must not touch your face; It is 
blinding and dangerous. 
Blinding Acid can cause permanent loss 
of sight. 
Metaphor Her big house was not a home anymore; It was a 
cemetery now. 
Cemetery Her house felt sad and empty. 
Hyperbole They had said goodbye to so many pets in the 
garden; It was a cemetery now. 
Cemetery There were lots of animals 
buried in the garden. 
Literal They had developed the land next to the church; It 
was a cemetery now. 
Cemetery The land next to the church was 
used for burying people. 
 
Metaphor The interview had been really hard; It was an 
assault of the worst kind. 
Assault He wasn’t physically wounded 
in the interview. 
Hyperbole Her brother pushed past her to get more cake; It 
was an assault of the worst kind. 
Assault Her brother didn’t intend to 
attack her. 
Literal He had been involved in a crime; It was an assault 
of the worst kind. 
Assault The crime he was  involved in 
was a violent crime 
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Metaphor He came in here and broke all my dreams; He was 
a terrorist of the worst kind. 
Terrorist  
Hyperbole The little baby was always breaking things; He 
was a terrorist of the worst kind. 
Terrorist  
Literal The man who targeted the office block did an 
awful thing; He was a terrorist of the worst kind. 
Terrorist  
Metaphor Having an argument affected my mood; It had 
been vandalised very badly. 
Vandalised  
Hyperbole Someone had put a sticker on my new school bag; 
It had been vandalised very badly. 
Vandalised  
Literal The car parked outside my house was in a mess; It 
had been vandalised very badly. 
Vandalised  
Metaphor My car is very nimble and efficient; It is an 
athlete in fact. 
Athlete  
Hyperbole Look, he is such a good worker, doing all that 
ironing; He is an athlete in fact. 
Athlete  
Literal The champion is extremely powerful and supple; 
He is an athlete in fact. 
Athlete  
Metaphor I am so hungry that my belly is making so much 
noise; I have my own orchestra playing in here. 
Orchestra  
Hyperbole It is great when my two kids perform for me; I 
have my own orchestra playing in here. 
Orchestra  
Literal I wanted to throw a party which would make a 
statement; I have got my own orchestra playing in 
here. 
Orchestra  
Metaphor I am so tired of worrying, my mind has become 
empty; It is a long dark corridor in there. 
Corridor  
Hyperbole The living room is claustrophobic and depressing; 
It is a long dark corridor in there. 
Corridor  
Literal When you enter the main block, follow the signs; 
It is a long dark corridor in there. 
Corridor  
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Metaphor I can’t think because my brain isn’t working 
anymore; It is poached in hot water. 
Poached  
Hyperbole I have been in the bath too long and my toe is 
wrinkly; It is poached in hot water. 
Poached  
Literal I will tell you what the best way to make a 
gammon is; It is poached in hot water. 
Poached  
Metaphor I seem to always be carrying you around 
everywhere in my arms today; I am your taxi 
today. 
Taxi  
Hyperbole I have been giving you a lift everywhere today; I 
am your taxi today. 
Taxi  
Literal Hello, are you the man who ordered a lift to the 
airport?  I am your taxi today. 
Taxi  
8Metaphor Our new flat had a big silver double fridge; It was 
a monster; a huge one. 
Monster The fridge was much bigger 
than average. 
Hyperbole They found out which dog it was that attacked the 
child; It was a monster; a huge one. 
Monster The dog was ferocious and 
vicious. 
Literal The adventure storybook had one main character; 
It was a monster; a huge one. 
Monster The character in the storybook 
was a big monster. 
Metaphor I can’t take anymore, my confidence has gone; It 
is smashed beyond repair. 
Smashed Her confidence has been 
damaged. 
Hyperbole I won’t be able to keep running because my knee 
is too bad; It is smashed beyond repair. 
Smashed Her knee is injured. 
Literal It was a shame that I knocked the jug off the 
table; It is smashed beyond repair. 
Smashed The jug is broken into pieces. 
Metaphor Easter eggs could tempt me from quitting 
chocolate because I love them so much; They 
could be fatal in fact. 
Fatal Easter eggs could bring an end 
to her commitment to giving up 
chocolate. 
Hyperbole Mum, these zits on my face are ruining 
everything; They could be fatal in fact. 
Fatal She feels that the zits on her face 
could ruin her life. 
Literal Certain conditions can be very serious if left 
untreated; They could be fatal in fact. 
Fatal Some illnesses and diseases end 
in death. 
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Metaphor My family have come to be so much like me; It is 
a big mirror now. 
Mirror  
Hyperbole I spent so long polishing this vase and making it 
clean; It is a big mirror now. 
Mirror  
Literal I have got lots of antiques and my favourite one is 
always changing; It is a big mirror now. 
Mirror  
Metaphor My husband is too clingy and he is always 
hanging around me; He is a backpack; a heavy 
one as well. 
Backpack Her husband is quite needy. 
Hyperbole This new hand bag I have bought is too big. It is a 
backpack; a heavy one as well. 
Backpack Her handbag is not small and 
elegant. 
Literal I have bought something to take my books around 
in. It is a backpack; a heavy one as well. 
Backpack The backpack has shoulder 
straps. 
Metaphor Although it isn’t well paid, I am happy with my 
first job; It is scaffolding to get higher up. 
Scaffolding His job is a good starting point. 
Hyperbole Why is that chair still in front of the window? It is 
scaffolding to get higher up. 
Scaffolding The chair is there to stand on. 
Literal They are staining our window so there is loads of 
stuff outside the door; It is scaffolding to get 
higher up. 
Scaffolding The scaffolding is made of metal 
Metaphor He left and took all his love with him; he was a 
thief and nothing less. 
Thief  
Hyperbole My boyfriend was always grabbing the last 
chocolate; he was a thief and nothing less. 
Thief  
Literal He grabbed a watch from a shop and didn’t pay; 
he was a thief and nothing less. 
Thief  
Metaphor People walk so fast along Oxford Street in 
London; it is a motorway along there. 
Motorway  
Hyperbole Vans go so quickly along our small residential 
street; it is a motorway along there. 
Motorway  
Literal The easiest way to get there was along the new 
route; it is a motorway along there. 
Motorway  
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Context and target sentences Probe word Comp statement 
Vegetarians often find it hard to find exciting dishes to cook 
every evening; it can be exhausting and boring. 
Exhausting  
Telling identical twins apart can be hard but mothers and 
fathers of twins often develop special tactics; it is challenging 
though. 
Challenging Identical twins look the same 
I am forever loosing pens down the backs of sofas, in the 
bottom of bags; I am hopeless these days. 
Hopeless  
I would quite like to go on holiday to America but it is very 
expensive; I don’t think I can afford it actually. 
Afford She hasn’t got enough money to 
go to America 
Owning a car is expensive and not always necessary when you 




My mum and dad are coming to visit this weekend; it will be 
fun I think. 
Exciting She is not looking forward to 
her parents visiting. 
There was a shard of glass on the street; It was sharp and 
dangerous. 
Jagged  
There was an enourmous cake on the table; It was chocolate 
and rich. 
Delicious Chocolate cake is sweet 
The saucepan was shiney and clean; It is new from the store. Smart  
Apricots can be dried to make a snack; They are delicious and 
healthy. 
Nice Dried apricots can’t be eaten. 
Alison always wears red trousers; they are her favourite piece 
of clothing. 
Best  
The tiger was wandering around its cage; It was bored and 
restless. 
Sad Tigers get more exercise in the 
wild. 
	   343 
I always wanted to try different foods when I was young; I was 
adventurous back then. 
Interested  
Happy people always get on better in life; They are ambitious 
wich helps. 
Aspirational Happy people are more 
successful than sad people 
A bottle of water is easy to carry around; It is light and small. Little  
The curtains will be drawn at midnight; These are the rules ok. Regulations There are no rules about when 
to draw the curtains. 
Having a hood on your coat is imortant when it rains; It is 
protection from the weather. 
Defence  
Children love christmas time because they get presents; It is 
exciting and fun. 
Magical Children hate Christmas 
because only adults get 
presents. 
Apples are better for you than bananas; They have more 
vitamins and minerals. 
Nutrients  
Giant ants live in the amazin rainforest; They are insects you 
know. 
Bugs Giant ants live in England. 
John was never delicate about the way he dealt with people’s 
worries and problems; he was a bulldozer these days. 
Bulldozer John was clumsy and 
destructive. 
Amy had become so greedy when she was eating; she was a 
pig back then. 
Pig  
Jane was a malicious and unkind in the meeting this afternoon; 
she was witch today. 
Witch Jane is a kind person. 
Helen’s teacher always got angry for no reason and shouted at 
everyone; she was a dragon to the children. 
Dragon Helen’s teacher was soft and 
never got angry. 
Mary’s daughter was such a good girl and always helped her 
do the washing; she was an angel and very sweet. 
Angel  
Tim’s new car was very fast and could pull away from traffic 
lights very quickly; it was a rocket which could fly. 
Spaceship  
Alex’s mum was fed up of having to ask him to tidy his room; 
it was a pig sty these days. 
Cess Pit Alex’s room was messy and 
dirty 
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Today was a horrible day from start to finish; it was a 
nightmare of the worst kind. 
Horror film  
My new job is so fun and interesting I can hardly believe it; it 
is a dream which isn’t real. 
Fantasy  
Sarah’s friend was always trying to cheat on the weekly 
spelling test by looking over her shoulder and copying her 
answers; she was a snake for doing that. 
Crocodile  
Little Matthew was so fast at running that he beat all of the 
other children on sports day; he was a bullet that day. 
Gun shot Bullets shot from a gun move 
very quickly like Mathew 
Daniel’s life was full of drama, happiness and tragedy; it was a 
novel which was long and complicated. 
Drama  
Sam was a good friend who was always there to support his 
best mates; he was a tree which stood strong. 
Pillar Trees are hard and strong which 
make them supportive like Sam 
Thomas’ was so in love with his fiancé and believed she was a 
rare and exceptional woman; she was a diamond to him. 
Ruby  
Scott loved to go jogging in the evenings to keep fit and he 
was actually quite fast; he was a cheetah these days. 
Leopard Leopards run very slowly. 
Tom can’t wait to replace his old car as it has become a bit 
rusty and unreliable; it is an old tin can these days. 
Drum Old tin cans are rubbish and 
ugly like Tom’s car 
We really need to smarten up and renovate our garden; it is a 
rubbish dump these days. 
Dung heap Rubbish dumps are attractive 
and beautiful places. 
I hate my school because it is a horrible and depressing 
building which I have to go to every day; it is a prison I would 
say. 
Jail Prisons are pleasant and give 
you a sense of freedom. 
That little boy that lives next door is a grubby , naughty little 
thing; he is a little rat scurrying around. 
Mouse  
I have been looking for that rare copy of that book for so long 
that I can’t belive I have got it now; it is gold in my pocket. 
Treasure  
That puddle that has formed in the middle of the playground is 
huge; it is a lake now. 
Lake Lakes are large areas of water. 
The cold weather has made the roads so dangerous; it is an ice 
rink out there. 
Ice rink Ice rinks are slippery. 
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I can’t walk up this street with all these shopping bags it is too 
steep; it is a mountain up here. 
Mountain  
I can’t believe how tall your dad is; he is a giant man. Giant  
This cup of tea is too hot for me to drink; it is boiling in my 
mouth. 
Boiling The tea has become too cold 
I can’t believe how cold it is in my bedroom; it is freezing in 
here. 
Icy  
I am so tired after such a busy day; I have been racing around 
too much. 
Running  
Can you make sure you draw the shower curtain next time you 
shower because there is water all over the floor every time you 
shower; I am floating in here. 
Swimming  
I felt fitter on my morning jog today; I was sprinting the whole 
way. 
Flying  
I managed to jump so high over that log; I flew through the air. Sailed  
Your house is so big and spacious; it is a castle in here. Palace The house was very small 
I ran around my usual running route so fast this morning; it 
was a world record I bet. 
Performance  
That cheese on toast was just what I wanted; it was a feast to 
remember. 
Banquet  
The car hit me so hard as I was cycling along; I was catapulted 
through the air. 
Shot  
This path is so muddy along here; I am sinking deeper. Wading  The path was very dry 
He was drinking wine out of such a large glass; it was a bucket 
of wine. 
Bath His glass of wine was bigger 
than the average 
There was a woman in the park lying in the sun for so long; 
she was frying out there. 
Grilling The woman was not lying in the 
sun long enough to get burnt 
June spent so much time sunbathing when she was young that 
now here skin is very damaged; it is leather now. 
Canvas Her skin no longer looks 
attractive 
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Hannah has become so thin that I am starting to get worried 
about her; she is a skeleton now. 
Bones Hannah is quite fat 
It is so hot in this shop that I am going to have to leave; I am 
roasting in here. 
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  D. Experiment 4: Eye-tracking experiment 
 1. Practice trial target, context sentences, and comprehension statements 
Context and target sentence Comprehension statement 
Alice likes to walk to the shops every morning to get some milk and 
the newspaper; it is her routine these days. 
Having a routine keeps you organized. 
My daughter loves to dance around the kitchen listening to her 
favourite music; it is a joy to watch her. 
 
Becky was so good at swimming and moving through the water; she is 
a fish, I would say. 
Fish live in water 
Tom smelt so bad because he didn’t wash often enough; he was a 
skunk, most people thought. 
 
It was almost impossible to eat those cakes you made yesterday; they 
were concrete in your mouth. 
Concrete is hard 
I can hardly move after that race today; I am dead now.  
	  
2.  Experimental target, context sentences, and comprehension statements 
 
 Context and target sentence Comprehension statement 
Metaphor My husband always manages to hide and 
block out all the negative things about life; 
He is a curtain to hide behind. 
Her husband protects me. 
Hyperbole Thank goodness we have got that rug on the 
washing line to give us some shade; it is a 
curtain to hide behind. 
The rug blocked out the sun. 
Literal In the corner of the room, we have put some 
beautiful new cloth on a rail to make a 
concealed changing section; it is a curtain to 
hide behind. 
The curtain is made of cloth. 
Metaphor A politics degree gives you a better 
perspective on society; it is a window to look 
out of. 
A politics degree teaches you about 
society. 
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Hyperbole John could see out of the hole in the wall he 
made for the gas pipe; it was a window to 
look out of. 
There was no glass in the window. 
Literal There is a feature at the top of the stairs 
which lets so much sunshine into the big hall 
way; it is a window to look out of. 
You could see out of the window. 
Metaphor My mind is systematic, thorough and 
organised; it is my computer these days. 
My brain is good at processing. 
Hyperbole My new microwave has so many buttons and 
switches which make it do so many different 
things; it is a computer these days. 
My microwave is very modern and 
sophisticated. 
Literal There is always something which people 
become completely reliant on to do 
everything for them; it is a computer these 
days. 
We are reliant on computers these days. 
Metaphor A good public school turns out an abundance 
of smartly dressed, polite and clever kids; it is 
a factory making products. 
 
The school consistently produces very 
good students. 
Hyperbole When I bake cakes with my kids, we make so 
many in our tiny little kitchen; it is a factory 
making products.  
The kids are good helpers. 
Literal Nearly everyone in my small town is 
employed in the same place; it is a factory 
making products. 
The factory employs lots of people. 
Metaphor Sometimes I think life is just all about 
showing off and seeing who is the most 
exuberant; it is an exhibition of an artists’ 
work. 
Life can be about proving yourself and 
being competitive. 
Hyperbole Your desk is covered in so many scraps of 
paper with lovely doodles all over them; it is 
an exhibition of an artists’ work. 
She has drawn lots of doodles. 
Literal There is a big cultural event going on in the 
entrance of the building; it is an exhibition of 
an artists’ work. 
The exhibition will display artists’ 
work. 
Metaphor Jimmy didn’t want to go to secondary school 
and leave his lovely primary school behind; it 
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had been his duvet for years. 
Hyperbole Hannah didn’t want to throw away her big, 
old, jumper; it has been her duvet for years. 
 
Literal She had kept the same bedding nearly all her 
life; it had been her duvet for years. 
 
Metaphor A privileged childhood can often conceal the 
harshness of reality; it is a blindfold that stops 
you seeing. 
 
Hyperbole This skiing mask is steaming up all the time 
so I am very disorientated; it is a blindfold 
that stops you seeing. 
 
Literal I am just going to put this on your face before 
the challenge starts; it is a blindfold that stops 
you seeing. 
 
8Metaphor Tim’s conscience was always making him 
feel bad and stopping him from doing things; 
it was a dictator of the worst kind. 
 
Hyperbole James’ teacher was a serious and bossy man; 
he was a dictator of the worst kind. 
 
Literal Hitler was not a good leader; he was a 
dictator of the worst kind. 
 
Metaphor Look at all the brightly coloured fish 
swimming in the pond; it is a festival down 
there. 
The fish were shining brightly in the 
water. 
Hyperbole I chose the nursery at the end of the road for 
my child because it is always full of fun and 
games; it is a festival down there. 
The children always have lots of fun at 
the nursery. 
Literal The village at the bottom of the valley has a 
big community gathering every year, with 
dancing and games; it is a festival down 
there. 
Festivals are fun and happy events. 
Metaphor Sam always got lost because the university 
was enormous; it was a forest with winding 
paths. 
 The university was big and confusing. 
Hyperbole The back yard definitely needed pruning; it The back yard had become overgrown. 
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was a forest with winding paths. 
Literal Sam and Mark went to a national park for the 
weekend; it was a forest with winding paths. 
There are lots of trees in the national 
park. 
Metaphor The politician’s style of politics was typical; 
it was noxious and disgusting. 
He was not a fair and honest politician. 
Hyperbole I had to drink earl grey and I hated it; it was 
noxious and disgusting. 
The tea tasted bad. 
Literal The varnish he was using was a new brand; it 
was noxious and disgusting. 
The varnish smelt bad. 
Metaphor I really don’t like that music band; it is 
mouldy and I hate it. 
She thought the music band was out of 
date and bad. 
Hyperbole I don’t want to wear last year’s dress; it is 
mouldy and I hate it. 
Her dress was out of date and 
unfashionable. 
Literal I am cleaning the bathroom window sill; It is 
mouldy and I hate it. 
The bathroom windowsill is damp and 
dirty. 
Metaphor The new novel by that young writer is so 
radical; It is blinding and dangerous. 
The new novel is different to most 
novels around today. 
Hyperbole My new lamp is so powerful; It is blinding 
and dangerous. 
The light  is far too bright. 
Literal Strong acid must not touch your face; It is 
blinding and dangerous. 
Acid can cause permanent loss of sight. 
Metaphor Her big house was not a home anymore; It 
was a cemetery now. 
Her house felt sad and empty. 
Hyperbole They had said goodbye to so many pets in the 
garden; It was a cemetery now. 
There were lots of animals buried in the 
garden. 
Literal They had developed the land next to the 
church; It was a cemetery now. 
The land next to the church was used 
for burying people. 
 
Metaphor The interview had been really hard; It was an 
assault of the worst kind. 
He wasn’t physically wounded in the 
interview. 
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Hyperbole Her brother pushed past her to get more cake; 
It was an assault of the worst kind. 
Her brother didn’t intend to attack her. 
Literal He had been involved in a crime; It was an 
assault of the worst kind. 
The crime he was  involved in was a 
violent crime 
8Metaphor He came in here and broke all my dreams; He 
was a terrorist of the worst kind. 
 
Hyperbole The little baby was always breaking things; 
He was a terrorist of the worst kind. 
 
Literal The man who targeted the office block did an 
awful thing; He was a terrorist of the worst 
kind. 
 
Metaphor Having an argument affected my mood; It 
had been vandalised very badly. 
 
Hyperbole Someone had put a sticker on my new school 
bag; It had been vandalised very badly. 
 
Literal The car parked outside my house was in a 
mess; It had been vandalised very badly. 
 
Metaphor My car is very nimble and efficient; It is an 
athlete in fact. 
 
Hyperbole Look, he is such a good worker, doing all that 
ironing; He is an athlete in fact. 
 
Literal The champion is extremely powerful and 
supple; He is an athlete in fact. 
 
Metaphor I am so hungry that my belly is making so 
much noise; I have my own orchestra playing 
in here. 
 
Hyperbole It is great when my two kids perform for me; 
I have my own orchestra playing in here. 
 
Literal I wanted to throw a party which would make 
a statement; I have got my own orchestra 
playing in here. 
 
Metaphor I am so tired of worrying, my mind has 
become empty; It is a long dark corridor in 
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there. 
Hyperbole The living room is claustrophobic and 
depressing; It is a long dark corridor in there. 
 
Literal When you enter the main block, follow the 
signs; It is a long dark corridor in there. 
 
Metaphor I can’t think because my brain isn’t working 
anymore; It is poached in hot water. 
 
Hyperbole I have been in the bath too long and my toe is 
wrinkly; It is poached in hot water. 
 
Literal I will tell you what the best way to make a 
gammon is; It is poached in hot water. 
 
Metaphor I seem to always be carrying you around 
everywhere in my arms today; I am your taxi 
today. 
 
Hyperbole I have been giving you a lift everywhere 
today; I am your taxi today. 
 
Literal Hello, are you the man who ordered a lift to 
the airport?  I am your taxi today. 
 
8Metaphor Our new flat had a big silver double fridge; It 
was a monster; a huge one. 
The fridge was much bigger than 
average. 
Hyperbole They found out which dog it was that 
attacked the child; It was a monster; a huge 
one. 
The dog was ferocious and vicious. 
Literal The adventure storybook had one main 
character; It was a monster; a huge one. 
The character in the storybook was a 
big monster. 
Metaphor I can’t take anymore, my confidence has 
gone; It is smashed beyond repair. 
Her confidence has been damaged. 
Hyperbole I won’t be able to keep running because my 
knee is too bad; It is smashed beyond repair. 
Her knee is injured. 
Literal It was a shame that I knocked the jug off the 
table; It is smashed beyond repair. 
The jug is broken into pieces. 
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Metaphor Easter eggs could tempt me from quitting 
chocolate because I love them so much; They 
could be fatal in fact. 
Easter eggs could bring an end to her 
commitment to giving up chocolate. 
Hyperbole Mum, these zits on my face are ruining 
everything; They could be fatal in fact. 
She feels that the zits on her face could 
ruin her life. 
Literal Certain conditions can be very serious if left 
untreated; They could be fatal in fact. 
Some illnesses and diseases end in 
death. 
Metaphor My family have come to be so much like me; 
It is a big mirror now. 
 
Hyperbole I spent so long polishing this vase and 
making it clean; It is a big mirror now. 
 
Literal I have got lots of antiques and my favourite 
one is always changing; It is a big mirror 
now. 
 
Metaphor My husband is too clingy and he is always 
hanging around me; He is a backpack; a 
heavy one as well. 
Her husband is quite needy. 
Hyperbole This new hand bag I have bought is too big. It 
is a backpack; a heavy one as well. 
Her handbag is not small and elegant. 
Literal I have bought something to take my books 
around in. It is a backpack; a heavy one as 
well. 
The backpack has shoulder straps. 
Metaphor Although it isn’t well paid, I am happy with 
my first job; It is scaffolding to get higher up. 
His job is a good starting point. 
Hyperbole Why is that chair still in front of the window? 
It is scaffolding to get higher up. 
The chair is there to stand on. 
Literal They are staining our window so there is 
loads of stuff outside the door; It is 
scaffolding to get higher up. 
The scaffolding is made of metal 
Metaphor He left and took all his love with him; he was 
a thief and nothing less. 
 
Hyperbole My boyfriend was always grabbing the last 
chocolate; he was a thief and nothing less. 
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Literal He grabbed a watch from a shop and didn’t 
pay; he was a thief and nothing less. 
 
Metaphor People walk so fast along Oxford Street in 
London; it is a motorway along there. 
 
Hyperbole Vans go so quickly along our small 
residential street; it is a motorway along 
there. 
 
Literal The easiest way to get there was along the 
new route; it is a motorway along there. 
 
 
3. Filler context sentences, target sentences, and comprehension statements 
 
Context and target sentences Comp statement 
Vegetarians often find it hard to find exciting dishes to cook every 
evening; it can be exhausting and boring. 
 
Telling identical twins apart can be hard but mothers and fathers of 
twins often develop special tactics; it is challenging though. 
Identical twins look the same 
I am forever loosing pens down the backs of sofas, in the bottom of 
bags; I am hopeless these days. 
 
I would quite like to go on holiday to America but it is very expensive; 
I don’t think I can afford it actually. 
She hasn’t got enough money to go to 
America 
Owning a car is expensive and not always necessary when you live in 
a big city like London; it has fantastic public transport these days. 
 
 
My mum and dad are coming to visit this weekend; it will be fun I 
think. 
She is not looking forward to her 
parents visiting. 
There was a shard of glass on the street; It was sharp and dangerous.  
There was an enourmous cake on the table; It was chocolate and rich. Chocolate cake is sweet 
The saucepan was shiney and clean; It is new from the store.  
Apricots can be dried to make a snack; They are delicious and healthy. Dried apricots can’t be eaten. 
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Alison always wears red trousers; they are her favourite piece of 
clothing. 
 
The tiger was wandering around its cage; It was bored and restless. Tigers get more exercise in the wild. 
I always wanted to try different foods when I was young; I was 
adventurous back then. 
 
Happy people always get on better in life; They are ambitious wich 
helps. 
Happy people are more successful than 
sad people 
A bottle of water is easy to carry around; It is light and small.  
The curtains will be drawn at midnight; These are the rules ok. There are no rules about when to draw 
the curtains. 
Having a hood on your coat is imortant when it rains; It is protection 
from the weather. 
 
Children love christmas time because they get presents; It is exciting 
and fun. 
Children hate Christmas because only 
adults get presents. 
Apples are better for you than bananas; They have more vitamins and 
minerals. 
 
Giant ants live in the amazin rainforest; They are insects you know. Giant ants live in England. 
John was never delicate about the way he dealt with people’s worries 
and problems; he was a bulldozer these days. 
John was clumsy and destructive. 
Amy had become so greedy when she was eating; she was a pig back 
then. 
 
Jane was a malicious and unkind in the meeting this afternoon; she 
was witch today. 
Jane is a kind person. 
Helen’s teacher always got angry for no reason and shouted at 
everyone; she was a dragon to the children. 
Helen’s teacher was soft and never got 
angry. 
Mary’s daughter was such a good girl and always helped her do the 
washing; she was an angel and very sweet. 
 
Tim’s new car was very fast and could pull away from traffic lights 
very quickly; it was a rocket which could fly. 
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Alex’s mum was fed up of having to ask him to tidy his room; it was a 
pig sty these days. 
Alex’s room was messy and dirty 
Today was a horrible day from start to finish; it was a nightmare of the 
worst kind. 
 
My new job is so fun and interesting I can hardly believe it; it is a 
dream which isn’t real. 
 
Sarah’s friend was always trying to cheat on the weekly spelling test 
by looking over her shoulder and copying her answers; she was a 
snake for doing that. 
 
Little Matthew was so fast at running that he beat all of the other 
children on sports day; he was a bullet that day. 
Bullets shot from a gun move very 
quickly like Mathew 
Daniel’s life was full of drama, happiness and tragedy; it was a novel 
which was long and complicated. 
 
Sam was a good friend who was always there to support his best 
mates; he was a tree which stood strong. 
Trees are hard and strong which make 
them supportive like Sam 
Thomas’ was so in love with his fiancé and believed she was a rare 
and exceptional woman; she was a diamond to him. 
 
Scott loved to go jogging in the evenings to keep fit and he was 
actually quite fast; he was a cheetah these days. 
Leopards run very slowly. 
Tom can’t wait to replace his old car as it has become a bit rusty and 
unreliable; it is an old tin can these days. 
Old tin cans are rubbish and ugly like 
Tom’s car 
We really need to smarten up and renovate our garden; it is a rubbish 
dump these days. 
Rubbish dumps are attractive and 
beautiful places. 
I hate my school because it is a horrible and depressing building which 
I have to go to every day; it is a prison I would say. 
Prisons are pleasant and give you a 
sense of freedom. 
That little boy that lives next door is a grubby , naughty little thing; he 
is a little rat scurrying around. 
 
I have been looking for that rare copy of that book for so long that I 
can’t belive I have got it now; it is gold in my pocket. 
 
That puddle that has formed in the middle of the playground is huge; it 
is a lake now. 
Lakes are large areas of water. 
	   357 
The cold weather has made the roads so dangerous; it is an ice rink out 
there. 
Ice rinks are slippery. 
I can’t walk up this street with all these shopping bags it is too steep; it 
is a mountain up here. 
 
I can’t believe how tall your dad is; he is a giant man.  
This cup of tea is too hot for me to drink; it is boiling in my mouth. The tea has become too cold 
I can’t believe how cold it is in my bedroom; it is freezing in here.  
I am so tired after such a busy day; I have been racing around too 
much. 
 
Can you make sure you draw the shower curtain next time you shower 
because there is water all over the floor every time you shower; I am 
floating in here. 
 
I felt fitter on my morning jog today; I was sprinting the whole way.  
I managed to jump so high over that log; I flew through the air.  
Your house is so big and spacious; it is a castle in here. The house was very small 
I ran around my usual running route so fast this morning; it was a 
world record I bet. 
 
That cheese on toast was just what I wanted; it was a feast to 
remember. 
 
The car hit me so hard as I was cycling along; I was catapulted through 
the air. 
 
This path is so muddy along here; I am sinking deeper.  The path was very dry 
He was drinking wine out of such a large glass; it was a bucket of 
wine. 
His glass of wine was bigger than the 
average 
There was a woman in the park lying in the sun for so long; she was 
frying out there. 
The woman was not lying in the sun 
long enough to get burnt 
June spent so much time sunbathing when she was young that now 
here skin is very damaged; it is leather now. 
Her skin no longer looks attractive 
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Hannah has become so thin that I am starting to get worried about her; 
she is a skeleton now. 
Hannah is quite fat 
It is so hot in this shop that I am going to have to leave; I am roasting 
in here. 
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E. Experiment 5: Developmental experiment 1 and 2 
 
1. Metaphor and hyperbole stories 
 
Metaphor 1 It’s Sunday afternoon, and Alex is playing outside in the fresh air. Today, Alex is a 
monkey. Can you find the picture in which Alex is a monkey? 
Metaphor 2 This weekend, Harry is going on holiday with his Daddy. Harry’s car has a backpack. 
Can you find the picture in which the car has a backpack? 
Metaphor 3 This weekend, Stephen is going on holiday in his car. They have had to stop because 
Stephen’s car has got a bad foot. Can you find the picture in which the car has a bad 
foot? 
Metaphor 4 It’s Saturday night, and Katy is playing with her toys before bed-time. Katy is a zebra 
playing with her toys.  Can you find the picture in which Katy is a zebra? 
Metaphor 5 This weekend, Emily is staying at her granny’s house. Emily has had a bath and now 
she is a hedgehog. Can you find the picture in which Emily is a hedgehog? 
Metaphor 6 It’s Saturday, and Archie is going to a party. Archie is ready to leave for the party 
and he has a bush on his head. Can you find the picture in which Archie has a bush 
on his head? 
Hyperbole 1 It’s Saturday, and Tom is playing outside in the rain. He is splashing in the lake 
outside of his house. Can you find the picture in which Tom is splashing in the lake 
outside his house? 
Hyperbole 2 This weekend, Jonny has been helping his mummy with the gardening. Now, the 
house is a forest. Can you find the picture in which the house is a forest? 
Hyperbole 3 It is Saturday, and Emma and her daddy are having a picnic. Emma is very thirsty; 
she is drinking a bucket of juice. Can you find the picture in which Emma is drinking 
a bucket of juice? 
Hyperbole 4 This weekend, Danny and his sister are playing in the living room. The sofa is a 
trampoline. Can you find the picture in which the sofa is a trampoline? 
Hyperbole 5 It is Sunday, and Charlotte is putting on her new shoes. Her shoelaces are so difficult; 
they are skipping ropes. Can you find the picture in which Charlotte’s shoelaces are 
skipping ropes? 
Hyperbole 6 This weekend, Jane is playing in the garden with her daddy. Jane is flying through 
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